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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates the impact of personality on decision-making processes and choices in a 
migration context. In this regard, personality is assumed to affect the perception and evaluation of 
costs and returns related to migration. Personality is shaped by individual traits, such as risk attitude 
and time preference. Other relevant aspects are social preferences, the Big-Five personality traits, 
and individual adjustment capability. The research design relies on geo-referenced data, which 
enables a more accurate tracing of migration decisions and the detection of personality-related 
geographic preferences. 
Spatial decision-making processes of prospective academics are the first research topic. It comprises 
various analyses regarding the formation of choice sets in the context of study location choice. 
Contrasting the findings from a preliminary selection stage with those from the final choice 
demonstrates individual traits to be of differing importance in the course of the decision-making 
process. 
Final choices, potentially yielding a migratory event, are subsequently examined in a discrete choice 
framework. This approach facilitates the investigation of the effects of personality on location 
choices in presence of a high-dimensional destination space. Empirical results indicate the relevance 
of complex interactions of individual traits and destination characteristics, e.g., heterogeneous 
deterrence effects of distance or preference-related sorting patterns into more or less favourable 
labour markets. This modelling strategy is also transferred from a student sample to a population-
representative sample, demonstrating its external validity. 
Another topic is the impact of individual traits on the formation of salary expectations for 
prospectively high-skilled workers in various migration scenarios. Individual-specific evaluations of 
mobility-related costs are shown to inflate these salary expectations, and thus, they have the 
potential to lower the overall level of labour mobility in an economy. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkung von Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen auf 
Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse und konkrete Entscheidungen mit Migrationsbezug. In diesem 
Kontext ist anzunehmen, dass Persönlichkeitsaspekte die Wahrnehmung und Bewertung von Kosten 
und Erträgen beeinflussen. Wesentliche Persönlichkeitsbestandteile sind hierbei Risiko-, Zeit- und 
soziale Präferenzen. Weitere bedeutende Faktoren sind die Big-Five Persönlichkeitsmerkmale und 
individuelles Anpassungsvermögen. Das Forschungsdesign baut auf georeferenzierten Daten auf, 
welche ein präziseres Nachvollziehen von Migrationsentscheidungen und das Aufspüren von 
persönlichkeitsbezogenen geografischen Präferenzen ermöglichen.  
Raumbezogene Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse zukünftiger Akademiker sind das erste 
Forschungsthema. Ein wesentlicher Schwerpunkt liegt hierbei auf dem Prozess der Vorauswahl 
möglicher Studienorte. Eine Gegenüberstellung der Ergebnisse in Bezug auf die Vorauswahl und die 
letztendliche Entscheidung zeigt, dass Persönlichkeitsmerkmale eine unterschiedlich starke 
Bedeutung innerhalb des gesamten Entscheidungsfindungsprozesses aufweisen.  
Die endgültige Wahl eines Studienortes, die zu einem Migrationsereignis führen kann, wird 
anschließend mittels eines Discrete-Choice Modells eingehender betrachtet. Ein solcher Ansatz 
ermöglicht eine Untersuchung des Auswahlprozesses bei einer Vielzahl von möglichen Alternativen 
unter Berücksichtigung von Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse deuten auf ein 
komplexes Zusammenspiel von persönlichen und zielspezifischen Charakteristiken hin, z.B. eine 
heterogene Abschreckungswirkung von Distanz sowie persönlichkeitsspezifische Präferenzen in 
Bezug auf eine mehr oder minder vorteilhafte Arbeitsmarktsituation. Um die externe Validität dieser 
Analyse zu demonstrieren wird der analytische Ansatz zudem von einer Studierendenstichprobe auf 
eine bevölkerungsrepräsentative Stichprobe übertragen.  
Ein weiteres Forschungsthema ist der Einfluss von Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen auf die Entwicklung von 
Gehaltserwartungen zukünftiger Hochqualifizierter in verschiedenen Migrationsszenarien. 
Individuelle Bewertungen mobilitätsbezogener Kosten erweisen sich als maßgeblich verantwortlich 
für massiv erhöhte Gehaltserwartungen und haben somit das Potenzial die Arbeitsmobilität 
innerhalb einer Ökonomie erheblich zu senken. 
 
Schlagworte: georeferenzierte Migrationsanalyse, raumbezogene Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse, 
Persönlichkeit 
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1 Main introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Migration is a topic of continuous importance for policy-makers and civil societies alike. Inter-
regional labour mobility can, at least partially, contribute to a reduction in regional disparities 
regarding unemployment rates or income levels (Niebuhr et al., 2012; Ederveen et al., 2007).1 A 
persistent inflow of workers, however, may affect labour market outcomes of native workers 
asymmetrically: native workers at the lower end of the wage distribution may incur adverse wage 
effects whereas those in the upper part may benefit from it (Dustmann et al., 2013). Similarly, low-
educated workers may be geographically displaced, while young highly-educated individuals are 
drawn to regions characterised by higher immigration levels (Mocetti and Porello, 2010).  
Absolute flow numbers, however, are only half the truth: understanding skill-specific sorting patterns 
may be of interest to firms to enhance productivity (Boschma et al., 2009). Resulting productivity 
gains may further be influenced by the origin of high-skilled mobile workers (Timmermans and 
Boschma, 2014). This is also tangible evidence in favour of labour mobility being a highly relevant 
means of knowledge diffusion (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013).  
Student mobility is another important form of mobility to consider. Increasing numbers of students 
temporarily migrating, either to other countries or states, may raise the question with respect to the 
efficient design of the funding system (Delpierre and Verheyden, 2014) or regarding the possibility of 
increasing revenues by attracting non-resident students (Jaquette and Curs, 2015). As inversion of 
the argument, the impact of tuition fees on student mobility or ability-related sorting behaviour can 
be of interest as well (Dwenger et al., 2012). Such geographic sorting patterns eventually affect the 
local labour force’s skill composition (Dotti et al., 2013) and a region’s innovative potential (Faggian 
and McCann, 2006).  
A third important aspect of migration concerns urban planners and local authorities: rising 
populations in metropolitan areas on the one hand, and declining populations in rural areas on the 
other, require a solution concerning the adequate provision of public infrastructure in the future. To 
predict future population dynamics or the impact of policy changes on the micro level, spatial 
microsimulation models are applied. Among other components, these microsimulation approaches 
rely on models of individual or household mobility (cf. Balas et al., 2005; Vencatasawmy et al., 1999), 
yet typically without integrating taste heterogeneity. 
In either case, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms on the individual level behind these 
(temporary) population shifts. In this regard, a variety of different approaches have emerged in the 
discipline of economics over the decades in order to explain the various facets of individual human 
migration. 
                                                          
1
 Within this thesis, the terms ‘migration’ and ‘mobility’ are used interchangeably. Therefore, mobility always has a spatial 
connotation.  
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A most influential approach builds on income maximising agents (Sjaastad, 1962), basing their 
decision on a comparison of costs and returns related to migration. Others are based on Roy (1951) 
and evolve around location-specific returns to skills, i.e., a form of self-selection. Most migration 
models, e.g., gravity models (Leppel, 1993; Lewer and Van den Berg, 2008), account for an adverse 
effect of distance on migration likelihood or migration streams. This distance deterrence effect is 
mostly attributed to uncertainty or psychic costs (Schwartz, 1973), and not necessarily constant 
across socio-economic or socio-demographic groups (Mincer, 1978). A broader perspective of returns 
to migration is provided in the literature on compensating differentials (Graves and Linneman, 1979; 
Clark and Cosgrove, 1991) - utility maximising individuals integrate both location-specific income and 
amenity levels to evaluate migratory scenarios.  
With an increasing availability of household panel data sets, more comprehensive models of 
individual mobility have been explored. Integrating individual factors beyond the standard socio-
economic or socio-demographic factors, such as risk attitude (Jaeger et al., 2010) or Big-Five 
personality traits (Jokela, 2009), has proven to be insightful. Most studies, however, concentrate only 
on one specific individual trait. Typically, this is less a deliberate empirical modelling strategy than 
related to data paucity. 
This dissertation addresses this data scarcity and then investigates mobility-related decision-making 
processes and choices of prospectively high-skilled individuals in light of a wider set of individual 
traits. The available data source furnishes information of individuals’ geographic whereabouts at 
various points in their life. Such a geo-referenced approach not only enables tracing previous 
mobility episodes, but also linking decisions rather precisely to location-specific conditions. 
Eventually, this research examines the heterogeneous effects of subjectively perceived costs, e.g., 
psychic costs, and returns on the decision-making process at various stages within the selection of a 
study location. Another focus rests on the influence of individual traits on choices in a high-
dimensional destination space, and hence accounts for complex decisions in a spatial context. This 
research additionally considers how individual traits may affect the design of incentives to induce 
labour mobility. Considering all of the above, this research contributes to the understanding of 
geographic sorting patterns of high-skilled individuals and the heterogeneous impact of personality-
related evaluations on migration outcomes. At the same time, some consistent findings suggest 
potential measures on how to foster mobility of high-skilled individuals. 
1.2 Synopsis 
This thesis title clearly defines the fundamental requirements to be fulfilled in order for any data set 
to be used in this research. For one, it has to provide detailed information on individual 
characteristics like personality traits and preferences. In addition, the data should furnish 
information on the decision-making process itself, e.g., what alternatives have been explicitly 
considered and when. And last, in order to conduct an analysis in a spatial context, geographic 
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reference points have to be available – only this allows accounting for location-specific features, 
which may also be relevant for the decision-making process.  
Eventually, none of the available data sets allowed analyses on the level of detail necessary to 
answer the underlying research questions to the designated extent. In order to remedy this 
drawback, a survey on “Mobility, Expectations, Self-Assessment and Risk Attitude of Students” 
(Weisser, 2016a) was conducted. This survey is this thesis’ main data source and therefore 
introduced in Chapter 2. Beyond a discussion of methodological and implementation aspects, this 
chapter also establishes the concept of geo-referenced mobility measurement and presents a 
descriptive survey overview.   
Chapter 3 investigates the mobility inclination and observed geographic mobility of prospective high-
skilled labour force participants at a transitional point in early adulthood. More precisely, this 
chapter examines how university entrants generate, in a first step, their initial choice set 
encompassing their most preferred alternative study locations. The analytical approach accounts for 
two dimensions in the choice set formation process: one relates to the choice set’s scope, i.e., the 
number of alternative applications. The other addresses the degree of geographic dispersion of 
included alternatives in relation to an individual’s origin, and consequently informs about a basic 
mobility inclination. 
Individual traits, such as personality traits and time preferences display a high relevance regarding 
the size of the choice set: least patient individuals are found to form distinctly smaller initial choice 
sets, as do the least extraverted. Personality traits are also found to impose a certain geographic 
restriction on the considered alternatives in this set: individuals, who are least extraverted and least 
open to experience exhibit a noteworthy preference for alternatives closer to the familiar living 
environment. Moving to a more distant destination would especially evoke high (psychic) costs for 
these individuals. There is also evidence linking risk-aversion and impatience to an initial choice set 
consisting of alternatives clustered around the origin. 
Contrasting the initial choice set formation stage with the realisation stage, a divergence between a 
basic inclination towards mobility and factual behaviour can be observed: a decision-maker’s 
patience is only informative in the initial stage. The Big-Five trait agreeableness, related to trust, 
proves in turn only significant in the realisation stage when actual choices among a small number of 
alternatives are to be made. 
Acknowledging the divergence between individuals’ initial considerations and their final choices in a 
spatial context, Chapter 4 is dedicated to an analysis of complex decision processes in a high-
dimensional destination space. The two pivotal research questions are how subjective evaluations 
affect students’ location choices in presence of a plethora of potential destinations and how 
unobserved restrictions or inappropriate information sets may affect empirical answers to the first 
question. The second question is directly related to the sensitivity of random utility models regarding 
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a misspecification of the underlying choice sets, i.e., what an analyst assumes to be the relevant 
destination space. Another critical aspect in the analysis of discrete (location) choices is a potential 
supply side restriction: observed choices, potentially leading to a migratory event, might only be 
imperfectly mirroring actual preferences if an admission process restricted the individual choice set 
further. 
In order to evaluate the impact of insufficient information about the individual choice process - 
potentially resulting in an imprecise choice set definition - and general forms of misspecification in a 
conditional logit model, a simulation study is performed. This simulation mimics the real-world: not 
only do individuals consider choice sets of varying size, but their final choice set can also be restricted 
by unsuccessful applications, while both aspects are related to individual characteristics. 
Simulation results demonstrate that estimates of individual choices in a demand and supply driven 
framework are sensitive with respect to the imposed information sets. Results tend to be distinctly 
biased if the choice set is defined too narrowly. Estimates are more precise if information on other, 
explicitly considered but eventually not chosen, alternatives is integrated.  
Within the empirical analysis, spatial choices of beginning students have been shown to be distinctly 
influenced by urban characteristics, labour market conditions, and quality of life. The novelty of this 
research comes from demonstrating that these regional characteristics are valued differently across 
individuals, depending upon their personality and preferences: the most patient individuals are more 
likely to select a location offering better employment perspectives for high-skilled workers or higher 
potential income levels. The appeal of such labour market conditions, however, diminishes drastically 
if the distance to a potential destination increases. Price levels and population density exert a 
deterring effect which also fades over distance.  
The relevance of interactions of location-specific conditions and individual characteristics has been 
proven to be robust. Moreover, the interaction of distance and personality attributes has revealed 
that the distance deterrence effect is not constant in an otherwise rather homogeneous population 
of prospective academics: perceived subjective costs and returns to mobility do not evenly increase 
in distance, but relative to individual traits and preferences. 
The analyses of choices in a spatial context in Chapter 3 and 4 are based on a student sample, which 
offers an adequate leverage point to scrutinise complex decision patterns in rich behavioural models. 
A valid concern relates to a potential lack of external validity of the previous findings. This issue is 
concisely addressed in Chapter 5, which also illustrates the heavy trade-off between sample size and 
a richer behavioural modelling approach in population-representative data. 
Using a specific geocoded data set from the German Socio-Economic Panel, this chapter investigates 
residential moving patterns and location choices of working-age decision-makers in the general 
population. The empirical findings emphasise the relevance of individual traits and preferences for 
analyses of spatial decision-making processes. Applying a similar modelling strategy as in Chapter 4, 
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household mobility in the general population has been shown to follow similar patterns as student 
mobility. The further someone moved in the past, the more likely this person will choose a more 
distant destination in the future. There are also complex sorting patterns, for instance, according to 
which risk-averse individuals are reluctant to choose a destination afflicted by higher levels of 
unemployment. Yet concurrently, these individuals have a distinct preference to sort themselves into 
regional labour markets with a potentially more productive labour force, as indicated by a larger 
share of high-skilled workers. 
Having shown that labour market characteristics can be already relevant at an early stage, i.e., 
university location choice, Chapter 6 casts a glance on potential post-graduation migration behaviour 
of the future high-skilled workers.  
Pivotal points in this approach are expected mobility premiums which are sufficient to tip the scales 
in favour of moving to a geographically distinct location in four scenarios, i.e., interstate versus cross-
border mobility and on-the-job search versus job search from unemployment. Investigating the 
overall distribution of ex ante premiums of future graduates has two major advantages: on the one 
hand, this approach proves to be directly informative about salary expectations (and potential 
mismatches in various scenarios) of the future entrants into the high-skilled labour market segment. 
On the other hand, this empirical strategy does not only integrate successful matches, as is typically 
observed in labour market data. Eventually, this approach is more informative with respect to factors 
inflating costs of mobility in a way that hardly any labour mobility occurs. 
The mobility premiums are first derived within a theoretical model, accounting not only for location-
specific amenity levels or labour market conditions, but also for heterogeneous personality and 
preference parameters. The derived hypotheses demonstrate that in presence of psychic costs or 
heterogeneous preferences, expected mobility premiums can remain positive even in an 
unemployment scenario.  
The empirical approach, employing ordinary least squares and simultaneous quantile regressions, 
identifies social preferences and time preferences as the relevant factors regarding the formation of 
salary expectations. Moreover, the observed mobility premium further increases for individuals who 
perceive a specific migration path as especially risky. 
Previous mobility experiences, in contrast, seem to act as dampening factors on expected mobility 
premiums. Individuals with international experience, who are more familiar with a changing 
environment and more likely to have devised adjustment strategies, expect distinctly smaller 
mobility premiums. Most importantly, this not only holds for cross-border scenarios but also for 
interstate labour mobility scenarios. An interesting implication of this finding is that labour mobility 
seems to be learnable to some extent. 
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2 Introduction to the main data source and the concept of geo-
referenced mobility measurement 
This chapter introduces the survey on “Mobility, Expectations, Self-Assessment and Risk Attitude of 
Students” (MESARAS 2013; Weisser, 2016a), which is also the major data source for subsequent 
econometric analyses of prospectively highly-qualified individuals’ migration behaviour. In addition 
to an illustration of the survey’s conceptual background, the survey design along with the sample’s 
representativeness is discussed. Another subchapter is dedicated to a brief introduction to the 
concept to geo-referenced mobility measurement and its limitations. This chapter concludes with a 
presentation of the most essential descriptive findings from the survey, which serve as starting 
points for subsequent econometric analyses.  
2.1 Presentation of the main data source: MESARAS 2013  
2.1.1 Conceptual background 
The MESARAS-survey has been conducted to provide information on a variety of individual traits and 
preferences in the context of detailed geo-referenced mobility events of prospectively highly-
qualified individuals. In this regard, the mobility event of primary interest is the choice of a university 
location, yet previous mobility experiences are recorded as well. In either case, each mobility event 
can be assessed in a precise manner, i.e., as moving from one specific postal code area to another. 
Instead of being restricted to interpreting migration outcomes as a binary stay/move decision, 
individual mobility can be quantified based on covered distance.  
Most importantly, the choice of a study location is for most respondents the first autonomous 
migration-related decision in their life. The observed outcome should thus reveal their preferences. 
At the same time, this decision, which occurs years before a future university graduate enters the 
primary labour market, is already indicative of subsequent migration behaviour (Perry, 2001; Groen, 
2004; Busch and Weigert, 2010). 
Hence, by linking detailed information on geo-referenced student mobility to individual 
characteristics and preferences, the survey enables an in-depth analysis of the actual decision-
making processes in the context of internal migration. A special emphasis rests on personality traits, 
such as the Big-Five, risk attitude and time preferences which are usually not jointly available.2  
To obtain an even more precise picture of such heterogeneous decision-making processes, the 
survey does explicitly address considered alternatives during the application stage and the final 
decision stage. This offers the opportunity to investigate first the formation of choice sets (Chapter 3) 
                                                          
2
 To a certain extent, these aspects are also covered by the German Socio-Economic Panel. Personality traits or time 
preferences, however, are not elicited on a yearly basis, but with a gap of several years. Considering the relatively low 
number of mobility events per year, the sample size may dwindle to a few hundred. This can be seen, for instance, in 
Chapter 5. 
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and in a second analytical step the final location choice (Chapter 4), both being contingent upon 
individual traits. Going one step further, the survey also offers some insights into individuals’ 
inclination towards future mobility: conditional on varying labour market and migration scenarios, 
expected wage premiums to induce mobility can be investigated (Chapter 6). 
Another merit of the MESARAS-data is that the chosen geo-referenced anchor points, i.e., postal 
code areas, enable accounting for local conditions in the decision-making processes as well. 
Individual migration-related decisions can thus be analysed in the context of internal and external 
factors alike. 
2.1.2 Implementation mode 
The survey had been conducted in October 2013, covering the first weeks of the winter term in the 
academic year 2013/2014. The economics and management departments of seven adjacent 
universities in three Federal States (Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and North-Rhine-Westphalia) 
participated: Bielefeld University (UBF), Clausthal University of Technology (TUC), TU Dortmund 
University (TDO), Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg (MLU), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
Universität Hannover (LUH), University of Münster (WWU) and Otto von Guericke University 
Magdeburg (OVG).3 
These seven universities offer various economics undergraduate programmes with a substantial 
degree of thematic overlap in the curriculum. In a narrow sense, these economics programmes 
comprise Business Studies (BWL), Economic Studies (VWL), International Management (IM) and 
Economics and Business (Wiwi). Similar programmes, also including a substantial curriculum related 
to economics, are Business Informatics (Winf), Engineering Economics (Wing) and Economic Policy 
Journalism (Wipol. Jour.). 
The reasons for choosing beginning students in an undergraduate economics study programme as 
the primary target group were threefold: beginning students in general, most likely enrolled for the 
first time, would have recently made a mostly autonomous mobility-related decision. Decision-
relevant factors can therefore still be recalled. Second, the above-mentioned economics 
programmes in a narrow sense are available at almost all universities in Germany. Thus, observed 
location choices are not driven by the lack of actual alternatives, as might be the case for highly 
specialised study subjects. Instead, students could choose from a large number of potential 
destinations, all providing a rather homogeneous academic curriculum. Furthermore, students 
selecting themselves into these programmes are a relatively homogeneous group, characterised by a 
general interest in economic processes. Third and last, high enrolment figures in these programmes 
are indicative of potentially large sub-samples of student migrants. For analytical purposes, a 
substantial share of mobile individuals is required. 
                                                          
3
 The introduced abbreviations may or may not coincide with official abbreviations. 
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To ensure high participation rates, the unincentivised paper-based survey (Figure A2.1 in the 
appendix) has been directly implemented into the first month’s programme: either into the 
departments’ official orientation week for beginning students or into introductory lectures. Apart 
from the departments’ heads, only the organisers of the orientation week or the respective lecturers 
knew beforehand about the survey. Due to the integration into the regular programme, participants 
did not incur additional costs of participation. This fostered accessibility and completion rates (Table 
2.1).4 
Table 2.1: Survey participation in the primary target group 
  participants participants  
(primary target group) 
accessibility 
rate 
completion 
rate 
UBF Bielefeld 191 181 (203) 89.2 % 97.2 % 
TUC Clausthal 68 67 (218) 30.7 % 99.1 % 
TDO Dortmund 408 348 (423) 82.3 % 98.0 % 
MLU Halle 518 399 (577) 69.2 % 97.8 % 
LUH Hannover 299 297 (520) 57.1 % 96.2 % 
OVG Magdeburg 396 373 (501) 74.5 % 98.5 % 
WWU Münster 709 643 (937) 68.6 % 97.8 % 
Total  2589 2308 (3379) 68.3 % 97.7 % 
Note: Numbers in brackets are official matriculation numbers. 
More than two thirds of the corresponding population of beginning students enrolled in an 
economics bachelor programme participated in the survey. Simultaneously, the chosen 
implementation mode ensured extremely high completion rates.  
2.1.3 Sample overview and representativeness 
In the end, the primary target group comprised 2308 respondents in total. Amongst these, 91 % were 
enrolled in an economics-only programme, while the remaining nine percent were students with an 
economics-related major. 
As the median age of 19 years (Table 2.2) suggests, the majority of respondents in the primary target 
group enrolled immediately after graduating from school. 44 % of the participants were female and 
16 % of all respondents had previously already completed a vocational education. Most of these 
vocational degrees have been obtained in the sectors of banking and finance, industry and 
commerce. 
Table 2.2: Socio-demographic characteristics of the primary target group 
 n mean median min  max 
age (years) 2298 20.04 19 17 45 
gender (female=1) 2308 0.44    
grade of university entry certificate (UEC) 2256 2.37 2.4 1.0 4.0 
university semester enrolled 2110 1.29 1 1 21 
completed vocational training (yes=1) 2302 0.16    
Approximately three out of four respondents applied for economics at other universities as well 
(Table 2.3). One third of the students also expressed a certain interest in non-economic programmes 
at other universities. 37.7 % eventually chose the study location which, to their knowledge, was the 
closest one. 
                                                          
4
 The accessibility rate is defined as the ratio of the number of participating students from the primary target group and the 
total number of matriculated students in the primary target group. The completion rate is defined as average number of 
answered items in the primary target group in relation to the total number of main items (111). 
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Table 2.3: Alternative study plans and preferences 
 n mean  
application for economics programme at other universities (yes=1) 2306 0.737 
application for other programmes at other universities (yes=1) 2294 0.340 
current programme is the most preferred one (yes=1) 2301 0.851 
current university is the most preferred one (yes=1) 2301 0.747 
current university is the closest one (yes=1) 2294 0.377 
 
20 % of all respondents applied for only one programme at one university. Two thirds mentioned 
that both university and study programme were their most preferred alternatives. 
Table 2.4 reveals that there are gender-related sorting patterns concerning the selection of study 
programmes and destinations: whereas the share of female students in the business studies at WWU 
is close to 50 %, the corresponding share at MLU and OVG is 40 % or below. Such gender-specific 
patterns regarding the selection of universities and programmes are typically adequately mirrored in 
the survey samples. This congruence points to a substantial degree of representativeness of the 
MESARAS-data. For smaller sub-samples, i.e., programmes with lower total enrolment numbers or 
referring to enrolment of students from abroad, some deviations can be observed.  
Table 2.4: Sample characteristics for the primary target group, by university and programme 
university  study 
programme 
n  share (%) of 
female 
students  
 mean age  
(in years) 
 share (%) of 
students from 
abroad 
UBF Bielefeld Wiwi 181 (203)  40.3  (38.4)  19.9 (-)  1.7 (4.4) 
TUC Clausthal BWL 58 (124)  31.0 (30.6)   21.5 (-)  5.2 (13.7) 
 WIng 9 (95)  33.3 (23.2)  20.0 (-)  0 (20.0) 
TDO 
 
Dortmund Wiwi 334 (404)  50.0 (47.5)  20.0 (20)  2.7 (7.7) 
 Wipol. Jour. 14 (19)  35.7 (36.8)  20.1 (20)  0 (5.3) 
MLU 
 
Halle BWL 280 (351)  42.5 (39.6)  20.1 (20.4)  1.8 (1.4) 
 VWL 33 (41)  12.1 (14.6)  20.7 (21.4)  0 (0) 
 Wiwi 85 (156)  47.1 (50.0)  20.4 (20.9)  2.4 (1.3) 
 WInf 1 (29)  0 (13.8)  18 (22.1)  0 (3.5) 
LUH Hannover Wiwi see Table 2.5 
OVG 
 
Magdeburg BWL 204 (270)  38.7 (35.9)  19.9 (-)  1.0 (6.3) 
 IM 101 (119)  71.3 (70.6)  19.5 (-)  0 (7.6) 
 VWL 68 (112)  35.3 (37.5)  20.3 (-)  1.5 (4.5) 
WWU Münster BWL 437 (617)  51.3 (48.5)  19.9 (20.55)  3.2 (4.4) 
  VWL 107 (167)  29.9 (26.3)  19.7 (20.2)  4.7 (3.6) 
  WInf 99 (153)  26.9 (17.6)  19.5 (20.2)  6.1 (8.5) 
Full sample 2308 (3379)  44.1    20.0   2.7  
Note: Numbers in brackets report respective population figures (if available), derived from universities’ official 
matriculation data. 
Drawing on more detailed administrative data, representativeness can be evaluated more precisely 
for the LUH-sample. This sample is characterised by a medium sample size and a relatively low 
accessibility rate, both increasing the likelihood that analyses based on this sample might only 
provide a distorted picture of the underlying population. In fact, a certain deviation in the share of 
female students can be observed (Table 2.5). Aside from this difference, mean age, the share of 
students from abroad and the average grade of the university entrance certificate (UEC) are hardly 
distinguishable across the MESARAS-sample and the population at LUH. Applying a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distributions leads to a clear non-rejection of the null hypothesis: there 
are no significant distributional differences between the sample and the population data for age and 
                                                          
5
 Age was provided as 2013 minus year of birth. This leads to a slight overestimation of the average age for October 2013. 
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UEC grades. This result is reassuring, considering that individual educational achievement might be 
perceived as sensitive information, which introduces the risk of deliberate misreporting. 
Table 2.5: Comparison between the MESARAS-sample and the population of the primary target group at LUH 
 n share (%) of  
female students 
mean age  
(in years) 
share (%) of 
students from 
abroad 
mean grade  
of UEC 
sample 297 46.13  20.30 2.37 2.49 
population 520 41.35 20.36 2.88 2.50 
KS (p-value)   1.000  0.966 
Note: For continuous variables, the exact p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (𝐻0: equality of distributions) 
is reported. 
Self-reported socio-demographic characteristics in the survey display a substantial degree of 
consistency between university-specific samples and corresponding populations. In light of high 
accessibility and overall questionnaire completion rates, the MESARAS-data can be assumed to be 
reasonably representative in order to serve as a foundation for subsequent econometric analyses. 
2.2 Geo-referenced mobility measurement 
Mobility events are identified as changing the centre of one’s life from one small-scale spatial unit to 
another. The primary analytical units are the postal code areas where the individuals graduated from 
school. For one, these spatial units have been chosen for reasons of memorability. Moreover, whilst 
these locations plausibly functioned as social hubs, where young adults interacted with their peers, 
they were either identical or in very close proximity to actual places of residence. Thus, these specific 
locations are natural geo-referenceable anchor points. Figure 2.1 depicts the geographic distribution 
of origins of the primary target sample. 
Figure 2.1: Geographic dispersion and relevance of origins 
 
Note: ‘Frequency of origins’ refers to the number of students who 
originated from a specific postal code area and enrolled at any 
among the seven included universities (labelled ‘destinations’). 
Chapter 2   11 
 
   
 
 
Whereas the universities in Bielefeld, Dortmund and Hannover mainly have a local or regional 
catchment area, the study locations Halle, Magdeburg and Muenster have been chosen more 
frequently by students from all over the country (Figure A2.2 in the appendix). The overall sample 
thus includes a substantial number of individuals, who actually exhibit a pronounced degree of 
mobility. 
2.2.1 Measuring mobility based on geo-referenced data 
Within the survey framework, participants have been repeatedly asked to report the respective 
postal code corresponding to a geographic anchor point, e.g., birthplace or other relevant locations 
during their life.6 Changing postal codes allows identifying mobility events and the calculation of 
covered distances, with the latter being a proxy for costs of mobility.  
Each postal code corresponds to a specific postal code area. In a predominantly rural area, such a 
postal code area may comprise several small towns. In the case of metropolitan areas, a single postal 
code area may just represent a city district. Using geographic information systems (GIS) data, 
reported postal code areas can be further defined based on the set of geographic coordinates, which 
constitutes an area’s boundaries. Each postal code area can thus be represented by one or several 
polygons, where the respective corner points are exactly defined by their geographic longitude and 
latitude. Figure 2.2 presents schematics of the two postal code areas Vechta (left) and Hannover-City 
(right).  
Figure 2.2: Graphical example for centroid-based distance calculations 
 
 
The points 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 denote the two areas’ centroids, which are the arithmetic mean of all 
coordinate points actually included in the respective postal code area. Calculating the distance 𝑑 
between these two centroids yields a measure of average distance between the two corresponding 
spatial units. In this example, distance 𝑑 amounts to 106.865 kilometres. 
Without knowing the exact address of an individual, this centroid-based distance provides a rather 
precise measure of individual mobility. To foster precision furthermore, this geographic distance is 
                                                          
6
 If the postal code was unknown, city and state (country) were adequate substitutes. 
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calculated as distance on the WGS 84 reference ellipsoid.7 This accounts for the fact that the earth is 
not a perfect sphere, but an ellipsoid, which amplifies its relevance the further away from the 
equator the coordinates under considerations are. 
2.2.2 Limits of precision and alternative measurement concepts 
The proposed centroid-based distance measure allows tracking mobility rather accurately, yet it has 
its limitations as well: as Figure 2.2 indicates, it is most unlikely that an individual actually lived at 𝐶1 
and moved exactly to an address situated at 𝐶2. Referring to the two extreme cases in the above 
depicted scenario, a person might cover 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 115.436 or just 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 98.249 km.  
In either case, possible maximum deviations 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 tend to be much smaller in metropolitan areas 
with smaller postal code areas.8 Any resulting localisation error 𝜀 will be in the interval 
[−𝑟1 − 𝑟2, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2]. Eventually, 𝐸[𝜀] ≈ 0 will prevail for the whole sample and evenly populated 
areas. 
Consequently, the distance measure 𝑑 is most precise for moves within a metropolitan area or from 
one highly urbanised and densely populated region to another. In these cases, the maximum possible 
deviation will be in the range of several hundred meters. Highest measurement errors result for 
moves between large postal code areas in less urbanised areas, if both origin and destination were 
located on (an extension of) line 𝑑. Larger postal code areas in rural regions, however, are also 
sparsely inhabited. This in turn lowers the likelihood of someone actually residing on the fringe, and 
thereby decreases the probability of maximum localisation error occurrences. 
A second limitation originates from the earth’s shape: geographic surface features, i.e., mountains 
and valleys, lead to a deviation from the perfect ellipsoid assumption. The actual distance to be 
covered in order to move from location 𝐶1 to 𝐶2 is depicted in blue in Figure 2.3. Yet, the applied 
algorithm calculates 𝑑 as the distance between 𝐶1
′ and 𝐶2, following the curvature of the reference 
ellipsoid (black dotted curve). Using this algorithm to assess migration patterns in Germany, where 
maximum geographic distances remain below 1000 km, and considering topographical circumstances 
as well, the resulting approximation error remains in the range of some dozen meters.  
Aggregate measurement errors, either caused by the localisation error in the centroid concept or due 
to the approximation error, will typically remain in the range of several hundred meters up to one-
figure kilometres. To assess geographic mobility in a medium sized country, obtained measures 
based on postal code area’s centroids yield a sufficiently precise distance measure. 
  
                                                          
7
 WGS 84 is the World Geodetic System standard, defined in 1984, which assumes a reference ellipsoid with an equatorial 
radius of 6378.137 kilometres and a flattening ratio of 298.257 (NIMA, 2000). Distance calculations have been performed in 
Stata 14.1, relying on the geodist-command. Centroids’ coordinates have been derived based on imported GIS-data (using 
the Stata command shp2dta), providing geographic coordinates of polygons defining postal code areas. The original GIS-
data was downloaded as Public Domain data (Metaspatial, 2013). 
8
 For the metropolitan postal code area in Hannover, the observed maximum deviation is 𝑟1 = 1.565 km; for the less 
urbanised postal code area Vechta the corresponding figure amounts to 𝑟2 = 7.737 km. 
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Figure 2.3: Measurement error due to topographical deviations 
 
Note: The black dotted curve represents the reference ellipsoid; the 
blue curve illustrates a topographical deviation. 
 
A third potential drawback of using simple geographic distances refers to a lesser extent to the 
calculation procedure than to the perception of distance by decision-makers. Mobility-related costs 
are not necessarily determined by the shortest distance between an origin and a destination, but 
plausibly related to actual travel conditions, such as the road network. Depending on topographical 
features of the landscape, such as mountains or rivers, road distance may drastically differ from 
simple geographic distance. At the same time, travelling on a highway from one metropolitan area to 
another located at a distance of 100 kilometres will most likely be less time consuming than 
travelling the same distance on a country road. This points to two alternative distance measures, 
namely road distance and travel time.  
Another argument favouring these two alternative measures is the process of information acquisition 
and processing. If a decision-maker assesses means and costs of transportation between two 
locations, he or she will possibly extend the information search to the internet and not stick to ad-
hoc heuristics. In such a case, routing tools typically provide information on both road distance and 
expected travel time. 
In order to investigate subsequent analyses’ robustness with respect to the applied distance 
concepts, I introduce alternative distance concepts from the so-called reachability-model provided 
by the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs, and Spatial Development (BBSR). 
Reference postal code areas are matched to one of over 11000 municipal or traffic cells from the 
reachability-model. For each observed mobility event, i.e., moving from one postal code area to 
another, road distance and travel time (in minutes) are thus made available as well. 
The degree of correlation between geographic distance and road distance is extremely high, as the 
left panel in Figure 2.4 illustrates. The slope coefficient of the depicted regression line (red, constant 
omitted) amounts to 1.2071: irrespective of the overall travel distance, for every kilometre as the 
bird flies one has to travel 1.2 kilometres on roads. This strong correlation is directly related to the 
fine-meshed road network in Germany, which averts the necessity to take frequent detours.  
The right panel illustrates the connection between geographic distance and travel time (on roads). 
The straight red line corresponds to the regression line from a linear regression; the curved line 
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originates from a regression of travel time on geographic distance and its squared term. The slope 
coefficient of 0.8264 in the purely linear case implies that it takes on average 50 seconds on a road to 
cover one kilometre of geographic distance. For shorter distances, the model including a squared 
distance term displays a better fit. This corresponds to short-distance journeys taking place mainly 
within urban or metropolitan areas, thereby preventing reaching higher speed levels, which would 
have been otherwise possible on the highway in case of longer rides.  
Figure 2.4: The conjunction of time and space 
 
Note: All distance concepts refer to distances between individuals’ origin and chosen university location. The 
sample comprises those 2208 individuals in the primary target group, for whom an explicit postal code area of 
origin in Germany could be identified.  
 
If individuals pay special attention to travel time, which can be perceived as high opportunity costs of 
mobility, analytical results might notably differ compared to results based on simple geographic or 
road distance. To assess this issue, results’ robustness regarding the underlying cost of mobility 
concept will be investigated in some of the subsequently performed analyses. 
2.3 Descriptive findings on student mobility 
The MESARAS-data offers at the descriptive level a variety of insights, which point towards avenues 
for further research. This paragraph presents some stylised facts, whereas a more complete 
documentation is provided in the project report (Weisser, 2016b). 
Scrutinising the observed degree of mobility, which is measured as geographic distance between 
origin and chosen study location, no obvious gender-specific patterns emerge (Table 2.6). Female 
students typically came from further away to study at WWU, as compared to their male peers. The 
opposite was the case for students at MLU. 
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Table 2.6: Gender-specific differences in mobility 
  gender n mean 
distance 
median 
distance 
KS  
(p-value) 
UBF Bielefeld male (m) 106 31.9 24.0 0.844 
 female (f) 71 36.9 24.9 
TUC Clausthal m 44 156.0 178.8 0.583 
 f 19 117.8 85.6 
TDO Dortmund m 170 42.7 21.8 0.007*** 
 f 165 43.9 32.2 
MLU Halle m 220 153.1 130.3 0.070* 
 f 157 130.7 110.3 
LUH Hannover m 157 60.5 32.6 0.479 
 f 127 58.3 39.2 
OVG Magdeburg m 189 171.3 125.7 0.062* 
 f 171 144.2 106.2 
WWU Münster m 351 101.7 78.4 0.023** 
 f 260 115.4 94.6 
Full sample m 1.236 104.1 63.9 0.226 
f 969 97.6 65.0  
Note: The exact p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (𝐻0: equality of 
distributions for male and female students’ mobility) is reported. 
Irrespective of gender, some universities mainly attracted local students, whereas other universities 
were selected by students from all German states. If students with a similar interest in a specific 
study programme make such distinct location choices, the decision-making process has to be 
influenced by some other heterogeneous preferences or individual traits.  
Figure 2.5: Willingness to take risks in general for students at UBF and MLU, by gender 
  
  
Note: 𝜇 indicates the corresponding mean. 
One potentially relevant trait could be individual willingness to take risks: more risk-averse 
individuals might perceive the costs of going to a remote and unknown destination to be much 
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higher than risk-loving individuals would. Consequently, rational individuals least willing to take risk 
would opt for a closer alternative. Figure 2.5 exemplifies this for the subsamples of male and female 
students at UBF and MLU, for whom the observed degrees of mobility were especially low or high, 
respectively. 
In both subsamples, male students reported to be significantly more willing to take risks (on a 11-
point scale) than their female fellow students. In addition, women enrolled at MLU displayed on 
average a risk attitude comparable to men enrolled at UBF. Seen in the context of overall higher 
degrees of mobility of students enrolled at MLU, this points to the existence of geographic sorting 
patterns according to individual risk attitude. For the full sample, Figure 2.6 demonstrates subjective 
risk perception to be an important aspect in the context of interstate migration. 
Figure 2.6: Mobility and subjective risk assessment of an interstate move 
 
This claim is supported by the results reported in Table 2.7: for both risk domains, referring to the 
willingness to take risks in general or in the career domain, the group of most risk-averse individuals 
opted on average for a much closer alternative than the most risk-loving individuals. Complementary 
to that, those respondents most willing to bear present costs for the sake of future returns are also 
the most mobile group. In the context of choosing a study location, inseparably associated with an 
investment in human capital, most patient individuals may plausibly enlarge their choice set by 
including more distant alternatives. 
Table 2.7: Covered distance, by risk attitude and patience 
 trait categorisation 
 low 
(score < 𝜇 − 𝜎) 
medium 
(𝜇 − 𝜎 ≤ score 
≤ 𝜇 + 𝜎) 
high 
(score > 𝜇 + 𝜎) 
willingness to take risks  
(in general) 
83.62 99.28 108.25 
willingness to take risks  
(career domain) 
87.93 96.26 106.51 
willingness to bear present costs  
for future returns (patience) 
92.50 94.64 115.74 
Note: Reported figures are mean geographic distances in kilometres. The trait categorisations are based 
on a standardised version of the underlying scale variable. 𝜇 denotes the mean of this underlying 
variable; 𝜎 is the standard deviation.  
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Investigating mobility outcomes conditional on previous mobility experiences highlights notable 
differences as well. The more frequently someone moved during school, the larger on average the 
observed degree of mobility (Table 2.8). Considering that such a move during childhood or youth is 
initiated by parental decisions, its ramification regarding a first autonomous mobility-related decision 
is remarkable.  
Table 2.8: Observed mobility and previous mobility experiences 
  n geographic distance 
(km) 
 road distance 
(km) 
 travel time 
(minutes) 
   mean median  mean median  mean median 
residential changes 
during school 
not once 1693 97.1 62.3  117.1 75.3  88.1 65.5 
once 299 108.5 63.4  131.3 77.9  95.1 65.4 
twice 117 121.9 76.2  147.1 91.5  105.1 73.2 
three times 54 127.0 83.0  153.8 104.3  110.6 80.3 
more than three times 36 130.2 117.8  154.5 142.1  110.5 98.4 
           
school exchange 
participation 
no 1482 94.34 56.9  113.7 69.2  85.6 60.2 
yes 717 115.4 76.6  139.4 92.4  101.9 78.1 
           
stay abroad  
(> 1 month) 
no 1703 89.9 55.6  108.4 66.9  82.7 58.4 
yes 497 140.1 110.2  169.0 133.84  119.0 99.3 
 
Participation in a school exchange programme or an extended stay abroad, i.e., events which have 
been at least partially under the volitional control of respondents, are also precursors of a more 
pronounced degree of mobility around university admittance. This prevails on application of any 
distance concept whatsoever. Previous mobility experiences, induced by external parental decisions 
or a possibly intrinsic motivation, seem to increase the individual capability of adjusting to new 
circumstances. This may lower the expected costs of mobility, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
someone selecting a more distant and less familiar destination. 
Respondents were also asked to state how far they were willing to move in different scenarios: one 
referring to realising higher income perspectives and the other to increase employment perspectives 
in case of unemployment (Table 2.9). 
Table 2.9: Willingness to move in varying scenarios, by willingness to take risks 
scenario higher income perspectives  better employment perspectives in case of 
unemployment 
 low willingness 
to take risks 
medium 
willingness to 
take risks 
high willingness 
to take risks 
 low willingness 
to take risks 
medium 
willingness to 
take risks 
high willingness 
to take risks 
not at all 1.85% 1.13% 1.24%  5.82% 7.25% 8.61% 
within the state 13.72% 8.41% 5.79%  13.49% 9.54% 7.38% 
to another state 44.06% 38.16% 31.4%  40.21% 38.96% 27.51% 
to another European country 24.54% 27.08% 22.73%  23.54% 23.72% 23.77% 
to another country outside Europe 15.83% 25.22% 38.84%  16.93% 20.54% 30.74% 
observations 379 1237 242  378 1227 244 
Pearson 𝝌𝟐 52.8771  27.6140 
prob > 𝝌𝟐 0.0000  0.0010 
Note: The medium willingness to take risk category comprises all individuals rating themselves in the interval [𝜇 − 𝜎, 𝜇 + 𝜎]. Pearson 
𝜒2 tests the independence of columns and rows. Percentages are calculated by columns.  
Across the two scenarios, the share of individuals willing to move to the most distant destination 
increases with their willingness to take risks. For higher income perspectives, 15.8 % of the most risk-
averse respondents consider moving to another country outside of Europe. This fraction increases to 
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38.8 % in the group of the most risk loving individuals. It can also be observed that a non-negligible 
fraction of respondents does not consider moving at all, even if this could result in better 
employment perspectives when unemployed. This fraction increases with a rise in an individual’s risk 
attitude from 5.8 % to 8.6 %. 
This raises several interesting questions, such as whether unemployed immobile workers are indeed 
suffering from a lock-in effect in an adverse labour market or whether they are just less risk-averse 
and choose to stay and wait things out. Another question, to be addressed in Chapter 6, evolves 
around the design of individual specific mobility premiums, i.e., wage increases of sufficient size to 
induce labour mobility. 
Big-Five personality traits represent a further angle to explain subjective valuations of mobility-
related costs, eventually leading to differing location choices.9 Introducing standardised scores, 
individuals can be categorised for each of the five personality traits into one of three distinct sub-
groups: those scoring more than one standard deviation below the mean (low), those around the 
mean (medium) and those scoring more than one standard deviation above the mean (high). For all 
five traits one observes that covered distances increase or decrease monotonously (Table 2.10). 
Most open individuals chose on average a destination in 104.4 km distance, individuals of medium 
openness cover on average 98.08 km and those scoring lowest in the trait openness stay closest to 
their origin (87.88 km on average). 
Table 2.10: Big-Five personality traits and observed mobility 
 Big-Five categorisation 
 low 
(score < 𝜇 − 𝜎) 
medium 
(𝜇 − 𝜎 ≤ score 
≤ 𝜇 + 𝜎) 
high 
(score > 𝜇 + 𝜎) 
Openness to experience 87.88 98.08 104.40 
Extraversion 81.97 98.86 100.63 
Neuroticism 104.33 97.18 92.60 
Conscientiousness 102.35 98.38 86.65 
Agreeableness 91.00 96.94 104.14 
Note: Reported figures are mean geographic distances in kilometres. 
All the preceding findings indicate that migration outcomes are driven by individual traits and 
preferences, since returns and costs to mobility are not identically evaluated across individuals. 
Especially risk attitude, but also previous mobility-related experiences seem to influence the 
decision-making process in the context of location choice of beginning students. In addition, 
observed mobility outcomes varied also concurrent with Big-Five personality traits and individual 
time preferences, respectively patience. 
Building on these findings, the next chapters will explore this avenue further and investigate how 
heterogeneous individual traits actually affect the decision-making process itself. 
                                                          
9
 The Big-Five personality traits were constructed based on a Big-Five short inventory (Rammstedt and John, 2007), 
validated in a sample of German students. A more extensive version, e.g., the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (McCrae and Costa 
Jr., 2004) consisting of 60 items, could not be implemented in the survey due to time restrictions. 
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3 The agony of choice: Choice set formation and geographic mobility 
3.1 Introduction 
High tertiary education participation rates, ranging from 30 to 60 percent in Europe (King and Ruiz-
Gelices, 2003), emphasize the relevance of university graduates as an integral part of the labour 
force. In light of a strong interrelation between student and post-graduation migratory trajectories 
(Perry, 2001; Busch and Weigert, 2010), understanding the behaviour of mobile individuals at the 
verge of commencing tertiary education promises valuable insights into their prospective migration 
patterns. In the case of Germany, for instance, flows between Eastern and Western states are 
strongly driven by the mobile young (Hunt, 2006), hence the behaviour of young cohorts is highly 
relevant for understanding population dynamics. 
Aside from enhancing human capital or functioning as economic incubators, universities also attract 
students, whose talents can then be put to use immediately after graduation in the surrounding 
geographic labour market (Dotti et al., 2013). This may translate into a direct link between initial 
student migration and the strengthening of the human capital pool in a region (Winters, 2011), 
eventually enhancing local growth perspectives. 
Ultimately, migration outcomes over the years are driven to a considerable extent by students’ initial 
choices regarding where to apply and where to study. The underlying decision-making process, in 
turn, is governed by individual-specific valuations, pointing to the relevance of earlier experiences 
and individual traits, moulding a kind of migrant personality (Boneva and Frieze, 2001; Frieze et al., 
2006). 
The main goal of this study is to develop a more precise picture of the facets, defining such a migrant 
personality and to investigate its impact on the decision-making process within the selection of a 
study location. This is done by explicitly integrating personality traits, individual experiences and 
valuations.  Another contribution of this work is to shed some light on intra-national student mobility 
outside the Anglo-American realm, which is a rather sparsely discussed phenomenon (Prazers, 2013).  
This work draws on a survey, specifically designed to provide information not only on final choices, 
but also on preferences within the application process. Based on information about actually 
considered alternatives, this research’s premise is the partitioning of the decision-making process 
into two distinct stages: first, the formation of an initial choice set, including the most preferred 
location alternatives in a planning phase. The second realisation stage is defined by the selection of 
one alternative, from a potentially exogenously restricted choice set, yielding a migration outcome. 
The formation stage is analysed to determine individual traits explaining the initial choice set’s scope. 
In this domain, individual traits such as patience and extraversion are positively related to the 
number of considered alternatives. Moreover, by applying a geo-referenced framework, the chosen 
analytical procedure acknowledges that internal migration is a truly distance-based phenomenon. An 
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analysis of the components in the initial choice set demonstrates that the personality trait openness 
gains in importance: individuals least open to experiences exhibit a distinct initial preference for 
alternatives closer to their origin. At the realisation stage, though, some of the initially significant 
factors lose their relevance: decision-making processes at the planning stage and the subsequent 
final choice in a migratory context do not necessarily coincide. 
A pivotal implication of these findings is that individuals evaluate costs of mobility differently, and 
thus exhibit differing sensitivities to moving distance. A potential mechanism is an increased 
adjustment capability to new circumstances, mitigating costs of mobility. This adjustment capability 
seems to be nurtured by previous mobility experiences, such as moves during childhood or exchange 
participation.  
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Chapter 3.2 reviews the state of research, both 
related to important mechanisms fostering geographic mobility in general and with reference to 
students in particular. Chapter 3.3 introduces the specific data set and highlights some descriptive 
statistics. Individual choice set formation, accounting for the impact of heterogeneously perceived 
costs of mobility, is investigated in Chapter 3.4. Observed migration outcomes, and thus actual 
location choices from alternatives in the initial choice set are investigated in Chapter 3.5. Chapter 3.6 
concludes and points out remaining questions. 
3.2 Literature review 
This review discusses first relevant findings with respect to individual migration in general and turns 
then to the specific topic of student mobility. 
Decision-making processes in a migration context are often modelled based on a cost-benefit 
comparison where individuals are assumed to relocate in order to maximize their expected utility. 
This is a reliable framework to analyse migratory dynamics in the general population as well as in 
subgroups, e.g., consisting of students. One of the first to describe migration as an outcome of an 
individual’s comparison of expected earnings differentials between various destinations (the 
monetary returns to migration) and associated costs of migration was Sjaastad (1962). Aside from 
monetary costs, he also recognized the importance of ‘psychic costs’, originating from social and 
family attachment. 
Returns to migration can have a monetary dimension, e.g., attaining a steeper post-migration 
earnings path (for Germany, see Kratz and Brüderl, 2013 or Lehmer and Ludsteck, 2011), or a 
nonpecuniary dimension if a higher living standard can be realised. In the latter case, a sufficient 
improvement regarding the availability of amenities can not only compensate for associated costs of 
migration, but even a decline in income (Graves and Linneman, 1979; Roback, 1982; Graves, 1983).  
Both costs and returns to migration are a matter of subjective perception, shaped by personality and 
individual experiences. Risk and time preferences, for instance, might lead to heterogeneous 
valuations of objectively identical income or amenity differentials between two locations.  
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Since time preferences vary across individuals, these potential returns to mobility will be valued 
differently (Frederick et al., 2002). Eventually, this impacts on migration intentions (Van Dalen and 
Henkens, 2012) and can individually affect optimal job search intensity (DellaVigna and Paserman, 
2005), and hence also labour market outcomes. Risk attitude is a relevant individual trait as well, 
since more pronounced risk-aversion may inflate perceived costs of mobility and reduce the overall 
willingness to migrate. More risk-seeking individuals, on the other hand, are more likely to migrate in 
general (Jaeger et al., 2010; Nowotny, 2010), and even when controlling for cultural distance 
(Bauernschuster et al., 2014), thereby imposing possible additional costs of relocation.  
Costs of mobility have a clearly defined monetary aspect: relocating and moving a household’s 
belonging requires, for instance, commissioning a moving company. Associated transportation costs 
increase typically with distance. In conjunction with the plain fact that long-distance moves are more 
likely to result in the crossing of national or administrative borders, causing additional transaction 
costs, distance is the most consistent predictor in the context of geographic mobility: this holds for 
aggregate cross-border migration flows (Mayda, 2010; Belot and Everdeen, 2012) and internationally 
mobile students (Rodríguez González et al., 2011; Brezis and Soueri, 2011; Perkins and Neumayer, 
2014; Beine et al., 2014).  
Portending a certain similarity of the underlying decision process in case of cross-border and intra-
national migration, this distance deterrence effect is also observed at the intra-national or regional 
level for students (McHugh and Morgan, 1984; Leppel, 1993; Alm and Winters, 2009; Cooke and 
Boyle, 2011) or for the general population (Stillwell, 2005; Schwartz, 1973; Biagi et al., 2011), and 
even when distance enters a model as rather imprecise proxy.10 
Aside from directly measurable transportation or transaction costs, there exist psychic costs of 
migration, plausibly rising with distance as well.11 These psychic costs of migration could manifest as 
acculturative stress, associated to a “lowered mental health status (specifically confusion, anxiety, 
depression), feelings of marginality and alienation, heightened psychosomatic symptom level, and 
identity confusion” (Berry et al., 1987). Loss of emotional support in the origin country, and the 
(perceived) migratory distance are also associated with increased depression risk (Vega et al., 1987). 
Whilst some acculturative stress scenarios might only be relevant in the context of cross-border 
movement, and hence also cross-culture migration (e.g., language issues12), others might already 
result in the case of internal migration: moving from a rural area, with its specific social environment, 
to an urban centre, characterised by a larger degree of anonymity, can lead to feelings of alienation 
as well. 
                                                          
10
 The issue of (categorical) distance proxies is discussed more intensively in a related context by Ham et al. (2011). Their 
results, i.e., estimates’ magnitude and significance, are highly sensitive with respect to the implemented distance proxy 
(indicating moving types). 
11
 In the notation of Sjaastad (1962) these could be represented by a monetary equivalent, defined as a maximum amount 
of a region-specific income which could be taxed away before the respective individual decides to migrate to an alternative 
region. 
12
 In this regard, language proficiency could facilitate the process of cultural adjustment and thus lower possible distress in 
a host country, causing less frequent occurrence of schizophrenia amongst migrant samples (Bhugra, 2004). 
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The assessment of mobility-related stress is thus likely to vary based on psychological features. 
Several links between personality and geographic mobility might be considered. Frieze and Li (2010), 
for example, suggested place attachment, sensation seeking or sociability. Sensation seeking 
individuals might reap some benefits just by moving to a new and possibly exciting environment 
which in turn would mitigate perceived psychic costs.13 More sociable types might experience the 
(initial) loss of social interaction as more burdensome on moving to an unfamiliar place. There is 
empirical evidence that the Big-Five traits openness and extraversion, indicating a more pronounced 
ability to establish new connections, are indeed associated with a higher internal migration 
probability (Jokela, 2009) or a more pronounced and qualification-dependent inclination towards 
future mobility (Canache et al., 2013). Higher aggregate levels of neuroticism or conscientiousness 
have been found to be indicative of larger shares of non-mobile households on the state-level 
(McCann, 2015).  
There is also evidence that distress is perceived more frequently by women (Mirowsky and Ross, 
1995) or that women are psychologically more responsive to geographic relocation, hence are more 
prone to depression than men thereafter (Magdol, 2002). In addition, distance to their kin and social 
contacts play a more prominent role for women to avoid psychological distress. 
Aside from personality or preferences in a wider sense, educational attainment is another individual 
trait which is found to influence individuals’ willingness to migrate substantially.14 Skilled workers, 
i.e., college graduates, display higher propensities to migrate (Wozniak, 2010; Tolbert et al., 2009), 
and migrate over longer distances over the course of their life (Hillmert, 2008). Tertiary educated 
individuals are likely to realise higher returns from migrating to a spatially different labour market, 
yielding a comparative advantage regarding mobility decisions (Dahl, 2002; Carlsen et al., 2013).15 
Geographic mobility, however, does not only translate into monetary returns: Coté (1997) showed 
that migration per se is conducive to higher occupational status during the middle age, even when 
controlling for socio-economic and regional characteristics. 
Since highly educated individuals, i.e., former students, are a most mobile group once they entered 
the labour force, an immediate question refers to the origin and the evolution of such distinct 
migration behaviour. 
In this regard, McHugh and Morgan (1984) or Dotti et al. (2013) presented evidence that student 
migration is influenced by economic conditions in the destination state too, for instance, as students 
might explore local employment options after graduation. Furthermore, students seem to be 
                                                          
13
 In principle, it could also be interpreted as non-monetary return from moving. 
14
 Even when only conditioning on years of schooling Machin et al. (2012) uncovered for Norwegian data a positive 
relationship between education and migration: one additional year is associated with an increase of the migration rate of 
0.15 percentage point.   
15
 More interestingly, due to this comparative advantage, the related “self-selection of higher educated individuals to states 
with higher returns to education generally leads to upward biases in OLS estimates of the returns to education in state-
specific labor markets” (Dahl, 2002, p. 2367). 
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attracted to destinations with better amenities (Mixon and Hsing, 199416; Cooke and Boyle, 2011), 
thus behaving similarly to non-student migrants.  
There is also a strong linkage between student mobility and subsequent individual mobility over the 
course of life. Studying abroad fosters the likelihood of starting into the working life abroad (Parey 
and Waldinger, 2011; Oosterbeek and Webbink, 2011; Di Pietro, 2012). This is possibly related to the 
acquisition of country-specific labour market information, especially language skills (Fertig and 
Schmidt, 2002). Moreover it seems to affect the decision-making process of men and women 
asymmetrically (Balaz and Williams, 2011), in a way that only female border-crossing migrants were 
more risk-loving.   
Yet, previous cross-border student mobility may also foster inter-regional mobility after graduation 
(Franck et al., 2012). Persisting migration patterns, i.e., a tendency to linger at a specific location or in 
a geographic region that had once been chosen for study purposes, is frequently documented, even 
when potential alternative study destinations are accounted for (Groen, 2004). A consistent picture 
emerges for the US and Germany: around two thirds of the students tend to stay in the states they 
graduated from university (Perry, 2001; Busch and Weigert, 2010).  
In the context of university choices, the evidence on the impact of institutional quality is mixed. 
Students are in so far selective, yet some choose to migrate in order to attend highly ranked 
institutions, others due to availability of admission (Mixon and Hsing, 1994; Cooke and Boyle, 2011). 
The potential impact of a ranking on preferences may also vary across types of university, whereas 
higher research activities may even deter potential students (Drewes and Michael, 2006). Sá et al. 
(2004) reported no unambiguous impact of educational quality, but of programme quantity on the 
decision to enrol at a specific university. Excluding flagship institutions with relatively few enrolled 
students, there is also evidence in favour of students choosing study places mostly based on 
availability and costs (Faggian and McCann, 2006). 
The initial decision regarding where to study may also be partially ‘inherited’, i.e., children whose 
father graduated from university (and thus typically displayed some mobility inclination) were also 
more willing to move to another region for study purposes or subsequent labour market entry 
(Belfield and Morris, 1999). Such mobility patterns, shaped by parental decisions, “may represent an 
acquired predisposition due possibly to increased knowledge and decreased psychological inhibitions 
to moving away from a known environment” (Black, 1983, p. 274). This highlights a direct line 
between parental decisions, individual adjustment capability and the perception of psychic costs to 
mobility. 
Though the literature typically focuses on one specific individual feature, the evidence suggests 
various individual traits, which may have a joint impact on the decision-making process in a migration 
context. 
                                                          
16
 In their specification, specific sportive activities constitute relevant consumption factors for students. 
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3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
Data on precisely traced geographic mobility, personality traits, attitudes and mobility-related 
preferences has proven to be scarcely available. This is especially true when it comes to the 
availability of information on considered, but eventually discarded alternatives in the decision 
process. Therefore, to investigate the process of choice set formation more closely, a data set was 
compiled which enables a joint evaluation of the previously stated non-standard characteristics and 
geo-referenced migration profiles. This data set is briefly introduced in this chapter. 
3.3.1 Introduction to the data source 
The underlying data source is a survey on “Mobility, Expectations, Self-Assessment and Risk Attitude 
of Students” (MESARAS 2013; Weisser, 2016a), a specifically designed survey which took place in 
October 2013.  
Its primary target group consisted of 2308 university students, enrolled in an undergraduate 
economics study programme in the first semester at one of seven adjacent universities in northern 
and middle Germany. This sample has been further restricted for the purpose of this study to include 
only those who commenced their university life, hence just chose a location within the preceding 
weeks. Furthermore, students whose postal code or city of origin could not unambiguously be 
identified were excluded. This also pertained to students from abroad. Yet, this restriction ensures 
that covered distances could be precisely determined, based on centroids in a close-meshed spatial 
grid. Eventually, this study’s target sample comprised 1861 individuals. The descriptive statistics for 
this sample are provided in Table A3.1 and Table A3.2 (in the appendix). 
The reason for such a specific target group was twofold: first, students can be seen as valid 
representatives of prospective highly qualified individuals, since after graduation they immediately 
enter the labour force as highly educated workers. Second, for most of the beginning students the 
choice of a study place is the first autonomous mobility-related decision whereas earlier mobility 
experiences resulted mainly from parental decisions. 
As a core feature, the specific design of the MESARAS-survey allows the identification of previous 
residential or other relevant locations (birth place, school entrance, alternative study locations) on 
the level of postal code areas. This in turn enables to capture mobility as a truly distance related 
phenomenon, on a scale of kilometres. Instead of being restricted to assessing mobility as a rather 
binary yes/no decision, mobility becomes a quantifiable item. In case of participants’ choice of a 
specific study location, the observed mobility-related decision can be expressed as distance between 
chosen university and origin, identified by previous residence or the respective city, where 
respondents graduated from school.17  
                                                          
17
 Any geographical distance between two postal code areas is measured as the ellipsoid distance between the two 
respective areas’ centroids. A more detailed description of the calculation procedure, alternative distance concepts (such as 
road distance and travel time) and a discussion of potential drawbacks can be found in Weisser (2016b, p. 7-9). 
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The restriction to economic study programmes resulted from methodological considerations and 
follows the idea that this approach minimises the likelihood of the occurrence of unobservable, but 
varying characteristics of an unknown distribution within the population. In addition, focusing on a 
specific family of programmes, represented at virtually every university, ensures that students truly 
had a choice between several locations and observed mobility was in fact a choice and not an 
inevitable outcome, related to the non-existence of alternatives.18 
The overarching goal of the target-specific survey was to provide genuine, geo-referenced data with 
a high response rate. The latter was ensured by implementation into faculties’ orientation weeks or 
first month’s lectures. For the participating faculties of the seven universities, the sample covered in 
total 68.3 percent of all enrolled first semester students.19 Using administrative enrolment data, a 
high degree of representativeness could be established.  
Thus, except for basic aspects of self-selection into a special study programme, the respondents can 
be assumed to be rather representative for young adults at the beginning of their (academic) career. 
Their inclination towards mobility, and some aspects of the choice of the place of study, should be 
related to their preferences for social interactions and expectations. In this regard, participants have 
been explicitly asked to report the importance of various potential criteria which might have 
influenced their decision, e.g., by determining their perception of psychic costs. 
3.3.2 A quick glance on students’ mobility 
How mobile are young academics in the sample, or in other words, how far do they go? The answer 
is on average exactly 97.15 kilometres.20 One quarter of them stays within a radius of 24.8 kilometres 
around their previous centre of life, thereby opting for the closest available alternative in most cases. 
In fact, respondents in the sample display profoundly varying degrees of mobility, which is measured 
as geographic distance between university location and previous residence, i.e., the location where 
someone acquired the university entrance certificate (UEC). Descriptive statistics in Figure 3.1 
portray the average observed mobility for three basic subgroups: those scoring distinctly below the 
mean (red) on a given scale, those around the sample mean (grey) and those notably above the 
mean (blue).21  
Participants scoring more than one standard deviation below the mean on the Big-Five trait 
neuroticism are found, on average, in more remote study locations. The distinction between groups 
is even larger regarding the importance of proximity to family: those stating that such proximity was 
of relatively higher importance chose on average universities much closer to the familiar 
environment. 
                                                          
18 
Subsequently presented empirical specifications explicitly accommodate the existence of alternatives. 
19 
More details, also with respect to representativeness, can be found in Weisser (2016b). 
20
 Notably, this figure is almost twice as large as the distance for young academics (age 20) in the 1964 birth cohort from 
the West German Life History Study, reported by Hillmert (2008). Across all educational groups, Leopold et al. (2012) 
reported an average distance of 68.4 kilometres for young adults’ move-outs from the parental household. 
21
 The categorisation based on individual scores, respectively the distance to the sample mean, fosters comparability across 
different underlying scales. 
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Figure 3.1: Average observed mobility in kilometres, conditional on individual traits and preferences  
  
 
Note: The three depicted groups refer to a classification based on standardised scores, such that ‘medium’ refers to those 
scoring within one standard deviation around the mean and ‘high’ (‘low’) comprises those more than one standard deviation 
above (below) the mean. The sample size varies across dimensions between 1811 and 1853. 
Groupings by individual risk attitude typically yield the expected outcomes: individual expressing a 
high willingness to take risks, both in general and in the career domain, display a higher level of 
observed mobility. The perception of a move’s riskiness is also indicative of specific mobility patterns. 
Individuals who see interstate moves as a rather risky endeavour eventually enrol, on average, at 
institutions in 69 kilometres distance. Those who assess interstate moves to be hardly a risky 
endeavour, in contrast, are almost twice as mobile. 
Overall, the degree of inter-group variation in the sample highlights several personality traits to be 
plausible candidates in the investigation of determinants of individual mobility and initial choice set 
formation. 
3.4 Destination choice sets of heterogeneous decision-makers 
Voluntary migration always involves a choice, i.e., in the simplest case it boils down to the question 
‘to move or not to move’. This naturally requires the existence of a possible alternative to the current 
location. For a worker, such a move could be induced by an alternative job offer in a remote city. In 
the case of a young adult, the choice of a study location would define the destination.  
Within the overall decision-making process, comprising an application and a realisation stage, 
prospective students consider various choice sets. Any observable migration outcome, however, 
depends eventually on these choice sets. Therefore, analysing the generation of these initial choice 
sets is crucial for a better understanding of individual mobility patterns.  
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The concept and the generation of initial choice sets are discussed in Chapter 3.4.1. Subsequently, 
the impact of personality on this individual-specific formation process is empirically investigated: 
first, regarding the initial choice set’s scope (Chapter 3.4.2), and then regarding the set’s components 
(Chapter 3.4.3). 
3.4.1 Generating the initial choice set of location alternatives 
The analytical starting point is a prospective student’s basic choice set, comprising all potentially 
relevant locations. In fact, the most basic choice set for prospective academics consists of 399 
officially recognised institutions of higher education in Germany, offering 9801 undergraduate 
programmes in total.22  
However, for an assessment of geographic mobility, being the focus of this work, the actual 
maximum number of alternative destinations can be narrowed down: the relevant destination space 
comprises 164 cities in Germany (Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2: Proportional geographic distribution of German higher education institutions 
 
Note: The relative size of the black dots corresponds to the 
number of institutions of higher education at the respective 
postal code area. 
Ultimately, there are 71 distinct university locations offering a full-time bachelor programme with 
economics or business focus in a broader sense.23 Curricula in these programmes have a high degree 
of overlap since these bachelor programmes consist of introductory courses with the same basic 
                                                          
22
 Figures taken from HRK (2015). 
23
 Included programmes are business administration, economics, economics and business administration, engineering 
economics and business informatics. Taking universities of applied sciences into account as well yields 164 unique locations. 
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content.24 For example, the interest in a specific field of study would be satisfied by studying business 
at a university in the north in the same way as by choosing to study in southern Germany.25  
Based on their study preferences, but also influenced by other individual preferences and valuations, 
individuals select a subset of institutions, where they apply for. This yields the initial choice set 𝐶0, 
which is characterised by a quantitative and a qualitative aspect.  
The first is taken into account by the total number of applications (𝑛𝐶0) at any institution (offering an 
economics programme) at any of the 164 alternative destinations. The initial choice set’s scope 
informs about ‘how many’ alternatives are considered. It captures whether someone puts all of his or 
her eggs into one basket by applying only for the preferred institution and location or hedges against 
refusals by sending out applications to multiple institutions. 
The qualitative aspect is evaluated in the distance dimension (𝑑).26 It refers to the choice set’s 
components and introduces the aspect of geographic mobility by investigating ‘where’ designated 
study alternatives are located. Regardless of the actual number of applications, preselected 
alternatives inform about the fundamental willingness to migrate over specific distances. 
Figure 3.3 (left panel) shows a graphical representation of the initial choice set of a fictitious 
individual. This fictitious individual considered nine destinations and applied at institutions on site. 
The remaining alternatives were irrelevant in this individual’s decision-making process. 
Typically, only the university’s location where someone finally enrolled (labelled ‘U’) is observed. The 
study’s underlying data source, however, preserves additional information: in addition to the finally 
chosen alternative, the observed initial choice set also comprises the three most preferred 
destinations someone applied for.  
Similarly, the three favoured locations, from where the admissions have been granted, are known 
too. Together with the eventually selected destination, these alternatives constitute the observed 
final choice set (𝐶1). Depending on the institutions’ admission process, the most preferred 
alternatives in the initial and the final choice set do not need to coincide. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Typically the curriculum comprises introductions to micro- and macro-economics, basic statistics, and some business-
related courses, e.g., accounting or investment. 
25
 One could make the case that identically labelled courses at two universities were still to differ with respect to the 
teaching content. Yet, course design and priorities rely mainly on the lecturer in the end, hence, specific course content 
may vary much stronger at one institution if the lecturer changes.  
26
 In principle, university rankings constitute a plausible qualitative dimension as well. However, there are several 
drawbacks. National rankings, i.e., the so-called Handelsblatt-Ranking or the CHE-Ranking, suffer from two major 
shortcomings: first, many (large) universities do not participate. Second, the ranking involves dimensions that are not 
necessarily relevant for students, such as publications in case of the Handelsblatt-Ranking. The CHE-Ranking 2011 
comprises additional research dimensions, e.g., third-party funding or number of doctorates, but is also of insufficient 
coverage when it comes to the dimension of student evaluations: here, the sample of ranked universities collapses to one 
third for economics (Berghoff et al., 2011). Resorting to international rankings does not solve this issue: The Shanghai-
Ranking 2012, for instance, mentions only 5 German universities in the Top 200 of economics departments 
(ShanghaiRanking Consultancy, 2012). Another conceptual limitation is concatenated to the elicitation mode of considered 
alternatives: being easily recalled, alternatives have typically been stated on the city level. This impedes a meaningful 
mapping of rankings in case of destinations with several universities. 
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Figure 3.3: The sets of possible location alternatives   
 
Compiled information on multiple applications in the initial choice set provides several insights: even 
if someone was less inclined to study at location X, compared to location Y, he or she would only 
apply for X if this alternative was at least acceptable as a sort of makeshift destination. Consequently, 
such an auxiliary alternative contains relevant information regarding a person’s preferences. A 
comparable reasoning can be used in case of applications for locations where admission chances are 
considered to be slim – the initial decision to apply nevertheless still provides valuable information 
regarding potential location choices, hence the theoretical willingness to migrate.  
3.4.2 The initial choice set’s scope 
The choice set’s scope analysis, investigating factors influencing the number of alternative 
applications, relies on two slightly different measures: one captures the general existence of 
alternative applications for economics programmes (𝑛𝑖,𝐶0), a second accounts only for the number of 
applications at institutions at geographically distinct locations (𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿 ).  
Table 3.1: Choice sets’ scope – all alternatives and geographically distinct alternatives 
  𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿  
(number of geographically distinct  
alternatives in 𝐶0) 
 
  1 2 3 ≥ 4 ∑ 
𝑛𝑖,𝐶0 
(total number of 
alternatives in 𝐶0) 
1 375    375 
2 3 153   156 
3 1 32 208  241 
≥ 4 0 10 128 807 945 
 ∑ 379 195 336 807 1717 
 
Approximately one fifth of the subjects (375) had an initial choice set consisting of a sole alternative, 
whereas 80 % of all individuals in the target sample (1342) had sent out at least one additional 
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application for an economics programme (Table 3.1). 13  % (174) amongst these, however, did not 
proportionally increase their initial choice set in a geographic sense: they instead applied for multiple 
economics programme at the same location.  
The chosen approach allows differentiating between individuals, for instance, one initially applying at 
three alternative locations and the other initially selecting three programmes at one location. Both 
individuals display a comparable degree of hedging against non-admission (𝑛1,𝐶0 = 𝑛2,𝐶0 = 3). Yet, 
the second individual displays a much stronger geographic preference for one specific location 
(𝑛1,𝐶0
𝐿 = 3, 𝑛2,𝐶0
𝐿 = 1). Albeit highly correlated on the aggregate level, the underlying concepts of 
these two measures of the initial choice sets’ scope vary notably: the second definition (𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿 ) 
introduces a stronger notion of geographic variation, and thus possibly accounts for a higher latent 
willingness to display migration behaviour.  
Recognising this conceptual difference, the subsequent econometric analysis contrasts both 
measures. Each of the two ordinal variables was additionally transformed into a binary version (𝑏𝑖,𝐶0, 
𝑏𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿 ), set equal to one if more than one application was reported, and zero otherwise. This allows 
investigating the basic hedging aspect and an evaluation of the outcomes’ robustness with respect to 
the embodied recording threshold of four alternatives.  
The simple binary scope measures are analysed in a logit and an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
framework. The first maps predicted probabilities exactly into the corresponding space, between 0 
and 1. Calculated odds ratios (OR) in the logit specification inform directly about whether a change of 
an explanatory variable increases the odds of an individual forming an initial choice set with at least 
one actual alternative. The linear probability model (LPM) yields some directly interpretable 
coefficients and may serve as benchmark for additional estimations, accounting for the existence of 
potentially endogenous variables. 
In case of the logit model, the probability of observing a choice set of size two or larger is given as 
𝑃(𝑏𝐶0 = 1|𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑏𝐶0
∗ > 0|𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑋′𝛽 + 𝜀 > 0) =
exp(𝑋′𝛽)
1+exp (𝑋′𝛽)
= 𝛬(𝑋′𝛽) (3.1) 
with Λ(. ) as logistic cumulative distribution function.  
The corresponding linear probability model (LPM) can be represented as 
𝑏𝐶0 = 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝜀  
In contrast to the standard OLS model, based on the conditional mean assumption 𝐸[𝜀|𝑋] = 0,  the 
error term in the LPM is not independent from 𝑋, even if all regressors were in principle exogenous: 
since 𝑏𝐶0 is restricted to be either zero or one, the corresponding error is either 1 − 𝑋
′𝛽 or 𝑋′𝛽, and 
thus heteroskedastic by design.27 Nevertheless, the LPM offers some insight into basic relationships, 
and in contrast to the logit model, a marginal effect of interest is not dependent on other variables.  
The matrix 𝑋 of explanatory variables consists of socio-demographic variables and an ability measure 
(the average grade of the university entrance certificate). Furthermore, risk and time preferences are 
                                                          
27
 This issue is addressed by applying standard errors, which are robust with respect to heteroscedasticity. 
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included, measured as willingness to take risks and as willingness to bear present costs for future 
benefits (labelled as patience), respectively. The set of individual traits is enriched by the Big-Five 
personality traits, a measure of adaptability and the importance of proximity to reference persons. 
The latter two exert potentially a certain impact on psychic costs associated with a migratory 
decision (Schwartz, 1973).  
Individual traits enter the models usually in a standardised manner, such that three distinct types of 
individuals can be identified: those scoring distinctly below the sample average (score < 𝜇 − 𝜎), the 
reference-type or average-type individuals (𝜇 − 𝜎 ≤ score ≤ 𝜇 + 𝜎), and those scoring at least one 
standard deviation above the mean (score > 𝜇 + 𝜎). This approach allows detecting non-linear links 
between individual traits and aspects of the choice set formation. 
Referring to the subset of individual traits, self-reported adaptability to new circumstance and the 
importance of proximity to reference persons might violate the exogeneity condition. This would be 
the case, if these concepts capture the underlying concept of psychic costs only to a certain extent, 
hence are recorded with a substantial measurement error, introducing correlation with the error 
term. To account for this possibility, these two variables are instrumented in some of the following 
specifications. As instruments serve previous mobility experiences, which are arguably exogenous in 
the analysed decision framework. Furthermore, they should only affect the investigated outcomes 
indirectly (via the first stage) and not exert any immediate impact on the scrutinised outcome.28 
The first instrument is a measure of residential mobility during childhood and youth. Such a decision, 
before the individual came of age, had been made by the individual’s parents. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that it could not be affected by the individual’s plans to apply at one or several 
universities. Such moves, during a child’s formative years, might strengthen the importance of 
reference persons in the family, hence validating this instrument’s usage in a first stage.  
Participation in a short-term (school) exchange programme is the second instrument. Typically, such 
programmes are designed for juveniles and participation requires parental permission. At the same 
time, parental encouragement might induce teenagers to participate in the first place, i.e., 
participation is largely at parents’ discretion. Eventually, being confronted with another environment 
in a different cultural setting might foster individual flexibility and thus justify this instrument’s 
application to instrument adjustment capability in a first stage.  
With respect to the binary assessment of the choice set’s scope, three main results – robust across all 
estimation methods and model specifications – emerge (Table 3.2, Table A3.3 and Table A3.5). 
  
                                                          
28
 Admittedly, this exclusion restriction can be challenged. Another concern relates to a potential correlation between the 
instruments and unobserved variables, such as household income. More affluent households might have distinct mobility 
patterns and offer their children more study opportunities, e.g., in more expensive study locations. The variable ‘academic 
household’ is supposed to partially account for parental households which are characterised by higher income levels. 
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 Table 3.2: Choice set’s scope – binary approach, all applications 
dependent variable  𝑏𝑖,𝐶0 
estimation method  logit  LPM  IV (2
nd stage)  LPM  IV (2nd stage) 
 
 OR  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female)  1.2486  (0.1724)  0.0316  (0.0211)  -0.0032 (0.0355)  0.0159  (0.0216)  -0.0375 (0.0420) 
age  0.8292 *** (0.0402)  -0.0321 *** (0.0088)  -0.0365 *** (0.0093)  -0.0266 *** (0.0086)  -0.0321 *** (0.0096) 
academic household  1.2294  (0.1599)  0.0324  (0.0200)  0.0384 (0.0291)  0.0284  (0.0203)  0.0329 (0.0327) 
uec grade  0.7829 ** (0.0964)  -0.0361 * (0.0198)  -0.0494 (0.0303)  -0.0635 *** (0.0197)  -0.0952 *** (0.0362) 
vocational training  1.4602  (0.3548)  0.0656  (0.0413)  0.0635 (0.0478)  0.0653  (0.0409)  0.0638 (0.0524) 
partnership                      
< 6 months  1.2918  (0.3471)  0.0330  (0.0349)  -0.0075 (0.0480)  0.0306  (0.0358)  -0.0308 (0.0562) 
6-12 months  0.8122  (0.1807)  -0.0321  (0.0382)  -0.0829 (0.0559)  -0.0498  (0.0391)  -0.1265 * (0.0656) 
1-2 years  0.7379  (0.1554)  -0.0520  (0.0369)  -0.0640 (0.0532)  -0.0603  (0.0379)  -0.0734 (0.0588) 
2-3 years  1.0564  (0.2367)  0.0071  (0.0340)  0.0061 (0.0432)  0.0053  (0.0356)  0.0065 (0.0500) 
> 3 years  1.1566  (0.2923)  0.0185  (0.0382)  -0.0012 (0.0486)  0.0180  (0.0395)  -0.0107 (0.0558) 
risk attitude (career domain)                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  1.0411  (0.1999)  0.0079  (0.0288)  0.0068 (0.0362)  0.0156  (0.0301)  0.0189 (0.0424) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.7801  (0.1199)  -0.0404  (0.0250)  -0.0282 (0.0370)  -0.0358  (0.0251)  -0.0204 (0.0421) 
patience                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.5498 *** (0.0850)  -0.1040 *** (0.0287)  -0.1075 *** (0.0314)  -0.1023 *** (0.0294)  -0.1051 *** (0.0352) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.2921  (0.2430)  0.0380  (0.0261)  0.0145 (0.0485)  0.0339  (0.0261)  -0.0098 (0.0556) 
extraversion                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.8235  (0.1524)  -0.0351  (0.0324)  0.0348 (0.0881)  -0.0484  (0.0334)  0.0681 (0.1009) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.9493  (0.1517)  -0.0076  (0.0249)  -0.0588 (0.0532)  -0.0097  (0.0254)  -0.0950 (0.0639) 
neuroticism                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.7939  (0.1586)  -0.0384  (0.0323)  -0.1103 (0.0681)  -0.0341  (0.0324)  -0.1464 * (0.0786) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.8685  (0.1546)  -0.0211  (0.0281)  0.0177 (0.0489)  -0.0129  (0.0284)  0.0534 (0.0575) 
openness                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.9343  (0.1476)  -0.0119  (0.0252)  -0.0131 (0.0334)  -0.0054  (0.0259)  -0.0024 (0.0374) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.9672  (0.1647)  -0.0054  (0.0268)  -0.0126 (0.0333)  -0.0314  (0.0271)  -0.0501 (0.0392) 
conscientiousness                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.9922  (0.1565)  -0.0036  (0.0260)  0.0158 (0.0315)  -0.0021  (0.0267)  0.0266 (0.0359) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.8903  (0.1536)  -0.0186  (0.0259)  -0.0459 (0.0358)  -0.0221  (0.0265)  -0.0666 (0.0415) 
agreeableness                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.9964  (0.1562)  -0.0030  (0.0252)  0.0286 (0.0354)  -0.0138  (0.0260)  0.0297 (0.0408) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.0767  (0.1863)  0.0097  (0.0262)  -0.0195 (0.0351)  0.0093  (0.0269)  -0.0362 (0.0412) 
𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: imp. of prox. (family)  1.0351  (0.0422)  0.0052  (0.0063)  0.0940 (0.0729)  0.0032  (0.0063)  0.1283 (0.0852) 
𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: adaptability  1.1660 *** (0.0527)  0.0242 *** (0.0074)  0.1353 (0.0962)  0.0213 *** (0.0076)  0.2000 * (0.1144) 
origin controls                     
constant                     
observations  1717  1717  1717  1717  1717 
log likelihood  -828.00         
df  30  30  30  26  26 
LR 𝜒2 / F / Wald 𝜒2  126.32  4.84  119.19  3.08  54.32 
prob > 𝜒2/ prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0009 
pseudo 𝑅2  / adjusted 𝑅2  0.0813  0.0707    0.0312   
exogeneity test           
Wooldridge (1995) score test      2.40 (p=0.3011)    4.59 (p=0.1006) 
regression based test      1.18 (p=0.3078)    2.27 (p=0.1038) 
1st stage: 𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
           
F(model)      6.51 (p=0.0000)    7.14 (p=0.0000) 
𝑧1: res. move during school      -0.3671 *** (0.0976)    -0.3568 *** (0.0972) 
𝑧2: exchange participation      -0.1225  (0.0820)    -0.1278  (0.0814) 
F(instruments)      8.38 (p=0.0002)    8.18 (p=0.0004) 
1st stage: 𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
           
F(model)      13.54 (p=0.0000)    15.08 (p=0.0000) 
𝑧1: res. move during school      0.0068  (0.0857)    0.0143  (0.0857) 
𝑧2: exchange participation      0.2505 *** (0.0744)    0.2421 *** (0.0742) 
F(instruments)      5.71 (p=0.0034)    5.36 (p=0.0048) 
weak instrument test           
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝛼 = 0.10)       7.03    7.03 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝛼 = 0.15)      4.58    4.58 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝛼 = 0.20)      3.95    3.95 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The two potentially endogenous variables (importance of proximity to family and adaptability to new circumstance) enter the 
specifications as quasi continuous variables (on a scale from 1 to 7). This modification is implemented with regard to the first stage 
estimations. LR 𝜒2 refers to the logit model, F to the LPM and Wald 𝜒2 to the IV estimation. 𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡report the critical values of Stock and 
Yogo’s (2005) weak instrument test, assuming i.i.d. error structure. 
 
Older individuals are less likely to form a choice set larger than size one. Since older age implies 
fewer years in the labour market to reap additional study-related returns to education, such a 
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smaller choice set may thus be the rational outcome. Least patient individuals exhibit a lower 
likelihood of forming a larger choice set as well: increasing admission likelihood, eventually rising 
expected future returns due to this human capital investment, is less valued by those individuals with 
a stronger preference for the present. Lastly, individuals displaying a weaker educational 
performance, indicated by a worse grade, also opt less frequently for a larger initial choice set. 
Amongst the potentially endogenous regressors, only adaptability displays a significant correlation 
with the dependent variable in the logit baseline specifications. More adaptable persons have higher 
odds of forming a larger choice set.  
The third and fifth columns in Table 3.2 and Table A3.3 (in the appendix) report second stage results 
from a two-stage least squares estimation, one controlling for origin characteristics. Testing for 
exogeneity of the two potentially endogenous regressors (𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
 and 𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
) leads to a non-
rejection of the Null hypothesis: regarding the scope of choice sets, these two variables do not 
display a significant correlation with the error term.  
In either case, the chosen instruments display a significant joint explanatory power in a respective 
first stage, as indicated by the corresponding F-statistics (labelled ‘F(instruments)’). Previous 
residential moves during childhood are a significant predictor of a less pronounced relevance of 
proximity to family, whereas participation in a school exchange programme does not display 
explanatory power on its own. Findings are reversed when it comes to the first stage explaining high 
degrees of adaptability: only the participation in a short-term exchange is significant, but not 
previous residential moves. Referring to a more formal test, Stock and Yogo (2005) characterise a set 
of instruments to be weak if a Wald test with a nominal confidence level of 5% exhibits an actual 
rejection rate of up to 10 % (15 % or 20 %). In case of the first potentially endogenous variable 
𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
, the respective first stage F-statistics of 8.38 and 8.18 are above the provided critical F-values 
for an actual 𝛼 of 10 %.29 This implies that the Null hypothesis of weak instruments can be rejected. 
For the second potentially endogenous regressor, with first stage F-statistics of 5.71 and 5.36, the 
Null can only be rejected at an actual 𝛼 equal to 15%.  
A direct comparison of OLS and IV estimates for the potentially endogenous regressors delivers 
evidence for the occurrence of attenuation bias: OLS estimates are always closer to zero than 
corresponding IV estimates. Ultimately, only adaptability shows explanatory power in the IV 
specification’s second stage without origin controls: a one scale-point increase in adaptability raises 
the probability that an individual has a choice set of at least size two by approximately 20 %. 
Though the binary scope approach yields valuable insights, and allows addressing the issue of 
potentially endogenous variables, it discards some of the information actually available in 𝑛𝐶0and 
𝑛𝐶0
𝐿 . There might be a qualitative difference, not only with respect to whether someone has an initial 
                                                          
29
 Provided critical F-statistics assume errors to be in fact i.i.d. Derived first stage F-statistics in a robust specification, 
however, are smaller than the corresponding statistics from estimations without robust variance-covariance matrix. 
Therefore, smaller F-statistics in the robust case make non-rejection of the Null of weak instruments even more likely. 
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choice set of size two or one, but also having one, two, three and four or more alternatives included 
into the initial choice set. This is addressed in the following subsection by applying ordered logit 
estimations. In an ordered logit model, the probability that an individual’s choice set is of scope 
𝑛𝐶0 = 𝑗 ∀ 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4 is represented by 
𝑃(𝑛𝑖,𝐶0 = 𝑗) = 𝑃(𝜅𝑗−1 < 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝜀 ≤ 𝜅𝑗) =
1
1+exp(−𝜅𝑗+𝑋′𝛽)
−
1
1+exp(−𝜅𝑗−1𝑋′𝛽)
 .  (3.2) 
It corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function 𝑋′𝛽 plus the logistically 
distributed error term 𝜀 are within the interval defined by the upper cut point 𝜅𝑗 and lower cut point 
𝜅𝑗−1. An underlying assumption is the so-called proportional odds or parallel regression assumption: 
it requires that the functional relation between an explanatory variable and the observed outcome is 
not conditional on the outcome level. In other words, irrespective of whether one compares 
individuals with 𝑛𝐶0 = 1 to those with 𝑛𝐶0 ∈ [2,4] or alternatively the group with 𝑛𝐶0 ∈ [1,2] to 
those individuals with 𝑛𝐶0 ∈ [3,4], the coefficients obtained from the first comparison should not 
significantly differ from those derived in the second comparison. This assumption can be tested, for 
instance, using the Brant (1990) or the Wolfe-Gould (1998) test. 
An alternative approach to investigate the initial choice set’s scope, treating the number of 
applications as actual count data, is a censored Poisson regression model. It accounts for a censoring 
at four or more alternatives in the initial choice set. More precisely, the right-censored Poisson 
regression model actually addresses the number of additional ‘hedging’ applications, such that the 
corresponding dependent variable is  𝑛𝐶0
𝑃 = 𝑛𝐶0 − 1 and the censoring occurs at the threshold  
𝑇 = 𝑛𝐶0
𝑃 = 3.30 
Based on a Poisson distribution, the probability to observe 𝑛𝐶0
𝑃 = 𝑗 is given by 
𝑃(𝑛𝐶0
𝑃 = 𝑗|𝑋) =
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑗
𝑗!
= 𝑃𝑗        (3.3) 
where 𝜆 is the distribution’s mean. Following Greene (2012, p. 812-814), the corresponding 
conditional mean function, assuming a right-censored Poisson distribution, is represented by 
𝐸[𝑛𝐶0
𝑃 |𝑋] = 𝑇 − ∑ (𝑇 − 𝑗)𝑃𝑗
𝑇−1
𝑗=0        (3.4) 
It represents the expected incidence of an additional application, beyond the first one, which also 
consequently extends the initial choice set’s scope. 
Results for the more precise scope measures (Table 3.3 and Table A3.4) support the main findings 
from the binary scope analysis. The odds of having a larger initial choice set are 0.8739 (0.9001) 
times smaller if age was to increase by one year.31 Similarly, derived incidence rate ratios (IRR) in the 
censored Poisson model indicate that if an individual was to age one year, his incidence rate of 
                                                          
30
 This modification of the dependent variable is required so the outcome can be modelled as originating from a Poisson 
process, i.e., 𝑛𝐶0
𝑃 = 0 has to be possible. 
31
 Across specifications, both the Brant and the Wolf-Gould test lead to non-rejection (at a confidence level of 5 % or 10%) 
of the Null hypothesis of no coefficient differences across outcome groupings. This indicates that the proportional odds 
assumption is not violated. 
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hedging applications would change by a factor of 0.9367 (0.9498) ceteris paribus. This is equivalent 
to a decrease of 6.33 % (5.02 %) in the expected count of such applications. 
In addition to the trait patience, the Big-Five trait extraversion now displays explanatory power too: 
least extraverted individuals have 0.62 times smaller odds of sending additional applications. In 
terms of incidence rates of hedging applications, these individuals have an approximately 20 % lower 
expected incidence rate than the reference group. Since the dependent variables in the ordinal and 
count approaches account for a wider scope, these findings indicate that least extraverted individuals 
perceive their returns to a larger choice set, and thus to a higher overall admission likelihood, as not 
as positive as their peers in the reference group. 
Table 3.3: Choice set’s scope – ordinal approach, all applications 
dependent variable  𝑛𝑖,𝐶0 
 𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝑃  
estimation method  ologit  cpoisson 
 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  IRR  s.e.  IRR  s.e. 
gender (female)  1.1813  (0.1275)   1.0811  (0.1150)  1.0804   (0.0521)   1.0438   (0.0503) 
age  0.8739 *** (0.0328)   0.9001 *** (0.0321)  0.9367 *** (0.0169)   0.9498 *** (0.0165) 
academic household  1.1929 * (0.1203)   1.1551  (0.1141)  1.0771 * (0.0481)   1.0690   (0.0477) 
uec grade  0.8861  (0.0858)   0.7733 *** (0.0729)  0.9482   (0.0411)   0.8868 *** (0.0372) 
vocational training  1.2765  (0.2382)   1.2780  (0.2302)  1.1209   (0.0988)   1.1207   (0.0974) 
partnership                             
< 6 months  0.9569  (0.1700)   0.9435  (0.1647)  0.9907   (0.0796)   0.9775   (0.0788) 
6-12 months  0.7856  (0.1389)   0.7117 * (0.1255)  0.8878   (0.0745)   0.8462 ** (0.0714) 
1-2 years  0.8122  (0.1449)   0.7691  (0.1378)  0.8930   (0.0744)   0.8723   (0.0727) 
2-3 years  0.8977  (0.1490)   0.8996  (0.1495)  0.9665   (0.0737)   0.9552   (0.0746) 
> 3 years  0.7979  (0.1412)   0.7998  (0.1376)  0.9006   (0.0769)   0.8991   (0.0769) 
risk attitude (career domain)                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.9714  (0.1396)   1.0244  (0.1483)  0.9965   (0.0648)   1.0157   (0.0667) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.8739  (0.1083)   0.9085  (0.1086)  0.9369   (0.0523)   0.9557   (0.0528) 
patience                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.6266 *** (0.0807)   0.6347 *** (0.0816)  0.7968 *** (0.0501)   0.8030 *** (0.0510) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.2249  (0.1631)   1.1865  (0.1548)  1.1054 * (0.0645)   1.0918   (0.0631) 
extraversion                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.6184 *** (0.0893)   0.6144 *** (0.0873)  0.8002 *** (0.0568)   0.7888 *** (0.0563) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.0880  (0.1350)   1.0671  (0.1307)  1.0399   (0.0575)   1.0308   (0.0568) 
neuroticism                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.8508  (0.1288)   0.8652  (0.1275)  0.9165   (0.0656)   0.9289   (0.0660) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.1025  (0.1577)   1.1306  (0.1601)  1.0488   (0.0652)   1.0643   (0.0657) 
openness                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.9604  (0.1203)   1.0002  (0.1241)  0.9787   (0.0556)   0.9943   (0.0567) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.0762  (0.1432)   0.9377  (0.1225)  1.0274   (0.0613)   0.9686   (0.0574) 
conscientiousness                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.9772  (0.1226)   0.9807  (0.1224)  0.9828   (0.0556)   0.9843   (0.0561) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.8406  (0.1076)   0.8174  (0.1034)  0.9175   (0.0539)   0.9094   (0.0533) 
agreeableness                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.9862  (0.1230)   0.9386  (0.1160)  0.9904   (0.0564)   0.9672   (0.0552) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.9012  (0.1174)   0.9096  (0.1180)  0.9583   (0.0565)   0.9573   (0.0567) 
local conditions at origin (district)                               
GDP growth  1.0107  (0.0082)         1.0058   (0.0038)         
unemployment growth   1.1556 *** (0.0605)         1.0703 *** (0.0268)         
population density (log)  0.8090 *** (0.0438)         0.9113 *** (0.0233)         
recreational area (per capita, log)  0.5399 *** (0.0691)         0.7511 *** (0.0445)         
constant                 
cut points (𝜅1, 𝜅2, 𝜅3)                 
observations  1717  1717  1717  1717 
log likelihood  -1911.49  -1947.14  -2149.57  -2200.78 
df  28  24  28  24 
LR 𝜒2(df)  137.31  71.42  132.44  70.62 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared  0.0357  0.0174     
Brant test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2)  60.55 / 56 / 0.315  51.04 / 48 / 0.355     
Wolfe-Gould test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2)  54.35 / 56 / 0.207  52.07 / 48 / 0.319     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Some other findings, of slightly less robust nature, deserve some mentioning: local conditions at 
individuals’ origins exhibit some explanatory power in the initial choice set’s scope approach as well. 
The environment with which one is confronted around graduation from school might have some 
impact on the decision-making process. If, for instance, employment perspectives are poor, investing 
in human capital - and thereby acquiring the skills to enter later into the white-collar labour market - 
might become more attractive. This explains the positive relationship between unemployment 
growth and a larger initial choice set, increasing admission likelihood.  
Population density and recreational area at the district of origin are negatively associated to the 
choice set’s size. A plausible explanation is a certain preference for the current centre of one’s life, 
being characterised by a certain degree of urbanisation and recreational value. If staying in such an 
environment yields non-monetary returns, increasing the choice set by applying to a larger number 
of distant universities would not be optimal. At the same time, even in larger cities the number of 
potential institutions offering the desired study programme is limited. 
Furthermore, GDP growth is positively related to the occurrence of larger choice sets, though 
typically only significant at the 10 % significance level. A higher GDP growth, in turn, is indicative of 
increasing household wealth. Improving economic circumstances might eventually enable some 
individuals to apply at institutions located in destinations with higher price levels, which are on 
average inaccessible to individuals from less affluent origins. This expands the potential set of 
destinations for persons from economically prospering districts, translating into larger choice sets. 
On the level of individual traits, only weak evidence exists in favour of a direct link between a higher 
willingness to take risks and a diminishing choice set’s scope, including geographically distinct 
locations (Table A3.3). Relationship status, in contrast, proves to be more insightful: compared to 
individuals not in a relationship, those in a relationship of six to twelve months or two years feature 
distinctly smaller choice sets. The benefits of increasing the choice set, requiring possibly applications 
at distant institutions, might not compensate adequately if the partner lives in the district of origin. 
Those aspects, which are enhancing the value of staying at one specific familiar location, especially 
seem to confine the choice set’s scope. Their impact should become more visible in the subsequent 
choice set’s components approach, explicitly integrating the geographic dimension. 
3.4.3 The initial choice set’s components 
Initial choice sets will not only vary with respect to their size, but also regarding their components: 
depending on individual preferences and circumstances, chosen alternatives should display some 
common features. In the context of choosing a study location, potentially resulting in a mobility 
event, a relevant criterion for an alternative’s inclusion into the initial choice set is distance. 
Moreover, contingent upon individual traits and preferences, observed components should be 
optimally chosen.  
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Establishing a link between individual traits and those optimally chosen components, evaluated in 
the distance dimension, informs about an individual’s fundamental willingness to migrate at the 
initial decision stage. Acknowledging the existence of revealed alternatives, the initial choice set’s 
components approach provides insights into a basic mobility inclination, undistorted by subsequent 
external admission processes. Such downstream acceptance processes in the sense of a potential 
supply side restriction, possibly eliminating most preferred alternatives, may introduce bias to the 
estimated relationship between individual traits and observed outcomes in a migration context.  
To evaluate the choice set’s components in the distance domain, the baseline measure is defined as 
the distance between an individual’s origin (where someone graduated from school) and a selected 
alternative. It is calculated as the distance between the two corresponding postal code area’s 
centroids, yielding an average distance between the two small-scale areas. This simple geographic 
distance measure, indicating a basic inclination towards mobility for educational purposes, has a 
clear drawback: a higher value does not necessarily imply that the respective individual is 
fundamentally more willing to move farther than another person with a somehow lower value. In 
fact, the higher value might just be an artefact if someone lived in a more rural area, and hence the 
closest university was more distant.  
To mitigate the ramifications of this issue, the concept of ‘excess mobility’ is introduced: it is defined 
as the difference between the distance to a potential university location and the distance to the 
nearest university (or university of applied sciences) offering an economics bachelor programme.32 
Referring to Figure 3.3 (left panel), the excess distance in case of the most preferred alternative 
would be the difference between the distance from ‘origin’ to the location labelled ‘1’ less the 
distance from ‘origin’ to location ‘2’.  
Three distinct measures of excess mobility will be investigated, all on the kilometre scale. The first is 
the minimum excess distance (𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛), referring to the closest alternative in the initial choice set. Its 
counterpart is the maximum excess distance (𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥), accounting for the most distant selected 
alternative. The third measure is the average excess distance (𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔) of all stated alternatives in the 
initial choice set. This measure takes into account the geographic dispersion of observed components 
in the choice set and reflects by how much a person was willing to move beyond the closest possible 
destination on average.  
A fourth measure relaxes the assumption of disclosed absolute distances, and introduces relative 
distances. Individuals may not exactly know the distance between a larger number of potential 
destinations and their origin, but may have formed an educated guess regarding which locations are 
closer and which are distant. Such relative distances are captured by a rank measure, representing an 
alternative’s relative position amongst all potential 164 alternatives in the destination space. For the 
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 Alternative specifications were based on excess mobility in relation to universities, yet the results were almost identical. 
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sake of brevity, only results for average rank positions of alternatives (𝑟𝑑
𝑎𝑣𝑔
) in the initial choice set 
are reported. 
On average, the closest alternative in the initial choice set was 42.76 kilometres farther away than 
the nearest potential study location (Table 3.4). However, at least one fourth selected the closest 
possible alternative into the initial choice set.33 All three excess mobility measures and the rank-
based measure are distinctly right-skewed, indicating a strong preference for closer alternatives right 
from the start when students formed their initial choice set. 
Table 3.4: Choice sets’ components – potential excess mobility and rank based mobility 
 mean std. dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 42.76 70.92 0.0 0.0 13.6 53.8 126.0 
𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔 100.42 94.58 0.0 28.1 73.7 147.3 230.4 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 169.50 150.73 0.0 46.8 122.0 267.2 399.1 
𝑟𝑑
𝑎𝑣𝑔
 25.88 27.89 1.0 5.5 15.3 37.8 66.8 
Note: The sample size is in all four cases 1714 individuals. Columns labelled ‘p’ document corresponding 
percentile thresholds. 
The first analytical step in investigating the initial inclination towards mobility is a linear estimation of 
potential excess mobility 
𝑑𝑗 = 𝑋′𝛽 + 𝜀. 
Model specifications are identical to those in the scope approach. This also includes an IV estimation 
to account for the potential endogeneity of some regressors (proximity to reference persons and 
adaptability). Though the dependent variable is highly right skewed, it is not log-transformed, since 
estimating the conditional mean function 𝐸[ln(𝑑𝑗|𝑋)] = 𝑋′𝛽 was only possible for 𝑑𝑗 > 0. This, 
however, would result in the loss of a substantial number of observations.  
A strategy to account for the dependent variable’s skewedness and 𝑑𝑗 = 0 is the estimation of a 
generalised linear model (GLM). The selected gamma model with log-link function relies then on the 
natural logarithm of the expected outcome 
ln(𝐸[𝑑𝑗|𝑋]) = 𝑋′𝛽. 
This specification furthermore assumes the outcome variable 𝑑𝑗 to follow a gamma distribution 
Γ(𝑎, 𝑏), with shape parameter 𝑎 ≤ 1 and a scale parameter 𝑏.34 Such a specification is suitable to 
deliver estimates in a model of continuous positive distances, which do not suffer from an upward 
bias observed in a log-transformed OLS model. 
In contrast to the scope approach, there is substantial evidence in favour of the two critical 
regressors (importance of proximity to reference persons and adaptability) actually being 
endogenous (Table 3.5). First stage results are virtually identical to the scope approach,35 lending 
support to a channel on how previous mobility experiences may affect perceived psychic costs in 
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 This is indicated by 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 for the 25th percentile. 
34
 The shape parameter’s definition corresponds to a non-symmetric distribution, as observed in the data. The scale 
parameter reflects the dispersion above zero. 
35
 Minor changes in some decimal places originate solely from the slightly different sample (1714 instead of 1717 
individuals). As in the scope approach, comparing F-statistics from a test on joint significance of the instruments to the 
critical Stock and Yogo (2005) values indicates that the instruments pass the weak instrument test. 
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subsequent mobility-related decision scenarios: on the one hand via a lowered importance of 
proximity to reference persons, and on the other hand via an increased adjustment capability.  
Table 3.5: Choice set’s components – potential excess mobility (OLS and IV) 
dependent variable  𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑣𝑔
 
estimation method  OLS  OLS  IV (2
nd stage)  OLS  IV (2nd stage) 
 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female)  1.149 (4.868)  4.458  (4.761)  14.507  (14.479)  2.760  (4.731)  10.046  (15.954) 
age  3.948 ** (1.793)  3.769 ** (1.800)  1.068  (3.984)  4.279 ** (1.797)  1.671  (4.045) 
academic household  21.245 *** (4.758)  17.411 *** (4.646)  -6.606  (12.290)  16.845 *** (4.645)  -7.392  (12.816) 
uec grade  -4.170 (4.704)  -7.714 * (4.583)  -36.621 *** (13.157)  -10.031 ** (4.387)  -42.911 *** (14.422) 
vocational training  -13.122 (8.752)  -9.184  (8.660)  16.740  (19.499)  -8.892  (8.559)  17.577  (20.211) 
partnership                            
< 6 months  -4.533 (9.052)  -1.940  (8.740)  1.517  (20.566)  -1.890  (8.693)  -1.689  (21.973) 
6-12 months  -19.470 ** (7.926)  -15.571 ** (7.837)  -6.856  (22.247)  -17.495 ** (7.870)  -13.282  (23.896) 
1-2 years  -21.721 *** (7.355)  -14.594 ** (7.428)  29.738  (21.636)  -15.208 ** (7.463)  28.099  (22.449) 
2-3 years  -15.927 ** (7.987)  -11.688  (7.889)  17.066  (19.147)  -11.645  (7.998)  17.629  (20.015) 
> 3 years  -32.705 *** (8.098)  -29.334 *** (7.815)  -13.258  (18.001)  -29.056 *** (7.860)  -14.009  (19.052) 
risk attitude (career domain)                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -14.375 ** (6.384)  -11.102 * (6.163)  11.176  (15.462)  -10.346 * (6.129)  13.331  (16.239) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  4.348 (5.802)  -0.293  (5.752)  -28.032 * (15.037)  0.140  (5.789)  -27.146 * (15.784) 
patience                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -14.756 ** (5.847)  -13.962 ** (5.695)  -9.756  (11.722)  -13.988 ** (5.751)  -9.470  (12.248) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  15.848 ** (7.092)  9.115  (6.973)  -44.928 ** (21.824)  8.401  (6.949)  -47.914 ** (22.914) 
extraversion                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -21.020 *** (6.495)  -10.548  (6.645)  85.295 ** (37.770)  -12.029 * (6.674)  89.833 ** (40.300) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -1.881 (6.049)  -6.080  (5.907)  -52.378 ** (22.379)  -6.203  (5.910)  -57.158 ** (24.482) 
neuroticism                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -0.230 (7.430)  -4.650  (7.300)  -60.017 ** (28.324)  -4.636  (7.307)  -64.610 ** (30.184) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  5.323 (6.387)  9.673  (6.175)  53.138 ** (21.746)  10.632 * (6.198)  57.570 ** (23.472) 
openness                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -9.434 * (5.338)  -5.580  (5.235)  20.364  (13.580)  -4.687  (5.236)  21.697  (14.187) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  14.120 ** (6.660)  11.395 * (6.524)  -9.609  (14.464)  8.728  (6.422)  -15.453  (15.362) 
conscientiousness                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -0.976 (5.731)  -1.753  (5.575)  -0.027  (12.189)  -1.570  (5.622)  1.670  (12.850) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -8.711 (5.970)  -9.957 * (5.997)  -28.053 * (15.943)  -10.258 * (5.996)  -30.426 * (16.982) 
agreeableness                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -6.038 (5.546)  -8.507  (5.499)  -14.071  (14.921)  -9.612 * (5.539)  -14.081  (15.614) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -5.434 (6.078)  -5.208  (5.910)  -13.653  (14.266)  -5.152  (5.957)  -15.767  (15.307) 
𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: imp. of prox. (family)     -9.641 *** (1.529)  -43.939  (29.110)  -9.787 *** (1.538)  -39.366  (31.577) 
𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: adaptability     8.208 *** (1.603)  103.120 ** (40.874)  7.967 *** (1.605)  111.802 ** (44.734) 
origin controls                     
constant                     
observations  1714  1714  1714  1714  1714 
df  28  30  30  26  26 
F / Wald 𝜒2  4.82  6.71  47.99  6.89  38.46 
prob > F  / prob > 𝜒2    0.0000  0.0000  0.0199  0.0000  0.0548 
pseudo 𝑅2  / adjusted 𝑅2  0.0523  0.1005    0.0922   
exogeneity test           
Wooldridge (1995) score test      36.44 (p=0.0000)    37.39 (p=0.0000) 
regression based test      18.39 (p=0.0000)    18.93 (p=0.0000) 
1st stage: 𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
           
F(model)      6.48 (p=0.0000)    7.13 (p=0.0000) 
𝑧1: res. move during school      -0.3689 *** (0.0979)    -0.3588 *** (0.0974) 
𝑧2: exchange participation      -0.1238  (0.0817)    -0.1286  (0.0815) 
F(instruments)      8.44 (p=0.0002)    8.24 (p=0.0003) 
1st stage: 𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
           
F(model)      13.54 (p=0.0000)    15.08 (p=0.0000) 
𝑧1: res. move during school      0.0005  (0.0857)    0.0081  (0.0857) 
𝑧2: exchange participation      0.2469 *** (0.0744)    0.2385 *** (0.0743) 
F(instruments)      5.56 (p=0.0039)    5.20 (p=0.0056) 
weak instrument test           
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝛼 = 0.10)       7.03    7.03 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝛼 = 0.15)      4.58    4.58 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝛼 = 0.20)      3.95    3.95 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The two potentially endogenous variables (importance of proximity to family and adaptability to new circumstance) enter the 
specifications as quasi continuous variables (on a scale from 1 to 7). This modification is implemented with regard to the first stage 
estimations. 𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡report the critical values of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak instrument t assuming i.i.d. error structure. 
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Second stage results indicate, however, that only the latter might be relevant. The lower the 
instrumented degree of adaptability, the more clustered are the selected alternatives around the 
origin. In addition, second stage results also portend a preference of low performing pupils for 
choosing closer alternatives: students with a one grade worse university entrance certificate select 
alternatives that are on average 36.6 to 42.9 kilometres closer to their origin. 
In addition, those individuals most willing to take risks are restricting their initial choice set to consist 
of closer alternatives. Considering that these applicants do in fact limit their overall access to a 
broader spectrum of institutions of higher education, such patterns related to risk attitude become 
reasonable. A remaining issue is the overall model fit in case of the IV estimations. Though the 
specifications can address some potential endogeneity in factors related to psychic costs, relatively 
small Wald test statistics for the second stage (p-values of 0.0199 and 0.0548) indicate a potential 
lack of overall explanatory power. Given the dependent variables’ highly right-skewed distribution, 
such small a model fit is a likely outcome. 
In order to overcome this limitation, Table 3.6 reports average marginal effects from the above 
mentioned GLM estimation. The model specification corresponds to the one in the first column in 
Table 3.5, thus to a specification without the two endogenous variables.36  
Although the underlying concepts vary, results are highly comparable across the varying definitions 
of the dependent variable, both regarding magnitude and significance. Accounting for the skewed 
nature of the dependent variable, several robust findings emerge. 
Individuals from an academic household, select on average potential destinations into their initial 
choice set that are 20.5 kilometres farther away than those from a non-academic background. This 
points to the existence of an intergenerational transmission of mobility preferences. Social life, i.e., 
being in a relationship, seems to affect the formation of the initial choice set as well. Aside from 
those shortly in a relationship, being in a relationship makes the preselected alternatives more 
clustered around the origin. This just confirms that long-term relationships might indeed hamper 
mobility of only one partner, respectively lead to tied-stayers (cf. Mincer, 1978) with an implicitly 
restricted access to higher education. Such restrictions regarding enrolment alternatives into tertiary 
education, hence bearing the potential to affect the human capital formation adversely, might also 
have repercussions on subsequent post-graduation earnings paths. 
In line with hypotheses on human capital investment, least patient individuals applied on average 
(referring to 𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑣𝑔
) at locations 16.4 kilometres closer to their origin. A similar pattern can be 
detected for least extraverted individuals or those least open to experience, the latter effects being 
typically only half the size. These two traits appear to be related to how individuals perceive psychic 
costs of mobility – not only do some individuals eventually choose closer alternatives, they 
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 Raw coefficients are reported in Table A3.6 in the appendix. Based on a link test, the discussed specifications do not 
include origin controls.   
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considered only potential destinations in closer proximity to their current living environment right 
from the start. 
As in the scope approach, the evidence for a prominent role of risk attitude during the formation of 
the initial choice set is limited. Least risk-prone individuals tend to select a closest alternative (𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) 
that is 10.5 kilometres nearer compared to the reference group, formed by individuals of average 
willingness to take risk. On average, their most preferred alternatives in the initial choice set are 13.8 
kilometres closer to their origin. 
 Table 3.6: Choice set’s components – average marginal effects 
dependent variable  𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑚𝑖𝑛  𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑣𝑔
  𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑟𝑑,𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑣𝑔
 
estimation method  Γ, log-link  Γ, log-link  Γ, log-link  Γ, log-link 
 
 AME  s.e.  AME  s.e.  AME  s.e.  AME  s.e. 
gender (female)  0.8601 (3.6229)  -1.7273 (4.8700)  -4.4568 (8.0024)  -1.3412 (1.4521) 
age  4.0914 *** (1.3253)  4.1766 ** (1.8107)  2.9189 (2.9258)  0.9840 * (0.5402) 
academic household  6.9917 * (3.5910)  20.5438 *** (4.7590)  37.0998 *** (7.6120)  5.6413 *** (1.4059) 
uec grade  1.4315 (3.2196)  -5.1830 (4.2231)  -14.6298 ** (6.7353)  -2.7134 ** (1.2608) 
vocational training  -11.8111 ** (5.2232)  -13.3834 * (7.9510)  -8.2074 (13.8485)  -4.8333 ** (2.2793) 
partnership             
< 6 months  4.1830 (6.6677)  -1.0237 (9.1315)  -1.6672 (14.5714)  -0.7729 (2.6406) 
6-12 months  -10.6084 * (5.5893)  -18.9172 ** (8.3334)  -27.6453 * (14.1786)  -4.7062 * (2.6094) 
1-2 years  -1.9407 (5.8752)  -21.3984 *** (7.2287)  -38.5916 *** (11.4498)  -6.2108 *** (2.1397) 
2-3 years  -7.4783 (5.8718)  -17.8535 ** (7.9902)  -28.6185 ** (12.4938)  -6.5060 *** (2.1893) 
> 3 years  -13.3133 ** (5.4834)  -33.0298 *** (7.8107)  -53.2971 *** (13.2006)  -8.9455 *** (2.3425) 
risk attitude (career domain)             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -10.5157 ** (4.3960)  -13.8311 ** (6.7125)  -13.4694 (11.1355)  -3.2107 (2.0389) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  4.9884 (4.5372)  4.8142 (5.6465)  10.1732 (8.9782)  1.3160 (1.6920) 
patience             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  1.2761 (4.6474)  -16.3669 *** (5.8037)  -36.4541 *** (8.9562)  -4.2769 ** (1.7228) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  6.6378 (5.0064)  15.7202 ** (7.0422)  25.4126 ** (11.1420)  5.0389 ** (2.0770) 
extraversion             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -10.1447 ** (4.5885)  -22.4361 *** (6.4007)  -36.4696 *** (10.4541)  -5.8311 *** (1.9473) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  2.7971 (4.5954)  1.3506 (6.1773)  0.1101 (9.5550)  0.1055 (1.7950) 
neuroticism             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  2.1145 (5.5139)  2.0875 (7.3274)  -0.3355 (11.2938)  0.0996 (2.1360) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  4.9106 (5.1794)  6.8227 (6.9592)  7.9829 (11.0581)  2.2010 (2.1187) 
openness             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -8.0848 ** (3.6616)  -10.7644 ** (5.2438)  -15.7635 * (8.9471)  -3.6385 ** (1.5426) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  3.2691 (4.7926)  9.4261 (6.6993)  17.5075 (10.7821)  1.8823 (2.0043) 
conscientiousness             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -2.0667 (4.3274)  0.9482 (5.9664)  3.8884 (9.8332)  -0.0715 (1.7846) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -9.0156 ** (4.1343)  -9.7699 * (5.8804)  -13.6331 (9.5210)  -3.1152 * (1.7138) 
agreeableness             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -5.1073 (4.2424)  -6.5983 (5.7975)  -7.5946 (9.4467)  -1.0605 (1.7865) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -7.7450 * (4.1753)  -5.9363 (6.0763)  -1.8982 (10.0972)  -2.0955 (1.7534) 
observations  1714  1714  1714  1714 
log likelihood  -8078.01  -9568.16  -10459.99  -7233.39 
deviance  1549.73  1240.93  1236.63  2283.23 
rank (k)  25  25  25  25 
AIC  9.4551  11.1939  12.2345  8.4695 
BIC  -11027.55  -11336.36  -11340.65  -10294.05 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The diagnostic section is taken from Table A3.6 in the appendix. AMEs for the first three specifications correspond to 
kilometre changes. For the rank distance measure, the AMEs inform about changes in the average rank position of 
alternatives in the initial choice set. 
Typically, factors relevant for explaining the size of individuals’ initial choice sets also display distinct 
explanatory power in the components approach: if the sign of corresponding coefficients is 
consistent, their statistical significance in the components approach is usually more pronounced. 
Moreover, the socio-demographic background becomes more important when it comes to selecting 
potential alternatives. The linkage between relationship status and the clustering of preselected 
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alternatives in a relatively close proximity is especially salient. In a similar fashion, perceived psychic 
costs are influenced by the personality traits extraversion and openness. Empirical evidence suggests 
that individuals, who score low in these two traits, already anticipate during the initial decision-
making process that they might have a harder time handling new experiences and reconnecting if 
they leave their familiar environment.  
The next chapter investigates the extent to which these considerations uphold when it comes to the 
final decision for one location, after the potential restriction of the initial choice set by the admission 
process at a chosen study location. 
3.5 Observed mobility choices  
After prospective students revealed their basic preferences regarding a specific study programme 
and location during the formation of the initial choice set, their final choice set is then determined by 
the institutions' admission process. Depending on universities’ selection criteria, the size of the final 
choice set 𝐶1 varies between one and the maximum scope of the initial choice set.
37  
If the final choice set is larger than one, additional information can then be obtained from the 
location choice: it is now possible to identify a decision-maker’s willingness to migrate based on 
whether he or she chooses an alternative nearby or farther away (for example see Figure 3.3, right 
panel). 
3.5.1 Migratory preferences in the presence of alternatives 
To assess possible factors influencing mobility-related choices of students in a more robust way, 
individually displayed geographic mobility is evaluated based on three alternative dependent 
variables. The first one is constructed as binary variable, indicating whether someone chose the 
closest alternative over the most preferred alternative with admission in the subset of size  𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2. 
Referring to the right panel in Figure 3.3, the dependent variable 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2 is coded as one, if the 
most preferred location ‘1’ is the closer alternative, and zero if the finally chosen university ‘U’ is the 
closer alternative.38 The second binary dependent variable (𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]) accounts for all observed 
alternatives in the final choice set 𝐶1 of size 𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]. Once again, this variable is encoded as one 
if the eventually chosen alternative ‘U’ is not the closest location and zero if it is the closest option to 
the previous location amongst all stated available alternatives.  
More information regarding geographic mobility is contained in the third dependent variable 
(𝑟𝑢|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]), being of ordinal nature. The three categories indicate whether someone picked the 
closest observed alternative in the final choice set 𝐶1, a destination at intermediate distance or the 
                                                          
37
 Principally, the choice set could also collapse to zero if all applications were rejected. As the sample under scrutiny 
consists of enrolled students, the final choice set’s de facto minimum scope is one. 
38
 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
𝐿∗ = 2 indicates whenever the chosen alternative was not the closest alternative (compared to the most preferred 
alternative), given the two options are geographically distinct locations. This variable mirrors the concept from the scope 
approach. 
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remotest available alternative with admission. Ultimately, this concept’s categories capture a 
progressive degree of displayed mobility. 
As in the analyses of the choice set formation, the binary variables have been investigated in a linear 
probability model in a first analytical step. Subsequent IV estimations (Table A3.7, in the appendix), 
addressing the possible endogeneity of factors impacting on perceived psychic costs (proximity to 
family and adaptability), signify potential endogeneity only for the decisions in the context of the 
complete observed final choice set (𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]). 
Table 3.7: Observed mobility – logit and ordered logit models 
dependent variable  𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2  𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
𝐿∗ = 2  𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]  𝑟𝑢|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4] 
estimation method  logit  logit  logit  ologit 
 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
gender (female)  1.0032  (0.1505)  0.9774  (0.1446)  1.3635 ** (0.1929)  1.3439 ** (0.1775) 
age  0.9337  (0.0560)  0.9290  (0.0536)  0.9857  (0.0521)  0.9812  (0.0492) 
academic household  0.9554  (0.1328)  0.9730  (0.1331)  1.2208  (0.1605)  1.0704  (0.1313) 
uec grade  1.8299 *** (0.2616)  1.6898 *** (0.2353)  1.2228  (0.1595)  1.3877 *** (0.1722) 
vocational training  0.7035  (0.1882)  0.7374  (0.1922)  0.7147  (0.1776)  0.6173 ** (0.1392) 
partnership                         
< 6 months  0.9377  (0.2372)  0.8894  (0.2224)  0.7150  (0.1726)  0.7725  (0.1800) 
6-12 months  0.8895  (0.2271)  0.8375  (0.2119)  0.6840  (0.1621)  0.6778 * (0.1529) 
1-2 years  0.6984  (0.1782)  0.8756  (0.2141)  0.7772  (0.1767)  0.8761  (0.2025) 
2-3 years  0.7238  (0.1870)  0.6620  (0.1699)  0.7149  (0.1707)  0.6986  (0.1554) 
> 3 years  1.3809  (0.3729)  1.4869  (0.3904)  1.3621  (0.3447)  1.3789  (0.3096) 
risk attitude (career domain)                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.7350  (0.1694)  0.6870 * (0.1545)  0.7219  (0.1478)  0.7035 * (0.1348) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.1570  (0.1860)  1.1265  (0.1789)  1.2061  (0.1888)  1.0976  (0.1536) 
patience                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  1.1196  (0.2215)  1.0239  (0.1999)  0.7799  (0.1454)  0.8085  (0.1506) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.0991  (0.2012)  1.1379  (0.2039)  1.1896  (0.2114)  1.1490  (0.1802) 
extraversion                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.6061 ** (0.1390)  0.5789 ** (0.1319)  0.7560  (0.1548)  0.7455  (0.1425) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.0195  (0.1769)  1.0689  (0.1815)  1.1318  (0.1865)  1.1651  (0.1787) 
neuroticism                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.8613  (0.1902)  0.9240  (0.1962)  0.9946  (0.2007)  1.0100  (0.1971) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.9959  (0.1933)  0.9262  (0.1777)  0.8475  (0.1551)  0.7434 * (0.1169) 
openness                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.8660  (0.1553)  0.9091  (0.1583)  1.2109  (0.1986)  1.1286  (0.1717) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.1381  (0.2078)  1.1273  (0.2036)  1.1996  (0.2084)  1.1387  (0.1806) 
conscientiousness                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  1.0662  (0.1919)  1.0174  (0.1798)  1.0212  (0.1729)  0.9794  (0.1609) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.0519  (0.1971)  0.9996  (0.1833)  1.0375  (0.1822)  0.8997  (0.1367) 
agreeableness                         
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  0.6563 ** (0.1217)  0.6651 ** (0.1193)  0.9720  (0.1613)  0.9820  (0.1505) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.4568 ** (0.2665)  1.4255 ** (0.2578)  1.3979 * (0.2514)  1.4132 ** (0.2352) 
distance to closest alternative                 
constant                 
cut points (𝜅1, 𝜅2)                 
observations  1053  1053  1053  1053 
log likelihood  -648.71  -665.43  -710.26  -1077.43 
df  25  25  25  25 
LR 𝜒2(df)  47.96  46.61  33.76  42.73 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0038  0.0054  0.1132  0.0150 
pseudo R-squared  0.0399  0.0368  0.0250  0.0203 
Brant test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2)        43.28 / 25 / 0.013 
Wolfe-Gould test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2)        41.52 / 25 / 0.020 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Inference is based on robust standard errors. A model comparison is reported in Table A3.8. The sample consists of 
those individuals having a final choice set 𝐶1 containing at least two alternatives with admission. 
In either case, a smaller sample, consisting only of those individuals with at least one additional 
alternative, affected the reliability of the first stages: first stage F-statistics are much smaller, and 
although the instruments maintain their individual explanatory power in the first stages, they no 
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longer pass Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak instrument test at reasonable levels. This finds expression 
in second stages displaying a scant model fit at best. 
Focusing on logit specifications, not comprising the two critical regressors, provides informative 
results regarding mobility outcomes in the presence of observed alternatives (Table 3.7): in reference 
to the most preferred alternative, least extraverted individuals have odds of selecting the more 
distant alternative that are only 0.6 times the odds of the reference group.  
In contrast, this result vanishes by enclosing the full final choice set of size 𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4] into the 
analyses. Accounting for all actually observed alternatives, which mimics the more complex decision 
scenario individuals face in reality, extraversion loses its predictive power. In this scenario, women 
display distinctly higher odds than men to not opt for the closest available alternative. 
Conditioning on geographically distinct locations (𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
𝐿∗ = 2) reveals that most risk-averse persons 
have similarly decreased odds (0.687), as compared to the average risk-type individuals. This finding 
is reproduced in the ordered logit specification: once again, individuals least willing to take risk 
feature odds of choosing an alternative at intermediate or maximum distance that are 0.7 times 
smaller than the reference group. A similar decrease in odds is recognisable for those individuals 
scoring highest in the Big-Five trait neuroticism.  
One drawback in case of the analyses of ranked (ordered) mobility outcomes is a potential violation 
of the proportional odds assumption, as suggested by the test statistics of the Brant and Wolfe-Gould 
tests. The robustness of the basic findings (Table A3.9) is supported upon the application of a partial 
proportional odds model (Williams, 2006), which allows some coefficients to differ across ordered 
outcome groups. Beyond that, it lends support to the hypothesis that individuals of differing 
personality types exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity with respect to distance: the odds of a most 
neurotic individual choosing an alternative at intermediate distance over one at minimum distance 
are below unity, but not significant. Yet, these odds are approximately 0.5 times smaller, and 
significant, when it comes to the choice between an alternative at maximum distance and one at 
intermediate (or minimum) distance. Relaxing the proportional odds assumption, most conscientious 
individuals display a decision-making pattern comparable to those scoring highest in the Big-Five trait 
neuroticism. 
A robust finding is the relationship between the Big-Five trait agreeableness and observed mobility 
outcomes. Irrespective of whether a subset of the final choice set (𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2, 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
𝐿∗ = 2) or the 
complete admission set (𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4], 𝑟𝑢|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]) is taken into account, odds ratios are 
numerically invariant and significantly different from unity: most agreeable individuals display odds 
of selecting the more distant alternative over other most preferred, but nearer locations that are 1.4 
times higher than in the reference group. Since an important dimension of the trait agreeableness is 
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trust in other individuals,39 this finding is directly interpretable: a higher willingness to trust in others 
may lower the expected transaction costs associated to interactions with unknown individuals in an 
unfamiliar environment. This, in turn, is likely to notably mitigate the perceived costs of mobility. 
3.5.2 On the results’ sensitivity regarding the distance concept 
The relevance of the dimension ‘distance’ in migration processes has been stressed several times. Its 
significance was underpinned in the analysis concerning the generation of the initial choice set – 
specific types of individuals already refrained in the first step from considering more remote 
potential destinations. Others not only displayed a strong inclination regarding more pronounced 
geographic mobility but eventually opted for the more distant alternatives. 
In the models above, distance was identified as the simple geographic distance between the 
centroids of the two postal code areas, origin and (potential) destination. Obviously, one cannot 
always travel as a bird flies, and therefore this distance measure might be overly simplistic and 
misguiding. If individuals explicitly integrated distance into their decision-making to account for 
distance related costs, they could directly use information from the known map and routing services: 
kilometres to travel or required travel time. In order to test the results’ sensitivity related to the used 
distance concept, I re-estimated some benchmark models for observed mobility outcomes, now 
accounting for these two alternative distance measures.  
Both measures originate from the ‘reachability model’, developed by the Federal Institute for 
Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR). The underlying model provides 
information on the accessibility of over 11000 municipal or traffic cells within Germany. A first matrix 
contains road distances between these reference points, while a second matrix comprises travel time 
on roads. Derived travel times are based on various speed profiles, according to the road type, also 
integrating traffic flow features between two traffic cells. For the sake of the subsequent robustness 
check, these traffic cells were matched to the corresponding postal code areas. 
Table A3.10 (in the appendix) reports the results for the binary dependent variables 
𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2, based on the same model specifications documented in Table 3.7 and Table A3.8. 
Calculated odds ratios are numerically stable across the alternative specifications. This holds not only 
for a comparison between the geographic distance concept on the one hand, and road distance or 
travel time on the other, but also regarding a model comparison building upon the alternative 
concepts. Analytical results in the examination of whether someone chooses the closest location 
over the most preferred reported alternative are not driven by the underlying distance concept. The 
sole noteworthy difference is a more frequent and robust occurrence of significantly smaller odds 
ratios for individuals in a relationship of intermediate duration in case of the distance concept travel 
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 The second dimension of the Big-Five trait agreeableness in the implemented short inventory is the tendency to find fault 
with others (Rammstedt and John, 2007) 
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time. Individuals in such a relationship might put a higher emphasis on spending time with their 
partner, who possibly stays at the current location, thus value the time itself more.  
Taken altogether, results are remarkably robust towards the investigated distance concept. This 
holds albeit there are in principle plausible arguments why simple geographic distance might be an 
insufficient proxy for covered distance or required travel time, and thus also related costs in the 
context of mobility.  
Two main reasons for this robustness could be invoked: first, in the case of Germany, offering a well-
developed traffic system, the correlation between geographic distance and the two alternative 
distance concepts is extremely high. The utility maximising outcome in a comparison of destinations 
does not change if an individual evaluates costs of mobility based on kilometres (to drive) or time 
spent travelling. The second argument is that car driving might not be the most relevant travel mode 
for young adults, such as first semester students, around the age of 20. This could be attributed to 
infrequent car ownership or a general preference for other, less expensive means of transportation, 
i.e., public transport. 
Given these findings, evaluating internal migration of individuals based on simple geographic 
distances between centroids of areas sufficiently small proves to be a reliable approach. 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study investigates mobility inclination and observed geographic mobility of prospective high-
skilled labour force participants. Beginning students were observed at a transitional point in early 
adulthood, when they - mostly for the first time - made an autonomous mobility-related decision: 
they chose a study location amongst a variety of potential alternatives.  
In contrast to other studies, most preferred considered alternatives during the decision-making 
process are known. This allows an examination of how individuals, in a first step, generate their initial 
choice set. It can vary regarding its scope, since some individuals might consider more potential 
alternatives than others. At the same time, this set’s components are likely to reflect the 
heterogeneity of the decision-makers: an individual’s preferred alternatives will display some 
common features, such as distance to a decision-maker’s current location, which introduces the 
migration aspect into this choice.  
Least patient individuals are found to form distinctly smaller initial choice sets, as do those least 
extraverted. Since a larger choice set is associated with a higher overall admission likelihood, these 
findings correspond to lower expected returns to tertiary education for these individuals. Similar 
results emerge for older ages and individuals with weaker scholastic performance or individuals in a 
relationship of intermediate duration. 
Regarding the selected alternatives in the initial choice set, and thus already at the consideration 
stage, being in a relationship restricts the set of study locations to closer alternatives. Consistent with 
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results in the scope approach, least extraverted and least patient individuals select on average closer 
alternatives, once again limiting their overall access to institutions of higher education. Another 
potential impediment, increasing perceived psychic costs, is a low degree of openness since 
individuals least open to experience also exhibit a noteworthy preference for alternatives closer to 
the familiar living environment. There is also evidence correlating least pronounced willingness to 
take risks to an initial choice set, consisting of alternatives clustered around the origin.  
Individual factors explaining the formation of the initial choice set proved to be robust with respect 
to an inclusion of conditions at the origin, such as measures referring to economic circumstances, 
urbanisation or amenities. However, these conditions display some relevance on their own: higher 
GDP growth, indicative of fewer financial constraints, and weaker labour market performance were 
associated with larger choice sets, comprising alternatives characterised by greater geographic 
dispersion. Negative relations between a choice set’s scope or potential migratory distance on the 
one hand, and population density or a measure of recreational value at the origin on the other, 
mirror a general preference for staying closer to urbanised amenity-rich locations.  
Whilst the first part of this analysis only provides answers regarding a potential inclination towards 
mobility – considering a location at an initial step is not necessarily identical to actually being willing 
to move there – the second part is dedicated to observed migration outcomes. This divergence 
between a basic inclination and factual behaviour can be observed in case of the trait patience: there 
is not one specification where patience is significantly related to eventually choosing a more distant 
alternative from the final choice set. Individual time preferences may be integrated into the 
formation of the initial choice set, yet when it comes to a final decision based on a potentially 
restricted choice set, its relevance seems to be superimposed by other factors. 
Amongst the Big-Five personality traits, extraversion and agreeableness display explanatory power 
regarding observable mobility outcomes: least extraverted or agreeable individuals are less likely to 
select any, but the nearest alternative. There is also some evidence that most neurotic individuals 
perceive psychic costs to be higher, thus they exhibit a stronger preference for closer alternatives. 
These findings support the hypothesis that psychic costs of moving are inflated for individuals who 
face a harder time establishing new social ties at an unfamiliar location.  
In this regard, the relevance of reference persons, such as family, or adjustment capability may 
constitute a further channel regarding how individual traits or preferences affect the perception of 
psychic costs in a migration context. This is investigated in several instrumental estimations, where 
previous mobility experiences act as instruments. Residential moves during childhood and youth 
were associated to a lower importance of proximity to family. Exchange participation during school, 
in turn, was related to a more pronounced adjustment capability. Therefore, earlier mobility 
experiences during childhood and youth, hence at a time when individuals were not autonomous but 
directly dependent on parental decisions, may foster individuals’ mobility during adulthood.  
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A related policy implication refers to the possibility of strengthening individual flexibility and 
adjustment capability by expanding school or comparable short-term exchange programmes during 
adolescence. Such programmes, causing relatively little expenses or effort, can increase internal 
student mobility and possibly reduce overcrowding in some universities located in metropolitan 
areas. 
As this study demonstrates, the various stages of a migration process – thinking about moving, 
evaluating alternatives and then selecting amongst them – are affected by personal characteristics 
and preferences in heterogeneous ways. Moreover, migration outcomes seem to be based on a 
complex decision-making process: it requires the identification of potential destinations amongst a 
plethora of alternatives, and then, a joint evaluation of conditions on-site and individually perceived 
costs or returns to mobility. 
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4 Counterfactual mobility: The relevance of unchosen paths and 
personality for the analysis of spatial choices 
4.1 Introduction 
How to find one’s place in a world full of opportunities and alternatives? In a literal sense, this 
question boils down to a discrete location choice among a plethora of alternatives at different levels, 
such as countries, states, cities, boroughs or streets. This question is relevant for any individual, 
retired or working, but especially for those starting into a new stage of life, such as taking up 
(academic) training. Any decision in this regard involves a comparison between a current reference 
point and potential benefits from changing this status quo, i.e., moving to another location. Such a 
comparison might involve many dimensions, e.g., employment perspectives for workers, study 
opportunities for prospective academics, general consumption possibilities or individual social 
preferences. One place can be the optimal destination for one individual, but at the same time this 
destination could be inconceivable for another person – depending on subjectively perceived costs 
and returns. 
There is a wide body of literature on the relevance of place-specific amenities or labour market 
outcomes, respectively their mutual compensating capacity, for such migration-related decisions in 
general (Graves and Linneman, 1979; Roback, 1982; Clark and Cosgrove, 1991; Whisler et al., 2008). 
Similarly, the choice of specific locations from a set of alternatives has been investigated as well, be it 
on the state level (Davies et al., 2001; Schündeln, 2014) or on the community level (Bayoh et al., 
2006). Depending on the individual socio-demographic or socio-economic context, individuals display 
highly varying degrees of short and long distance migration behaviour. Aside from external factors, 
individual attitudes and preferences are likely to affect subjective assessments of costs and returns 
to mobility as well (Jokela, 2009; Frieze and Li, 2010; Jaeger et al., 2010).  
A lot is known about external factors attracting individuals to specific places, or individual attributes 
fostering mobility on an abstract level. Surprisingly little is known about how these influential factors 
interact, e.g., whether risk-averse individuals shy away from moving to a location with relatively 
higher unemployment rates or how social preferences exactly affect perceived (psychic) costs of 
migration. 
These interactions are the pivotal elements of this study where I demonstrate that derived 
elasticities of location-specific attributes in a random utility framework vary substantially with 
respect to heterogeneous individual characteristics, such as risk, time or social preferences. Another 
focus rests on heterogeneous costs of migration which may generate specific distance-related sorting 
patterns. Psychic costs of migration might be larger, for instance, for individuals with a higher 
attachment to social reference persons, and therefore they might react less sensitively to favourable 
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conditions at a potential destination. My approach thus enables to derive choice elasticities of 
destination-specific features conditional on diverse personality groupings.  
In order to perform this analysis, this study relies on observed location choices of individuals, just 
starting into a new stage of life by enrolling into institutions of tertiary education, in a high-
dimensional destination space. Each of the included destinations offers a distinct basket of amenities 
and local conditions. The analytic framework includes both, demand and supply aspects: individuals 
may apply based on their preferences, yet their choices might be restricted by admission decisions – 
a scenario very close to matching on the labour market. 
The reason to focus on students is threefold: For one, (prospectively) high-skilled workers display a 
high propensity of mobility (Tolbert et al., 2009; Wozniak, 2010) – thus it is more likely to observe a 
mobility event. At the same time, the choice of a study location is a relevant precursor of subsequent 
location choices (Belfield and Morris, 1999; Groen, 2004; Busch and Weigert, 2010; Buenstorf et al., 
2016). Therefore it is plausible that economic conditions already matter at this stage (McHugh and 
Morgan, 1984; Dotti et al., 2013), since some of the decision-makers will consider their post-
graduation employment perspectives as well. Ultimately, mobility for educational purposes may 
prove informative regarding mobility patterns of high-skilled workers. The second reason is that this 
sample allows narrowing down the set of potential destinations (with at least one institution of 
higher education), for which a wide range of location-specific indicators is available. The third and 
last reason is the availability of survey data, which provides information on a variety of personal 
characteristics and preferences on the one hand, and on the process of location choice on the other. 
The data does not only provide information on the eventually chosen alternative, but also on 
considered alternatives at various stages within the selection process, that is, all the paths that finally 
have not been chosen. This in turn enables to investigate the results’ sensitivity regarding alternative 
specifications of choice sets from an empirical point of view. 
To accommodate the size of the destination space and the model parameterisation, accounting for 
heterogeneous individuals, a conditional logit model is applied. This model might be susceptible to 
varying definitions of the underlying choice set, misspecification in parameters or errors. Therefore, 
before actually turning to the econometric analysis, I first perform a Monte-Carlo simulation study to 
assess the outcomes’ reliability. The implemented simulation approach acknowledges and preserves 
destinations’ real-world features, such as economic conditions, and their position in space. Simulated 
individuals vary with respect to their valuation of site-specific features or costs of migration, 
introducing heterogeneous preferences. The overall process mimics the real-world rather precisely: 
not only do individuals consider choice sets of varying size, but their final choice set can also be 
restricted by unsuccessful applications, while both aspects are related to individual characteristics. 
This simulation study is therefore especially insightful regarding the impact of a supply side driven 
restriction of choice sets on estimates.  
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The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Chapter 4.2 gives an introduction to the related 
discrete choice literature, focusing on spatial choices, estimation procedures and choice set 
definition. Descriptive statistics of the survey data and destination characteristics are displayed in 
Chapter 4.3, since these are not only relevant for the subsequent discrete choice modelling, but also 
serve as a benchmark for the design of the simulation study in Chapter 4.4. Estimation results from 
the econometric analysis are presented in Chapter 4.5, which also includes a discussion of related 
issues and potential remedies. Chapter 4.6 summarises this study’s main insights.  
4.2 Review of the related literature on discrete choices 
The first subchapter gives an overview of applications of conditional logit models in the context of 
spatial choices of students and the general population. These choices may stretch from community 
to country selection. The next subchapter discusses alternative estimation methods to investigate 
discrete choices. The last subchapter introduces to the issue how analysts’ definitions of choice sets, 
respectively the assumed decision-making processes, may affect estimation outcomes. 
4.2.1 Conditional logit models of human migration: Spatial choices in presence of alternatives 
Partitioning the mutual selection process of colleges and students into three recursively addressed 
stages, Kohn et al. (1976) delivered one of the first analyses of educational choices in a geographic 
framework accounting for heterogeneous socio-demographic backgrounds.40 Stratifying their sample 
by family income, and drawing on simulated feasible choice sets, they showed that on-site residence 
is more likely for less financially constrained students. Extending the conditional logit model to the 
college choices for graduates from 1972, 1982 and 1992 among (almost) all colleges in the US, Long 
(2004) stressed an attenuating deterring effect of distance across all income and ability groups over 
time. Tuition costs affected the choice of a specific college to a lesser extent for younger cohorts, 
though individuals from low income backgrounds still displayed a comparable sensitivity.  
Female graduates were found to be more likely to be mobile across regions (Faggian et al., 2007), 
since they opted more frequently into the ‘option’ of being a repeat-migrant, first to university and 
subsequently to another region. Though the authors declared this might be a strategy to compensate 
for lower returns in the labour market, they did not extend their conditional logit model to account 
for gender-specific elasticities of regional labour-market characteristics. Young Germans, between 
the ages 18 to 30, do apparently also select themselves into regions offering better economic 
perspectives or quality of life (Schneider and Kubis, 2010). In addition, university graduates also 
display a noticeable preference for the ‘known’ around labour market entry: they favour regions 
which are similar to their origin regarding spoken dialect or settlement type (Buenstorf et al., 2016). 
                                                          
40
 In fact, the assessed stages (commuting vs. living on campus, college choice given residence decision, enrolment decision) 
could be seen as components for a nested logit model, although they have not been treated explicitly as such.  
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Applying a conditional logit model to an analysis of internal migration between 48 US states, Davies 
et al. (2001) demonstrated the relevance of economic opportunities and distance for a location 
choice. They also provided information on substitutability of economic opportunities, i.e., if the ratio 
of unemployment rates at destination and origin were to double, an increase of around three quarter 
in income would be required to maintain a destination’s attractiveness.41 These findings for intra-
national migration are in line with those of Geis et al. (2013) regarding destination choice of cross-
border migrants, who can choose among the USA, the UK, France and Germany.  
Investigating destination choices at an early consideration stage, Lovo (2014) incorporated measures 
of subjective well-being and corruption levels in potential destination countries. The first was found 
to be associated with increasing selection likelihood, the opposite held for perceived corruption. 
Most interestingly, counterintuitive signs or levels of significance for GDP per capita or distance 
vanished when destination dummies were interacted with origin-related characteristics – the latter 
being a proxy for the respective conditions an individual faces. 
On a geographically smaller scale, Bayoh et al. (2006) scrutinised residential choices across 
communities in a metropolitan area. School quality and safety, both public goods, were the 
predominant factors influencing community choices. Incorporating an interaction of community 
dummies and household attributes, such as household income and number of school-age children, 
they also provided some guidance regarding the relevance of household specific characteristics:42 
with respect to the reference community, for instance, the likelihood of choosing a city centre 
residence decreases by 0.09 percentage points if household income increases by one per cent.  
The attractiveness of Australian regional capital cities seems to be declining with the decision-
maker’s age (Black et al., 2009). Additionally, a distinct sorting pattern into locations with higher 
levels of social and human capital levels could be isolated. At the same time, job opportunities 
measured as skilled or unskilled vacancies did not matter for the general population, albeit males 
displayed location preferences for destinations with lower unemployment rates. A similar pattern 
could be established for Germany: destination choice of full-time employed men has been shown to 
be largely driven by economic conditions (Arntz, 2010).43 Moreover, regional wage levels act as 
stronger attractors for high-skilled individuals. Immigrants display a higher level of sensitivity with 
respect to (expected) destination wage levels (Schündeln, 2014) and are more mobile across and 
within the 16 German states. The second finding can be seen as a direct consequence of a 
pronounced disparity between measures of unobserved costs of migration: the corresponding 
                                                          
41 
Furthermore, their approach allows deriving cross-marginal effects, which furnish information with respect to a location’s 
relative attractiveness within the nexus of potential destinations. 
42
 This specification requires a normalisation of derived marginal probabilities with respect to a reference community, i.e., 
one destination where the community dummy takes the value zero. 
43
 In principal, the applied estimation procedure is a nested logit model. Locational choices, conditional on leaving the 
current location, have been estimated sequentially, thus the lower level in the decision tree is basically a conditional logit 
model. Findings from the upper level (the decision whether to move or stay) showed that individual attributes, such as age, 
income or earlier job moves are highly relevant for labour-market related mobility.  
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measure is 3.6 times as large for natives in the case of within state migration, and 3.2 times higher 
for inter-state migration scenarios. 
Focusing on technical workers with a postgraduate degree, Dahl and Sorenson (2010) converted 
coefficients from a conditional logit model into monetary equivalents for compensating increasing 
distance to various social reference persons: doubling the distance to parents, this equivalent 
amounted to almost $ 5300 for those who changed their employer. Moreover, this amount surged to 
nearly $ 13000 a year for high-skilled workers whose previous employer closed down, hence whose 
staying option basically melted into thin air. In general, the valuation of spatial proximity to (social) 
anchor points was found to be more pronounced than the valuation of incomes. 
4.2.2 Alternative estimation methods for discrete location choices 
Oosterbeek et al. (1992) applied a multinomial logit approach to qualify factors that led to students’ 
choice amongst the five universities in The Netherlands with an economics department.44 In addition, 
they incorporated into their full structural model an estimate for expected earnings to control for 
expected returns to a specific enrolment decision. Most interestingly, the moderate positive effect of 
university-specific expected life-time earnings on selection probabilities vanishes when the 
multinomial logit model also comprises individual-specific attributes – utility seems to be 
predominantly shaped by preferences beyond earnings. This manifested for instance in a certain 
degree of sorting alongside paternal education-levels or a university city’s attractiveness.  
Separating attendance and location choice, Montgomery (2002) applied a nested logit model to 
examine enrolment choices into a graduate programme.45 Individual ability, measured by GMAT 
scores, fostered in general enrolment in the attendance nest. A general preference for schools with a 
more able student body or a top ranking position could be observed in the school choice nest. Most 
interestingly, final school choice was heavily affected by geographic proximity although it was not 
relevant for stated ‘first choice’ schools: while an initial choice set may comprise a variety of 
(geographically) distinct alternatives, the final choice seems often to be restricted by distance. 
Within a choice set composed of 26 destinations in the Stockholm area, Dahlberg and Eklöf (2003) 
compared the performance of a classical conditional logit specification, a mixed logit and a 
multinomial probit model.46 One of their essential conclusions was that in their short-distance 
                                                          
44
 The distinction between a conditional and a multinomial logit model is that the latter has one alternative declared as 
reference alternative. Therefore, results can be interpreted in comparison to this reference alternative, leading to an 
interpretation of relative choice probabilities or sorting behaviour.  
45
 In contrast to a conditional logit model, the nested logit model allows for higher levels of substitutability between some 
alternatives without necessarily implying a violation of the independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA) in 
general. Nests are supposed to reflect some plausible grouping, e.g., destinations in state A in one nest and destinations in 
state B in the second. This approach accounts for unobserved correlation among the destinations in one state, yet allows 
maintaining the IIA across nests.  
46
 Mixed logit (or random parameter) models do not impose any restriction on substitution patterns. Moreover, they 
account for individual (random) taste variation by introducing individual specific parameters. Their distribution, however, 
has to be predefined. Similar to the multinomial logit model, the multinomial probit model requires the definition of one 
reference alternative. An advantage is that it can feature case-specific individual variables. Moreover, an estimation of the 
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migration setup, the conditional logit model could not be rejected in favour of the more flexible 
mixed logit specification. Instead, diverging results occurred only for ‘overly’ frugal specifications. 
Replacing the multinomial probit by a nested logit model, Christiadi and Cushing (2007) transferred 
the model evaluation to the case of US interstate migration, also detecting a fairly similar 
performance regarding coefficient signs and magnitude, as well as significance.47 The same 
observation was made by Schündeln (2014), investigating German interstate migration patterns and 
contrasting conditional logit models with nested logit specifications, relying on three coarse nests 
(East, West and staying). 
Average coefficients related to distances to reference persons or destination population size from a 
mixed logit model evinced a high degree of comparability to those from a conditional logit 
specification in the case of Danish high-skilled workers (Dahl and Sorenson, 2010). In the context of 
recreational demand, too, conditional logit models accounting for taste heterogeneity can compete 
with random parameter (mixed) logit specifications (Murdock, 2006): unemployed individuals, for 
instance, are less deterred by travel distance to their chosen recreational site.  
Although unobserved similarities between alternative destinations in activity-based models impose 
conceptual issues, spatially correlated models (accounting for correlation across neighbouring 
alternatives) produce coefficient estimates which are of remarkable similarity to those from a 
conditional logit model (Bekhor and Prashker, 2008).48 
As a modification to the mixed logit model, Greene and Hensher (2003) proposed a latent class 
model to account for individual heterogeneity, whilst relaxing a core requirement in the mixed logit 
model: instead of predefining parameters’ exact distributions it is sufficient to specify a number of 
latent classes, into which individuals are implicitly sorted. In the context of stated road choices, the 
classical conditional logit specification was rejected in favour of both the mixed logit and the latent 
class specification. Choice elasticities for travel time and travel costs across all choices, however, 
were in a close range only in case of the latent class model specification and, most remarkably, the 
classical conditional logit.  
Greene et al. (2006) incorporated behavioural variation into what they called a heteroscedastic 
mixed logit model by allowing not only the mean of the random parameters to be affected by 
individual-specific attributes but also the variance. In terms of model-fit for stated choices amongst 
commuting modes, the conditional logit is outperformed. Turning to relevant model outcomes, such 
as values of travel time savings, figures from the conditional logit and the standard mixed logit are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
error’s correlation structure relaxes the assumption of equal substitutability of alternatives, yet inflates the number of 
estimates. 
47
 The authors also include age and education interactions, which turned out to be highly relevant predictors for locational 
choices. 
48
 Activity-based models refer usually to non-work related destination choices for trips, e.g., shopping or for the purpose of 
recreational activities. 
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highly comparable.49 Differences emerge when heteroscedastic parameter variances are introduced, 
yielding a better model fit, but these modifications “produce unacceptable ranges in the behavioural 
outputs, including negative VTTS estimates” (Greene et al., 2006, p. 91).50 Though the 
methodological approach is rather sophisticated, and introduces actual behavioural variation and 
individual characteristics into a mixed logit model, results in the end are mostly different but not 
more plausible or reliable.  
4.2.3 Choice set definition and stability of results 
Making choices typically involves an initial stage, in which a consideration set is formed from an 
awareness set: here, a potential decision-maker compiles a set of relevant alternatives from all the 
alternatives he is aware of. In a subsequent (not necessarily isolable) stage, the consideration set 
may be further reduced to include only the most favoured alternatives.51 Eventually, a decision-
maker’s resulting actual choice set is derived based on deterministic or probabilistic constraints,52 
which may be seen as “depending upon the degree of confidence the observer places on information 
at hand” (Swait and Ben-Akiva, 1987, p. 92). Thereby, awareness of alternatives and accessibility of 
related information seem to be influential factors in such a ‘hierarchical information processing 
strategy’ (Pellegrini and Fotheringham, 2002). In the context of spatial analyses, another factor is 
differences in “physical accessibility levels due to path limitations and due to differences in 
individuals’ mobility levels” (Pramono and Oppewal, 2012, p. 48).  
The aspect of destination awareness is also relevant in the context of college choice: high achieving 
students in the two top deciles are aware of a larger number of potential college locations (Niu and 
Tienda, 2008). This points to heterogeneous formation processes of choice sets, respectively their 
scope, conditional on ability. Across alternative choice sets, this variability on the individual level was 
also diffused to a varying degree to the estimates of institutional attributes of the most preferred 
alternative. In respect thereof, constraints may also exert differing effects on heterogeneous 
decision-makers.  
Testing different modelling approaches for the formation of a consideration set, Horowitz and 
Louviere (1995) portended that these sets might be primarily indicators of preferences. Though 
additional information from an alleged consideration stage may not foster consistency, a gain in 
estimates’ efficiency can be achieved nevertheless.  
                                                          
49
 E.g., saving one hour of travel time is valued at $17.98 (derived in a conditional logit model) by those usually using public 
transport. The corresponding value from the mixed logit model (assuming a positive random parameter domain) is $16.62 
with a standard deviation of $2.45. 
50
 VTTS stands for values of travel time savings. 
51
 The choice set formation process, including the consideration set, and its relevance is a frequently discussed topic in the 
consumer choice literature (cf. Shocker et al., 1991; Andrews and Srinivasan, 1995) or in vacation destination choice (cf. 
Crompton, 1992; Decrop, 2010), bearing some resemblance to destination choice in a migration context. 
52
 A deterministic constraint in this work’s application would imply categorical non-inclusion of an alternative (yet is hard to 
imagine). Probabilistic constraints could be imposed by fees - some individuals could not afford certain alternatives, or by 
familiarity with a location. Both aspects point immediately to highly subjective choice set formation processes. 
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If the concept of consideration sets is primarily introduced to reduce the dimensionality of the 
underlying choice problem, and thus for analytical convenience, simulations demonstrate that results 
may be severely affected: to small consideration sets may bias estimates towards zero, 
simultaneously increase their variance and reduce overall model fit (Carson and Louviere, 2014). This 
can also be found in empirical applications, i.e., a conditional logit model of office relocation choice 
when firm-specific search areas, analogous to consideration sets, are introduced (Elgar et al., 2015). 
Comparing models relying on complete, vicinity-based and familiarity-based choice sets, Hicks and 
Strand (2000) examined the impact of information about choice sets on parameter estimates in 
scenarios of discrete recreational choices.53 Whereas familiarity with an alternative becomes in 
general less likely with distance, estimates originating from predefined distance-based choice sets 
converge to the full choice set results’ if the conditional distance is scaled up. This sensitivity is 
particularly marked for estimates corresponding to travel-related variables, which in turn can be seen 
as strong evidence against applying a too restrictive geographic conditioning. On the other hand, 
defining spatial boundaries of choice sets such that they include at least 95 % of all observed choice 
events was found to produce stable results (Parsons and Hauber, 1998). 
Recapitulating these findings, one may conclude that the identification of the appropriate relevant 
choice set is at least as important as the selection of a suitable estimation procedure.  
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The first subchapter introduces the data source providing information on potentially mobile 
academics. Moreover, it also discusses how information on considered locational alternatives at 
various stages of the decision-making process is elicited. In order to introduce the alternatives that 
decision-makers could choose from, the second subchapter illustrates some location specific 
characteristics of the potential alternatives in the destination space. 
4.3.1 Microdata on decision-makers and choice sets 
This study draws on a survey on “Mobility, Expectation, Self-Assessment and Risk Attitude of 
Students” (MESARAS 2013; Weisser, 2016a54), a cross-sectional survey which has been designed to 
provide both, detailed information on individual characteristics and preferences on the one hand, 
and multiple geo-referenced anchor points on the other. These geographic anchor points allow 
important mobility events to be traced. They also serve as pivotal points in subsequent analyses 
since they enable to calculate a precise measure of mobility, i.e., covered distance in kilometres.  
The survey’s target group composed of 2308 undergraduate university students, who started an 
economics programme at one of seven vicinal universities in northern and middle Germany in 
                                                          
53 
Most interestingly, the full choice set is defined by all recreational sites of similar type in a region. This, however, 
implicitly imposes a geographic (de facto distance-based) constraint on the likelihood that any alternative is an element in 
this full choice set. 
54
 The survey’s representativeness could be established using administrative data. Further information regarding the 
sample and the methodology is provided in Weisser (2016b). 
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October 2013. The definition of such a homogeneous target group is suitable to minimise the impact 
of unobserved factors in the examination of mobility patterns: since economic programmes are 
offered at virtually any university in Germany, this restriction ensures that chosen destinations are 
actually outcomes from a choice process and not mostly predetermined by the interest in an exotic 
programme only available at few institutions. In total, there are 164 potential study locations 
(districts or district-free cities) with at least one institution of higher education offering an economics 
programme. In a narrow definition, based on curriculums’ similarities, the following study 
programmes are rated as economics programmes: Business Studies, Economic Studies, International 
Management and Economics and Business. A broader definition also includes Business Informatics, 
Engineering Economics and Economic Policy Journalisms.55  
Figure 4.1 displays the geographic distribution of the 164 alternative destinations, defining the full 
destination space 𝐷. The left panel refers to the application stage of a figurative individual, the right 
panel shows the corresponding outcome in the admission space 𝐴, hence after the supply side 
decision has imposed some further restrictions on the set of potential destinations. The hollow 
circles represent all potential alternatives that have never been considered, whereas the filled circles 
indicate a study location this figurative individual has applied for. Aside from the eventually chosen 
alternative (labelled ‘U’), the three most preferred alternatives at each stage are observed as well. 
Figure 4.1: Decision-makers’ alternatives in the full and restricted space 
 
Note: The left panel depicts the full application set (sent applications in the 𝐷-space for a fictitious individual), 
the right panel illustrates the final alternatives in the admission set (the 𝐴-space). 
                                                          
55
 Institutions offering economics programmes in a broader sense usually offer Business Studies or Economics and Business 
as well. Within the empirical analysis, robustness checks account for differing degrees of programme availability (Table 
A4.9). 
Chapter 4   58 
  
   
 
Another design related restriction led to the exclusion of study programme changers to ensure that 
all study subjects made a choice with respect to a study location for the first time. Students from 
abroad, i.e., those who graduated from high school in another country, were also taken out of the 
sample since previous geographic anchor points are too imprecise. Eventually, this study’s target 
sample comprised a total of 1861 individuals. 
Among these individuals in the study target sample, 69 % actually had an alternative admission for an 
economics programme. Around 55 % in this group eventually chose the closest available alternative. 
Going one step back and focusing on the locations initially applied for (indicating demand), 23.2 % 
sent out only a single application. 11.6 % selected two potential locations, 19.4 % applied at 
institutions in three distinct locations. The majority (45.9 %) included into their application set at 
least four alternative destinations. 
The left panel in Figure 4.2 illustrates how frequently one of the 164 potential destinations has been 
either finally selected or mentioned as being one of the three most preferred alternatives at the 
application stage. The right panel contrasts this with individuals’ origin.  
Figure 4.2: Geographic distribution of origins and considered destinations 
 
Note: Circles in the left panel are approximately proportional to their relevance in the set of most preferred or finally 
selected alternatives in the application stage. ‘Frequency of origins’ in the right panel refers to the number of students 
who originated from a specific postal code area and enrolled at any among the seven included universities, labelled as 
destination. 
Two main observations can be made: individuals displayed in the end a tendency to enrol at an 
institution in relative proximity to their origin. On average, respondents in the study target sample 
chose a study location within 97.15 kilometres of their origin, the latter identified as the city they 
graduated from high school. There are, however, remarkable differences of observed mobility with 
respect to varying personal characteristics, as Table 4.1 reveals. Least patient or most risk-averse 
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individuals seem to enrol at closer institutions in comparison to those on the other end of the scale. 
Moreover, those expressing a strong preference for proximity to family behave accordingly when it 
comes to the choice of a study location.  
Table 4.1: Observed mobility (in km) and personality characteristics 
 
low medium high 
risk attitude (career domain) 87.9 96.3 106.5 
patience 92.5 94.6 115.7 
importance of proximity to family 127.4 92.4 77.2 
Note: Columns refer to standardised indicators where ‘low’ indicates a score of more than one 
standard deviation below the mean, and ‘high’ a score of more than one standard deviation above 
the mean. Sample size varies between 1811 and 1844 respondents across the traits. 
The second conclusion to be drawn based on Figure 4.2 is that prospective academics in the study 
target sample do initially consider many potential destinations further away. City states, like Berlin or 
Hamburg, are frequently mentioned as most preferred study alternatives where someone actually 
applied for an economics programme. Study locations, especially those in metropolitan areas appeal 
to the young academics in the sample. Nevertheless, there is a substantial degree of variation in a 
geographic sense regarding considered alternatives in the destination space. 
4.3.2 Characteristics of alternatives in the destination space 
Acknowledging the observed preference patterns, Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.6 display for all 164 potential 
destinations bivariate kernel density estimates of one location-specific condition (depicted on the 
vertical axis) and individuals’ mobility (on the horizontal axis), measured as average distance to 
individuals’ origins. All location-specific data originates from the INKAR online database (BBSR, 2014) 
and refers to the district level. The reference year is 2012, which is the last complete year before 
respondents in the sample made their decision. 
Figure 4.3: Bivariate kernel density – destinations’ GDP per capita and distance 
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The left panels refer to locations that have been either eventually chosen or belonged (for at least 
one per cent of the subjects) to the three most preferred considered locations at the application 
stage. Concurrently, the right panels illustrate the cases of locations either not considered as the 
most preferred alternatives (of at least one per cent of the included individuals) or which have in 
deed not been considered at all. The graphs can be read like a topographical map: going from outer 
to inner lines, the portrayed contour lines indicate an increasing joint density. 
As Figure 4.3 highlights, not considered or not preferred locations (right panel) are typically 
characterised by lower GDP per capita, a proxy for income levels or living standards, and are on 
average further away from an individual’s origin. Destinations in the subset of preferred locations 
(left panel) are concentrated in the vicinity of € 35000 GDP per capita and an average distance of 170 
kilometres. 
For the destination specific share of recreational area (Figure 4.4), which can be interpreted as proxy 
for quality of life, an even clearer picture emerges: considered locations exhibit distinctly higher 
recreational potential. Additionally, they are on average much closer to a respondent’s previous 
centre of life. 
Figure 4.4: Bivariate kernel density – destinations’ recreational area and distance 
 
 
Regarding labour market perspectives, some first insights can be obtained on the aggregate level as 
well. For both types of destinations, those in and those not included in the subset of preferred 
locations, a cluster surfaces in the vicinity of 7 % youth unemployment rate and 200 kilometres 
distance. A second distinct cluster also emerges for a much lower unemployment rate and 420 
kilometres distance between origin and destination (right panel in Figure 4.5). Though a lower youth 
unemployment rate could signal better employment perspectives for students during their studies, 
these potential locations are usually not considered.  
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Figure 4.5: Bivariate kernel density – destinations’ youth unemployment rate and distance 
 
 
In contrast to the previous finding, there is also descriptive evidence that the analysed young 
academics did not completely lose track of future labour market perspectives. Their initial application 
set tended to include those destinations with higher employment levels for high-skilled workers, as 
measured by the proportion of workers with university degree (Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6: Bivariate kernel density – destinations’ high-skilled employment and distance 
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The descriptive analyses in Chapter 4.3.1 and Chapter 4.3.2 accentuated some choice patterns, which 
are not only related to destination-specific features, but also affected by individual characteristics. 
People tend to sort into locations not only based on expected returns, as indicated for instance by 
labour market related preferences, but also based on individually varying assessments and 
preferences. The interaction of these individual characteristics and destination features, yielding a 
form of behavioural sorting will thus be further addressed in a framework acknowledging the 
existence of heterogeneous agents. 
4.4 Heterogeneous agents and varying information sets in a random utility 
framework 
The workhorse of this study is a random utility model (RUM) and its econometric counterpart, the 
conditional logit model. Despite its limitations, i.e., the assumption of independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), it offers some advantages for this application.56 First of all, it does not require 
specifying nests of alternatives, which might be irrelevant from an individual’s perspective, as a 
nested logit model warrants. Second, in contrast to mixed logit models, the focus does not rest on 
abstract distributions, but rather on actual personality or preference patterns in the decision-making 
process. Therefore, heterogeneous dependencies are introduced by directly implementing plausible 
interactions following structured personality groupings or according to distinct preferences. This 
allows drawing inference with respect to the relevance of a specific destination condition, and thus 
its impact on a potential destination’s selection probability for various sub-groups (cf. Liaw, 1990; 
Elgar et al., 2015).57 Last but not least, the chosen approach relaxes severe computational limitations 
in a high-dimensional destination and parameter space while, as the literature review suggests (cf. 
Greene and Hensher, 2003; Murdock, 2006; Bekhor and Prashker, 2008; Dahl and Sorenson, 2010), it 
is able to produce estimates in a comparable range as more sophisticated models. 
4.4.1 A conditional logit model for heterogeneous agents 
Assuming that every individual 𝑖 evaluates a potential location 𝑙 (with 𝑙 ∈ 𝐷) based on the 
corresponding utility 𝑈𝑖𝑙 , the individual’s decision can be represented by a random utility model 
(McFadden, 1973). A location 𝑙 is chosen if  
𝑈𝑖𝑙 > 𝑈𝑖𝑗  for all other 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝐷 
or 
𝑈𝑖𝑙 ≥ 𝑈𝑖
∗.  
                                                          
56
 This is further addressed in Chapter 4.5.3. The IIA can be relaxed using nested logit or mixed logit models. In the first 
case, the IIA can still be an issue within nests of alternatives. Mixed logit models account for individual taste variation but 
not for a specific taste or personality grouping. In this application, characterised by a larger than usual choice set and a rich 
vector of personality and preference parameters, computational challenges are substantial.  
57
 Liaw (1990) used these interactions between ‘ecological’ variables and individual characteristics in a model of 
interprovincial migration by young Canadians. The destination choice model at the second stage of the underlying nested 
logit model, however, is basically a conditional logit model. Elgar et al. (2015) investigated location choices of different 
types of firms in the Toronto area.   
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The first case represents the final destination choice among all considered alternatives in an 
unrestricted destination space 𝐷. Mirroring the application stage, the second case accommodates 
choices yielding a set containing several alternatives, which are preferred over the remaining 
alternatives.  
If utility is linear in parameters relating to a vector 𝑧𝑖𝑙  and disturbances 𝜀𝑖𝑙, the probability that an 
alternative 𝑙 is selected is given by 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙) = 𝑃[𝑧𝑖𝑙𝜔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑙 > 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝜔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐷|𝑗 ≠ 𝑙] .     (4.1) 
If the random error term 𝜀 follows a type 1 extreme value (or Gumbel) distribution, the conditional 
logit model states the probability that alternative 𝑙 is selected among all 𝐷=164 possible alternatives 
in the destination space as 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙) =
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙
′𝜔)
∑ exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙
′𝜔)𝐷𝑙=1
.        (4.2) 
This econometric procedure allows detecting which location-specific factors affect a destination’s 
selection likelihood. It is, however, in its standard specification not suitable to identify the impact of 
subject-specific characteristics on the corresponding selection probability. If the vector 𝑧𝑖𝑙  comprises 
location-specific variables 𝑥𝑖𝑙  and some individual characteristics, summed in the vector 𝑣𝑖, the latter 
cancels out in equation 4.2. The subsequent specification, accounting for individual specific factors, 
serves as the starting point to illustrate this issue and a possible remedy together: 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙) =
exp(𝑣𝑖
′𝛼+𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]
′𝛾)
∑ exp(𝑣𝑖
′𝛼+𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]′𝛾)
𝐷
𝑙=1
        (4.3) 
Location and individual-specific factors are combined by the matrix vector product [𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]
′, which 
introduces interaction terms.58 This equation can be rearranged into 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙) =
exp(𝑣𝑖
′𝛼)exp(𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]
′𝛾)
exp(𝑣𝑖
′𝛼)∑ exp(𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]′𝛾)
𝐷
𝑙=1
=
exp(𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]
′𝛾)
∑ exp(𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]′𝛾)
𝐷
𝑙=1
 ,   (4.3’) 
demonstrating why all non-interacted individual level components are not identified in a conditional 
logit model. The joint impact of individual characteristics and location-specific variables may be 
retrieved in the coefficient vector 𝛾. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate whether different types of 
individuals, for instance differing by risk attitude, have diverging elasticities with respect to certain 
destination-specific conditions, such as unemployment rates. Conveniently, coefficients of 
interactions of individual characteristics and distance can be interpreted as measures for 
heterogeneous costs of migration.  
Another merit of introducing individual characteristics into the model is that it also accounts for an 
individual specific choice set formation process, which has further repercussions on the final choice. 
Directly controlling for individual factors contributes then to a better understanding of the 
unexplained variation across individuals concerning their location choices. In case of a high-
                                                          
58
 Vectors 𝑥𝑖𝑙and 𝑋𝑙𝑘  are both of dimension 𝑚 × 1 with 𝑚 as number of location-specific factors. 𝑋𝑖𝑙 is allowed to differ 
from 𝑥𝑖𝑙 in so far as it may contain a smaller number of non-zero elements than 𝑚, corresponding to the number of factors 
to be interacted. The matrix 𝑉𝑖 is of order 𝑟 × 𝑚 with 𝑟 as total number of individual specific categories to be interacted. 
Within each row 𝑟, columns 𝑚 contain identical entries, such that 𝑉𝑖 matches the dimension of 𝑋𝑖𝑙. 
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dimensional destination space, this direct approach averts the necessity to resort to circuitous 
models of choices from endogenous choice sets (cf. Horowitz, 1991). 
A crucial assumption in conditional logit models is the independence from irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA), which becomes more plausible for choice sets containing alternatives of similar substitutability 
(McFadden, 1973). In such cases, a newly added alternative would be associated with a selection 
probability of 𝑝𝐷+1 whereas selection probabilities of all 𝐷 old alternatives would be proportionally 
diminished to (1 − 𝑝𝐷+1)𝑝𝐷. While alternative study locations might be perceived to be of 
comparable substitutability in a scenario which evolves mainly around the decision to study or not to 
study, this scenario is different. In this application, focusing on location choices of those who 
selected themselves into a specific study programme, the final choice of a destination is based on a 
choice set comprising rather distinct alternatives: university cities (and districts) in Germany display a 
high degree of variation regarding location-specific characteristics (𝑥𝑖𝑙), e.g., with respect to city size, 
economic conditions or price levels. These differences might introduce varying degrees of 
substitutability among some subsets of alternatives, and thus potentially violate the IIA. This issue is 
further explored in Chapter 4.5.3.  
4.4.2 The impact of varying information sets in a conditional logit model: A Monte-Carlo 
simulation study 
One of the central research questions guiding this work is how differing information sets can impinge 
on estimates in models of discrete destination choice. A first pivotal aspect of the information set is 
related to what the analyst observes in the data. Typically, only the final choice without 
comprehensive information on considered alternatives or supply side restrictions is observed. 
Supply side restrictions might emerge whenever an observable location choice is the outcome of an 
interaction of one individual and one institution, e.g., an employer or a university. Any finally 
observable location choice was not only conditional on individual application (a first decision stage), 
but also on subsequent institutional acceptance or admission. If the second stage always results in a 
successful match, e.g., due to guaranteed acceptance, the ultimately observable choice should 
correspond to the considered alternative yielding the highest utility in a random utility framework.  
Whenever subsequent acceptance is required, however, this may change: most preferred considered 
alternatives (yielding highest levels of utility) might drop out of the eventually available choice set. 
Whilst a rational individual would still choose the respective alternative associated with the highest 
utility in this second-stage choice set, the final recorded choice could be a rather inferior alternative 
in the initially considered choice set.59 Usually, these interactions and potential restrictions cannot be 
observed by the analyst, although they may affect estimates’ reliability in a random utility framework 
severely. 
                                                          
59
 In the most extreme scenario, the final observed choice (characterised by relatively low utility levels in the first stage 
choice set) could be no choice at all, but rather the inevitable outcome due to the lack of feasible alternatives. This would 
reflect individuals’ preferences only to an extremely low degree. 
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For modelling discrete choice, however, another crucial aspect of the information set is what the 
analyst assumes: this refers to the more general question about how to appropriately define the 
underlying choice set, i.e., the destination space. In case of choice set misspecification, the 
econometrically deduced impact of factors influencing location choices might be severely biased. 
This has been observed in the fields of recreational choices (Hicks and Strand, 2000; Parsons and 
Hauber, 1998) and intra-urban office relocation (Elgar et al., 2015). The same will hold in all 
likelihood for a consequential decision, such as where to study and live for the next few years. 
In order to evaluate whether more comprehensive information sets, accounting for explicitly 
considered alternatives, can contribute to uncovering the underlying mechanisms and individual 
preferences, a Monte-Carlo simulation study is performed. The design of this simulation study 
accounts for various information sets, misspecification in parameters and in the error term. In 
addition, it precisely portrays the three decision stages within the selection of a study location, 
namely application process, admission process and destination selection in the end. Therefore, I can 
also examine how strongly a supply side restriction might affect estimates of location choice. At the 
same time, I can investigate how relevant the first critical aspect regarding the analysts’ information 
set, i.e., an insufficient observability of the choice process itself, can become. The second aspect, 
namely, estimates’ sensitivity with respect to the definition of the destination space will be 
addressed in the empirical application directly. 
A specific feature of the simulation design is to maintain real-world location-specific conditions, i.e., 
to randomly place simulated individuals into real cities and districts. Therefore, the simulation 
algorithm starts by drawing 1000 ‘blank’ individuals (with replacement) from a list of 401 existing 
districts of origin. The district sampling probability is proportional to the district’s population, thus 
the simulated samples comprise on average twice as many simulated individual from Berlin (3.5 
million inhabitants) than from Hamburg (1.8 million inhabitants). Individual-specific variables 𝑣𝑖, such 
as gender, age, risk attitude and grade were generated in the next step and are based on random 
draws from distributions mirroring observed sample properties.60    
Subsequently, the initial sample of 1000 simulated individuals has been expanded to include the full 
set of 𝐷 = 164 potential locations for each individual. Destination-specific conditions, such as district 
unemployment rates or population density have been appended next and constitute matrix 𝑥𝑖𝑙.
61 
The subsequently implemented data generating process (DGP) simulates individual and alternative 
specific utility levels as 
𝑈𝑖𝑙 = 𝑧𝑖𝑙
′ 𝜔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑙 = 𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽 + [𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]
′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑙.      (4.4)
  
                                                          
60
 Distributional properties and correlations are described in Table A4.1 (in the appendix). The in-sample values, serving as 
reference values can be found in Table A4.2 (in the appendix). 
61
 The essential item ‚distance‘ has been calculated as average distance between all postal code areas (centroids) in the 
district of origin and the centroid of a respective postal code area with a higher education institution in the destination 
district. 
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The correct specification of the error component is implemented with 
𝜀𝑖𝑙 = 𝑒𝑖𝑙
𝐺~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1). With respect to the conditional logit model, a first misspecification in 
the error is introduced with 𝜀𝑖𝑙 = 𝑒𝑖𝑙
𝑁~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  𝑁(0,1). In a third specification, correlated error 
components at the individual level are derived as 𝜀𝑖𝑙 = 𝑒𝑖𝑙
𝐺(0.5 + 𝑒𝑖
𝑈) with 𝑒𝑖
𝑈~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑈(0,1).62 
The implemented main DGP draws on the following parameterised form: 
𝑈𝑖𝑙 = (
𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑝𝑜𝑝. 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟. 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
)
′
 (
−0.0080
   0.0015
   0.0150
−0.3000
) +
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒#𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒#𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒
𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒#𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑝𝑜𝑝. 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦#𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟. 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎#𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒#𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒#𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒#𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
′
(
 
 
 
 
 
−0.0002
−0.0015
   0.0010
−0.0001
−0.0005
   0.0150
   0.0150
   0.0500)
 
 
 
 
 
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑙 
The components in the coefficient vectors 𝛽 and 𝛾 have been determined based on an initial 
conditional logit estimation on the real data. To denote interactions between variables on the 
location and the individual level, the symbol # is used.  
Building on these utility levels, individual selection probabilities for 𝐷 = 164 alternative destinations 
were calculated accordingly to equation (4.3’). The simulation of the first stage (the application 
process) is completed by simulating the size 𝑆 of the individual application set 𝐶0. Since the overall 
number of sent applications may not be purely random, but for instance related to individual 
willingness to take risks, this simulated initial application set of size 𝑆𝐶0 ∈ [1, 𝐷] is negatively 
correlated with the risk variable.63  
The admission process is then incorporated based on simulated admission likelihoods. Since the 
simulated sample is supposed to mirror the real sample (all consisting of enrolled, thus successful 
students), one sure admission is modelled for the location with the highest admission likelihood. 
Scholastic achievement is, furthermore, inversely related to additional admissions, such that 
individuals with the top grade obtain admission at all considered locations. This success probability 
declines with lower scholastic achievement, yielding an admission set 𝐶1 of size 𝑆𝐶1 ≤ 𝑆𝐶0. 
In the third and last step, simulated enrolment choices are based on the outcomes from the main 
DGP, such that the following two conditions hold for the eventually chosen location 𝑙∗: 
𝑙∗ ∈ 𝐶1  and  
𝑈(𝑙∗) > 𝑈(𝑙𝐶1) ∀ 𝑙𝐶1 ∈ 𝐶1, 𝑙𝐶1 ≠ 𝑙
∗.  
This merely requires the eventually chosen location 𝑙∗ to be in the final admission set 𝐶1 and yielding 
the highest utility in comparison to all other alternatives in this final set.  
Drawing on the choice sets 𝐶0 and 𝐶1, three outcome variables can be established, differing with 
respect to the information set under consideration. A first one indicates the final choice within the 
                                                          
62
 A multiplicative construction of a clustered error component is required for the same reasons as for why individual-
specific variables have to be included as interaction terms. 
63
 The initial (complete) choice set 𝐶0 comprises those alternatives yielding the 𝑆𝐶0 highest levels of utility. 𝑆𝐶0 is based on 
draws from a negative binomial distributions (see Table A4.1) 
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subset of itself and the ‘stated most preferred’ alternatives with admission, which is of size 
𝑆𝐶1𝑜𝑏𝑠
∈ [2,4].64 The upper bound corresponds to the bound implied by the survey design. The 
resulting outcome variable, labelled ‘choice in 𝐴’, is coded as one for 𝑙∗ and zero for all other 
𝑙𝐶1 ∈ 𝐶1
𝑜𝑏𝑠. 
The second outcome variable ‘choice in 𝐷’ represents the final choice within the full set of all 𝐷 
potential alternatives. It is coded as one for 𝑙∗ and zero for all other 𝐷 − 1 alternatives. This version 
does not necessarily allow retrieving much information regarding true location preferences, since the 
observed outcome might be driven to a lesser extent by individual preferences but by the admission 
process. The third outcome variable ‘preferences in 𝐷’ takes into account the final choice and the 
‘stated most preferred’ alternatives in the initial selection process. It is 𝑆𝐶0𝑜𝑏𝑠
-times coded as one (for 
𝑙∗ and for those alternatives yielding the 𝑆𝐶0𝑜𝑏𝑠
∈ [1,4] − 1 highest levels of utility) and zero for the 
remaining 𝐷 − 𝑆𝐶0𝑜𝑏𝑠
 alternatives. Technically, this specification violates mutual exclusiveness of 
choices for any 𝑆𝐶0𝑜𝑏𝑠
> 1. Yet, in the context of observed choices, which depend on a subsequently 
exogenously restricted choice set, an increased information set can still be an indicator of 
preferences (Horowitz and Louviere, 1995) and help to mitigate the distorting impact of such a 
second-stage influence on estimated coefficients.  
Table 4.2 summarises the estimation results for the three different outcome variables and three 
model specifications. The first value in each cell is the mean coefficient estimate over the 500 
simulated samples; the second number represents the number how often a coefficient has been 
significant on the 5 % level. The specifications vary with respect to their parameterisation, i.e., to 
which extent location-specific conditions are interacted with individual-specific factors (none, partial 
and full). 
As simulation results in Table 4.2 indicate, estimations based on the exogenously restricted choice 
set (choice in 𝐴) are neither suitable to get precise estimates nor to identify whether a factor may be 
actually relevant in the decision process. This occurs mainly for two reasons: first, only a subsample 
of individuals has a final choice set of size 𝑆𝐶1𝑜𝑏𝑠
∈ [2,4]. Since the simulated supply side restriction is 
ability related, as in universities’ admission processes, this sample reduction is not completely 
random. Second, a lot of information is discarded since the choice set is only assumed to comprise 
between two and four alternatives per individual. Estimations which evaluate a final choice in the full 
space of all 𝐷 alternatives (choice in 𝐷) perform better in this regard: not only do estimated 
coefficients come close to the true parameters in the main data generating process, but the 
respective standard errors are smaller as well. As expected, the most parsimonious specification 
without any interactions produces nevertheless substantially biased estimates. The fully interacted 
specification is more reliable in this regard: the estimates expected value hardly indicates any bias at 
all. Beyond that, estimates not driving the DGP are exposed as well: the count of allegedly significant 
                                                          
64
 It only includes those simulated individuals who actually had a choice between at least two alternatives with admission. 
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coefficient estimates at the 5 % significance level is close to 25. For 500 simulated samples, this 
corresponds exactly to the test’s nominal significance level. 
Table 4.2: Simulation results for varying information sets (type 1 extreme value specification) 
𝑢𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.   
𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1)  
  information set 
(estimated specification) 
   preferences in 𝐷 (I)  choice in 𝐷 (II)  choice in 𝐴 (III) 
observed location choices  𝑆 = 4  𝑆 = 1  𝑆 = 1 
destination space  𝐷 = 164  𝐷 = 164  𝐴 ∈ [2,4] 
model DGP  none partial full  none partial full  none partial full 
𝒙𝒊𝒍: average 
distance 
-0.0080  -0.01243 
(500) 
-0.00799 
(464) 
-0.00791 
(457) 
 -0.01197 
(500) 
-0.00814 
(309) 
-0.00817 
(307) 
 
-0.00053 
(66) 
0.00022 
(24) 
0.00023 
(24) 
gender # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0   
-0.00033 
(54) 
0.00000 
(25) 
 
 
-0.00029 
(27) 
0.00000 
(19) 
  
0.00003 
(26) 
0.00006 
(25) 
age # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.0002   
-0.00022 
(245) 
-0.00022 
(245) 
 
 
-0.0002 
(99) 
-0.0002 
(103) 
  
-0.00004 
(22) 
-0.00004 
(22) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0   
0.00001 
(23) 
0.00001 
(24) 
 
 
0.00013 
(27) 
0.00013 
(25) 
  
-0.00003 
(28) 
-0.00003 
(27) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.0015    
-0.0016 
(391) 
 
  
-0.00143 
(149) 
   
-0.00026 
(26) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0.0010    
0.00102 
(141) 
 
  
0.00087 
(74) 
   
-0.00002 
(25) 
𝒙𝒍: population 
density 
0.0015  -0.0005 
(500) 
-0.00157 
(490) 
0.00157 
(491) 
 -0.00049 
(500) 
0.0015 
(319) 
0.00149 
(312) 
 
-0.00003 
(31) 
0.0002 
(27) 
0.00019 
(26) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0   
0.00000 
(22) 
0.00000 
(22) 
 
 
0.00000 
(18) 
0.00000 
(20) 
  
-0.00002 
(24) 
-0.00002 
(24) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 -0.0001   
-0.0001 
(500) 
-0.0001 
(500) 
 
 
-0.0001 
(456) 
-0.0001 
(454) 
  
-0.00001 
(23) 
-0.00001 
(24) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0   
0.00000 
(23) 
0.00000 
(23) 
 
 
0.00000 
(19) 
0.00000 
(20) 
  
-0.00001 
(32) 
-0.00001 
(24) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0    
0.00000 
(27) 
 
  
0.00000 
(27) 
   
0.00000 
(26) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0    
-0.00001 
(29) 
 
  
-0.00001 
(25) 
   
0.00002 
(16) 
𝒙𝒍: recreational 
area (p.c.) 
0.0150  0.00525 
(500) 
0.01586 
(479) 
0.01585 
(481) 
 0.00485 
(500) 
0.0152 
(309) 
0.01517 
(309) 
 
0.00047 
(38) 
0.0012 
(34) 
0.00117 
(31) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0   
0.00001 
(33) 
0.00001 
(33) 
 
 
0.00000 
(27) 
0.00001 
(24) 
  
0.00002 
(26) 
-0.00003 
(30) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 -0.0005   
-0.00053 
(390) 
-0.00053 
(392) 
 
 
-0.00051 
(197) 
-0.00051 
(196) 
  
-0.00005 
(24) 
-0.00005 
(21) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0   
0.00001 
(26) 
0.00001 
(27) 
 
 
-0.0001 
(20) 
-0.0001 
(21) 
  
0.0001 
(26) 
0.00011 
(34) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0    
-0.00001 
(25) 
 
  
-0.00014 
(21) 
   
0.00032 
(27) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0    
-0.00017 
(27) 
 
  
-0.00012 
(24) 
   
-0.0005 
(20) 
𝒙𝒍: unemploy-
ment rate 
-0.3000  0.04081 
(492) 
-0.30723 
(428) 
-0.31507 
(433) 
 0.04298 
(401) 
-0.28255 
(215) 
-0.29240 
(224) 
 
0.00155 
(26) 
-0.02776 
(27) 
-0.02989 
(25) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0   
-0.00374 
(29) 
0.00124 
(25) 
 
 
-0.0056 
(23) 
0.00037 
(27) 
  
0.00048 
(24) 
0.00142 
(29) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 0.0150   
0.01578 
(463) 
0.01576 
(465) 
 
 
0.01479 
(270) 
0.1477 
(265) 
  
0.00107 
(28) 
0.0012 
(27) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0.0150   
0.01477 
(83) 
0.01475 
(80) 
 
 
0.01386 
(35) 
0.01375 
(33) 
  
0.0036 
(31) 
0.00329 
(30) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0    
-0.00089 
(23) 
 
  
-0.00073 
(24) 
   
-0.00237 
(36) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0.0500    
0.05338 
(193) 
 
  
0.05215 
(114) 
   
0.00386 
(21) 
Note: The DGP-column presents the true parameters used in the data generating process (DGP). All results originate from a simulation, 
based on 500 replications and a simulated sample size of 1000. The first value in each cell is the average estimated coefficient, the 
value below stands for the number of estimated coefficients, which are significant at the 5 % level. Specifications ‘none’ are based 
solely on the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑙 of location specific variables. Specifications labelled ‘partial’ draw on an interacted model (𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑙) without the 
two risk indicators. Specifications ‘full’ include all (interacted) variables involved in the DGP. In case of the most restricted choice set, 
with 𝐴 ∈ [2,4], all simulated individuals with only one alternative have been dropped (no variation on the individual level). This 
reduced the sample by approximately one half.  
Accounting for the maximum information set (preferences in 𝐷) produces on average coefficients 
which display a similar degree of unbiasedness. However, the underlying mechanisms and 
preferences are identified in a more reliable way since estimates are more efficient in terms of 
smaller standard errors. Figure A4.1 (in the appendix) bolsters this claim by illustrating kernel 
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densities for the three information sets: for virtually all elements in the coefficient vectors 𝛽 and 𝛾 
holds that 𝐸[𝛽𝐼] ≈ 𝛽𝐷𝐺𝑃 ≈ 𝐸[𝛽𝐼𝐼] but 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛽𝐼] < 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛽𝐼𝐼].65 
The basic findings also hold for estimations in a simulated sample with error misspecification 
(normally distributed instead of type 1 extreme value), as presented in Table A4.3 and Figure A4.2 (in 
the appendix): more complete information sets increase the estimates’ efficiency. Regarding 
estimates’ bias, a noteworthy difference emerges in the case of an error misspecification: bias for 
both richer information sets is substantial for all non-zero parameters in the main DGP. Whereas 
misspecification in the error still allows uncovering possible decision-relevant factors, their actual 
impact cannot be plausibly inferred. 
In reference to this small simulation study, two main conclusions can be drawn:66 first, only 
conditioning on the complete space of potentially considered alternatives (the 𝐷-space) may yield 
unbiased estimates. A sole analysis of choices in a subsequently supply side restricted space of 
alternatives (the 𝐴-space) will not depict underlying mechanisms in the destination selection process 
in a reliable manner. Instead, substantial bias will arise almost by design. The second finding refers to 
the efficiency of estimated coefficients: Accounting for additional information provided by survey 
respondents, such as reported alternatives that were explicitly considered but eventually not 
selected, may enhance estimates’ efficiency substantially. However, there is an interesting trade-off 
between analysing stated preferences and choices in the 𝐷-space. Depending on the dimensionality 
of the destination space and the number of stated alternatives, computational challenges might arise 
for the analysis of preferences. Avoiding these, and turning to an examination of choices in the 
destination space still yields unbiased estimates, although the corresponding test statistics will be 
much more conservative.  
In either case, all paths in the unrestricted destination space that might have been considered, but 
eventually not chosen, enrich the information set such that estimations relying on individual-specific 
elasticities become more informative and reliable. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
Drawing on the findings from the Monte-Carlo simulation study, Chapter 4.5.1 presents estimation 
results for the corresponding empirical specifications using survey data. After demonstrating the 
congruence between models in the simulation and the econometric analysis, the main results based 
on the information sets in the 𝐷-space are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.5.2. In Chapter 4.5.3 
some tests regarding violations of the IIA are performed, and Chapter 4.5.4 introduces a framework 
to tackle a potential violation of the IIA. 
                                                          
65
 respectively 𝐸[𝛾𝐼] ≈ 𝛾𝐷𝐺𝑃 ≈ 𝐸[𝛾𝐼𝐼] and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛾𝐼] < 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛾𝐼𝐼]. 
66
 Another result (presented in Table A4.4 in the appendix) shows that clustered errors on the individual level do affect the 
estimates’ reliability in this application to a limited degree. 
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4.5.1 On the sensitivity of estimation results for varying information sets and destination spaces 
Subsequently discussed estimation results originate from conditional logit models, which vary with 
respect to underlying information sets and destination spaces. As a baseline specification, Table 4.3 
contrasts odds ratios obtained from models relying on the same definitions of information sets that 
are known from the simulation.67  
The first model column in Table 4.3 refers to preferences in the destination-space (‘preferences in 
𝐷’), explaining the selection of the three most preferred alternatives at the application stage and the 
final outcome in the full set of all 𝐷 potential alternatives. The second model (‘choice in 𝐷’) evaluates 
exclusively the finally observed choice in the context of the same destination space. Whereas the last 
model relates to the exogenously restricted choice set at the admission stage, including only these 
individuals who eventually had at least two alternatives with admission (‘choice in 𝐴’). The 
explanatory variables contained in the vectors of location-specific (𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑥𝑙) and individual 
characteristics (𝑣𝑖), as well as some related descriptive statistics, are documented in Table A4.2. 
As conjectured by the simulation study, the model estimating only choices among alternatives with 
admission (‘choice in 𝐴’, Table 4.3) displays some conspicuous features: odds ratios above (below) 
one are typically distinctly larger (smaller) than those in the two other models. This reflects the 
pronounced levels of bias in coefficient estimates observed in the simulation study. The second 
noteworthy aspect is a markedly differing pattern of significance. Distance, for one, is not identified 
as affecting destination choice significantly, the same holds for previous mobility experiences and 
some other socio-demographic factors. At the same time, women seemingly have significantly lower 
odds of choosing a destination at a certain distance than men do. One might object that this was 
driven by differing samples, i.e., the restricted sample comprises only 1139 instead of 1712 
individuals. Yet, if the models in the complete destination space 𝐷 are re-estimated for the same 
restricted sample as a robustness check (Table A4.7), exactly the same divergence occurs. In fact, the 
reason is not the sample restriction but the ignored information content in the restricted information 
set. This has a direct implication for analyses of location choices in a scenario with supply side 
restrictions: if the analyst conditions only on the subset of feasible alternatives, remaining after the 
completion of the admission procedure, results with respect to behaviour shaping preferences are 
hardly reliable in a conditional logit model. 
Turning to the two models investigating preferences and choices in the complete destination space 
(𝐷 = 164), a high degree of congruence emerges. Typically, if one model attributes a factor 
explanatory power, the other does, too. At the same time, coefficient estimates are slightly larger in 
absolute size for ‘choice in 𝐷’, producing odds ratios that are more different from one. There is also 
some evidence that some factors may play a role of varying importance within the process of 
                                                          
67 Odds ratios are reported for a more immediate interpretability of results. They indicate by how much the odds of one alternative to be 
chosen increase (decrease) if an explanatory variable changes by one unit. Referring to the ‘choice in 𝐷’ (Table 4.3), for example, if two 
alternatives at 100 and 101 kilometres distance are compared (and everything else is held constant), the odds that the second alternative is 
chosen are 0.9695 times smaller than for the closer alternative. Odds ratios are directly linked to coefficient estimates, since they are 
calculated as 𝑂𝑅 = 𝑒𝛽 , thus all essential information is preserved. Standard errors are transformed accordingly. 
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selecting a study location. During the application process, individuals have seemingly a certain 
tendency to also apply at institutions at locations characterised by lower GDP per capita and higher 
price levels.  
Table 4.3: Conditional logit models for varying information sets 
dependent variable preferences in 𝐷  choice in 𝐷  choice in 𝐴 
observed location choices 𝑆 ≤ 4  𝑆 = 1  𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷 = 164  𝐷 = 164  𝐴 ∈ [2,4] 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙          
distance 0.9830 *** (0.0043)  0.9695 *** (0.0060)  1.0014  (0.0154) 
𝑥𝑙                   
population 1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0012 *** (0.0003) 
population density 0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)  0.9949 *** (0.0004) 
GDP (per capita) 0.9939 *** (0.0018)  1.0138 *** (0.0019)  1.0053  (0.0151) 
price level (€/sq.) 1.0013 *** (0.0002)  0.9971 *** (0.0003)  1.0000  (0.0014) 
share of recreational area 1.1764 *** (0.0115)  1.3074 *** (0.0183)  1.3344 *** (0.0523) 
reg. centre reachability 0.9505 *** (0.0021)  0.9187 *** (0.0044)  0.9173 *** (0.0193) 
unemployment rate 1.1563 *** (0.0205)  1.0542 * (0.0304)  1.3762 *** (0.1618) 
youth unemp. rate 0.9919  (0.0175)  1.7445 *** (0.0590)  2.3758 *** (0.2840) 
high-skilled emp. rate 0.9340 *** (0.0070)  0.8468 *** (0.0147)  0.5291 *** (0.0459) 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 1.0773 *** (0.0030)  1.1785 *** (0.0070)  1.3912 *** (0.0430) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                    
female 0.9990  (0.0007)  0.9992  (0.0009)  0.9950 *** (0.0019) 
age 1.0002  (0.0002)  0.9998  (0.0003)  0.9993  (0.0008) 
uecgrade 0.9994  (0.0006)  1.0054 *** (0.0009)  1.0001  (0.0017) 
academic household 1.0023 *** (0.0006)  1.0011  (0.0009)  1.0012  (0.0016) 
in partnership 0.9981 *** (0.0007)  0.9979 ** (0.0009)  1.0001  (0.0018) 
vocational education 0.9991  (0.0012)  0.9966 ** (0.0016)  1.0017  (0.0041) 
moved during school 1.0015 ** (0.0007)  1.0018 * (0.0010)  0.9989  (0.0018) 
exchange participation 1.0026 *** (0.0007)  1.0028 *** (0.0009)  1.0017  (0.0017) 
stay abroad 1.0045 *** (0.0007)  1.0049 *** (0.0009)  1.0006  (0.0019) 
risk attitude low 0.9982 ** (0.0007)  0.9982 * (0.0011)  0.9978  (0.0021) 
high 0.9999  (0.0010)  1.0011  (0.0013)  1.0022  (0.0025) 
patience low 0.9982 * (0.0010)  0.9989  (0.0012)  0.9922 ** (0.0031) 
high 1.0018 ** (0.0008)  1.0023 ** (0.0011)  0.9979  (0.0023) 
extraversion low 0.9989  (0.0011)  0.9995  (0.0015)  0.9966  (0.0030) 
high 0.9990  (0.0008)  0.9990  (0.0010)  0.9998  (0.0021) 
openness low 0.9986  (0.0009)  0.9981 * (0.0011)  0.9943 ** (0.0022) 
high 1.0017 ** (0.0008)  1.0014  (0.0011)  1.0043 ** (0.0019) 
neuroticism low 0.9988  (0.0010)  0.9978  (0.0014)  0.9962  (0.0031) 
high 1.0012  (0.0009)  0.9998  (0.0013)  0.9975  (0.0022) 
conscientiousness low 0.9997  (0.0008)  1.0002  (0.0010)  1.0000  (0.0022) 
high 0.9989  (0.0008)  0.9981  (0.0013)  1.0061 *** (0.0022) 
agreeableness low 0.9988  (0.0009)  0.9981 * (0.0011)  1.0024  (0.0025) 
high 0.9999  (0.0008)  1.0016  (0.0011)  1.0050 *** (0.0019) 
adaptability low 0.9984 * (0.0009)  0.9979 * (0.0012)  1.0045 ** (0.0021) 
high 1.0025 *** (0.0009)  1.0036 *** (0.0011)  1.0058 *** (0.0022) 
importance of 
proximity to family 
low 1.0020 ** (0.0008)  1.0031 *** (0.0012)  1.0035 * (0.0021) 
high 0.9985  (0.0011)  0.9993  (0.0015)  1.0026  (0.0034) 
importance of 
proximity to friends 
low 1.0020 ** (0.0009)  1.0020  (0.0013)  1.0006  (0.0023) 
high 0.9981  (0.0012)  0.9998  (0.0016)  0.9989  (0.0031) 
observations 1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1139 × ?̅? 
LL(0) -21393.29  -8730.97  -1259.80 
LL -13411.59  -4116.20  -478.13 
df 40  40  40 
Wald 𝜒2 6624.60  6793.91  576.39 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.3731  0.5286  0.6205 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: A sequential model comparison for ‘preferences in 𝐷’ and ‘choice in 𝐷’ is  performed in Table A4.5 and 
Table A4.6, respectively. These model comparisons inform about the sensitivity of results with respect to the 
inclusion of additional personality traits. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates 
interactions between distance and individual-specific characteristics. ?̅? ≈ 3.1370 is the average number of 
observed alternatives in the admission set of those 1139 individuals whose admission set included more 
than one alternative. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0).  
 
If they make their final choice, they are more likely to choose a destination offering better income 
perspectives and lower price levels, a hint towards the impact of budget restrictions. In addition, 
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importance of proximity to friends seems to affect only the choice where to apply, but not where to 
eventually enrol. Beyond that, there is some evidence in favour of ability-related sorting. Given a 
location in a certain distance, individuals with weaker scholastic performance have higher odds of 
selecting themselves into such a location.  
Another concern, beyond information sets, is the definition of the destination space 𝐷 itself: it 
assumes that all 164 locations offering an economics programme are relevant potential destinations. 
This definition, however, does not distinguish between the types of institution, i.e., comprehensive 
university versus university of applied science. Moreover, some smaller institutions might just be 
complete unknown among individuals in the sample, thus the complete destination space would 
misrepresent their actual destination space and bias estimation results. 
Acknowledging that the sample consists of only those individuals who signalled, by their observed 
enrolment choice, a certain preference for comprehensive universities, one robustness check 
addresses the first issue: the initial destination space of size 𝐷 = 164 is restricted to included only 
those destinations actually hosting a public university.68 This reduces the destination space in the 
initial application process to 𝐷𝑈 = 71. In order to remedy the problem of a misspecification due to 
the inclusion of institutions no one in the sample was actually aware of, another version of the initial 
destination space comprises only those destinations (𝐷𝑆 = 101) which have been stated as most 
preferred (or finally chosen) alternatives by at least one individual in the sample. A comparison of 
Table 4.3 and Table A4.8 demonstrates that the estimation results are highly robust with respect to 
the three alternative destination space definitions. Using the complete destination space 𝐷, including 
all those destinations hosting any type of university offering an economics programme, does not 
adversely affect the results’ reliability. 
Another robustness check makes allowance for the general definition of economics programmes, 
including all programmes with a presumed substantial economic emphasis. Some of these might 
have a more specific focus and are not necessarily offered with the desired curriculum at all the 
institutions included in the destination space.69 If someone is interested in International 
Management, institutions and therefore destinations offering only Business Studies are probably not 
valid alternatives. The highest degree of similarity, in terms of the curriculum, can be attributed to 
programmes labelled Business Studies and Economics and Business. At least one of these 
programmes is provided at those destinations, spanning the complete destination space. At the same 
time, these are, by far, the most frequently chosen programmes in the sample and also in the 
population of freshmen in the winter term 2013 (Destatis, 2014). As Table A4.9 reveals, the most 
noteworthy change is due to an increase of the estimates’ variance: the odds ratios for individuals 
attributing proximity to family a low importance and those with completed vocational training are 
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 In contrast to those, which host exclusively universities of applied sciences. 
69
 One example is Economic Engineering, which may indeed have a strong focus on economic content, yet it can also be a 
primarily technical study programme with some few courses in economics. 
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only significant in the full sample. Ultimately, restricting the sample to those 1391 individuals 
enrolled in one of the two programmes preserves the general sorting patterns. 
In view of the facts delineated in this subchapter, and backed by the simulation study, the further 
discussion evolves primarily around specifications drawing on the full set of potential destinations 𝐷. 
Since the general interest of this research rests on factors influencing the final location choice, the 
relevant dependent variable is consequently ‘choice in 𝐷’. 
4.5.2 Discussion of the identified sorting patterns of prospective academics 
Table 4.4 provides additional guidance regarding the preferred model specification. The table reports 
outcomes from Wald tests for varying parameter restrictions, and thus allows evaluating whether a 
more parsimonious model is nested in a reference specification. If this hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, the additional parameters in the richer model do not significantly improve the model and 
the more concise model is preferable.  
The first reference model (M4) is the one from Table 4.3, the second model (M5) also accounts for 
plausible interactions between selected individual and economically relevant location-specific 
characteristics (Table A4.10). Individuals of different risk attitude or time preferences might display 
distinct geographic sorting patterns: less patient workers might exert less effort in the job search 
(DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005), and hence, less patient prospective academics might not consider 
future job perspectives at the stage of study location choice. On the other hand, a lower degree of 
risk aversion in the labour force is related to higher levels of unemployment (Pissarides, 1974), 
implying a more developed tolerance for being unemployed of more risk-loving individuals.    
Table 4.4: Model comparison, based on Wald tests 
choice in 𝐷 
  
overall model fit  𝐻0: M nested in M5  𝐻0: M nested in M4 
restrictions 
(df) 
𝜒2 (df) P > 𝜒2  restrictions 
(df) 
𝜒2 (df) P > 𝜒2  restrictions 
(df) 
𝜒2 (df) P > 𝜒2 
M5 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠) 
 
all (64) 6817.76 0.0000         
M4 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙) 
all (40) 6793.91 0.0000  𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠  
(24) 
48.36 0.0023     
M3 (𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙) 
all (30) 1843.39 0.0000  𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠, 𝑥𝑙  
(34) 
5384.64 0.0000  𝑥𝑙  
(10) 
5298.62 0.0000 
M2 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙) 
all (11) 5923.00 0.0000  𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠, 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙  
(53) 
283.49 0.0000  𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙   
(29) 
225.48 0.0000 
M1 (𝑥𝑖𝑙) 
all (1) 1553.63 0.0000  𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠, 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑥𝑙   
(63) 
6058.14 0.0000   𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑥𝑙  
 (39) 
6012.04 0.0000 
Note: Reported Wald test statistics refer to the preferred specifications for ‘choice in 𝐷’ with a destination space 𝐷 = 164. The model M5 
(see second specification in Table A4.10) introduces plausible interaction terms of some destination-specific and individual-specific 
characteristics. The additional vector 𝑣𝑖
𝑠  comprises risk attitude and patience. Selected economically relevant location-specific 
characteristics (𝑥𝑙
𝑠) are GDP per capita, a price level proxy, (youth) unemployment rate and the high-skilled employment rate (of labour 
market entrants). 
Testing more parsimonious specifications against the second model specification in Table 4.3 (choice 
in 𝐷), i.e., restricting the corresponding parameters of the vectors 𝑥𝑙, the interaction between 
distance (𝑥𝑖𝑙) and 𝑣𝑖 or both to be zero, each times leads to a rejection of the Null that the more 
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parsimonious model is nested in the baseline specification M4: conditioning on individual 
characteristics increases the model fit distinctly. At the same time, M4 itself is not nested in M5, 
since the additional interaction terms’ parameters have significant joint explanatory power. By 
introducing these interactions M5 proves to be more informative. 
The odds ratios for the more copious model M5 (second model in Table A4.1070) confirm the results 
from the baseline model M4 (Table 4.3): aside from the existence of the distance deterrence effect 
(𝑥𝑖𝑙), people tend to sort into destinations with a larger general population, which are at the same 
time not too densely populated. There is also the tendency to select those locations potentially 
offering higher consumption levels, since districts with higher GDP per capita or lower price levels are 
more likely to be chosen. While a larger share of recreational space seems to serve as attractor, 
higher travel time to the next regional centre works in the opposite direction, as an odds ratio below 
one for ‘regional centre reachability’ (measured in minutes) indicates. 
The interaction terms between distance and individual characteristics provide the following 
interpretations: a destination in a given distance has an odds ratio below one, and thereby is less 
frequently chosen by individuals in a partnership (compared to those not in a relationship) or those 
with completed vocational training.  
Individuals with previous mobility experience, e.g., a move during childhood or episodes abroad, 
display for a respective destination odds ratios above one. They are more willing to choose a study 
place farther away, since these previous experiences mitigate the perceived costs of mobility. 
Something similar can be observed for those expressing a relatively low preference for proximity to 
their family. The inversion of the argument, however, implies that more family-oriented prospective 
academics have a limited destination space, and hence fewer institutions to choose amongst.  
Regarding the impact of personality traits, the Big-Five do not yield robust results. Any conclusion 
that personality characteristics do not matter would be, nevertheless, premature: those with the 
lowest willingness to take risks (compared to those of average risk attitude) are distinctly less likely 
to sort themselves into a destination at a certain distance to their origin.  
Another important and highly robust factor is individual patience – least patient prospective 
academics seem to be less likely to select a study location further away. Consistently, most patient 
individuals are characterised by a notably larger potential willingness to display mobility for 
educational purposes. For them, increasing returns to tertiary education, by enlarging the choice set 
of suitable institutions, is especially rewarding. Another relevant factor, attenuating the more 
immediate psychic costs of integrating into a new social and urban environment, is the ability to 
adjust to new circumstances. Those expressing highest (lowest) levels of adaptability have higher 
(lower) odds of picking an alternative at a certain distance than the reference group. 
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 This table contains also results for varying information sets and definitions of the destination space. 
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In order to provide a more immediate interpretation of the interaction effects of distance and 
location-specific conditions on the one hand and individual traits on the other, the following 
paragraph presents some selected graphs. Included average marginal effects and predicted choice 
probabilities are derived for various levels of the interacted location-specific variable within the area 
of support, e.g., in case of distance in the range of 0 to 600 kilometres.71  
Figure 4.7: The decay of the distance deterrence effect – the average marginal effect of distance 
 
Note: The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % confidence interval. 
Figure 4.7 illustrates a diminishing distance deterrence effect for any destinations further away than 
100 kilometres. Comparing two alternatives, one in 200 kilometres distance and the other (probably 
in another direction) 201 kilometres away, the selection probability decreases on average by 0.2 
percentage points. For two locations in the vicinity of 300 kilometres distance, this effect is only half 
as large. This attenuating distance deterrence effect is known from the literature (Long, 2004). 
In contrast to that, Figure 4.8 demonstrates that the distance deterrence effect is, in fact, related to 
individual characteristics. The non-overlapping confidence intervals for larger distances point to a 
distinct difference between individuals who have a previous mobility experience abroad and those 
who do not. The same holds for those with a high adaptability to new circumstances in contrast to 
those probably facing a harder time in a new living environment. The effect on the selection 
likelihood of a potential destination is rather strong: whereas most adaptable individuals feature a 
20 % probability of choosing a location in 300 kilometres distance, least adaptable individuals do so 
with a probability of only 10 %. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71 This range covers 99 % of all potential paths for each of the 1712 individuals in the sample to any of the 164 potential destinations. 
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Figure 4.8: Predicted destination selection likelihood, by various individual characteristics 
  
  
Note: The left axes represent the predicted selection likelihood of a potential destination. The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % 
confidence interval. 
Turning to some pivotal urban statistics (Figure 4.9), namely population size and density, gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita and price levels (measured as building plot prices), observed 
average marginal effects are significant for all potential national destinations in a radius of up to 600 
kilometres. Although many universities are situated in larger cities, negative average marginal effects 
of population density and price levels indicate that the subjects in the sample have a certain 
preference for less crowded and more affordable destinations. Prospective academics in the sample 
also exhibit a certain preference for destinations with higher GDP per capita, yet the interest in 
destinations offering higher wealth levels diminishes in distance. 
The right panel in Figure 4.9 graphs average marginal effects for the share of recreational area and 
reachability of the closest regional centre. Both can be interpreted as factors contributing to quality 
of life. The first referring to a more hedonistic concept of well-being and the latter is a proxy for 
access to a variety of amenities which cannot be found in smaller cities (larger shopping malls, 
theatres or the like). Lower levels of accessibility to urban amenities are associated with a smaller 
destination selection likelihood. The relative impact of recreational potential is strong: if the share of 
the recreational area at a destination in 100 kilometres distance was to increase by one percentage 
point, destination selection likelihood would increase by more than 3 percentage points. 
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Figure 4.9: Average marginal effects of various urban characteristics over distance 
 
Note: The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % confidence interval. 
The relevance of the hedonistic concept can also be further investigated, yielding an interesting 
finding (Figure 4.10). Average marginal effects across the group of those who spent time abroad and 
those who never made such a kind of previous mobility experience differ notably.  
Figure 4.10: Average marginal effect of recreational value, by distance and previous cross-border mobility 
 
Note: The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % confidence interval. 
If the recreational area was to increase by one percentage point for a destination in 300 kilometres 
distance, selection likelihood increases on average by more than 2 percentage points for those who 
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displayed this type of previous cross-border mobility. For individuals who did not make such an 
experience yet, the likelihood increases on average only by approximately 1.4 percentage points. 
Individual-specific characteristics exert heterogeneous effects on destination choices also in the 
context of labour market related aspects. Especially levels of patience, corresponding to various 
degrees of time preferences, prove insightful (Figure 4.11). The upper left panel illustrates average 
marginal effects for the high-skilled employment rate at a destination, the upper right panel the 
corresponding graphs for the young high-skilled employment rate. The latter informs about the 
current job perspectives for university graduates in the age bracket of 30 to 34 years.  
Figure 4.11: Average marginal effects for labour market characteristics 
  
 
Note: The young high-skilled employment rate refers to employed high-skilled individuals with a university degree, aged 30 to 34, in 
relation to all employed and its scale is in per mille. The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % confidence interval. 
Least patient individuals display no sensitivity with respect to the age independent high-skilled 
employment rate (90 % confidence interval includes zero). Most patient individuals, in turn, are 
much less likely to choose a location with good job prospects for academics. This result is only a 
conundrum at first glance, since most patient individuals are much more likely to select themselves 
into a destination with higher employment rates of academics in their early thirties. Ultimately, these 
most patient individuals have a strong preference for destinations which labour markets are 
characterised by two features: good job perspectives for young academics who just established 
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themselves in the labour market, on the one hand, and a not overly fierce competitive situation with 
older (more experienced) workers, on the other.  
The lower panel reports the average marginal effect of GDP per capita. Once again, least patient 
individuals do not show any significant sensitivity with respect to higher income levels. Thus, the 
observed relevance of higher potential per capita levels (Figure 4.9) is mainly attributable to the most 
patient individuals. 
The results highlighted in Figure 4.11 insinuate that the choice of a study location might indeed 
already inform about subsequent location choices, as suggested by some authors (cf. Belfield and 
Morris, 1999; Groen, 2004; Busch and Weigert, 2010; Buenstorf et al., 2016). This also confirms the 
general findings of McHugh and Morgan (1984) and Dotti et al. (2013), who elaborated that 
economic conditions matter already at such a pre-labour market entry stage. My results furnish a 
refined behavioural explanation: it is especially the most patient individuals who make in the present 
such distinct location decisions while keeping local post-graduation employment prospects, the 
future returns, in mind. Yet, even for the most patient and considerate decision-makers, distance-
dependent costs of mobility are limiting the set of potential destinations and local labour markets.  
Drawing on the richest model specification M5 (Table A4.10), imposing the fewest restrictions on 
interactions of personality or individual attributes and location-specific characteristics, this analysis 
demonstrated a variety of factors that attract prospective academics to a destination. Some are 
labour market related and others have a more hedonic implication. In most cases, however, different 
types of people display varying sensitivities to those factors: when it comes to the valuation of basic 
economic conditions or amenities, individual preferences vary substantially. 
4.5.3 Testing for violations of the IIA 
As previously mentioned, a relevant assumption for conditional logit estimations is the independence 
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA, cf. McFadden, 1973; Train, 2009). In general, this assumption follows 
from equation 4.2 and reads as 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙)
𝑃(𝑗|𝑧𝑖𝑗)
=
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙
′𝜔)
∑ exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙
′𝜔)𝐷𝑙=1
 (
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜔)
∑ exp(𝑧𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜔)𝐷𝑗=1
)
−1
=
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙
′𝜔)
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜔)
.     (4.5) 
Irrespective whether one or several alternatives (other than 𝑙 and 𝑗) are added or removed from a 
choice set, the ratio of these two alternatives’ selection probability remains unchanged. In other 
words, regardless of any choice set modification not affecting alternatives 𝑙 and 𝑗, whenever one was 
preferred over the other before the change, the same holds true after the adjustment of the choice 
set. Moreover, if the selection likelihood of 𝑙 was twice as large as the selection likelihood of 𝑗 before 
the modification, the same must be fulfilled afterwards. In reality, however, this can be violated 
whenever a newly included alternative is a very close substitute to an existing one (Train, 2009). 
This assumption can be tested, applying the Hausman-McFadden test (Hausman and McFadden, 
1984), which basically tests the equality of coefficients obtained based on a larger choice set (𝐷) and 
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those resulting from a restricted choice set (𝐷𝑅 ⊆ 𝐷). If the IIA is maintained in a given model 
specification for a population of 𝐼 individuals, the coefficient difference Δ = 𝜔𝑅 −𝜔  should be zero, 
respectively converge in distribution 
√𝐼(𝜔𝑅 −𝜔)
𝑑
→𝑁(0, 𝑉𝑅 − 𝑉),  
yielding the corresponding test statistic 
𝐻𝑀 = 𝐼(𝜔𝑅 −𝜔)
′(𝑉𝑅 − 𝑉)
−1(𝜔𝑅 −𝜔).  
Under the Null, this HM-statistic is 𝜒2-distributed, with the degrees of freedom equal to the rank of 
𝑉𝑅 − 𝑉. A rejection of the Null indicates significant differences between the coefficient vectors 𝜔𝑅 
and 𝜔 for the corresponding model specification. An important limitation of this test, however, is 
given by the fact that it is rather a joint test of IIA and model-specification. It is not able to exactly 
distinguish between a genuine violation of the IIA and a model misspecification of some sort, i.e., in 
the vector 𝑧 containing explanatory variables (Hausman and McFadden, 1984).  
Table 4.5 reports test results for the main specifications and the relevant destination space 
definitions, where the unrestricted choice sets are given by 𝐷,𝐷𝑈 and 𝐷𝑆. For each of these sets, one 
potential destination has been excluded and a restricted version of the model has been estimated 
and its coefficients tested against the unrestricted model’s coefficients. Then, the next alternative 
from the corresponding unrestricted choice set has been dropped and a new restricted model was 
estimated, and so on.72 These calculations have been applied to the specifications with the maximum 
number of interactions (M5), the slightly restricted version comprising distance-interactions (M4) 
and some specifications reported in tables referring to a sequential model comparison (see Table 
A4.6 and Table A4.8). 
Table 4.5: Hausman-McFadden test for preferred empirical specifications 
destination 
space 
observed 
location 
choices 
specification 𝑧 no 𝐻0  
rejected 
𝐷 = 164  𝑆 = 1  M5 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠  153 
  M4 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙   159 
  M3 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙   159 
  M2  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 162 
  M1  𝑥𝑖𝑙 144 
𝐷𝑈 = 71  𝑆 = 1  M5  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠 67 
  M4  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 69 
  M3  𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 69 
  M2  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 71 
  M1  𝑥𝑖𝑙 61 
𝐷𝑆 = 101  𝑆 = 1  M5  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠 96 
  M4  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 99 
  M3  𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 96 
  M2  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 101 
  M1  𝑥𝑖𝑙 84 
Note: The confidence level for the 𝜒2-HM test has been set to 𝛼 = 0.05. In each case, a 
maximum number of 𝐷 (𝐷𝑈 or 𝐷𝑆) restricted models were estimated and the respective 
coefficients compared to those from the unrestricted model. 
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 This test has been performed using Stata’s suest-command, yielding two important merits: First, it avoids the pitfall of an 
undefined standard Hausman test for a cluster robust variance-covariance estimator (which may not meet the test’s 
asymptotic properties). Second, it does not rely on a fully efficient estimator for comparison, as the standard test does (cf. 
StataCorp, 2015).   
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Taken at face value, these results indicate a substantial likelihood that some of the restrictive 
assumptions of the conditional logit model are not met for the most preferred model specifications 
with the best model fit (as displayed in the previous section, Table 4.4). Yet, the distribution of 
estimated coefficients in the 164 restricted samples is highly concentrated around the coefficients in 
the unrestricted destination space (Table A4.11). In addition, the obtained estimates are in so far 
reliable as the number of significant parameter estimates in the restricted samples reveals. Factors 
that were found to be significant predictors in the unrestricted destination space retain their 
significant predictive power in the restricted samples.  
In order to obtain some additional insights regarding potential reasons for these detected failures, 
applying the HM-test, I also report in Table 4.6 corresponding test results from the simulations. As a 
reminder, the specifications in the simulation labelled ‘full’ comprised only those explanatory 
variables which have actually been used in the simulation’s data generating process. Furthermore, 
implemented errors satisfied the required conditions, i.e., 𝑒𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1), of a conditional 
logit model. 
Table 4.6: Hausman-McFadden test for correct model specifications in the simulation 
destination 
space 
observed 
location 
choices 
error simulated 
samples 
𝑧 avg. no 𝐻0  
rejected 
min. no 𝐻0  
rejected 
max. no 𝐻0  
rejected 
𝐷 = 164  𝑆 = 1  𝜀𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  
𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1) 
500 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑥𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙  159.69 154 163 
𝐷 = 164  𝑆 = 1  𝜀𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  
𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1) 
500 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑥𝑙 93.11 77 107 
Note: The confidence level for the 𝜒2-HM test has been set as 𝛼 = 0.05. In each simulated sample, a maximum number of 164 restricted 
models were estimated and the respective coefficients compared to those from the unrestricted model. 
In each of the 500 simulated samples, 159.69 HM-tests lead on average to a rejection of the Null (of 
equal coefficients), thus indicating a potential violation of the IIA in the model mirroring the true 
vector 𝑧, when a certain alternative has been excluded. In stark contrast to this, the number of 
average rejections declined to 93.11 for models incorporating only destination specific components 
into the vector of explanatory variables. Aside from the fact that this number is still very large, one 
has to note that the data generating process of these simulated samples was in fact based on the 
richer version of vector 𝑧: simulated subjects’ alternative-specific utility levels of elements in the 
choice set have been affected (by design) by their individual preferences. Ignoring such a 
heterogeneous process, e.g., by stripping down vector 𝑧, would affect the individual-destination-
specific errors, produce biased estimates and reduce overall model fit (as has been shown in the 
simulation).  
As it turns out, the HM-test points in the simulation context to a reduced likelihood of a violated IIA 
in cases of a model actually suffering from severe misspecification. It does not seem powerful 
enough to provide reliable guidance in case of a complex model structure and a large choice set. 
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4.5.4 Heterogeneous substitution patterns in spatial choice frameworks 
Although the previously applied Hausman-McFadden test proved to be insufficiently reliable in this 
application, a potential violation of the IIA is nevertheless a concern – the investigation of individuals’ 
decision-making processes in such a complex context might be prone per se to such shortcomings. 
An additional model extension explicitly accounts for such complex structure by acknowledging the 
fact that faced with a plethora of destination alternatives, a decision-maker might resort to a 
“hierarchical information-processing strategy where clusters of alternatives are initially evaluated 
before a destination is chosen from within a selected cluster” (Pellegrini and Fotheringham, 2002, p. 
497). The advantage of such an information-processing based approach, compared to a nested logit 
model, is that it is not required to define some clusters, which were possibly never evaluated by a 
decision-maker.73 Instead, a respective alternative’s utility shall be weighted by the likelihood 𝐿𝑙 that 
this alternative would be considered, yielding 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙) =
exp(𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]
′𝛾)𝐿𝑙
∑ exp(𝑥𝑖𝑙
′ 𝛽+[𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑙]′𝛾)
𝐷
𝑙=1 𝐿𝑙
 .       (4.6) 
This likelihood can be modelled as a sort of average accessibility measure 𝐴𝑙(𝐷, 𝑥𝑙), which is a 
function of proximity to other alternatives and familiarity, the latter being driven by population size 
such that 
𝐿𝑙 = 𝐴𝑙(𝐷, 𝑥𝑙)
𝜃 = [
1
𝐷−1
∑
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗
𝑑𝑙𝑗
𝐷
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑙 ]
𝜃
.       (4.7) 
This measure, based on Pellegrini and Fotheringham (2002) integrates, in fact, two dimensions: a 
form of mental accessibility relating to awareness, and the other referring to physical accessibility in 
the sense of Pramono and Oppewal (2012). Furthermore, this model extension yields the competing 
destinations model (Fotheringham, 1983; Fotheringham, 1986), where the parameter 𝜃 can be 
interpreted as measure regarding the level of hierarchical information processing. This modelling 
approach, in fact, also corresponds to a special case of the ‘availability/perception’ approach of 
Cascetta and Papola (2001) where alternatives may enter utility based on their likelihood 𝐿𝑖𝑙  to be 
element of the resulting ‘fuzzy’ choice set, i.e., the consideration set: random utility is thus related to 
alternatives’ varying degrees to be perceived or available.74  
In the end, this modification has two interesting implications regarding the independence from 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in a spatial conditional logit model: The first merit of evaluating spatial 
choices in a competing destination model is an increasing chance that the IIA is not violated, since it 
only requires 
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 Resorting to generalised extreme value models (GEV), it is possible to relax the a priori definition of nests e.g., by using 
the generalised nested logit model. Introducing allocation parameters allows alternatives to be a constituent of several 
nests, which display varying degrees of substitutability (respectively similarity) among themselves (Hunt et al., 2004). 
Especially the restriction of dissimilarity parameters to be bounded between zero and one, required so the model is 
consistent with random utility theory, is frequently found to be violated in empirical applications. This, in turn, limits such 
models applicability. 
74
 More precisely, this parity results for 𝑈𝑖𝑙 = 𝑧𝑖𝑙
′ 𝜔 + 𝐸[ln 𝐿𝑖𝑙] + 𝜂𝑖𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑙 , given 𝜂𝑖𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑙~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1). 
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𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙)
𝑃(𝑗|𝑧𝑖𝑗)
=
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙
′𝜔)𝐴𝑙
𝜃
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜔)𝐴𝑗
𝜃 =
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙
′𝜔+𝜃 ln𝐴𝑙)
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜔+𝜃 ln𝐴𝑗)
  
to hold. In this form, adding an alternative (hence changing the set 𝐷) with distinct characteristics is 
likely to change the ratio 𝐴𝑙
𝜃/𝐴𝑗
𝜃 and thus bears the potential to accommodate observed changes in 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑧𝑖𝑙  )/𝑃(𝑗|𝑧𝑖𝑗). At the same time, it becomes possible to test for differences in substitutability 
across alternatives (for 𝜃 ≠ 0) on the one hand, and for constant substitution patterns (𝜃 = 0). In 
this second case, the model would collapse into the baseline conditional logit model. 
The second beneficial implication is related to the inclusion of a rich set of location-specific 
conditions: some destination-specific attributes, which do not only affect the selection probability of 
an alternative but already the likelihood that this destination is considered at all, are even controlled 
for in the deterministic utility component 𝑧𝑖𝑙. Consequently, it would be sufficient to include only 
those relationships into 𝐴𝑙(𝐷, 𝑥𝑙) which influence human information processing in a very specific 
way (Pellegrini and Fotheringham, 2002). One most prominent is distance-related, e.g., Sener et al. 
(2011) have demonstrated that for intra-metropolitan location choices possible spatial correlation 
can be addressed by modelling a distance-based correlation structure. 
An implicit choice set modelling strategy, such as the competing destinations model entails 
drawbacks to be considered as well. The accessibility measure as a core component is constructed 
based on observed factors, thus assumes the implicit choice set formation to be deterministic itself. 
Moreover, inclusion into an implicit choice set is based on presumed awareness (of an alternative), 
and determined by spatial accessibility (Hunt et al., 2004) – though individual de facto levels of 
awareness, in contrast, might differ in unknown ways.  
A plausible reasoning to counter such argument is to highlight actual means of gathering 
information. Widely available and rather detailed information about study possibilities on the 
internet, for instance, should foster awareness towards a finite number of potential locations: 
specific non-commercial information offers provide a structured overview of all possible 
combinations of programme and study location in Germany.75 At the same time, spatial accessibility 
(also related to population size) is likely to foster a fundamental likelihood of ever having heard of a 
potential location – raising the likelihood of being familiar with such a possible destination. 
Table 4.7 reports the results for the model specifications M2, M3 and M4 (from left to right, and one 
without the vector of personality variables) in the competing destinations framework, accounting for 
the potential violations of the IIA. 
Across all specifications accounting for destination-specific conditions (𝑥𝑙) in the competing 
destination framework, 𝜃 > 0 (yielding odds ratios above one) can be observed. This implies the 
presence of agglomeration effects (Hunt et al., 2004), i.e., “the attraction of a cluster increases 
exponentially as the number of alternatives in it increases” (Pellegrini and Fotheringham, 2002, p. 
500). This is not only evidence in favour of people displaying a form of hierarchical decision making, 
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 E.g., the so-called ‘Hochschulkompass’ (HRK, 2015). 
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but once more accentuates their overall preference for locations which are in close proximity to 
other alternative destinations, typically being urbanised centres: the higher the density of 
alternatives, respectively the more accessible it is, the more likely a specific alternative will be 
considered.  
Table 4.7: Conditional logit results in a competing destinations framework 
dependent variable choice in 𝐷 
observed location choices 𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷 = 164 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙             
distance 0.9833 *** (0.0006)  0.9709 *** (0.0065)  0.9682 *** (0.0062)  0.9765 *** (0.0061) 
𝑥𝑙                         
population 1.0049 *** (0.0003)  1.0049 *** (0.0002)        1.0048 *** (0.0002) 
population density 0.9936 *** (0.0002)  0.9936 *** (0.0002)        0.9936 *** (0.0002) 
GDP (per capita) 1.0490 *** (0.0034)  1.0490 *** (0.0034)        1.0490 *** (0.0034) 
price level (€/sq.) 0.9888 *** (0.0005)  0.9891 *** (0.0005)        0.9892 *** (0.0005) 
share of recreational area 1.3763 *** (0.0137)  1.3824 *** (0.0141)        1.3874 *** (0.0143) 
reg. centre reachability 0.8577 *** (0.0122)  0.8616 *** (0.0120)        0.8628 *** (0.0121) 
unemployment rate 1.6064 *** (0.0742)  1.6358 *** (0.0767)        1.6414 *** (0.0775) 
youth unemp. rate 1.7491 *** (0.0825)  1.7161 *** (0.0804)        1.7152 *** (0.0805) 
high-skilled emp. rate 0.6760 *** (0.0194)  0.6773 *** (0.0194)        0.6780 *** (0.0193) 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 1.3342 *** (0.0157)  1.3328 *** (0.0157)        1.3333 *** (0.0158) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                       
female    0.9991  (0.0009)  0.9994  (0.0010)  0.9989  (0.0010) 
age    0.9998  (0.0003)  1.0002  (0.0003)  0.9996  (0.0003) 
uecgrade    1.0062 *** (0.0009)  1.0042 *** (0.0009)  1.0056 *** (0.0009) 
academic household    1.0014  (0.0009)  1.0012  (0.0009)  1.0010  (0.0009) 
in partnership    0.9979 ** (0.0009)  0.9974 *** (0.0010)  0.9982 * (0.0009) 
vocational education    0.9944 *** (0.0018)  0.9962 ** (0.0017)  0.9956 ** (0.0017) 
moved during school    1.0024 ** (0.0010)  1.0012  (0.0010)  1.0017 * (0.0010) 
exchange participation    1.0028 *** (0.0009)  1.0030 *** (0.0009)  1.0029 *** (0.0009) 
stay abroad    1.0052 *** (0.0010)  1.0051 *** (0.0010)  1.0039 *** (0.0010) 
risk attitude low       0.9985  (0.0012)  0.9982  (0.0011) 
high       1.0012  (0.0013)  1.0004  (0.0012) 
patience low       0.9988  (0.0013)  0.9989  (0.0013) 
high       1.0024 ** (0.0011)  1.0030 *** (0.0011) 
extraversion low       0.9981  (0.0017)  0.9999  (0.0015) 
high       0.9986  (0.0011)  0.9991  (0.0011) 
openness low       0.9985  (0.0012)  0.9977 ** (0.0012) 
high       1.0006  (0.0011)  1.0007  (0.0011) 
neuroticism low       0.9981  (0.0014)  0.9977  (0.0014) 
high       1.0002  (0.0013)  0.9998  (0.0013) 
conscientiousness low       1.0006  (0.0011)  1.0003  (0.0011) 
high       0.9973 * (0.0014)  0.9978 * (0.0013) 
agreeableness low       0.9978 * (0.0012)  0.9979 * (0.0012) 
high       1.0019  (0.0012)  1.0019 * (0.0011) 
adaptability low       0.9980  (0.0014)  0.9982  (0.0013) 
high       1.0033 *** (0.0011)  1.0042 *** (0.0011) 
importance of 
proximity to family 
low       1.0031 ** (0.0012)  1.0027 ** (0.0012) 
high       0.9990  (0.0016)  0.9990  (0.0016) 
importance of 
proximity to friends 
low       1.0020  (0.0013)  1.0020  (0.0013) 
high       0.9994  (0.0017)  0.9994  (0.0017) 
ln 𝐴𝑙: accessibility of 𝑙        
observations 1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷 
LL(0) -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97 
LL -3836.81  -3749.59  -6477.72  -3695.04 
df 12  21  31  41 
Wald 𝜒2 9445.65  10159.81  1248.51  10701.20 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.5606  0.5705  0.2581  0.5768 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific 
characteristics. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0). Results for alternative definitions of the destination space are 
reported in Table A4.12.  
A negative estimate of 𝜃 results in those specifications (M3) where all parameters in the vector of 
destination-specific conditions have been restricted to zero. If one was to rely solely on this 
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specification, one might conclude that alternatives in close vicinity to others would be chosen less 
often - the competition effect would be active. Albeit this model specification displays a much poorer 
model fit, as indicated by the lower log likelihood in Table 4.7 and the model selection tests in Table 
4.4. Instead of the vector of location-specific conditions, the accessibility measure absorbs 
substantial variation. 
Table 4.8: Coefficients of the accessibility measure in the competing destinations framework 
destination 
space 
observed 
location 
choices 
specification 𝑧 𝜃 
𝐷 = 164  𝑆 = 1  M5 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠  8.7055 
  M4 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙   8.6580 
  M3 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙   -1.0936 
  M2  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 8.7031 
𝐷𝑈 = 71  𝑆 = 1  M5  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠 7.1150 
  M4  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 6.9993 
  M3  𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.5536 
  M2  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 6.9779 
𝐷𝑆 = 101  𝑆 = 1  M5  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑠 7.5195 
  M4  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 7.4581 
  M3  𝑥𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.5265 
  M2  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑙 7.5068 
Note: ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific 
characteristics. Estimation results for M5 are not reported, the other results can be 
found in Table 4.7 and Table A4.12. 
With respect to the previously discussed models, integrating location-specific conditions and 
accounting for heterogeneous effects of personality, the outcomes in the competing destinations 
framework support previous findings. Nevertheless, varying magnitudes of location-specific 
conditions’ estimates illustrate a certain sensitivity of results with respect to the assumed decision-
making process. The overall patterns, however, especially regarding interactions of individual 
personality-related and alternative-specific characteristics, remain stable in the context of a 
competing destinations framework, relaxing the IIA. This, in turn, promotes confidence in the core 
results from Chapter 4.5.1 and Chapter 4.5.2, where a possibly violated IIA assumption still advised 
caution.   
4.6 Conclusion 
This study analyses destination choices of prospectively high-skilled individuals in light of their 
varying preferences and personality characteristics. Moreover, I explicitly investigated the impact of 
choice set definition and model misspecification on estimation outcomes, both from a theoretical 
point of view by applying a Monte-Carlo simulation and from an empirical perspective. Individual 
choices have been modelled in an implicit demand and supply framework where observed choices do 
not solely depend on individuals’ preferences, but also on an acceptance from a counterpart. 
Findings from the simulation study part point to the fact that choices in a finite high-dimensional 
destination space are best evaluated taking the full destination space into account. All potentially 
relevant paths that have not been chosen, i.e., the counterfactual destinations, contain information 
with respect to heterogeneous preferences that can then be used in a conditional logit approach. 
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Accounting for heterogeneous elasticities of location-specific conditions, by introducing interactions 
with individual characteristics, enables tracing the impact of individual preferences and personality-
related sorting patterns even in a potentially supply side restricted choice framework.  
The empirical analysis investigates destination choices of students, who are homogeneous in their 
study preferences, but heterogeneous with respect to the perception of costs and returns of 
migration. The empirical random utility framework accounts for discrete location choices in presence 
of a plethora of alternative study locations. These 164 potential destinations offer each a distinct 
combination of economic and living conditions. Labour market conditions, urban characteristics (GDP 
per capita, population size and density) and quality of life have been shown to be relevant criteria 
within spatial choices of students.  
The novelty of this research comes from illustrating that these conditions are valued differently 
across individuals displaying varying types of personality and preferences. The most patient 
individuals are more likely to select a location offering better post-graduation employment 
perspectives for high-skilled workers or higher potential income levels. The appeal of such labour 
market conditions, however, diminishes drastically if distance to a potential destination increases. 
Price levels and population density exert a deterring effect, which is also fading over distance. This 
implies that internal long distance migrants, who are willing to shoulder the burden of leaving their 
familiar environment, are less sensitive to more challenging conditions at a potential destination. 
The relevance of interactions of location-specific conditions and individual characteristics has been 
proven to be robust, and in addition, integrating individual characteristics and preferences improved 
the model fit across all specifications. Moreover, the interaction of distance and personality 
attributes has revealed that the distance deterrence effect is not constant across an otherwise rather 
homogeneous population of prospective academics: perceived costs of mobility are not evenly 
increasing in distance, but relative to individual traits and preferences.  
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5 The relativity of distance: On the variation of migration outcomes in 
a heterogeneous general population 
5.1 Introduction 
Within the framework of utility-maximising decision-makers, individuals choose to relocate their 
centre of life whenever expected returns at least outweigh the associated costs of such a migratory 
event (Sjaastad, 1962). Returns can be derived from getting access to a better paid job, leading to 
labour mobility, or from moving to a destination offering a higher living standard. A migratory event 
may even result for a post-migration income below the previous level, as long as this drop is 
compensated by an improvement in another subjectively highly valuated dimension (Clark and 
Cosgrove, 1991). 
In either case, individual decisions about whether to stay or to relocate are the outcome of a 
cognitive process, involving a subjective evaluation of available alternatives. This process can be 
rather complex: typically, the decision is not merely a binary one, but a plethora of alternatives may 
exist. Each of these alternatives offers a distinct bundle of potentially decision-relevant 
characteristics. Among these, distance to the current location is probably the most consistent factor, 
approximating the costs of migration: the larger the distance the lesser the likelihood of a destination 
being selected.  
Yet, as decision-makers are heterogeneous, there is no plausible reason to maintain the assumption 
of homogeneous elasticities of selection likelihoods with respect to distance. One kilometre might 
not have the same deterring effect on two seemingly similar working-age individuals in a geo-
referenced setup. Instead, as I will show in this concise study, distance is relative and its assessment 
depends crucially on individual traits.  
5.2 Material and methods 
5.2.1 Data sources 
To assess migration-related decisions in light of individual preferences and traits, this study relies on 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, version 31; cf. Wagner et al., 2007), augmented by SOEP-
Geocode data. This additional data set provides information not only with respect to dichotomous 
stay-move decisions, but also regarding the covered distance and chosen destination. The latter is 
recorded on the level of regional planning units (96 RPUs in total), an intermediate spatial 
aggregation unit comprising several districts, yet more precise than a state-level aggregate. Even for 
intra-RPU moves, GPS-based distance measures implicitly provide information on the type of move: 
be it to a neighbouring house, another borough or another city. 
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These moving distances or changes in RPU can then be linked to individual characteristics. Moreover, 
it is also possible to integrate destination-specific conditions acting as pull factors, e.g., by 
supplementing labour market data on the RPU-level from the INKAR data base (BBSR, 2016).   
5.2.2 Sample definition and description 
For the purpose of this study, three main requirements affect the sample definition: availability of 
geo-referenced data on household mobility, existence of sufficient information on individual traits 
and identifiability of the decision-making individual.  
SOEP-Geocode data is available from 2001 onwards. Individuals’ risk attitude, a highly relevant 
predictor of heterogeneous migratory responses (Jaeger et al., 2010) and pivotal point in this 
analysis, has been continuously included in the SOEP since 2008. Other potentially relevant factors, 
e.g., Big-Five personality traits, are less frequently available and limit, if used, the sample size 
notably. The third requirement constrains the sample to include only households comprising one 
adult person aged 18 to 64.76 This imposed constraint enables plausible inference on the impact of 
individual traits, not of unobserved household bargaining processes, on migration outcomes. 
Figure 5.1: Likelihood of the occurrence of a migratory event  
 
Note: * (**) indicates variables only available for 2008 and 2013 (2009 and 2013). The number of person-year 
observations varies across the dimensions between 3560 and 10793. The three depicted groups refer to a 
classification based on standardised scores, such that ‘medium’ refers to those scoring within one standard deviation 
around the mean and ‘high’ (‘low’) comprises those more than one standard deviation above (below) the mean. 
 
Such migration outcomes 𝑦𝑡+1, occurring between the points 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 are explained by individual 
traits 𝑣𝑖𝑡  or destination-specific characteristics 𝑥𝑙𝑡. This design introduces a certain degree of 
contemporaneous exogeneity, ensuring that the chain of causation goes from individual trait to 
migration outcome, not vice versa. 
                                                          
76
 Thus only migration decisions before the legal retirement age are considered. 
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Eventually, the analysed sample is an unbalanced panel (10793 person-year observations), consisting 
of 4044 individuals, who participated in at least two consecutive waves from 2008 to 2014 (overview 
in Table A5.1 in the appendix). 
Figure 5.2: Average moving distance 
 
Note: * (**) indicates variables only available for 2008 and 2013 (2009 and 2013). The number of person-year 
observations varies across the dimensions between 288 and 906. The three depicted groups refer to a classification 
based on standardised scores, such that ‘medium’ refers to those scoring within one standard deviation around the 
mean and ‘high’ (‘low’) comprises those more than one standard deviation above (below) the mean. 
 
The potential relevance of heterogeneous individual traits and assessments for migration outcomes 
is sketched in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. Whereas only 7.2 % of most risk-averse individuals reported 
a residential move, the share amounts to 10.5 % for the group of most risk-loving individuals. 
Conditional on the occurrence of such a migratory event, average moving distance also varies 
notably across groups.  
5.3 Geo-referenced mobility from alternative analytical perspectives 
Based on the distinct patterns briefly illustrated in Chapter 5.2.2, I address the interrelations 
between individual traits or valuations and various migration outcomes in three distinct analytical 
stages. 
5.3.1 A general inclination towards mobility: The binary destination space 
A natural starting point for any analysis of migration outcomes is the implicit binary destination 
space, essentially boiling down to either maintaining the status quo or relocating to any other 
location 𝑙 (𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1). This yields the econometric counterpart to Figure 5.1 as 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1|𝑣𝑖𝑡) = Λ(𝑣𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽),         (5.1) 
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where Λ(. ) represents the logistic cumulative distribution, which has been chosen for reasons of a 
straightforward interpretation of calculated odds ratios.  
The vector 𝑣𝑖𝑡 consists of standard socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics (𝑣
𝑠𝑜𝑐), as 
well as labour market participation indicators (𝑣𝑙𝑎𝑏). Additionally, standardised information on 
satisfaction with life, household income and the dwelling is integrated in 𝑣𝑠𝑎𝑡;77 standardised 
individual willingness to take risks acts as a pivotal personality trait across the full time horizon 
(2008-2013). Adding standardised Big-Five personality traits and time preference measures restricted 
the number of waves (2009 and 2013, respectively 2013). The cumulative sum of previously recorded 
moves and the total covered distance is included (𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑏), accounting for the concept of ‘migrant 
personalities’ (Boneva and Frieze, 2001), i.e., absorbing latent factors boosting the general inclination 
towards mobility or to learnt adjustment capabilities. 
The selected estimation procedure is a pooled logit model with standard errors clustered on the 
individual level; a sequential model comparison is reported in Table A5.2. Alternative estimation 
strategies, i.e., random and fixed effects estimations have been explored as well (Table A5.3). 
Eventually, I discarded these for two reasons: first, specifications introducing relevant individual 
traits typically dissolve the panel structure due to an insufficient yearly coverage of relevant variables 
in the SOEP. This issue is even aggravated in subsequent analyses relying on smaller samples of those 
actually displaying residential mobility (𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1). The second reason is related to this research’s 
focus on individual characteristics affecting mobility decisions. Some of these are time-invariant, thus 
cannot be identified in a fixed effects (FE) specification, which is to be preferred over a comparable 
random effect (RE) model according to a Hausman test (Table A5.3). At the same time, the sample 
size decreases further, since effects of time-variant factors can only be identified for those individuals 
actually moving within the analysed time periods. 
Table 5.1 reports some selected results for the pooled logit approach.78 Across all specifications, 
future mobility becomes more likely if a person is least satisfied with the dwelling – changing the 
status quo is associated with relatively lower costs. Odds ratios of 2.7 and larger indicate that the 
odds of moving in the subsequent year are 2.7 times as large for least satisfied individuals compared 
to those of medium satisfaction with their dwelling. 
Previous moves serve as facilitators, also increasing the general inclination towards mobility. Having 
one additional residential moving experience yields odds of moving once more which are 1.2 times as 
large as for those lacking such additional moving experience. 
Introducing a richer set of personality traits reveals that the most risk-averse or least patient 
individuals are distinctly less likely to move, as implied by odds substantially below one: future 
returns to mobility will be perceived as more uncertain and weighted less than immediate mobility-
                                                          
77
 Satisfaction with the dwelling is a major determinant of residential mobility (Deane, 1990). 
78
 Complete results are documented in Table A5.2 (in the appendix). 
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related costs. On the other hand, individuals scoring highest in the Big-Five trait neuroticism are 
much more likely to become movers. 
 Table 5.1: The impact of individual traits in the binary decision space 
dependent variable  𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 
model  pooled logit 
   OR  s.e. OR  s.e. 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡   overall life low 1.0640  (0.1215) 0.6635  (0.2252) 
  high 1.3972 *** (0.1625) 1.1609  (0.3778) 
 HH income low 0.8047 * (0.0923) 1.0785  (0.3440) 
  high 0.7547 * (0.1139) 0.9976  (0.3586) 
 dwelling low 2.7685 *** (0.2383) 3.4645 *** (0.7944) 
  high 0.8063  (0.1193) 0.9721  (0.3817) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏  previous moves  1.2180 *** (0.0372) 1.2131 ** (0.0919) 
 covered distance  1.0003  (0.0002) 0.9998  (0.0006) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
  risk attitude low 0.9721  (0.0939) 0.3810 *** (0.1257) 
  high 1.1570  (0.1314) 1.0828  (0.2985) 
 patience low    0.4963 ** (0.1574) 
  high    0.9018  (0.2798) 
 B5: openness low    0.6442  (0.2032) 
  high    0.8187  (0.2113) 
 B5: extraversion low    1.0713  (0.2988) 
  high    0.9816  (0.2890) 
 B5: neuroticism low    1.0863  (0.3223) 
  high    1.8482 ** (0.5181) 
 B5: conscientiousness low    0.7690  (0.2201) 
  high    0.8132  (0.3031) 
 B5: agreeableness low    1.0885  (0.2948) 
  high    0.7289  (0.2618) 
socio-demographic controls    
labour market controls    
reference years  2008 - 2013 2013 
individuals  4044 1791 
individual-year observations  10793 1791 
Note: Complete results in Table A5.2 (appendix). Odds ratios (OR) for ‘high’ or ‘low’ 
categories are in reference to the baseline category of ‘medium-type’ individuals.  
5.3.2 Heterogeneous (psychic) costs of mobility: The relativity of distance-related costs 
Whilst any change in the locational status quo is associated with certain costs, these costs vary with 
distance. The longer the covered distance, the higher travel and transportation cost will be. Aside 
from this direct monetary aspect, distance may also inflate psychic costs, i.e., by making it more 
time-consuming (or harder) to maintain social connections. Higher migratory distances also increase 
the likelihood of settling in an administrative or culturally different area, imposing foreseeable 
additional challenges to the adjustment process.79 To establish a connection between covered 
distance and personality types, thus testing for heterogeneous effects of distance on migration 
outcomes, the following pooled log-linear model is estimated 
log(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1) = 𝑣𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (5.2) 
Since this analysis is conditional on being a residential mover, the sample size decreases drastically. 
In the sample of movers remain eventually 665 individuals (85.7 %) who moved only once between 
2008 and 2013. 12 % moved twice and 2.3 % moved three times at least. 
Conditional to being a mover, those least satisfied with their life tend to select themselves into more 
distant locations: on average, one would expect them to choose a destination 44 % farther away 
                                                          
79
 The cultural aspect is also relevant for Germany though, at first glance, being a culturally homogeneous country 
(Bauernschuster et al., 2014). 
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than a similar individual in the reference group would do (Table 5.2). The same holds for those with 
larger quantitative previous mobility experience (covered distance) or those least willing to take risk. 
Once having decided on changing the locational status quo, moving further and thus enlarging the 
set of potential destinations becomes more beneficial for these individuals.  
Table 5.2: The interrelation between individual traits and migratory distance 
dependent variable  log(𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1) 
model  pooled OLS 
 
 
 coeff.  s.e. 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡  satisfaction with    
 overall life low 0.4413 * (0.2263) 
 high -0.1171  (0.2394) 
 HH income low 0.4539 * (0.2714) 
 high -0.0905  (0.2803) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏 previous moves  -0.0282  (0.0551) 
 covered distance  0.0024 *** (0.0005) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 risk attitude low 0.3735 * (0.2046) 
 risk attitude high 0.4158  (0.2568) 
socio-demographic controls   
labour market controls   
reference years  2008 – 2013 
individuals  776 
individual-year observations  907 
Note: Complete results are depicted in specification (4) in Table A5.4 
(appendix). Coefficients for ‘high’ or ‘low’ categories are in reference 
to the baseline category of ‘medium-type’ individuals.  
5.3.3 Integrating heterogeneous costs of mobility into a high-dimensional destination space 
In reality, however, the world offers not only two but a plethora of alternatives. In this study’s 
framework, individuals can choose amongst 𝐷 = 96 potential destinations, all of them characterised 
by unique features 𝑥𝑙𝑡 and different distances to an individual’s current residence.
80 Applying a 
conditional logit model enables controlling for destination-specific characteristics, which serve as 
attractors and may affect a location’s probability to be selected. In the underlying random utility 
model, the probability that alternative 𝑙 yields a higher utility than all other potential destinations in 
𝐷 is given by  
𝑃(𝑙𝑡+1|𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1, 𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝜔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑙𝑡 > 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐷|𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 ).   (5.3) 
Further assuming that errors are i.i.d. extreme value (type I), one can reformulate the selection 
probability of alternative 𝑙 as 
𝑃(𝑙𝑡+1|𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1, 𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡) =
exp (𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝜔)
∑ exp (𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝜔)𝐷𝑙=1
 .      (5.4) 
Two potential limitations emerge: the first refers to the model’s capability to integrate individual-
specific characteristics. Assuming that vector 𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡 contains destination-specific variables 𝑥𝑙𝑡, 
individual-specific variables 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and some interactions as matrix product, equation 5.4 can be 
rewritten as 
𝑃(𝑙𝑡+1|𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1, 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖𝑡) =
exp (𝑣𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛼)exp (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝛽+[𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡]
′𝛾)
exp (𝑣𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛼)∑ exp (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝛽+[𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡]′𝛾)
𝐷
𝑙=1
=
exp (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝛽+[𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡]
′𝛾)
∑ exp (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝛽+[𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡]′𝛾)
𝐷
𝑙=1
 . (5.4’) 
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All (individual) characteristics that are constant across alternatives, cancel out and corresponding 
parameters cannot be identified. In order to assess heterogeneous elasticities of individual traits, 
interactions between these traits and alternative-specific features have to be incorporated. 
The second limitation originates from the underlying assumption of identical degrees of 
substitutability between alternatives. Whether a third alternative is added or removed from an 
individual’s choice set is not supposed to affect the relative selection likelihood of the two other 
alternatives, since 𝑃(𝑙𝑡+1|𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡)/𝑃(𝑗𝑡+1|𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡) is unaffected. In spatial applications, however, this ratio 
tends to change, depending on the choice set. 
If individuals apply some sort of hierarchical information-processing strategy, this issue can be 
mitigated (Pellegrini and Fotheringham, 2002): alternatives might be associated with different 
likelihoods to be considered at all, depending on their (mental) accessibility, which is specified as 
 𝐴𝑙𝑡 = [
1
𝐷−1
∑
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑗
𝐷
𝑗=1,𝑙≠𝑗 ].        (5.5) 
Accounting for such a mental process yields a modified relative selection likelihood   
 𝑃(𝑙𝑡+1|𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡)
𝑃(𝑗𝑡+1|𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡)
=
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝜔)𝐴𝑙𝑡
𝜃
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜔)𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝜃
=
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡
′ 𝜔+𝜃 ln𝐴𝑙𝑡)
exp(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜔+𝜃 ln𝐴𝑗𝑡)
 ,       
which accommodates observed changes, related to alterations of choice sets, via changes in relative 
accessibilities. 
Table 5.3 reports results from the conditional logit model.81 The first specification accounts solely for 
destination-specific characteristics (𝑥𝑙) and distance (𝑥𝑖𝑙). The second and preferred model 
introduces interactions between distance and the full set of individual traits (𝑣𝑖), offering an 
interpretation as heterogeneous costs of migration in this framework. Another set of interactions 
between destination-specific unemployment rates and shares of employees with university degree (a 
proxy for knowledge clusters) and the personality trait ‘risk attitude’ provides insights regarding trait-
specific sorting patterns into distinct regional labour markets, possibly offering differing expected 
returns. 
Irrespective of individual characteristics, the distance deterrence effect emerges: if a considered 
alternative was one kilometre further away, the odds of being selected are 0.9898 times as small as 
for a reference destination. Ultimately, the selection likelihood of any potential destination 
decreases with distance to an individual’s current centre of life. A further reduced selection 
likelihood can also be observed for older individuals, households with a higher number of children 
and a higher GDP per capita at a potential destination. Considering that regions with higher per 
capita wealth levels also exhibit higher price levels, this result becomes plausible: whilst it is not 
guaranteed that someone can actually benefit from such favourable income perspectives in one 
specific destination, the individual would nevertheless face higher local prices. More populated 
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 Model comparisons and results from the hierarchical information processing specifications are documented in Table 
A5.5. Results are robust with respect to the inclusion of the information processing control. 
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destinations are typically preferred, yielding evidence in favour of a distinct preference for more 
urbanised destinations. 
Table 5.3: Heterogeneous selection probabilities in a high-dimensional destination space 
dependent variable  𝐼(𝑙𝑡+1|𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1) 
model  pooled conditional logit 
 x  OR  s.e. OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙  distance  0.9723 *** (0.0017) 0.9898 ** (0.0052) 
𝑥𝑙  population (in 1000)  1.0005 *** (0.0001) 1.0006 *** (0.0001) 
 population density  1.0002  (0.0002) 1.0002  (0.0002) 
 GDP per capita (1000 €)  0.9820 * (0.0106) 0.9735 ** (0.0105) 
 share of recr. area  0.9692  (0.0279) 0.9827  (0.0305) 
𝑥𝑙
𝑈  unemployment rate   1.0148  (0.0276) 1.0199  (0.0306) 
𝑥𝑙
𝐻𝑆 high-skilled emp. rate  1.0392 * (0.0223) 1.0503 ** (0.0247) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑐#𝑥𝑖𝑙    gender (female=1)    1.0077 ** (0.0034) 
 age (years)    0.9995 *** (0.0001) 
 educational attainment      
 secondary    0.9932  (0.0051) 
 tertiary    1.0114 *** (0.0035) 
 number of kids in HH    0.9902 * (0.0053) 
 HH income    1.0000  (0.0000) 
 partnership    0.9963  (0.0024) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑐#𝑥𝑖𝑙    LM participation      
 full-time    0.9976  (0.0036) 
 part-time    0.9984  (0.0032) 
 unemp. experience    0.9988  (0.0008) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡#𝑥𝑖𝑙  satisfaction with      
 overall life low   1.0063  (0.0039) 
 high   0.9953  (0.0031) 
 HH income low   1.0045  (0.0038) 
 high   0.9954  (0.0048) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏#𝑥𝑖𝑙    sum of res. moves     0.9960 *** (0.0013) 
 sum of covered distance    1.0000 *** (0.0000) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠#𝑥𝑖𝑙   risk attitude low   1.0020  (0.0036) 
  high   1.0057 * (0.0030) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝑈  risk attitude low   0.8947 ** (0.0480) 
 high   0.9903  (0.0545) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠#𝑥𝑙
𝐻𝑆 risk attitude  low   1.0468  (0.0344) 
 high   1.0143  (0.0339) 
reference years  2008-2013 2008 – 2013 
individuals  679 679 
individual-year observations × 𝐷  75936 75936 
Note: Complete results are depicted in Table A5.5 (appendix, specifications 1 and 4). 
Odds ratios (OR) for ‘high’ or ‘low’ categories are in reference to the baseline category 
of ‘medium-type’ individuals.  
For any distance, a destination is more likely to be selected by women and individuals with highest 
levels of educational attainment. The qualitative aspect (number of moves) and the quantitative 
aspect (covered distance) of past mobility experiences have diverging implications. Whereas the first 
lowers the selection likelihood of a destination compared to an individual with less migration 
experience, the second encourages it. In light of most moves being rather local moves (more than 
50 % in the sample covered fewer than 5 km), larger covered distances are indicative of someone 
who previously made a move to an unfamiliar destination. Such an individual thus gathered 
experience on how to adjust to new circumstances, which in turn lowers perceived costs associated 
with subsequent moves. 
In order to investigate the impact of complex interactions, e.g., varying effects over distance, the 
following graphs prove informative. 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates a fading distance deterrence effect: whereas any additional kilometre at 50 
kilometres reduces the selection likelihood of a destination by more than 0.4 percentage points, the 
corresponding effect is less than half as large for a potential destination at 100 kilometres distance. 
Figure 5.3: The fading distance deterrence effect - the average marginal effect of distance 
 
Note: The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % confidence interval. 
Any additional move in the past years decreases the selection likelihood of a destination in 100 
kilometres distance by around 2.5 percentage points (left panel in Figure 5.4).  
Figure 5.4: Average marginal effects of previous mobility experiences 
  
Note: The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % confidence interval. 
Risk attitude also plays a role with respect to sorting patterns into destinations with specific labour 
market features. The most risk-averse individuals react more sensitively to higher levels of 
unemployment at a destination, indicating worse income perspectives (left panel in Figure 5.5): if the 
unemployment rate was one percentage point higher in one destination in 50 kilometres distance 
than in another comparable destination, the selection probability of the first would be 1.2 
percentage points smaller. On the other hand, the same most risk-averse individuals are more likely 
to sort themselves into locations with a stronger knowledge base, i.e., a higher share of high-skilled 
employment (right panel in Figure 5.5). These trait-specific sorting patterns can be observed mainly 
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for potential destinations in up to 150 kilometres distance. Few observation points beyond this 
threshold limit the possibility to derive reliable effects for larger intra-national moves in this specific 
sample. 
Figure 5.5: Average marginal effects of labour market characteristics, conditional on risk attitude 
  
Note: The dashed whiskers indicate the 90 % confidence interval. 
5.4 Conclusion 
By linking data on geo-referenced migratory events to a household panel this study points towards 
the existence of distinct spatial sorting patterns contingent on individual traits. People with varying 
characteristics and previous experiences display different location preferences. Relying on a random 
utility framework the preferred model specification demonstrates that the destination selection 
likelihood is not only affected by distance to the current location, but also depends on individual 
traits: the observable distance deterrence effect is individual specific. Not all individuals perceive a 
specific increase in distance as identically costly – the perception of distance is thus relative. 
Moreover, most risk-averse individuals are more reluctant to choose a destination characterised by 
relatively higher levels of unemployment. At the same time, these individuals have a distinct 
preference for knowledge cluster, i.e., regional labour markets with higher employment levels of 
high-skilled and a potentially more productive labour force.  
As a further research angle, the analytical level of migratory events could be refined by focusing not 
on regional planning units as potential destinations, but on actual districts. While this does not 
increase the sample of mobile individuals, it clearly raises the number of distinct destinations by 
disaggregating the currently most frequently chosen destination, being the initial RPU of residence. 
This will, in turn, foster estimates’ efficiency, most prominently for potential locational alternatives at 
short to medium distances. 
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6 The price of mobility: Adjustment capabilities, personality and the 
mobility premium of highly qualified individuals 
6.1 Introduction 
Since 2010, the German labour market has displayed two distinct trends, which are both interrelated 
with its matching efficiency. On the one hand, the average ratio of registered unemployed to job 
vacancies, a measure of labour market tightness, is characterised by a downward trend from 3.5 in 
2010 to 3.0 in 2015. This is indicative of better job finding perspectives on the aggregate level. On the 
other hand, according to the Institute for Employment Research’s job vacancy survey (IAB, 2016), the 
relative number of job hires associated with difficulties in the recruitment process increased from 
29 % to 36 %. Finding a suitable employee, respectively establishing a successful job match has 
become more intricate.  
An insufficient number of applicants was mentioned in 23 % of these difficult recruitment attempts 
in the year 2015, compared to 14 % in 2010. Moreover, the share of applicants with too high salary 
demands rose from 10 to 14 % (IAB, 2016).82 Ultimately, locally available labour supply was declared 
to be insufficient – an issue more pronounced in East Germany – or there was a substantial mismatch 
of salary expectations.  
In either case, some features in the bundle of job and regional characteristics might have been 
insufficient to attract applicants from another geographic labour market. In reality, such impeded 
geographic job mobility may occur although workers react in principle to regional labour demand 
differentials. Yet, job opportunities and local conditions or amenities are jointly relevant criteria 
when it comes to the decision whether to move to a geographically distinct labour market or not 
(Graves and Linneman, 1979; Roback, 1982; Clark and Cosgrove, 1991; Whisler et al., 2008; Partridge, 
2010). Since the complete bundle is relevant, a lower level of amenities could in principle be 
compensated by a higher wage – resulting in the so-called compensating wage differential.  
Referring to the introductory example of diverging salary expectations, it could be the case that a 
worker perceives a firm’s location to be unfavourable, so he expects a substantial compensation for 
the associated discomfort of moving to such a location. The expected wage premium may thus be 
well above the remuneration package the firm is willing to offer. In a worst case scenario, such a 
perceived mismatch might prevent the formation of an otherwise mutually profitable employment 
relationship.  
To prevent such an inefficient outcome, the challenge is to strike a balance between minimising the 
firm’s labour costs and ensuring that the offered compensating wage differential is just of sufficient 
size to attract a suitable employee from another region (or even country). A resulting payment 
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 Other reasons, indicative of a recruitment process with difficulties, were insufficient qualification levels and a lacking 
willingness to accept working conditions. Multiple responses were possible.  
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scheme would thus not exclusively depend on expectations regarding a worker’s productivity or the 
task profile, but also integrate a mark-up to induce mobility. In order to maintain the firm’s 
profitability, these considerations are tantamount to the following question: What is the minimum 
compensating premium, ensuring that a specific qualified worker would accept this offer and move 
from his current location to the firm’s location? 
Finding an answer to this question for prospectively high-skilled workers with heterogeneous 
preferences and personality profiles is the first contribution of this research. This research is not 
limited to an analysis of observed premiums of those who chose to accept, neglecting all actually 
occurring salary mismatches. Instead, the overall distribution of ex ante premiums of future 
university graduates is investigated. Moreover, the above mentioned question will be answered for 
two labour market scenarios (employed vs. unemployed) and two types of mobility (interstate vs. 
cross-border). To the best of my knowledge, this study is also the first which explicitly integrates 
agents with truly heterogeneous individual traits and preferences into an analysis of compensating or 
post-migration wage differentials. 
This study is organised as follows: Chapter 6.2 provides an overview of the literature addressing post-
migration premiums, compensating or agglomeration premiums and other relevant factors shaping 
mobility-related decisions. In chapter 6.3, the mobility premiums are derived in a parsimonious 
theoretical framework, incorporating the concept of psychic costs (Sjaastad, 1962) and personality 
profiles. Beyond, the four alternative labour market and migration scenarios are discussed and 
illustrated. Chapter 6.4 delineates the data source and reveals insightful descriptive statistics. 
Previously derived hypothesis are then tested in the econometric analysis, performed in Chapter 6.5; 
sensitivity checks will supplement earlier results. Chapter 6.6 comprises the main conclusions. 
6.2 Overview of the related literature 
6.2.1 Mobility premiums and local conditions 
Job-related migration is a predominant cause for employed men to move, but still accounts for less 
than one third of all migratory episodes (Böheim and Taylor, 2007). Compared to non-migrants, the 
average inter-district migrant or those who explicitly moved for job reasons experience a distinct real 
wage gain, which is not necessarily restricted to the year of migration. The wage growth rate 
amounts to 8 % for US interstate job-to-job changers and to 6.8 % for displaced workers (Yankow, 
2003). Positive wage differentials are not only relevant for the general population of (male) 
employed job-changers, but they may constitute important migration incentives for unemployed 
(Rabe and Taylor, 2012) or foreign-born workers as well (Hall, 2009).  
Especially repeat migrants seem to be able to realise highest wage gains, probably related to a 
successful sorting into low unemployment areas. These returns to migration seem to be increasing in 
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educational attainment, e.g., for French labour market entrants (Lemistre and Moreau, 2009).83 
Higher education, especially, translates into additional gains, e.g., college graduates are found to 
receive a mobility premium for first job-related moves of around 10 % (Ham et al., 2011).84 However, 
the most pronounced increase is reaped by tertiary educated, five years after the relocation (Knapp 
et al., 2013). Overall, higher salaries increase the probability that US college graduates will choose a 
more distant location (Gottlieb and Joseph, 2006). Hence, the observed mobility premium may 
partially act as distance compensation scheme for tertiary educated and be of substantial size too: to 
choose a destination twice as far, Danish scientists and engineers would expect an annual income 
increase of around 80 % (Dahl and Sorenson, 2010).  
For Germany, Kratz and Brüderl (2013) delivered an estimate for the overall wage gain due to 
regional migration of 6.8 %, which comprised a contemporaneous premium of 3.7 %. With local 
establishment movers as control group, derived contemporaneous returns to regional migration 
amount to 0.4 %, and the five year premium to 1.8 % (Lehmer and Ludsteck, 2011). However, effects 
are heterogeneous regarding experience groups and regions: those with fewest experience realised 
an immediate premium of 1.8 %, which almost doubled within the subsequent five years. Leaving 
metropolitan areas was found to be associated with a wage decrease of 1.3 %, while departing a 
rural region resulted in the highest wage gains.  
This finding is in line with the so-called agglomeration or urban wage differential. Moving to a 
metropolitan area not only leads to an upwards shift of the migrant’s wage profile, but also to a 
persistently steeper income profile (Glaeser and Maré, 2001). Facilitated labour market coordination 
(better job matches) or accelerated learning process due to more frequent interactions are the likely 
channels.  
Observing bohemian clusters in metropolitan areas, identified by the relative shares of creative 
minds, Florida (2002, p. 67) suggested “that a bohemian presence in an area helps establish an 
environment that attracts other talented or high human capital individuals”. Cultural diversity, 
originating from heterogeneous national origins of residents, could be a production enhancing factor, 
making more diverse cities more attractive for native labour (Ottaviano and Pari, 2006).85  
A large extent of the resulting urban wage premium may be related to the fact that cities attract an 
over proportional share of high-skilled workers (Yankow, 2006). Especially ‘power-couples’, where 
both spouses are at least college-educated, seem to be attracted to locations offering higher quality 
of business environment (Chen and Rosenthal, 2008). This sorting outcome might be amplified by 
complementarities of skills and city size (Glaeser and Resseger, 2010) – the urban income premium 
thus varies in relation to population size, though crowding into urban areas might also diminish 
returns to education (Adamson et al., 2004). Combes et al. (2008) complemented these findings by 
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 Calculated returns for women were strictly below those of their pale peers. 
84
 For a subset of 12 European countries, returns to education did not vary between native stayer, native migrants and 
cross-border migrants (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios, 2010). 
85
 A challengeable assumption states that native workers do not vary in their taste for cultural diversity. 
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highlighting that skill-dependent sorting patterns of workers and employment density explain 
regional wage differentials also outside the metropolitan context. 
The relevance of the urban wage differential is also challenged in the literature. Controlling for 
labour force composition and regional price differentials, including building land prices, metropolitan 
real wages did no longer break ranks (Blien et al., 2009). Alternatively, sorting into urban residence 
alongside usually unobserved family background characteristics, which are related to higher earnings 
potential, might bias the urban wage premium upwards (Krashinsky, 2011).  
Previously described findings stress the relevance of a factor beyond mobility itself, such as local 
conditions at a destination. Observable income differences can then be interpreted as compensating 
wage differential - compensating for endowment differences between origin and destination in other 
relevant non-pecuniary dimensions. 
One of the first links between local non-traded goods (amenities) dates back to Graves and Linneman 
(1979), coining the phrase ‘compensating differential’, which is characterised as income or rent 
differences to establish locational indifference. Local variations in rents or wages in a regional 
equilibrium thus reflect varying site-specific amenity levels (Graves, 1983). Wages in large crime-
ridden cities in the US, for instance, comprise a higher compensating earnings component (Roback, 
1982). The reverse was detected for climatically more favourable sites: a higher number of sunny 
days is associated with lower earnings. For the US, such favourable climatic conditions are robust 
predictors of local population growth across age-groups, and rising house prices (Rappaport, 2007) or 
real wages (and the hazard rate of interstate migration, cf. Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan, 2007). 
The presence of dis-amenities, such as emissions of toxic air pollutants, was also shown to negatively 
affect population growth in communities (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008), and hence local labour supply. 
Labour demand was also found to adjust to the work force’s preferences. Job creation seems 
partially endogenous with respect to hedonic migration patterns (Kohler, 1997), pointing to a 
hedonic cycle: first, workers seek a location with high amenity levels. Some firms, relying on skilled 
labour with a distinct preference for these amenities, may then follow these workers. The resulting 
job creation might then attract even more workers to such a location. 
Greenwood et al. (1991) challenged the regional equilibrium assumption, underlying previous studies 
examining compensating differentials: observed wage differentials do not exclusively capture 
amenity differences between locations. Clark and Cosgrove (1991) explicitly stressed the joint 
relevance of labour market related and hedonic migration, the first associated to labour market 
disequilibria and the second to households’ preference for non-tradable local goods.86 Not only do 
local wages reflect site-specific amenity levels, but households’ willingness to migrate over a longer 
distance increases with the potential wage differential. Aside from economic opportunities and local 
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 Regarding mortality-adjusted population growth in Canada, Ferguson et al. (2007) elaborated that for rural areas mainly 
economic factors are relevant. Population growth in urban areas, in contrast, is jointly associated to economic factors and 
amenities, comprising natural and ‘modern’ (man-made) amenities.  
Chapter 6   101 
 
   
 
amenities (urban characteristics, neighbourhood quality, climate, leisure and cultural offers), fiscal 
factors (taxes and expenditures) can also induce or deter migration, respectively (Clark and Hunter, 
1992), but to varying degrees over individuals’ life-cycle. Public infrastructure, such as highways, was 
identified as relevant household amenity too (Dalenberg and Partridge, 1997; Colombo and Stanca, 
2014). Publicly provided services, e.g., education, hospitals and police, may also increase migration to 
a location or decrease out-migration, respectively (Clark et al., 2003). Furthermore, households’ 
sensitivity to these services might be heterogeneous (Welch et al., 2007): whereas both tenants and 
homeowners seem to value police protection and libraries, other public services are mainly 
capitalised into either housing prices (e.g., education and roads) or rents (e.g., parks). 
Job outlook, local human capital levels and population size were found to diminish outmigration 
(Whisler et al., 2008). Cultural and recreational offers strengthened a metropolitan area’s retention 
capability further. The reverse was found for high costs of living. The latter was confirmed for college 
graduates and university graduates (Venhorst et al., 2011). Adequate job opportunities, i.e., a larger 
number of jobs requiring higher qualification or scientific jobs, as well as above-average regional GDP 
growth, were linked to lower outmigration rates. This concurs with findings that regions with 
universities experience in general higher in-migration rates (Biagi et al., 2011), whereas economic 
conditions matter primarily for long distance moves. Graduate degree holders have a preference for 
staying in more urban areas or where labour demand in the public sector is relatively higher (Faggian 
and McCann, 2009). In addition, they favour locations offering richer natural amenity levels. Negative 
economic shocks, such as the recession of 2007 and 2008, however, may lead to a reversal of positive 
skill clustering (Betz et al., 2015).  
With respect to trends in US population growth Partridge (2010) contended that amenity-driven 
models are especially insightful. This finding might not be completely transferable to Germany, 
where Arntz (2010) detected only a modest overall relevance of amenities in Germany. Here, 
identified influential factors on migration behaviour were related to the labour market and varied by 
skill group: highly skilled individuals were more incentivised by interregional wage levels, less skilled 
individuals were more responsive to unemployment rates, and experienced higher costs of 
migration.   
6.2.2 Individual traits and valuations affecting the migratory decision-making process 
Other studies addressed the question what individual characteristics, besides socio-economic factors, 
might affect location preferences or location-specific earnings potentials, as well as migratory 
outcomes. The importance of language regarding employment perspectives and labour income has 
been frequently documented (e.g., Hall, 2009). Earnings of immigrants were found to be positively 
affected by language proficiency (Shields and Price, 2002; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003). The latter 
established a positive effect on employment probability as well, though outcomes can vary distinctly 
by nationality. Language similarity fosters migration across borders (Adsera and Pytlikova, 2012), 
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highlighting the mitigating effect of being familiar with a destination’s language on migratory costs. 
Foreign language proficiency, however, not only affects cross-border migration, but commuting 
intentions too (Huber and Nowotny, 2013), albeit the impact lacks behind the respective impact of 
previous mobility experiences. Such familiarity with a culturally different setting is even relevant in a 
rather homogeneous country such as Germany: larger cultural distance, measured by historical 
dialect distance, is indicative of higher compensating post-migration wages: moving to a destination 
most culturally different from the origin was associated with a wage premium of around 4 % (Falck et 
al., 2014). Monetary measures of unobserved costs of German intrastate migration are distinctly 
higher and correspond to a monthly income change of € 4000, and of € 7000 for interstate migration. 
These costs are 31 % lower for immigrants than for natives, whereas recent immigrants face the 
lowest costs (Schündeln, 2014). 
Valuation of amenities might be subjective, e.g., depending on educational attainment (Dalmazzo 
and de Blasio, 2011): individuals with highest formal education tend to report highest levels of 
satisfaction with amenities in the municipality, e.g., leisure activities or safety and crime control, 
although the provided services are objectively comparable. This underscores the likely relevance of 
subjective perceptions and valuations concerning location-specific opportunities within the process 
of migratory decision-making. 
Literature also offers insights into how migration-related mental processes might pass off: 
individually discerned persistent dis-amenities or stressors in the accustomed environment, 
translating into lower levels of subjective well-being, might provoke a migratory reaction suited to 
provide relief. This could explain why later internal migrants, who displayed in the years before 
migration distinctly lower levels of happiness, managed to reach their initial levels of subjective well-
being after migration (Nowok et al., 2013). In this sense, migration then serves as remedy to regain a 
previously higher level of well-being within the process of hedonic adaption (Graham and Oswald, 
2010).  
Alternatively, migratory behaviour might be “initiated and perpetuated by an ex ante aspiration gap 
reflecting people’s desire to realise economic, social, human or political opportunities” (Czaika and 
Vothknecht, 2014, p. 3). Migration becomes the means of choice to close the gap between the actual 
and the aspired (higher) level of subjective well-being. Yet, if aspiration levels adjust themselves 
based on experience (Wolpert, 1965) or accordingly to aspiration adaption theory (Selten, 1998), 
migrants having encountered new experiences and opportunities may further raise their aspirations. 
Eventually, such a process could spur further migration to close the renewed aspiration gap – 
yielding a ‘hedonic treadmill’, as suggested by Czaika and Vothknecht (2014).  
Personality characteristics and life events are, in this line of thought, assumed to be inputs to a 
‘social production function’, generating subjective well-being (Ormel et al., 1999). Overall well-being 
comprises both physical well-being, achievable by stimulation and comfort, and social well-being, 
strengthened by status, behavioural confirmation and affection. Establishing a link to the 
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compensating differential literature, moving to warmer climate could raise comfort, thus physical 
well-being. If only migration would provide access to a more prestigious job, social well-being would 
increase due to improved status.87 Another link can be established to the distance-compensating 
mobility premium: if social capital depreciates over distance to its local origin, a sufficiently high 
premium would be required to compensate for moving to a distant labour market (David et al., 
2010). 
Personality traits and affective states (snapshots of well-being) are interconnected (Zautra et al., 
2005), e.g., neuroticism could serve as amplifier for the consequences related to undesirable events. 
Furthermore, least extraverted individuals had to be more involved in desirable events to reach a 
comparably positive affective state than extraverted peers. Objectively comparable migration-
related decisions would then affect individuals’ well-being levels differently, depending on their 
personality characteristics: some might perceive an interstate move to be an unsurmountable 
hardship whilst others may view it as a welcome diversion. 
The ‘migration change model’ partitions the mental decision-making process of a (cross-border) 
migrant into four distinct stages (Tabor and Milfont, 2011): the first stage (precontemplation) 
accounts for factors that may shape a general disposition to migrate, for instance in the sense of a 
‘migrant personality’ (Boneva and Frieze, 2001); it captures intrapersonal factors (e.g., personality 
traits or risk tolerance) and familial connections. During the subsequent contemplation stage, a 
potential migrant weighs micro (e.g., lifestyle or employment opportunities88) and macro (e.g., 
environmental or governmental aspects) issues. The action stage is related to stress (e.g., caused by 
uncertainty during actual preparations) and coping mechanisms (e.g., meticulous planning and 
seeking for advice). The final post-migration acculturation stage involves psychological adjustment 
and sociocultural adaption. 
Regarding migratory decision-making processes, a consistent picture emerges: internal and cross-
border migrants do not base their decision purely on economic motives. Instead, their considerations 
include location-specific amenity levels as well. A location worth living is valued as such; any loss of 
well-being has to be compensated. The related wage compensation is especially relevant in case of 
highly educated workers, who are not only sought employees but exhibit distinct preferences for 
locations offering a high quality of life. These individuals, however, do differ regarding their taste and 
how they subjectively evaluate conditions at a potential destination. Objective facts might be rated 
differently: a city park of one square kilometre might be rather appealing for one person whilst 
another would not even consider any park smaller than New York’s Central Park. Moreover, 
individual valuations within the assessment of potential costs and benefits related to migration will 
                                                          
87
 Following the reasoning of Colombo and Stanca (2014), relational amenities (time spent with friends) may have their 
hedonic value as well: they might lead to behavioural confirmation or affection, eventually supporting a rising level of 
subjective well-being. 
88
 Potential migrants sometimes expressed that they expect a post-migration income loss, pointing to non-pecuniary goals 
of migration. 
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vary based on personality characteristics and aspirations. Albeit the relevance of subjective 
perceptions is acknowledged, literature remains silent when it comes to questions regarding the size 
of the mobility premium, conditional on heterogeneous individual traits. 
6.3 About the nature of the mobility premium 
The decision to move to an alternative location is a deliberate process, integrating over various 
individually relevant dimensions. Eventually, returns to mobility have at least to compensate for 
associated costs, such that expected utility from moving to an alternative destination 𝐷 is at least 
equal to the expected utility from staying at the current point of origin 𝑂: 
𝐸[𝑈𝐷] ≥ 𝐸[𝑈𝑂]         (6.1) 
In this context, the ‘mobility premium’ Δ would be the minimum additional surplus related to 
mobility, which ensures that equation 6.1 holds. This mobility premium is highly context-specific and 
varies between heterogeneous agents. Yet, in any case it had to be of sufficient magnitude to tip the 
scale in favour of choosing the alternative location. Referring to labour migration, Δ could be a post-
migration wage increase which compensates for monetary moving costs and additional costs, for 
instance psychic costs.89 Here, the mobility premium was a sort of monetary incentive to induce 
geographically mobile behaviour, accounting also for more general preferences and accommodating 
non-monetary costs. 
6.3.1 Modelling the mobility premium in presence of heterogeneous personality parameters 
For the subsequent modelling approach I assume individuals to be partially myopic, respectively 
being subject to a form of bounded rationality. While life-time utility plausibly depends on all periods 
to come, having therefore an impact on an optimal decision in the present, human foresight is 
limited. Hence, an individual’s decision whether to migrate or not will now be an outcome of a 
decision-making process referring to a limited planning horizon of only one period, representing for 
instance a specific stage of life. The general model design accommodates various specific types of 
migration: internal and cross-border migration, generic and labour mobility. 
Overall utility depends on the consumption of a commodity 𝑥 and availability of an amenity 𝑎𝐿, the 
latter being specific to a given location 𝐿. The consumption level of commodity 𝑥 is location-specific, 
since it is determined by location-specific income levels 𝐼𝐿 and prices 𝑝𝐿. Quality of consumption 
good 𝑥, however, is homogeneous across locations. This gives as modified version of equation 6.1: 
𝐸 [(
𝐼𝐷
𝑝𝐷
)
𝛼
𝑎𝐷
1−𝛼] ≥ 𝐸 [(
𝐼𝑂
𝑝𝑂
)
𝛼
𝑎𝑂
1−𝛼]       (6.1’) 
However, there remains a degree of uncertainty regarding location-specific labour market outcomes: 
with probability 𝜋𝑈𝑂, ‘bad luck’ leads to job loss at the beginning of the planning horizon. This event 
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 In contrast to the original idea of Sjaastad (1962) Δ is not the amount of income which could be taxed away before 
someone leaves a given location, but rather the minimum income gain required to ensure the willingness to move to a new 
location.  
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is exogenous from a worker’s point of view, but related to local economic conditions. Individual 
perception of this likelihood is heterogeneous nevertheless: people do neither have perfect 
information on actual economic statistics nor do they evaluate available information fragments 
identically, thus the perceived individual job loss probability 𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖 becomes relevant. 
In case of job loss, subsequent individual efforts to find new employment in location 𝑂 are successful 
with probability 𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖. The corresponding location specific wage income 𝑤𝑂 is assumed to be equal 
to the one received before. If job search remains unsuccessful, the resulting income consists of 
unemployment benefits 𝜂𝑂𝑤𝑂. In the end, one obtains the expected utility for the staying option 
𝐸[𝑈𝑂] = (
(1−𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖)𝑤𝑂+𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖(𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖𝑤𝑂+(1−𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖)𝜂𝑂𝑤𝑂)
𝑝𝑂
)
α
𝑎𝑂
1−𝛼 .    (6.2) 
Irrespective of an initial job loss at origin, the individual has the opportunity to look for (new) 
employment at alternative destinations 𝐷, resulting in ‘try-your-luck’ migration.90 This endeavour is 
fruitful with probability 𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖, leading to a realised wage income of 𝑤𝐷 = 𝑤𝑂(1 + Δ), thus 𝑤𝐷 may 
differ from the previous wage level at the origin. As moving would also be possible if job hunting 
remained unsuccessful, associated income consisted of unemployment benefits, once again 
calculated as replacement rate 𝜂𝐷 times previous wage income. If origin and destination were both 
subject to the same legislation, i.e., in case of moving within a country, 𝜂𝑂 = 𝜂𝐷 = 𝜂 would result. 
This specification accommodates cross-border moves as well, where settling without having 
previously worked in a destination country would imply non-eligibility to unemployment benefits 
(𝜂𝐷 = 0). 
A moving person incurs fixed expenditures Γ𝐷, distance dependent monetary moving costs and 
psychic costs, i.e., inflicted by abandoning the familiar environment. Following the idea of Schwartz 
(1973), the latter are incorporated as recurring costs related to the frequency of visits 𝜏𝑖, required to 
compensate for the perceived psychic strain. This yields the distance dependent moving costs 
component (1 + 𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑), with 𝑓 being a function of distance such that 𝜕𝑓(𝑑) 𝜕𝑑⁄ > 0 holds. 
Acculturative stress, in the context of cross-border migration (Berry et al., 1987), or challenges to the 
integration into a new living environment impose factors to be considered as well. Adjusting to new 
circumstances takes some time and may affect the ability to enjoy amenities, therefore, the 
subjectively perceived amenity level at a destination is 𝛾𝑖𝑎𝐷, with 𝛾𝑖 ∈]0,1]. This also mirrors aspects 
of hedonic adaptation (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Graham and Oswald, 2010), where higher 
levels of adaptation allow individuals to recover faster from shocks to subjective well-being, thus 
plausibly lowering overall perceived costs of migration-related discomfort.91 
Taken together, these considerations yield the specification for expected utility at the destination 
                                                          
90
 The term is borrowed from O’Connel (1997) discussing migration under uncertainty. There, it refers to migration, which is 
induced by a more risky wage distribution in a potential destination whilst the actual conditions cannot be observed from 
the origin. 
91
 Similar to Frederick and Loewenstein’s (1999) prisoner example (adapting to a seven-foot cell), individuals with higher 
adaptability might faster adjust, e.g., to fewer recreational offers at a destination. Their overall expected change in 
subjective well-being would thus be smaller and require a smaller compensation or mobility premium Δ, respectively.  
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𝐸[𝑈𝐷] = (
𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖(1+Δ)𝑤𝑂+(1−𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖)𝜂𝐷𝑤𝑂−Γ𝐷−(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑)
𝑝𝐷
)
𝛼
(𝛾𝑖𝑎𝐷)
1−𝛼    (6.3) 
Substituting equations 6.2 and 6.3 into equation 6.1, and solving for the mobility premium finally 
results in 
Δ =
1
𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖
[(
𝑝𝐷
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖𝑎𝐷
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
((1 − 𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖) + 𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖(𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖 + (1 − 𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖)𝜂𝑂) +
Γ𝐷+(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑)
𝑤𝑂
+ 𝜂𝐷(𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖 − 1)] − 1. 
             (6.4) 
Several features of the minimum premium to induce geographic mobility are apparent: relatively 
higher prices or lower (perceived) availability of amenities at the destination require a higher level of 
compensation. Generosity of unemployment benefits matters, as do costs of migration relative to 
previous wage levels. A higher probability of job loss is associated with a smaller premium, since the 
expected value of staying is diminished.92 For there is a degree of uncertainty whether one keeps the 
job at the origin, a higher probability of finding new or alternative employment at a destination 
embodies an insurance effect, diminishing the required mobility premium.93 
All subject-specific components (index 𝑖) in equation 6.4 are assumed to depend on individual traits 
or preferences. Table A6.1 (in the appendix) provides an overview over assumed interrelationships 
between personality parameters or personal preferences and model parameters.94  
For instance, 𝛾𝑖  will be affected by individuals’ adaptability to new circumstances (𝜙𝐴), such that 
𝜕𝛾𝑖/𝜕𝜙𝐴 > 0 holds. Beyond that, Big-Five personality traits are likely to matter as well: those more 
open to new experiences might be more able to benefit from amenities in a new environment 
(𝜕𝛾𝑖 𝜕𝜓𝑂⁄ > 0). At the same time, acculturative challenges might be increasing in cultural 
dissimilarity (Falck et al., 2014), which is likely to become more pronounced the larger geographic 
distance (𝑑) between origin and destination (𝜕𝛾𝑖 𝜕𝑑⁄ < 0) or if proficiency in the local language is 
weak (𝜕𝛾𝑖 𝜕Λ𝐿⁄ > 0). This effect could be partially offset, depending on previous mobility 
experiences, as such experiences are indicative of enhanced inclination towards future mobility (e.g., 
Huber and Nowotny, 2013): someone who lived already for a certain time span abroad is likely to 
have developed some adjustment strategy and could thus handle unfamiliar circumstances more 
easily  (𝜕𝛾𝑖 𝜕𝜒⁄ > 0). 
In regards to psychic costs, the required visiting frequency to compensate for psychic discomfort due 
to leaving the social milieu (Schwartz, 1973) is determined by individuals’ extraversion and social 
preferences. More extraverted people are assumed to establish a new social network more easily, 
and thus travel back less frequently (𝜕𝜏𝑖 𝜕𝜓𝐸⁄ < 0). Those with closer social ties to their origin would 
exert more effort to maintain their connections (𝜕𝜏𝑖 𝜕𝜙𝑆⁄ > 0), reflecting also the idea of local social 
capital affecting migration outcomes (David et al., 2010). 
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 For 𝜂𝑂 < 1 it holds that   
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖
=
1
𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖
[(
𝑝𝐷
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖𝑎𝐷
)
1−𝛼
𝛼 (𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖 + (1 − 𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖)𝜂𝑂 − 1)] < 0. 
93
 Given that 𝜂𝐷  is sufficiently small, i.e., 𝜂𝐷 < (
𝑝𝐷
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖𝑎𝐷
)
1−𝛼
𝛼 ((1 − 𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖) + 𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖(𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖 + (1 − 𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖)𝜂𝑂) +
Γ𝐷+(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑)
𝑤𝑂
. 
94
 Additionally, hypothetical effects on mobility premiums are denoted as well. 
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As initially stated, labour market related parameters are location-specific and depend on local 
economic conditions. Economic growth is likely to diminish the probability of a job loss. While 
individual performance is not supposed to affect employment adversely,95 a more neurotic worker 
might still overestimate his or her individual job loss probability (𝜕𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖 𝜕𝜓𝑁⁄ > 0), which is 
nevertheless the relevant parameter in an individual assessment of alternatives.  
On the other hand, job finding probabilities 𝜋𝐸,𝑖  are presumed to depend on individual effort exerted 
during job search. Effort levels, for instance, how precisely alternatives are evaluated or how much 
attention is paid to an application, are supposed to be shaped by personality traits such as 
agreeableness (𝜓𝐴) and conscientiousness (𝜓𝐶). The latter has been found to be associated to a 
more intensive job interview preparation (Caldwell and Burger, 1998).  
Risk-attitude (𝜙𝑅) is likely to play a role as well (Ekelund et al., 2005; Kern, 2015): more risk-loving 
individuals might consider self-employment as an additional alternative, increasing the overall 
likelihood of generating labour market income in one way or another. Furthermore, a patience 
parameter (𝜙𝑃) might also be indicative of improved job finding perspectives if this parameter refers 
to individual willingness to bear higher (search) costs for the sake of increasing expected deferred 
returns (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005). The basic relations are thus 𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖 𝜕𝜓𝐶⁄ > 0, 
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖 𝜕𝜓𝐴⁄ > 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖 𝜕𝜙𝑅⁄ > 0 and 𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖 𝜕𝜙𝑃⁄ > 0.  
Aside from personality parameters, human capital will matter too. Especially language proficiency in 
the local language at location 𝐿 will boost employment perspectives: language proficiency may 
facilitate job search, help communicating own qualifications to prospective employers or be a 
prerequisite in occupations with customers (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003). 
Eventually, outlined channels highlight some plausible general mechanisms how personality and 
individual preferences might be associated with the mobility premium and consequently with 
migration outcomes.  
6.3.2 Scenario-specific mobility premiums 
Within the empirical analysis expected mobility premiums in four distinct scenarios are examined. 
These scenarios are defined by the likelihood of becoming unemployed and whether a cross-border 
move is considered or not. 
1. Scenario A1: internal try-your-luck migration 
The individual can retain the work place at the origin (𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖 = 0), but considers moving to an 
alternative location within the same jurisdiction (𝛾𝑖1(𝑑1), 𝜂𝐷 > 0): 
𝛥𝐴1,𝑖 =
1
𝜋𝐸𝐷1,𝑖
[(
𝑝𝐷1
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖1(𝑑1)𝑎𝐷1
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
+
Γ𝐷+(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑1)
𝑤𝑂
+ 𝜂𝐷(𝜋𝐸𝐷1,𝑖 − 1)] − 1  
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 In extreme cases, even shirking would go unpunished. Such an outcome is not at all unrealistic in the presence of strong 
worker protection. 
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2. Scenario A2: cross-border try-your-luck migration 
Though having employment at the origin (𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖 = 0), the individual considers migrating to 
another country (𝛾𝑖2(𝑑2), 𝜂𝐷 = 0): 
𝛥𝐴2,𝑖 =
1
𝜋𝐸𝐷2,𝑖
[(
𝑝𝐷2
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖2(𝑑2)𝑎𝐷2
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
+
Γ𝐷+(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑2)
𝑤𝑂
] − 1  
3. Scenario U1: internal migration to avoid unemployment  
If the individual decides to stay, he will be unemployed (𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖 = 1). Hence a possible alternative 
to avoid an unemployment spell is to move to another district in the same country (𝛾𝑖1(𝑑1), 
𝜂𝑂 = 𝜂𝐷 , 𝜂𝑂 > 0): 
𝛥𝑈1,𝑖 =
1
𝜋𝐸𝐷1,𝑖
[(
𝑝𝐷1
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖1(𝑑1)𝑎𝐷1
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
(𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖 + (1 − 𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖)𝜂𝑂) +
Γ𝐷+(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑1)
𝑤𝑂
+ 𝜂𝑂(𝜋𝐸𝐷1,𝑖 − 1)] − 1  
4. Scenario U2: cross-border migration to avoid unemployment  
Being without employment at the origin (𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖 = 1), the subject evaluates relocating to another 
country (𝛾𝑖2(𝑑2), 𝜂𝑂 > 0, 𝜂𝐷 = 0) to find gainful employment: 
𝛥𝑈2,𝑖 =
1
𝜋𝐸𝐷2,𝑖
[(
𝑝𝐷2
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖2(𝑑2)𝑎𝐷2
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
(𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖 + (1 − 𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖)𝜂𝑂) +
Γ𝐷+(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑2)
𝑤𝑂
] − 1   
These four depicted scenarios provide some immediate guidance regarding the magnitude or even 
the sign of the expected mobility premium.  
Typically, the mobility premiums to induce a move abroad should be larger than those related to 
intra-national moves (𝛥𝐴2,𝑖 > 𝛥𝐴1,𝑖 and 𝛥𝑈2,𝑖 > 𝛥𝑈1,𝑖). This difference comprises of an acculturative 
premium, and a compensation for the loss of unemployment insurance abroad. 
For any replacement rate 𝜂𝑂 ∈]0,1[ there results an excess mobility premium (Δ𝐴1,𝑖 > Δ𝑈1,𝑖 and 
Δ𝐴2,𝑖 > Δ𝑈2,𝑖) for the employed. It compensates for a relatively higher value of staying due to having 
employment at the origin.  
The mobility premiums can take on negative values (Δ𝑖 < 0) across scenarios if they are interpreted 
as hedonic premiums. This is the case whenever price levels at a destination are sufficiently below 
those at the origin, increasing consumption possibilities, or the subjectively perceived level of 
amenities at a destination is sufficiently above those at the origin. This constitutes the direct link to 
the compensating differential literature. 
Overall, the model’s parameterisation points to the relevance of location-specific (economic) 
conditions, respectively, to the importance of differentials between current location and potential 
destination. Outcomes will, thus, depend on the actual scenario a decision-maker is facing: on 
average, someone already residing in a rather advantageous location can be expected to ask for a 
higher mobility premium than someone originating from a less favourable region. 
6.3.3 A general visualisation of the mobility premium 
In order to provide a more graspable explanation of the interconnectedness of income, amenities, 
and mobility or their consequences for individual utility, Figure 6.1 portrays some basic connections. 
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Whereas relative individual preferences regarding consumption of (traded) goods and amenities are 
primarily expressed by the slope of the curve in the income-amenity space (left panel), 
corresponding curves in the income-distance space (right panel) capture other individual traits.96  The 
latter graph can also be interpreted as graphical representation of a wage-acceptance function, 
which depends on distance and destination.97 
The iso-utility curve 𝑈|𝐼𝑂=𝑤𝑂,𝑑=0 (black) in the left graph depicts all combinations of wage and 
amenity levels at a location (here denoted as origin), which yield the same level of utility. A 
representative individual is currently employed, earns labour income 𝑤𝑂 and enjoys an amenity level 
of 𝑎𝑂. In a world without language or administrative borders, where transport would neither cost 
time nor money,98 the individual would be indifferent between any location offering amenity level 𝑎0 
and earnings comparable to 𝑤𝑂 (indicated by the horizontal dotted iso-utility curve 
𝑈|𝐼=𝑤𝑂,𝑎=𝑎𝑂,𝑐(𝑑)=0 in the right panel). 
Since this is a rather unrealistic scenario, I assume in the following that transportation costs are 
increasing in distance. Additionally, the individual extracts no utility gains from setting out into the 
world, which could in extreme cases offset monetary costs. Consequently, the black curve 
𝑈|𝐼𝑂=𝑤𝑂,𝑎=𝑎𝑂 in the right panel shows for which income levels the individual would be indifferent 
between staying or moving to a location providing constant amenities in a certain distance 𝑑. The 
slope of this curve’s segments indicates how associated costs of mobility are perceived by the 
individual: someone putting relatively heavier weight on existing social ties might experience higher 
psychic costs of moving to a more remote location, and thus, the slope would be more pronounced 
(see Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.1: Iso-utility curves in the benchmark and unemployment scenario 
 
                                                          
96
 The vertical axis refers to income, and hence it parallels the two forms of income in the model, i.e., labour income (𝑤𝑂) 
and unemployment benefits (𝜂𝑤𝑂). The main implications would also be preserved if the real income, also integrating 
prices, was considered. 
97
 Relevant destinations in this context are other states or countries. The figure in the right panel is only one possible 
representation among all potential paths from an origin. The thresholds 𝑑1 (distance to the interstate border) and 𝑑2 
(distance to the national border) may vary, depending on the selected direction. 
98
 This would automatically imply that psychic cost become irrelevant. 
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Two discontinuities can be seen: the first occurs at 𝑑1, the second at 𝑑2. The first jump indicates the 
threshold between commuting distances and distances for which the individual would choose to 
move, for instance, if an alternative job was in another state.99 Because moving engenders additional 
costs, e.g., removal expenses or a brokerage fee, we observe this jump. The second jump indicates a 
distance which would require border-crossing. Here, especially costs related to language and cultural 
barriers or psychic costs might explain the sudden rise in ‘distance-dependent’ costs. The iso-utility 
curve of a person fluent in the neighbouring country’s language might display a less marked jump 
than for someone who never experienced a spell abroad. Eventually, to be willing to move to any 
location (for 𝑎 = 𝑎𝑂) just marginally beyond these thresholds, the individual under consideration 
would expect a compensation in form of a wage premium of at least Δ𝐴1, respectively Δ𝐴2. 
In an alternative scenario, the individual experiences a job loss at home due to a local economic 
shock – realised income is now given by unemployment benefits (𝜂𝑂𝑤𝑂). Such a shock shifts the iso-
utility curve in the income-amenity space downwards to 𝑈|𝐼𝑂=𝜂𝑤𝑂, 𝑑=𝑑𝑂 (grey). For the ‘outside-
option’ staying at the origin becomes now less attractive, the corresponding curve in the income-
distance space shifts downwards as well. This implies that the individual was now willing to cross the 
threshold 𝑑1 and move to another state if the potential destination would offer an income of  
𝑤1|𝐼𝑂=𝜂𝑤𝑂,𝑎1=𝑎𝑂 or more. The associated mobility premium Δ𝑈1 would be negative, albeit the 
premium to migrate to a location in another country (and cross the threshold 𝑑2) remained distinctly 
positive. 
Figure 6.2: Iso-utility curves in the aspiration and personality scenario 
 
A third exposition (Figure 6.2) dwells upon an individual who is employed, yet aspires a higher 
amenity level 𝑎∗, possibly related to a life-course event. Though this person would be willing to 
accept a lower wage (𝑤𝑂|𝑎=𝑎∗) at the familiar environment, her current location is not endowed with 
the desired amenity level. 
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 For the scenarios in which commuting is required to get to work, the costs are likely to increase in distance as well. 
Nevertheless, monetary costs could stay constant as well, for instance, if the considered commuting distance is covered by 
an already acquired commuting ticket for public transport. 
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To maintain the familiar overall subjective well-being (represented by 𝑈|𝐼𝑂=𝑤𝑂,𝑑=0) whilst gaining 
access to 𝑎∗, the individual would be willing to move to any location characterised by lying on 𝑈|𝑎=𝑎∗ 
(black dashed curve) or above in the income-distance space. For a sufficiently large difference 
between 𝑎∗ and 𝑎𝑂, the mobility premium Δ𝐴1 can become negative. In the event that the current 
(or any other) employer offered the same remuneration as at the origin, the individual could improve 
his or her well-being by moving to another state, as long as the destination is not farther away than 
𝑑|𝑎=𝑎∗. 
Finally, let us consider two individuals with the same relative preferences for amenities and tradable 
consumption goods, purchasable with income. The first person corresponds to the benchmark 
individual and is an extraverted character (𝜓𝐸
+) with iso-utility curve 𝑈|𝐼𝑂=𝑤𝑂,𝑎=𝑎𝑂,𝜓𝐸+ (black solid 
curve in Figure 6.2) in the income-distance space. In contrast, the other person is introverted (𝜓𝐸
−), 
featuring high psychic cost of leaving the familiar environment. This leads to more pronounced jumps 
at the distance thresholds and to a steeper profile over migratory distance 𝑑. As the corresponding 
iso-utility curve 𝑈|𝐼𝑂=𝑤𝑂,𝑎=𝑎𝑂,𝜓𝐸− (grey dashed curve) indicates, the mobility premium to move to 
another state Δ𝐴1
−  is much larger than for the (extraverted) benchmark individual (Δ𝐴1 in Figure 6.1). 
There exists at the same time no mobility premium to compensate the least extraverted person for 
the perceived hardship of moving to another country. 
6.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
Previously presented hypotheses are tested using individual microdata from a survey on “Mobility, 
Expectations, Self-Assessment and Risk Attitude of Students” (Weisser, 2016a). This cross-sectional 
survey comprises a large variety of items directly assessing individuals’ inclination towards various 
forms of mobility and related preferences. The survey’s target group, comprising students enrolled in 
an economics programme, allows addressing questions specifically related to prospectively highly 
educated individuals, constituting a substantial fraction of the future’s highly-skilled labour force.100 
In addition to individual characteristics, such as personality traits and personal valuations, the survey 
explicitly asked for postal codes to map episodes of geographic mobility in a geo-referenced 
framework. This approach allows to identify individuals’ current residence, and thereby to isolate a 
geographic reference point to which they might compare amenity levels at a potential destination. 
Having sketched the relevance of location-specific conditions in the above described model, the 
subsequent empirical analysis is explicitly taking these components into account. All location-specific 
data, e.g., economic and demographic conditions, originate from the ‘INKAR online’ database (BBSR, 
2014). The chosen reference year is 2012, the most recent year before the survey took place. 
Extracted data furnishes information on the district level, which makes it possible to merge 
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 Using administrative data, a high degree of representativeness could be established. More information regarding data 
compilation or sample composition can be found in Weisser (2016b). In addition, Table A6.2 depicts descriptive statistics for 
all variables used in subsequent analyses. 
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information on local circumstances with individuals’ geo-referenced whereabouts. In the end it can 
be inferred how large GDP per capita or unemployment was in the district where a respondent 
resided. Referring to the amenity domain, the INKAR data even provides information on locally 
available recreational area or transport connections. 
6.4.1 Migration motives and willingness to move 
The literature review presented a variety of influential factors affecting migration. Some factors, e.g., 
finding new employment or improving quality of life, may act as important motives to induce 
different types of migration. The realisation of more pressing motives, related to a substantial 
increase of subjective or economic well-being, might trigger a long distance move. Finding gainful 
employment in case of unemployment can be such a motive. The realisation of other motives, 
perceived as less important, could be too costly to induce any migratory reaction at all. In either 
case, individual evaluations are likely to vary over the life-cycle and depend on individual 
preferences. 
For seven different motives participants have been asked to state the maximum migratory move 
they would consider to realise the associated motive. The results in Figure 6.3 illustrate that 
especially economic motives might induce higher degrees of mobility.  
Figure 6.3: Maximum willingness to move, by motive (in %) 
 
Note: Sample size for all seven motives varies between 2202 and 2216 respondents. 
 
However, almost 17 % explained their unwillingness to move to another state (or beyond) to improve 
employment opportunities in case of unemployment. Most notably, 7.2 % claim to be unwilling to 
move at all, even within the state. Nevertheless, cross-border moves are, to a larger extent, 
considered in case of labour market related motives. From an ex ante perspective, approximately 
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44 % mention a basic willingness to leave the country for better job opportunities (in case of 
unemployment) and 51.5 % state that better income opportunities would make them consider a 
cross-border move.  
In contrast to this, prospective university graduates are less inclined to move to another country for 
the sake of being closer to family or friends. The same holds for gaining access to better housing 
conditions or infrastructure. If they strive for improvements in these dimensions, primarily intra-
national moves are considered. Since most respondents in the sample have been born and raised in 
Germany, increasing proximity to reference persons typically does not require a cross-border move. 
Similarly, housing and infrastructure quality in Germany can be assumed to be relatively high, hence 
migrating to another country would not yield an improvement. 
Climatic conditions, often identified as relevant migration motive (cf. Rappaport, 2007), do not 
constitute an important migration motive for young adults in this sample: 38.4 % display a complete 
unwillingness to move at all in order to get to a location offering better climatic conditions. The 
possibility to explore new living environments is for 60 % not a sufficiently strong motive to induce 
cross-border mobility, although especially such a move would imply immediate contact with a new 
cultural environment.  
The observed variation in the shares of individuals willing to display a specific degree of mobility 
stresses the relevance of the underlying individual aspiration. Some motives seem to be more urgent 
than others. At the same time and across motives, a notable share of individuals - ranging from 10 % 
to 45 % - lacks any willingness to move beyond the intra-German state borders. Staying at or 
remaining close to a place of residence is highly valued. In all likelihood, offsetting such a tendency to 
dwell requires a substantial mobility premium, even to induce interstate mobility. 
6.4.2 Distribution of mobility premiums for various scenarios and personality dimensions 
The mobility premiums have been derived from items inquiring expected income levels for the four 
scenarios.101 As a benchmark (𝑤𝑂) served the minimum expected net income after graduation. 
Furthermore, expected income levels so a respondent would be willing to move to an alternative 
destination have been directly asked for. Being confronted with precisely depicted scenarios, 
participants stated their expected wage levels for internal (𝑤𝐴1) and cross-border (𝑤𝐴2) try-your-luck 
migration, respectively internal (𝑤𝑈1) and cross-border (𝑤𝑈2) migration to avoid unemployment. 
Accordingly, one obtains as mobility premium, e.g., in case of cross-border mobility in the 
unemployment scenario: 
𝛥𝑈2 =
𝑤𝑈2 −𝑤𝑂
𝑤𝑂
 
The subsequent analyses are based on a trimmed sample, where the lowest and the highest 0.5 % of 
responses have been excluded. Consistency checks and a validation of participants’ response 
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 Translated versions of those items involved in the construction of the four mobility premiums are listed in the appendix 
(Figure A6.1). 
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behaviour indicated that responses at these extreme ends are mostly related to a misunderstanding 
of reference values (monthly versus yearly benchmark). Within the econometric analysis (Chapter 
6.5), I will also apply quantile regression in order to account for outliers in the data that remain 
within these two cutoff points. 
A first glance at the mobility premiums’ distributions in Figure 6.4 reveals already some noteworthy 
facts: the average expected mobility premium 𝜇(Δ𝐴1) for an interstate move whilst having an 
alternative employment option at the origin amounts to 27.46 %. In case of cross-border mobility, 
the corresponding average expected premium 𝜇(Δ𝐴2)  is 84.42 %.  
Figure 6.4: Mobility premiums, by destination and employment status 
 
Note: The solid red line depicts the average mobility premium (𝜇); the dashed line corresponds to the median. Illustrated mobility 
premiums correspond to the four scenarios described in Chapter 6.3.2. The lower left panel, for instance, shows the histogram for 
Δ𝑈1 being the expected mobility premium for moving to another state when unemployed. Each histogram bar covers an interval of 
five percentage points. For the sake of readability, the depicted premiums are confined to the interval [-50,200]. 
For the unemployment scenario, where 𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖  implicitly equals one, we observe the expected 
downward shift of the mobility premium in both migration scenarios. Most interestingly, the average 
internal mobility premium to avoid unemployment is still positive, i.e., 𝜇(Δ𝑈1) = 0.0674. In contrast 
to the scenario assuming continued employment at the origin (upper left panel), half of the 
respondents were willing to accept a lower income level for the sake of finding employment 
elsewhere. The average cross-border mobility premium in the unemployment scenario drops by 
more than one third to 𝜇(Δ𝑈2) = 0.5318. However, half of all respondents still featured an expected 
premium of more than 40 %. 
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From an economists’ perspective, ignoring all personality parameters, a positive expected mobility 
premium in the unemployment scenario with 𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖 = 1, 𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖 = 0, and 𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖 = 1 (as stated explicitly 
in the scenario) was largely related to monetary costs of moving, since the individual mobility 
premium would be given as 
  𝛥𝑈1,𝑖 = [(
𝑝𝐷1
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝑎𝐷1
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝜂
𝑂
+
Γ𝐷+𝑓(𝑑1)
𝑤𝑂
] − 1.  
In case of a newly graduated individual without previous employment, implying non-eligibility to 
unemployment benefits (𝜂𝑂 = 0), relative costs of moving (Γ𝐷 + 𝑓(𝑑1))𝑤𝑂
−1 would induce in all 
likelihood 𝛥𝑈1,𝑖 > 0. Following this thought, one could derive that average expected costs of moving 
in relation to the reference income level were 106.74 % in the sample.102 
Taking a broader perspective, and reintegrating the personality parameters in this scenario, the 
corresponding mobility premium is then 
  𝛥𝑈1,𝑖 = [(
𝑝𝐷1
𝑝𝑂
) (
𝑎𝑂
𝛾𝑖1(𝑑1)𝑎𝐷1
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝜂
𝑂
+
Γ𝐷+(1+𝜏𝑖)𝑓(𝑑1)
𝑤𝑂
] − 1.  
Psychic costs of moving, entering via 𝜏𝑖 would now further increase the likelihood of observing a 
positive mobility premium.  
Figure 6.5: Mobility premiums for internal migration scenarios, conditional on personality groupings (in %) 
 
Note: * The solid line represents risk-loving individuals; the line with dashes and dots stands for risk-neutral and the dashed-
line for risk-averse individuals. In all other cases, the three depicted groups refer to a classification based on standardised 
scores, such that ‘medium’ refers to those scoring within one standard deviation around the mean and ‘high’ (‘low’) comprises 
those more than one standard deviation above (below) the mean. The sample size varies across dimensions between 2120 
and 2181. 
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 A similar reasoning applies if the relevant reference income would not be a labour market income but parental or social 
assistance.  
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This claim is supported by the descriptive findings depicted in Figure 6.5, where the unemployment 
scenario is illustrated in red. The closer to the graph’s centre the smaller the group-specific average 
mobility premium, and vice versa. Participants who expressed a most pronounced preference of 
proximity to reference persons or who rated themselves as having a low adaptability to new 
circumstances also expect the highest mobility premium. If a person perceived an interstate move to 
be an especially risky endeavour, she would also exhibit a higher mobility premium. The tendency for 
more risk-averse persons to expect a higher mobility premium becomes more distinct for the 
scenarios assuming alternative employment at the origin (blue lines). Individuals scoring highest in 
the Big-Five trait neuroticism expect on average a mobility premium of 30.2 % in the employment 
scenario. Those on the opposite side of the scale exhibit an average mobility premium of 23.9 %. 
Turning to the cross-border scenarios (Figure A6.2 in the appendix), group-specific mobility 
premiums are consistently larger in both labour market scenarios. In case of the trait neuroticism, 
the average expected cross-border mobility premium in an unemployment scenario of those scoring 
highest amounts to 56.1 %. Least neurotic individuals still require on average a premium 47.9 %, 
which is twice the size of the corresponding premium in the internal migration scenario. 
In all likelihood, individuals will not perfectly adhere to some a priori formulated guess when they 
actually consider a move for employment reasons. Their initial expectations will nonetheless be of 
some relevance in the decision-making process. If someone was socially extremely well connected at 
the current place of residence, for instance had a high level of local social capital (David et al., 2010), 
leaving this place would be associated with substantial costs. Such a person might require an ex ante 
premium of one hundred or more percent, just to consider the mere possibility of moving and 
actually sending out an application. Though such a person might eventually deviate from this initial 
expectation during salary negotiations, e.g., ask for an implicit premium of 50 %, this person would 
still require a distinctly higher compensation than other, less rooted individuals. 
Therefore, the illustrated average positive mobility premium in an unemployment scenario is a 
plausible factor explaining why individuals may choose to stay in an economically disadvantaged 
region even when unemployed: wage offers at alternative locations might be perceived as 
insufficient to compensate for mobility-related discomfort. Heterogeneous personalities or individual 
preferences and adjustment capabilities, in turn, are now likely candidates for understanding the 
distribution of mobility premiums under various circumstances. 
6.5 Econometric analysis 
To which extent do personality characteristics and preferences bear substantial explanatory power 
regarding expected mobility premiums of prospective academics? After a brief discussion of the 
applied estimation methods and model specifications in Chapter 6.5.1, this chapter provides a 
general perspective in Chapter 6.5.2 by presenting results from a pooled premium sample. In Chapter 
6.5.3, scenario specific estimations are discussed. The fourth paragraph performs additional 
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sensitivity checks, especially addressing concerns regarding the reliability of decisions in a 
hypothetical context and gender-specific elasticities. 
6.5.1 OLS and quantile regression specifications 
Across chapters, the premiums’ conditional mean 𝐸[Δ|𝑋] is estimated based on the linear model 
Δ = 𝑋′𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀, 
where robust standard errors are implemented to account for a potential violation of the underlying 
assumption of i.i.d. errors. Estimated coefficients 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 show by how many percentage points the 
mobility premium Δ changes on average if the corresponding explanatory variable 𝑥 increases by one 
unit. 
To account for a potentially biasing impact of outliers, mobility premiums are also estimated applying 
quantile regression.103 In contrast to OLS, not the conditional mean function is estimated, but the 
conditional quantile function 
𝑄[Δ|𝑋, 𝑞] = 𝑋′𝛽𝑞 
assuming that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[Δ ≤ 𝑋′𝛽𝑞|𝑋] = 𝑞. The respective quantile is indicated by 𝑞, such that holds 
𝑞 ∈]0,1[ (cf. Greene, 2012, p. 207). Derived estimates, e.g., 𝛽0.50 or 𝛽0.75, inform about the 
elasticities of Δ with respect to an explanatory variable at the median, respectively at 75th percentile 
of Δ. Implemented standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications), which yields two merits: first, 
it evades the necessity to define a functional form of the so-called sparsity function, required for the 
calculation of the variance-covariance matrix even when residuals fulfil the i.i.d. assumption. 
Moreover, bootstrapped standard errors are not only an adequate measure to address 
heteroskedastic errors in this application (Rogers, 1992), but this inference method offers the 
additional advantage of performing simultaneous quantile estimation. Deriving quantile-specific 
coefficients simultaneously, and applying the bootstrap, yields a complete variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimators. The latter allows testing for equality of 𝛽0.50 and other quantile-specific 
coefficients across equations (Gould, 1997). Non-rejection of the Null lends then support to the 
hypothesis of a constant variance, respectively an uphold assumption of homoscedastic residuals. An 
asymptotical convergence of OLS coefficients and median regression coefficients would in addition 
point to a sufficiently symmetric distribution of Δ|𝑋. In this case, the simple conditional mean 
function was capable of portraying the underlying relationships. 
The matrix 𝑋 contains the set of explanatory variables. Aside from socio-demographic variables it 
also contains the individual traits and location-specific conditions from the theoretical model.104 The 
set of socio-demographic variables comprises in addition to gender, age, and partnership status also 
English language proficiency. Better English language skills Λ𝑖 are supposed to facilitate integration 
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 Based on consistency checks, only the lowest and highest 0.5 % (11 cases in each tail) were excluded. Thus, outliers may 
still have a certain impact on estimates. 
104
 An overview and corresponding descriptive statistics can be found in Table A6.2 in the appendix. 
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into a new living environment abroad, to reduce transaction costs in daily life, and to increase 
individual adjustment capability (𝜕𝛾𝑖 𝜕Λ⁄ > 0). 
The location-specific conditions refer to the district a participant explicitly stated to be his current 
place of residence. Aside from mostly economic variables, such as GDP per capita, a price level 
measure and the unemployment rate, they also comprise a measure of urbanisation (population 
density). Aspects of urban interconnectedness are also integrated, based on variables representing 
the time it takes to reach the three closest agglomeration centres by either car or train. Amenity 
aspects are directly represented by a measure of access to recreational space and the provision of 
public goods, gauged by the relative number of communal employees. 
Personality-related variables, such as willingness to take risks (in the career domain), patience and 
the Big-Five personality traits enter the model in categorical form. The same holds for the 
adaptability measure and the social preference variables. For each of these, a standardisation of the 
original scale variable yielded three distinct groups: the reference group comprising the average-type 
individuals (𝜇 − 𝜎 ≤ score ≤ 𝜇 + 𝜎), as well as a group distinctly below and one distinctly above the 
mean 𝜇, respectively the reference group. This procedure allows detecting some basic non-linear 
relationships across groupings. In most specifications, previous mobility experiences are controlled 
for as well. This includes earlier stays abroad and residential mobility during adolescence, as well as 
the most recent mobility experience, namely educational mobility.105  
In addition, specifications incorporate the logarithm of the expected post-graduation income levels. 
This accounts for cases where individuals might just ask for a reimbursement of fixed monetary 
moving costs, which are not depending on distance. Comparable amounts, however, might 
correspond to largely varying mobility premiums, depending on the position in the distribution of 
expected incomes.  
Another categorical variable is only relevant in the pooled analysis of mobility premiums. There, this 
component accounts for the different scenarios in which the mobility premiums have been derived. 
6.5.2 Results from pooled specifications 
Table 6.1 provides some preliminary guidance concerning the fundamental factors involved in the 
formation of mobility premiums by pooling observations from all four scenarios. The sample is 
restricted to those 1851 individuals with four non-missing premiums, yielding 7404 observations in 
total. Reported results are from the preferred specification, based on the full set of individual traits 
and location-specific conditions. The outcomes therefore correspond to the compensating 
differential models with heterogeneous preferences and personality. The first two columns’ results 
are obtained by OLS, the next six columns display outcomes from the simultaneous quantile 
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 Educational mobility shall refer in this context to geographic mobility for educational purposes, i.e., attending a 
university. It is measured as excess distance, i.e., the difference of the distance between an individual’s origin and the 
actually chosen study location and the distance between this origin and the closest university offering an economics 
programme. 
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regression (𝑞 = 0.25, 0.50,0.75) with identical model specification. The last two columns display the 
results from a test for equality of coefficients across quantiles, e.g., 𝛽0.25 = 𝛽0.50 and 𝛽0.50 = 𝛽0.75. 
Model comparisons for OLS and quantile regressions are documented in Table A6.3 and Table A6.4 
(in the appendix).106 
Table 6.1: Results from pooled OLS and pooled quantile regression estimation 
dependent variable Δ (pooeld)  Δ (pooled) 
estimation method 
OLS  QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75) 
 Test of quantile 
coefficient equality 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  F prob > F 
gender (female=1) -1.4270 (1.3706)  -0.8223 (0.8648)  -1.2135 (0.8926)  -1.5743 (1.4316)  0.19 0.8302 
age 0.0132 (0.3135)  0.4592 *** (0.1635)  0.1849 (0.1950)  -0.1495 (0.2708)  2.79 0.0614 
partnership (yes=1) 4.5258 *** (1.2187)  3.1488 *** (0.7515)  3.9627 *** (0.8387)  2.5378 ** (1.2452)  1.22 0.2955 
language skills (English)               
high -5.4846 ** (2.1700)  -1.7027 (1.2856)  -1.5020 (1.5810)  -2.3210 (2.0159)  0.09 0.9094 
medium -3.8161 * (2.0635)  -0.7153 (1.2197)  -1.0570 (1.3826)  -3.2240 (1.9776)  0.86 0.4250 
risk attitude (career domain, 𝜙𝑅)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.2169 ** (1.4854)  0.7002 (0.9210)  0.1983 (1.0705)  2.5212 * (1.5266)  1.72 0.1787 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.9471 (2.0277)  -1.6094 (1.2062)  -0.0655 (1.4156)  2.3730 (1.9298)  2.19 0.1117 
patience (𝜙𝑃)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 5.5332 *** (1.8439)  0.6229 (1.0105)  1.4625 (1.2219)  5.0169 *** (1.7997)  3.20 0.0406 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.9838 * (1.6646)  -1.7237 (1.5269)  -0.7533 (1.2953)  -1.0334 (1.6585)  0.29 0.7480 
extraversion (𝜓𝐸)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.5623 (2.1348)  -2.2053 * (1.1677)  -1.9608 (1.4537)  -2.7433 (2.2622)  0.10 0.9072 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.7294 (1.5828)  -1.4069 (1.0964)  -0.3685 (1.1690)  3.5314 ** (1.5941)  4.90 0.0075 
neuroticism (𝜓𝑁)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.2922 (2.1250)  -2.0661 * (1.2178)  -2.7612 ** (1.3452)  -4.4720 ** (1.8903)  0.86 0.4248 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.5316 (1.6377)  1.1151 (0.9828)  -0.0781 (1.1009)  -0.6966 (1.9244)  0.72 0.4863 
openness (𝜓𝑂)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -2.2346 (1.6215)  -2.5920 *** (0.9995)  -3.2312 *** (1.1116)  -0.8117 (1.5281)  1.71 0.1818 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.4738 (1.6307)  -1.8978 ** (0.9645)  -2.2190 ** (1.0912)  -0.2057 (1.6147)  1.04 0.3520 
conscientiousness (𝜓𝐶)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1602 (2.0614)  -1.5920 (1.2849)  -0.5805 (1.4783)  -0.4402 (2.0719)  0.33 0.7209 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.0733 (1.5892)  -1.6358 (1.1450)  0.1471 (1.2310)  0.6243 (1.7337)  1.26 0.2826 
agreeableness (𝜓𝐴)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.4499 (1.6026)  -0.4319 (0.9551)  -1.3759 (1.0930)  -0.5001 (1.6305)  0.55 0.5786 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.6450 (1.5898)  3.0968 *** (1.1911)  2.4534 ** (1.1239)  3.3136 ** (1.6623)  0.33 0.7187 
adaptability (𝜙𝐴)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 6.4159 *** (1.6698)  2.6821 *** (1.0250)  3.1993 *** (1.1196)  6.9878 *** (2.2771)  2.14 0.1179 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.8650 (1.8667)  0.0555 (1.2673)  -0.6003 (1.2678)  -1.2421 (1.6625)  0.28 0.7568 
importance of prox.  (family, 𝜙𝑆)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -2.9647 * (1.6278)  -3.0716 *** (1.0334)  -4.2628 *** (1.1381)  -3.4604 ** (1.7207)  0.67 0.5103 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 9.6209 *** (2.1239)  3.6166 ** (1.6598)  8.0606 *** (1.7380)  10.4156 *** (2.9412)  4.66 0.0095 
importance of prox.  (friends, 𝜙𝑆)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -6.7878 *** (1.6812)  -2.4733 ** (1.1131)  -2.4134 * (1.2496)  -4.3304 ** (1.7060)  0.80 0.4477 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 10.4159 *** (2.3144)  5.4241 *** (1.5191)  7.8578 *** (1.7804)  13.5379 *** (3.3106)  3.47 0.0312 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)               
residential move (yes=1) 0.7753 (1.4290)  -0.8163 (0.9414)  1.1209 (1.1321)  1.7354 (1.5455)  1.84 0.1592 
exchange participation (yes=1) -3.8862 *** (1.2788)  -1.0511 (0.8688)  -1.7724 * (0.9437)  -2.5715 * (1.3322)  0.72 0.4880 
stay abroad (yes=1) -10.7625 *** (1.3930)  -6.8525 *** (1.0687)  -6.2750 *** (0.9967)  -7.4641 *** (1.4534)  0.55 0.5763 
educational mobility (km) -0.0370 *** (0.0060)  -0.0231 *** (0.0037)  -0.0272 *** (0.0045)  -0.0335 *** (0.0052)  2.13 0.1194 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)               
GDP (per capita) -0.8941 *** (0.2075)  -0.4509 *** (0.1247)  -0.3860 *** (0.1310)  -0.5333 ** (0.2232)  0.49 0.6111 
building land prices 0.0915 *** (0.0311)  0.0341 (0.0237)  0.0379 * (0.0205)  0.0513 * (0.0265)  0.19 0.8311 
accessibility (train)  -0.1950 *** (0.0525)  -0.0190 (0.0323)  -0.0863 ** (0.0403)  -0.0942 (0.0580)  1.74 0.1759 
accessibility (car)  0.0547 (0.1028)  -0.0348 (0.0637)  0.0090 (0.0716)  0.0178 (0.0968)  0.22 0.7996 
pop. density -0.0018 (0.0023)  -0.0005 (0.0013)  -0.0001 (0.0014)  -0.0015 (0.0020)  0.40 0.6692 
recreational area (per capita) 0.0600 ** (0.0274)  -0.0023 (0.0187)  0.0200 (0.0168)  0.0047 (0.0242)  0.94 0.3902 
public services  0.0184 (0.0467)  0.0295 (0.0290)  0.0086 (0.0276)  0.0249 (0.0428)  0.34 0.7146 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -1.7269 *** (0.6611)  -0.7109 * (0.3846)  -0.9459 ** (0.4045)  -0.7000 (0.6272)  0.29 0.7481 
premium type controls                   
relative income control (𝑤0)                   
constant                   
observations 7404  7404  7404  7404    
df (model) 41  41  41  41    
F-statistic 65.04          
prob > F 0.0000          
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.2800  0.1538  0.1820  0.2223    
adjusted R-squared 0.2760          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are implemented in case of the OLS model. Standard errors in the simultaneous 
quantile regression are bootstrapped (500 replications). These standard errors are also used in the test for coefficient equality across 
the three quantiles. Depicted p-values in bold indicate significant differences of quantile coefficients at the conventional significance 
levels. The pseudo R-squared for the quantile regressions is calculated as 1-(minimum sum of deviations/absolute sum of deviations). 
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Typically, significant coefficient estimates in the OLS specification are closest to those from the upper 
quartile (𝑞 = 0.75) in the simultaneous quantile regression. This yields evidence in favour of outliers 
inflating mobility premium estimates in the OLS case. With exemption of the Big-Five estimates, the 
conditional mean provides some general guidance regarding factors that may increase or mitigate 
the expected mobility premium.  
Across the three quantiles, two traits display significant explanatory power: least neurotic individuals 
request negative mobility premiums between -2.1 and -4.5 percentage points. Most agreeable 
individuals, in contrast ask for an additional premium of 2.5 to 3.3 percentage points. If these 
individuals expect episodes of labour mobility to be prompted by a future employer, they might 
expect a compensation for showing such distinct form of commitment to the requirements of the 
job. And indeed, there is evidence that agreeableness and job performance are positively correlated 
(Mount et al., 1998), respectively agreeable individuals evince also higher levels of job involvement 
(Liao and Lee, 2009), becoming potentially more likely to meet such a requirement. 
Across specifications and estimation methods, individuals in a partnership expect a 2.5 to 4.5 
percentage point higher mobility premium. In accordance with expectations, least patient individuals 
expect on average a mobility premium of 5.5 percentage points. Quantile regression results indicate 
that this trait is especially relevant for the upper quartile in the mobility premium distribution. The 
observed difference across coefficients is also significant (p=0.0406). OLS estimates point to a 
significant risk-related component in the mobility premium, around 3 percentage points, which is 
only reflected in quantile regression results for the 75th percentile.107  
Adaptability to new circumstances, a measure also related to the concept of hedonic adaptation 
(Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Graham and Oswald, 2010) proves to be relevant across 
specifications and quantiles. Individuals rating themselves as least adaptable to new circumstances 
expect on average mobility premiums that are 6.4 percentage points above those of the reference 
group, consisting of respondents of medium adaptability. Quantile regression results support this 
finding while the coefficient is twice the size for the upper quartile compared to the median or the 
lower quartile. 
Social preferences, including the importance of proximity to reference persons, feature across all 
specifications not only a substantial degree of significance but also size. In absolute terms, the 
coefficients for proximity to peers are most of the times more pronounced than for family. Each time 
the coefficients for both subgroups, comprising individuals either with below or above average 
preferences, show the expected sign in relation to the reference group. Social ties seem to play a 
huge role: if an individual has a distinctive affinity to familiar reference persons, the observed 
mobility premium is 21 percentage points higher.108 This lends strong support in favour of the psychic 
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 Model comparisons in Table A6.3 and Table A6.4 show that this risk-related element of mobility premiums diminishes 
when social preferences are accounted for. 
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 For an individual scoring highest in importance of family and friends, the overall magnitude is the sum of 9.6 and 10.4 
percentage points. 
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costs theory – if existing social ties are especially relevant, people expect to be compensated more 
copiously for the discomfort of moving and being apart from familiar reference persons. The 
coefficients’ relative size is in line with findings of Dahl and Sorenson (2010), who documented 
technical workers’ high valuation of proximity to their parents or former classmates.109 This suggests 
that factors of high relevance in a real-world context can also be uncovered in an analysis of 
expected ex ante premiums. 
Previous mobility experiences, supposed to strengthen adjustment capabilities in the model, are 
indeed associated with lower expected mobility premiums in the pooled specifications. Participants 
who spent some time abroad expected in the pooled approach on average a 10.8 percentage point 
smaller premium. Those who displayed higher levels of educational mobility, hence selected 
themselves into more remote study locations in the first place, require a smaller premium as well: 
those who chose a destination 100 kilometres beyond the closest alternative feature an ex ante 
mobility premium which is diminished by 3.7 percentage points. Across specifications, residential 
mobility during adolescence does not exhibit any explanatory power – the impact of mobility 
experiences in the distant past seem to fade out over time.  
Turning to the potential relationship between location-specific conditions, such as amenities or 
unemployment likelihood, significant coefficients exhibit with one exception the expected sign. The 
lower the degree of accessibility of agglomeration centres, measured as longer travel time by train, 
the lower the expected mobility premium. For one, this points towards a fundamental value of being 
geographically well connected and having access to metropolitan markets or amenities. But then, in 
conjuncture with an insignificant coefficient for accessibility by car, this result suggests that cars are 
not the crucial means of transportation for this cohort. Similarly, individuals already residing in cities 
with better recreational opportunities, measured as recreational area per inhabitant, would want 
higher compensation for leaving such a favourable environment, offering a high recreational value. 
The provision of public services, accounted for as public employees in relation to population, 
constitutes an amenity which does not display a significant association in the pooled specifications.  
Building land prices on the district level as proxy for housing prices (thus in the end rents as well) 
deliver the expected results, consistent with the literature on compensating differentials: these 
prices capitalise to a substantial degree local amenity levels. People from municipalities where 
building prices are one standard deviation higher expect on average an additional mobility premium 
of almost 7.5 percentage points.110 
GDP per capita at the district level, the measure for general material well-being, is the mentioned 
outlier. One would have expected that, controlling for unemployment risk, individuals from relatively 
richer regions would request higher compensations. Albeit, there is a possible explanation for this 
result: if individuals from high income districts have a more wealthy background, their overall 
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 Doubling the distance to the former is related to an annual income compensation between $ 5263 and $ 12753. 
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 Calculated as 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆
𝑝 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑. 𝑑𝑒𝑣 = 0.0915 × 82.01 = 7.5039 
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financial position could be more favourable so they would possibly put less weight on potential 
income gains from migration. 
In accordance with the sketched model, labour market conditions prove to be relevant as well. A 
higher unemployment rate is across all specifications indicative of significantly lower mobility 
premiums. A one percentage point higher unemployment rate lowers the expected mobility 
premium by 0.7 to 1.7 percentage points – perceived unemployment risk thus reduces indeed the 
value of staying. 
6.5.3 Scenario-specific results 
Within the examination of internal mobility premiums, both the one with job alternative (Δ𝐴1) and 
the other assuming unemployment (Δ𝑈1), the preferred model specifications are with one exemption 
the same as in the pooled analyses.111  
Common to the pooled specification, previous mobility experiences and preferences regarding social 
proximity are the most relevant factors explaining internal mobility premiums (Table 6.2). In the 
domain of adjustment capabilities one can nevertheless observe some differences too, especially 
between the scenario assuming existing job alternative and the scenario assuming unemployment. 
Only in the first one, individuals with short-term cross-border mobility experience (exchange 
participation) reduce on average the expected mobility premium. In the unemployment scenario, this 
factor loses its predictive power. A longer stay abroad and higher levels of education mobility are 
associated with distinctly mitigated mobility premiums across both internal scenarios and estimation 
methods.  
Least adaptable individuals expect on average internal premiums of around 3 percentage points, 
which is not diminished in the unemployment scenario. This trait proves to be relevant for individuals 
in the lower or upper quartiles as well (Table A6.7). 
There are also some noteworthy differences between the two labour market scenarios. Family ties, 
for instance, seem to lose their relevance in an unemployment scenario. Desired proximity to friends, 
in contrast, still implies higher psychic costs, which have to be more heavily compensated to induce 
mobility. The network of friends might have a higher value, e.g., a peer network might provide 
information on job openings. At the same time, women expect in the unemployment scenario on 
average a slightly higher ex ante mobility premium than men. This is further evidence that women 
display a different place attachment then men, even when controlling for social factors.112 
Exclusively focusing on internal migration scenarios, risk attitude is not significantly related to 
observed mobility premiums in either scenario. English language skills are irrelevant in these 
specifications as well. In accordance with the hypothesis that language facilitates integration into a 
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 The only modification is related to scenario-specific estimations, and hence scenario-dummies are no longer required. 
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 This result should not driven by issues of childcare, since all women in the sample are currently enrolled in tertiary 
education and in their early twenties. 
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new living environment, English language proficiency should not affect outcomes when it comes to 
German interstate migration. 
 Table 6.2: Internal mobility premiums (OLS and quantile regression) 
dependent variable Δ𝐴1 (internal, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈1 (internal, given unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50)  OLS  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50) 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -0.7197 (1.3516)  -0.9017 (1.2214)  2.8991 * (1.4818)  1.7487 (1.2892) 
age -0.0424 (0.2950)  -0.0187 (0.2440)  0.8025 ** (0.3497)  0.4372 (0.2670) 
partnership (yes=1) 1.7965 (1.1705)  2.3455 ** (1.0442)  1.7942  (1.3101)  1.2333 (1.2056) 
language skills (English)               
high 0.2028 (1.9403)  -0.0976 (1.8628)  0.3641  (2.2884)  0.0329 (2.6217) 
medium -0.9351 (1.7837)  -0.4944 (1.6351)  -1.0436  (2.0699)  -0.9261 (2.4762) 
risk attitude (career domain, 𝜙𝑅)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0668 (1.4569)  0.7023 (1.3751)  -0.8305  (1.5940)  -1.0173 (1.4012) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.5480 (1.7940)  1.5708 (2.0496)  -0.3313  (2.0657)  -1.1009 (1.4471) 
patience (𝜙𝑃)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.5968 ** (1.6727)  0.2906 (2.0386)  2.8933  (1.8766)  1.7316 (1.5801) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.8534 (1.5963)  0.1157 (1.6530)  -2.8192  (1.8302)  -1.0277 (1.6726) 
extraversion (𝜓𝐸)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 2.5990 (1.8788)  0.6761 (1.6822)  -2.6948  (2.2157)  -3.4274 * (1.7488) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.1800 (1.4925)  -0.0070 (1.5925)  1.1296  (1.7892)  0.1050 (1.5865) 
neuroticism (𝜓𝑁)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.4558 (1.8312)  -2.3317 (1.9368)  -1.0017  (2.0034)  -0.5588 (1.4935) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8838 (1.6923)  1.1700 (1.6059)  1.4164  (1.8689)  -0.5578 (1.6989) 
openness (𝜓𝑂)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.3878 ** (1.4769)  -2.1224 (1.4575)  -1.3327  (1.7242)  -2.2063 (1.7063) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.5564 * (1.5025)  -2.0828 (1.5313)  0.4247  (1.7016)  -0.9624 (1.3139) 
conscientiousness (𝜓𝐶)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.2856 (1.8096)  0.1793 (1.9662)  0.5959  (2.2331)  -0.4277 (1.9040) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.2953 (1.5997)  0.6376 (1.7324)  -1.5744  (1.8060)  -1.0854 (1.6084) 
agreeableness (𝜓𝐴)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1304 (1.5247)  -0.8473 (1.4629)  0.4803  (1.7744)  -0.3515 (1.5270) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 3.1860 * (1.6513)  3.6829 ** (1.6189)  2.9933 * (1.6798)  0.8348 (1.5329) 
adaptability (𝜙𝐴)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.2690 ** (1.5967)  2.5528 (1.6570)  3.2048 * (1.8258)  1.1499 (1.7967) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.1230 (1.7819)  0.2607 (2.0337)  0.7855  (1.8689)  0.7450 (1.6411) 
importance of proximity  (family, 𝜙𝑆)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -2.0220 (1.5136)  -3.3319 * (1.7281)  -0.6128  (1.7450)  -1.4920 (1.2705) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 6.8777 *** (2.1252)  6.4863 *** (2.0921)  -0.0198  (2.3834)  2.0976 (2.8287) 
importance of proximity  (friends, 𝜙𝑆)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -4.1752 *** (1.6051)  -2.8224 (1.8835)  -2.6304  (1.8219)  0.5690 (1.4218) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 6.0000 *** (2.1067)  5.2766 ** (2.0472)  6.0702 ** (2.4882)  6.4117 ** (3.2032) 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)               
residential move (yes=1) 0.6710 (1.3230)  0.9114 (1.4143)  -0.0689  (1.5600)  -0.6078 (1.3071) 
exchange participation (yes=1) -2.6014 ** (1.2690)  -0.9302 (1.2463)  -1.4469  (1.4204)  -0.7153 (1.3238) 
stay abroad (yes=1) -4.7414 *** (1.5033)  -4.6585 *** (1.4081)  -4.1557 *** (1.6069)  -3.2052 ** (1.4134) 
educational mobility (km) -0.0239 *** (0.0058)  -0.0185 *** (0.0062)  -0.0254 *** (0.0060)  -0.0112 * (0.0060) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)               
GDP (per capita) -0.4408 ** (0.1916)  -0.2952 * (0.1682)  -0.4078 ** (0.2025)  -0.0737 (0.2121) 
building land prices 0.0868 *** (0.0278)  0.0498 ** (0.0235)  0.0237  (0.0314)  -0.0097 (0.0258) 
accessibility (train)  -0.0881 * (0.0508)  -0.0479 (0.0437)  -0.0824  (0.0570)  -0.0279 (0.0569) 
accessibility (car)  -0.0444 (0.0903)  -0.0800 (0.0833)  0.0524  (0.1056)  -0.0530 (0.1043) 
pop. density -0.0032 * (0.0018)  -0.0001 (0.0018)  -0.0022  (0.0021)  -0.0025 (0.0020) 
recreational area (per capita) 0.0216 (0.0220)  0.0227 (0.0189)  -0.0181  (0.0275)  -0.0244 (0.0233) 
public services  -0.0199 (0.0410)  -0.0332 (0.0328)  0.0630  (0.0473)  0.0297 (0.0450) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -0.4863 (0.5302)  -1.0188 * (0.5216)  -0.4212  (0.6319)  -0.0171 (0.6068) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                
constant                
observations 1851  1851  1851  1851 
df (model) 38  38  38  38 
F-statistic 7.75    3.64   
prob > F 0.0000    0.0000   
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.1280  0.0827  0.0834  0.0136 
adjusted R-squared 0.1097    0.0642   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Depicted coefficients in bold indicate significant differences of quantile coefficients at the conventional significance levels. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors have been applied in case of the OLS model. Standard errors in the simultaneous 
quantile regression are bootstrapped (500 replications). These s.e. are also used in the test for coefficient equality across the three 
quantiles.  
 
On this disaggregated level, amenity levels at the origin become less reliable predictors, although the 
concept of building prices as overall proxy for amenities remains a significant factor in the 
employment scenario. This, in turn, implies that individuals facing unemployment lower their 
valuations of current amenity levels. 
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Cross-border mobility premiums are not only larger in absolute terms, but feature a higher elasticity 
with respect to personality and preference parameters too (Table 6.3): whenever a coefficient is 
significant in the cross-border specification, it is typically at least twice the size of the corresponding 
coefficient from the internal specifications. 
Table 6.3: Cross-border mobility premiums (OLS and quantile regression) 
dependent variable Δ𝐴2 (cross-border, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈2 (cross-border, given unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50)  OLS  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50) 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -6.6906 * (3.7114)  -8.0174 ** (3.2287)  -1.1969 (3.4233)  -0.9467 (3.5209) 
age -0.9193  (0.8142)  -0.0054 (0.5998)  0.2120 (0.7946)  0.2948 (0.7595) 
partnership (yes=1) 6.5887 ** (3.3320)  3.5618 (2.7755)  7.9239 *** (3.0381)  9.2024 *** (3.1057) 
language skills (English)               
high -14.2812 ** (6.0308)  -7.5312 (4.8099)  -8.2240 (5.4485)  -4.9049 (4.5984) 
medium -7.8434  (5.8127)  -2.6918 (4.4189)  -5.4423 (5.1402)  -1.5507 (4.2560) 
risk attitude (career domain, 𝜙𝑅)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 8.0559 ** (4.0247)  2.4987 (3.6288)  4.5753 (3.6874)  2.4989 (3.6904) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 6.4476  (6.0069)  -1.4637 (4.1716)  0.1243 (4.6659)  -5.9945 (4.7704) 
patience (𝜙𝑃)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 8.1635  (5.0376)  6.1090 (4.5438)  7.4790 (4.7347)  -0.1297 (3.8332) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -3.4149  (4.6005)  2.9340 (3.8066)  -4.8476 (4.0071)  -4.2727 (4.3310) 
extraversion (𝜓𝐸)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 4.6261  (6.1318)  0.0552 (4.4084)  -6.7797 (5.1057)  -13.8425 ** (5.4124) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.7766  (4.4112)  -1.1286 (3.8128)  4.1911 (3.8364)  -0.2514 (3.7655) 
neuroticism (𝜓𝑁)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 2.5899  (6.3460)  -6.9390 (4.9512)  -1.3012 (4.8876)  -3.2947 (4.4597) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -4.2229  (4.2936)  -0.5503 (3.4719)  -0.2036 (4.1454)  -0.7242 (4.4543) 
openness (𝜓𝑂)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -4.6182  (4.3390)  -4.9739 (3.6924)  0.4002 (4.1392)  -2.9984 (4.2988) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.7239  (4.5052)  -1.1056 (4.2079)  0.9603 (4.0291)  -4.1780 (3.4982) 
conscientiousness (𝜓𝐶)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -2.1957  (5.6295)  -3.2834 (5.4462)  1.2447 (5.2145)  1.3620 (4.6801) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -3.0004  (4.3060)  2.8240 (3.7541)  -3.4233 (3.8873)  0.0633 (4.3371) 
agreeableness (𝜓𝐴)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.0486  (4.3776)  0.1601 (4.0343)  1.4011 (3.9828)  -2.0572 (3.6609) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4983  (4.4005)  5.2134 (4.0921)  -1.0977 (3.8906)  1.0174 (3.7160) 
adaptability (𝜙𝐴)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 8.8515 ** (4.4889)  6.6691 (4.5743)  10.3383 ** (4.1936)  5.9646 (4.2360) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -3.0120  (5.6145)  -5.1846 (4.1521)  -2.3565 (4.0201)  2.4811 (4.4360) 
importance of proximity  (family, 𝜙𝑆)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -5.5772  (4.6928)  -9.1449 ** (3.6249)  -3.6467 (3.8005)  -6.1431 * (3.4789) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 19.4975 *** (5.5309)  23.0422 *** (5.6191)  12.1282 ** (5.4026)  7.0679 (6.5728) 
importance of proximity  (friends, 𝜙𝑆)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -11.6357 ** (4.7672)  -7.4532 ** (3.7608)  -8.7098 ** (3.9763)  -3.4491 (4.2238) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 14.7322 ** (6.0359)  10.6885 * (6.2068)  14.8613 ** (5.9456)  14.6681 ** (6.7079) 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)               
residential move (yes=1) 1.0977  (3.9437)  -0.0260 (3.5325)  1.4013 (3.5242)  1.1609 (3.4606) 
exchange participation (yes=1) -7.7866 ** (3.4505)  -3.7527 (2.7751)  -3.7100 (3.1709)  -3.5601 (3.3276) 
stay abroad (yes=1) -16.9764 *** (3.8522)  -12.6476 *** (3.1778)  -17.1766 *** (3.2677)  -11.4687 *** (3.6994) 
educational mobility (km) -0.0535 *** (0.0169)  -0.0366 ** (0.0143)  -0.0454 *** (0.0140)  -0.0271 ** (0.0132) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)               
GDP (per capita) -1.4459 ** (0.5720)  -0.7290 (0.4876)  -1.2819 ** (0.5165)  -0.4098 (0.4622) 
building land prices 0.1760 ** (0.0833)  0.1457 ** (0.0678)  0.0795 (0.0784)  0.0441 (0.0679) 
accessibility (train)  -0.2835 ** (0.1406)  -0.2364 * (0.1219)  -0.3259 ** (0.1314)  -0.2013 (0.1227) 
accessibility (car)  0.1183  (0.2784)  0.2665 (0.2065)  0.0923 (0.2594)  0.2109 (0.2335) 
pop. density -0.0020  (0.0063)  -0.0016 (0.0049)  0.0001 (0.0058)  -0.0010 (0.0047) 
recreational area (per capita) 0.1261 * (0.0711)  0.0793 (0.0551)  0.1105 (0.0717)  0.0322 (0.0462) 
public services  -0.0331  (0.1287)  -0.0900 (0.1105)  0.0637 (0.1141)  -0.0147 (0.0957) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -2.9644 * (1.7863)  -0.6903 (1.3117)  -3.0359 * (1.7150)  -1.0407 (1.2903) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                
constant                
observations 1851  1851  1851  1851 
df (model) 38  38  38  38 
F-statistic 7.17    6.41   
prob > F 0.0000    0.0000   
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.1093  0.0761  0.1080  0.0572 
adjusted R-squared  0.0906    0.0893   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Depicted coefficients in bold indicate significant differences of quantile coefficients at the conventional significance levels. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors have been applied in case of the OLS model. Standard errors in the simultaneous 
quantile regression are bootstrapped (500 replications). These standard errors are also used in the test for coefficient equality 
across the three quantiles.  
 
Important factors are once again previous mobility experiences and adaptability, both fostering 
adjustment capabilities. Beyond that, English language proficiency is also significantly related to 
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cross-border mobility premiums in the alternative job scenario: highest levels of language proficiency 
(native-speakers and those speaking fluently in all situations), are paralleled by reduced mobility 
premiums by more than 14 percentage points. Contrasting these results with the OLS model 
comparison in Table A6.6 clarifies why English skills display no significance in the cross-border 
unemployment scenario: without previous mobility experiences, they are highly significant too. This 
suggests that language proficiency and previous mobility are interrelated and act jointly as 
facilitators to future cross-border mobility.113 These results hold also for the lower quartile (Table 
A6.7) and portend to English as lingua franca, which can serve as means to reduce barriers to cross-
border mobility by lowering perceived transaction costs.  
Social preferences prove to be robust predictors of mobility premiums, accordingly to the modelling 
approach of psychic costs. People who value their existing social ties highly strive to maintain them. 
Those who are in a relationship feature in contrast to the internal scenarios now a markedly positive 
premium. Whilst internal work migration over, by all likelihood, a shorter distance would in principle 
allow a weekend relationship, this would probably change when a cross-border move is considered. 
Perceived psychic costs in such a cross-border scenario were substantial. Hence, to tip the scale in 
favour of inducing geographically mobile behaviour requires a larger weight, corresponding to a 
higher mobility premium in both scenarios.  
Moving to another country might be considered as a relatively radical change, especially in the case 
of try-your-luck migration with a job alternative back home. This can be seen in the employment 
scenario, where the least risk prone individuals expect on average a cross-border mobility premium 
of 8.1 percentage points, and those in the upper quartile a 12 percentage point premium (Table 
A6.7). Local conditions display mostly the familiar patterns, yet there is one distinction: those living in 
less accessible regions exhibit now across scenarios on average a significantly negative premium.  
In contrast to the internal try-your-luck scenario, women display on average a markedly negative 
cross-border mobility premium in the try-your-luck scenario. This finding remains valid across all 
three quartiles. Controlling for social preferences, personality and individual traits, these outcomes 
still point to gender-specific decision-making processes in the context of labour mobility. The 
resulting price of mobility may thus vary distinctly between women and men - some aspects in the 
underlying decision-making process may be valued differently. This is further investigated in a 
subsequent sensitivity check. 
6.5.4 Sensitivity checks 
A first sensitivity check is applied to cope with the hypothetical nature of the underlying scenarios, 
where respondents have been asked to state the expected monthly net income that would make 
them willing to move to another location. Undoubtedly, an intention to migrate does not always 
coincide with a subsequent migratory decision as many intervening factors could become relevant. 
                                                          
113
 Separate regressions (not reported) show that this is mostly related to ‘stay abroad’ and ‘exchange participation’ 
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Lu (1999), for instance, presented some evidence that intentions and actual behaviour of households 
without children are more congruent than for households with children. Given the sample at hand, 
consisting of students in their early twenties before the typical age of family formation, any 
realisation of a plan should not be limited by parenting obligations. Therefore, mobility intentions 
should be valid precursors of mobility outcomes.  
In this regard, the theory of planned behaviour (summarised by Ajzen, 1991) provides some guidance 
under which circumstances a hypothetical statement can be a reliable precursor of actual behaviour: 
assuming a person has actual behavioural control over an outcome, stronger intentions together with 
more pronounced levels of perceived behavioural control would result in a higher likelihood that 
someone actually performs a certain behaviour.114 Conveying this concept to the migration scenarios 
at hand, actual volitional control implies merely that someone was physically able to migrate and had 
the (financial) resources to do so.  
Conner and Armitage (1998) suggested in their review of the theory of planned behaviour the 
inclusion of additional components, such as past behaviour or habit, to understand behavioural 
outcomes. Past mobility experiences, however, have already been included in the previously 
discussed specifications since they function as facilitators of future mobility by strengthening 
individuals’ adjustment capability. 
Based on this theoretical ground, two new components are introduced: the first is a measure of 
perceived behavioural control (𝜃𝑅), i.e., the perceived probability of succeeding at a given migratory 
path.115 This perceived success probability is proxied by individuals’ assessment regarding the 
riskiness of a specific move, e.g., to another state or another country. The second new component 
(𝜃𝑀) captures additional migration intentions, which are integrated as expected likelihood of moving 
to another state (or country in Europe) in the first five years after graduation.  
Following the theory of planned behaviour, accounting for perceived behavioural control and 
migration-related intentions should be a valid strategy to uncover factors that are not only significant 
predictors in a hypothetical scenario but also likely to affect the mobility premium in case of a real-
life move. Table 6.4 reports the results for the preferred specification for the four scenarios. 
The main findings remain robust with respect to the preferred full specifications from the scenario-
specific regressions (Table 6.2 and Table 6.3). Nevertheless, some differences emerge as well. 
Accounting for an extended parameter set, a notable increase of the adjusted R-squared value across 
all scenarios indicates that explanatory power increases substantially. The additional variables, 
representing behavioural control over the success of the migration outcome (riskiness of move, 𝜃𝑅) 
                                                          
114
 Within the theory of planned behaviour, intentions are shaped by individual attitudes towards a behaviour and 
subjective norms, based on relevant persons’ judgement whether a behaviour is desirable or not. Intentions can also be 
partially affected by perceived behavioural control. 
115
 In this context, the findings of Lu (1999) can be rationalised: children might limit the perceived behavioural control since 
a parent might integrate the a priori unknown migration-related hardship to her children.  
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and the basic migration intentions (likelihood of a move, 𝜃𝑀) manage to boost the estimations’ 
precision. 
Table 6.4: Sensitivity check (A) – the theory of planned behaviour 
dependent variable 
Δ𝐴1 (internal, given 
alternative job) 
 
Δ𝑈1 (internal, given 
unemployment) 
 
Δ𝐴2 (Europe, given 
alternative job) 
 
Δ𝑈2 (Europe, given 
unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) 0.3287 (1.3192)  3.7031 ** (1.4785)  -3.5915 (3.6478)  1.3906 (3.3904) 
age -0.0785 (0.2937)  0.7579 ** (0.3542)  -1.4356 * (0.8088)  -0.2010 (0.7928) 
partnership (yes=1) 1.1892 (1.1452)  1.5155 (1.3031)  4.1322 (3.2611)  6.0888 ** (3.0092) 
language skills (English)            
high 0.4485 (1.9188)  0.6705 (2.2713)  -9.6444 (6.0143)  -4.4365 (5.4476) 
medium -0.5597 (1.7682)  -0.6893 (2.0502)  -5.3815 (5.8175)  -3.1786 (5.1497) 
risk attitude (career domain, 𝜙𝑅)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.2254 (1.4214)  -1.4452 (1.5817)  5.4697 (3.9726)  2.3775 (3.6681) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.5500 (1.7467)  -0.4954 (2.0339)  7.8506 (5.9399)  0.9763 (4.5184) 
patience (𝜙𝑃)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.0206 * (1.6468)  2.4493 (1.8687)  6.2271 (4.8314)  5.8944 (4.5942) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.3386 (1.5548)  -2.1207 (1.8379)  -1.2457 (4.3488)  -3.5588 (3.8927) 
extraversion (𝜓𝐸)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.4483 (1.8455)  -3.2579 (2.1900)  4.2164 (6.0549)  -7.0070 (5.0767) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0232 (1.4710)  1.2074 (1.7818)  4.0492 (4.2876)  6.1074 (3.7380) 
neuroticism (𝜓𝑁)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.4020 (1.7533)  -0.8003 (1.9891)  2.5059 (6.0797)  -1.1782 (4.7147) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9539 (1.6653)  1.4162 (1.8559)  -6.4830 (4.1554)  -2.3119 (4.0188) 
openness (𝜓𝑂)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.6350 ** (1.4636)  -1.9006 (1.7068)  -6.3428 (4.3231)  -1.3168 (4.1051) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.0719 (1.4618)  0.6612 (1.6883)  0.6194 (4.3854)  1.8001 (3.9655) 
conscientiousness (𝜓𝐶)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1243 (1.7634)  1.0300 (2.2169)  -2.7054 (5.4537)  0.5621 (5.1433) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.5895 (1.5481)  -1.8254 (1.7989)  -3.7551 (4.1810)  -4.9366 (3.7416) 
agreeableness (𝜓𝐴)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.4704 (1.4878)  0.9381 (1.7497)  0.1299 (4.2642)  1.4642 (3.8778) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 2.3802 (1.6349)  2.4727 (1.6736)  2.0843 (4.2936)  -0.9279 (3.8300) 
adaptability (𝜙𝐴)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 2.4716 (1.5899)  3.2022 * (1.8185)  7.1185 (4.4212)  9.1852 ** (4.1474) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 2.0307 (1.7959)  0.9386 (1.8961)  -0.6299 (5.7053)  -1.4982 (4.0459) 
importance of proximity  (family, 𝜙𝑆)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.0271 (1.4950)  -0.4701 (1.7302)  -1.9117 (4.7013)  -1.1761 (3.7987) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 6.0926 *** (2.0843)  -0.5438 (2.3679)  15.4355 *** (5.3842)  8.2114 (5.2943) 
importance of proximity  (friends, 𝜙𝑆)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -4.0571 *** (1.5677)  -2.5203 (1.8164)  -9.2514 ** (4.6314)  -6.9912 * (3.9554) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 4.4351 ** (2.0764)  5.0743 ** (2.4345)  9.5718 (5.8711)  10.4055 * (5.7974) 
riskiness of move (𝜃𝑅)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.6693 *** (1.3859)  -1.0147 (1.5137)  -14.4132 *** (4.3262)  -7.3503 * (3.9429) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0155 (1.7403)  -1.6232 (1.9262)  5.0986 (6.2010)  8.4289 (6.3750) 
likelihood of move (𝜃𝑀)            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 13.5827 *** (1.7715)  9.5430 *** (1.9510)  32.2415 *** (5.7392)  27.4992 *** (5.2949) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.5582 * (1.3849)  -1.4206 (1.5782)  -19.3846 *** (3.3651)  -12.6224 *** (3.0043) 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)            
residential move (yes=1) 0.8984 (1.3139)  0.0093 (1.5480)  2.7119 (3.9068)  2.0721 (3.5225) 
exchange participation (yes=1) -1.7648 (1.2523)  -0.8655 (1.4149)  -6.0357 * (3.4124)  -2.1439 (3.1420) 
stay abroad (yes=1) -4.1823 *** (1.4606)  -4.0639 ** (1.6231)  -11.0323 *** (3.7134)  -12.9210 *** (3.1856) 
educational mobility (km) -0.0136 ** (0.0058)  -0.0195 *** (0.0059)  -0.0418 ** (0.0165)  -0.0372 *** (0.0138) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)            
GDP (per capita) -0.3400 * (0.1828)  -0.3561 * (0.1956)  -1.3585 ** (0.5513)  -1.2024 ** (0.4899) 
building land prices 0.0552 ** (0.0266)  0.0014 (0.0310)  0.1665 ** (0.0812)  0.0696 (0.0751) 
accessibility (train)  -0.0708 (0.0495)  -0.0692 (0.0575)  -0.2646 * (0.1386)  -0.2937 ** (0.1292) 
accessibility (car)  -0.0601 (0.0894)  0.0408 (0.1060)  0.0699 (0.2728)  0.0405 (0.2529) 
pop. density -0.0018 (0.0018)  -0.0012 (0.0021)  -0.0008 (0.0061)  0.0009 (0.0057) 
recreational area (per capita) 0.0274 (0.0218)  -0.0166 (0.0278)  0.1415 ** (0.0691)  0.1169 * (0.0695) 
public services  0.0049 (0.0395)  0.0866 * (0.0467)  -0.0171 (0.1244)  0.0883 (0.1094) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -0.6445 (0.5139)  -0.5321 (0.6318)  -3.1343 * (1.7299)  -3.0540 * (1.6715) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                
constant                
observations 1842  1842  1842  1842 
df (model) 42  42  42  42 
F-statistic 8.69  3.65  8.75  7.06 
prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.1741  0.1012  0.1556  0.1445 
adjusted R-squared 0.1548  0.0802  0.1359  0.1246 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Statistical inference relies on robust standard errors. Measures of behavioural control (𝜃𝑅) and migration intention (𝜃𝑀) are 
accordingly conditioned, either with reference to an interstate or a cross-border move to another country in Europe. A concise 
model comparison is given in Table A6.8. 
The sensitivity check yields directly interpretable significant coefficients as well: people who assess a 
certain move to be hardly risky at all expect on average a negative premium, yet not in the internal 
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unemployment scenario. Moreover, the underlying item, directly addressing subjectively perceived 
riskiness of a specific form of mobility, absorbs more variation than the baseline risk variable, 
referring to individuals’ willingness to take risks in the career domain.116 Secondly, the less (more) 
inclined someone is to move within the first five years after graduation to a certain destination the 
higher (lower) the respective mobility premium. 
Individual perceptions and intentions seem to matter when it comes to the formation of a subjective 
wage acceptance function. A direct implication is that labour market entrants, freshly graduated 
from university, who had no prior intention to move to another regional labour market, would ask 
for an especially high premium. This inflated premium is not related to social preferences, perceived 
riskiness of moving or high living standards at the current location – these factors are controlled for. 
Instead, it is attributable to an extremely pronounced place attachment amongst the future highly-
skilled labour force, and hence, is required to overcome a sort of internal resistance against any form 
of migration behaviour. 
Another result is worth mentioning, as coefficients of high levels of English proficiency are now 
smaller in size and insignificant. This is not contrary to the claim that English as lingua franca fosters 
successful socio-cultural or labour-market integration abroad, for the following reason: better English 
skills reduce the likelihood of post-migration hardships and transaction costs abroad, thus increase 
the likelihood of a successful migratory event. When controlling directly for expected riskiness of a 
move to another country, the related variation is no longer absorbed by the facilitator ‘language 
skills’, but by the corresponding control variable. 
A second sensitivity check (B) addresses aspects of labour market readiness. Low levels of labour 
market readiness were associated with a lack of information on how employers value labour and 
qualifications. This could potentially translate into unrealistic wage expectations, and thus ex ante 
mobility premiums. Two groups displaying low degrees of labour market readiness come to mind: 
those respondents who have not yet gained any labour market experience and those who recently 
entered university, hence, have no urgent need to think actively about job search and form salary 
expectations. The opposite can be expected of those already being enrolled in a masters’ 
programme, since they are likely to enter the labour market within the next two years. Additionally 
they already obtained a first university degree, which indicates a relatively advanced qualification 
level compared to their fellow students in a bachelor programme. To evaluate whether labour 
market experience might affect wage-related considerations, and thus the mobility premium, a 
vocational training variable is added. It is supplemented by a variable containing information on 
general labour market experience (full-time, part-time or mini-job and none). Those who already 
                                                          
116
 This item was implemented in the survey before participants were asked to state their wage expectations for various 
scenarios. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that response behaviour in case of this item was not affected by the 
process of thinking about salary expectations. If respondents’ subsequent answers, regarding expected wages for the 
alternative scenarios, were influenced by the previous assessment of a move’s riskiness this would correspond to the model 
specification and appropriately mirror the decision-making process in this context.   
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gathered full-time working experience, and thereby received a payroll, might have a more realistic 
knowledge about how the labour market values their skills.  
While neither the essential baseline results nor those from robustness check (A) change for the 
internal scenarios, labour market readiness is informative with respect to the process of forming 
wage expectations (Table A6.9 and Table A6.10). In the internal scenarios, those who already 
advanced to their masters’ studies expect across labour market scenarios a 8.5 to 10 percentage 
point lower mobility premium. Previous work experience, however, does not influence individuals’ 
expectations considering internal migration scenarios. This finding is reversed for the cross-border 
scenarios, where those with some work experience (part-time of mini-job) expect a significant 
positive premium in the try-your-luck scenario. 
Sensitivity check (C) tests the hypothesis that some factors may be of differing importance for men 
and women. Whereas Table 6.5 reveals a significant gender difference regarding unconditional 
mobility premiums in the internal migration scenario, assuming unemployment, results from the 
sensitivity checks point to a more robust nature of this differential, also when controlling for other 
individual traits. 
Table 6.5: Unconditional gender-specific mobility premiums 
premium female  male  t-test KS 
 mean std.dev.  mean std.dev.  p-value p-value 
Δ𝐴1 (internal, given alternative job) 27.52 26.56  25.86 25.07  0.1496 0.218 
Δ𝑈1 (internal, given unemployment) 9.35 29.35  4.89 27.20  0.0004 0.004 
Δ𝐴2 (cross-border, given alternative job) 78.89 69.33  82.71 78.48  0.2562 0.509 
Δ𝑈2 (cross-border, given unemployment) 52.95 63.68  50.88 67.39  0.4855 0.170 
Note: Sample comprises 854 female and 1183 male respondents and is conditional on the existence of all the four scenario specific 
premiums. The t-test tests for quality of group means. ‘KS’ refers to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions. 
 
Sensitivity check (C) is based on gender subsamples, yielding for each scenario separate estimation 
equations and results (Table A6.11 and Table A6.12) for women and men. This approach allows 
investigating gender-specific patterns, without interpreting all results in reference to the other 
group. In order to identify significant differences regarding the relevance of one factor across the 
sexes, coefficient equality (𝛽𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚) is tested using a Wald test.117 
Referring to the internal mobility scenarios, notable gender specific differences occur in three fields, 
namely those related to adjustment capability, social factors and local conditions. Adaptability to 
new circumstances is only relevant for women. On the other hand, only men expressing least 
pronounced preference for proximity to their family adjust their mobility premium downwards (-4.4 
percentage points). A lack of accessibility of other metropolitan areas, higher per capita wealth levels 
or unemployment rates is only lowering men’s expected mobility premiums. In the unemployment 
scenario, only least patient women expect a marked positive premium. The relevance of proximity to 
friends is exclusively relevant for men’s mobility premiums. 
                                                          
117
 Results are reported in the last column in Table A6.11 and Table A6.12 (in the appendix). 
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Differing behaviour across the sexes becomes more prominent for the cross-border scenarios. The 
positive partnership premium is only observable for women and amounts to almost 15 percentage 
points. Similarly, women’s mobility premiums are distinctly positive if they are most extraverted, 
least conscientious or adaptable to new circumstances. Moreover, Big-Five personality traits display 
typically only explanatory power in the female subsample. The most important factors shaping solely 
cross-border mobility premiums for men are the willingness to take risks and vocational training. 
Comparable to the internal migration scenarios, only men request to be compensated for potential 
changes in wealth levels, accessibility and employment perspectives. 
Across all four scenarios, the mitigating impact of educational mobility on ex ante premiums is more 
pronounced within the female subsample. In contrast, men who spent some time abroad are also 
more willing to adjust their premium downwards. Regarding social factors, most pronounced 
preferences for proximity to family inflates especially women’s mobility premiums. Yet, social factors 
are also non-negligible for men, since their preference for proximity to friends boosts all mobility 
premiums more than for their female peers. 
6.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Within recent years, related to a favourable development of the German labour market, recruitment 
attempts have become more challenging. On the one hand, the available local labour supply is more 
frequently inadequate to meet firms’ requirements. On the other hand, salary demands of potential 
employees are more often perceived to be too high (IAB, 2016). Overall, this points to a more 
prevalent occurrence of mismatches between asking and offered wages. This may prolong the 
recruitment process, making hiring more costly. Ultimately, firms may refrain from filling some 
vacancies or creating new employment opportunities.  
The pivotal point is the design of a compensation scheme, which is reasonable from an 
entrepreneurial perspective and sufficient to attract suitable employees from more distant labour 
markets. To achieve the latter, the compensation scheme might include a mobility premium. In this 
regard, the location of a hiring firm matters as well: some sought worker might be willing to move to 
a less favourable location only if a wage premium also compensated adequately for the associated 
drop in subjective well-being. Such possible interrelations between wages, location-specific 
amenities, and socio-demographic factors are intensively discussed in the literature on compensating 
differentials. Yet, personality or other individual traits, possibly acting as mobility facilitators, are 
typically not investigated.  
This work explicitly takes into account a variety of individual traits, social preferences and adjustment 
capability. Using a student sample, comprising prospectively high-skilled employees, I examine which 
factors are involved in the formation of salary expectations under alternative migration and labour 
market scenarios. Moreover, these analyses highlight which prospective high-skilled workers might 
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be especially costly to hire and which are most likely to refrain from applying for a distant job right 
away.  
As others have shown before (cf. Clark and Cosgrove, 1991), derived mobility premiums in my 
analysis are connected to amenity levels, accessibility to other metropolitan areas, and labour 
market conditions at an individual’s origin. However, psychic costs are even more important factors 
when it comes to the formation of an individual wage acceptance function, and hence, mobility 
premiums too. These psychic costs can explain why - even in an unemployment scenario - people 
expect on average a positive premium of 6.7 %. 
Social ties are amongst the most prominent components, which increase psychic costs of leaving the 
familiar milieu: if someone exhibits the highest valuation of proximity to social reference persons, 
the ex ante mobility premium for an internal move increases between 6 percentage points (facing 
unemployment) and 13 percentage points (being employed). For corresponding cross-border moves 
to another European country, these individuals expect an additional premium of 27 percentage 
points to 34 percentage points. Typically, proximity to family is more valued by women and proximity 
to friends is more precious to men. 
Within the process of forming salary expectations, personality and risk perception matter as well: 
least patient individuals expect a positive mobility premium; those perceiving a specific migratory 
path to be especially risky expect a further risk premium.  
Another relevant trait is adjustment capability, likely to affect the costs of integrating into a new 
environment. Those least adaptable to new circumstances expect an additional mobility premium of 
around 3 percentage points. Among the factors contributing to an improved adjustment capability, 
especially previous mobility experiences are associated with lower expected mobility premiums: 
higher degrees of educational mobility in a geographic sense are associated across all types of 
scenarios with a dampening effect on ex ante mobility premiums. Those with international 
experience, who are more familiar with living abroad and have devised adjustment strategies, expect 
cross-border mobility premiums which are diminished by 10 to 17 percentage points. Yet the 
mobility fostering effect can also be observed in case of interstate mobility premiums, which are 
reduced by around four percentage points. Considering job-to-job mobility, individuals who 
participated during their adolescence in an exchange programme feature relatively lower mobility 
premiums. Referring to cross-border mobility premiums, there is also evidence in favour of a mobility 
facilitating effect of English language proficiency. 
One of the main conclusions is that individually assessed (psychic) costs of mobility, though hard to 
measure, are highly relevant for understanding geographic mobility of high-skilled individuals: they 
have the potential to inflate expected mobility premiums, and thus, for a given wage offer 
distribution in an economy they may lower overall mobility. Some factors, scaling these costs up, 
cannot or should not be externally influenced, e.g., relevance of social ties. The impact of other 
factors, however, could be alleviated by fostering adjustment capability. This capability proves to be 
Chapter 6   132 
 
   
 
an especially promising leverage point and bears direct policy implications: promoting language 
proficiency is not only an investment into human capital, but into adjustment capabilities as well. 
One way to achieve this goal is to emphasise languages in the curriculum at schools or subsidising 
extra-curricular language courses, so they become more affordable for adolescents from less affluent 
families. In a similar manner, school exchange programmes should be further promoted, e.g., by 
facilitating the integration of individual short-term exchanges into the school year. Public funding, 
i.e., a sort of national ERASMUS for pupils, should additionally support exchange participation of 
children from lower-income families. Lastly, encouraging temporary sojourns abroad would allow 
future labour market entrants to familiarise with other labour markets or cultural peculiarities. This 
would not only increase socio-cultural capital in general, but the transferability of skills across 
borders as well. In addition, the increased adjustment capability could attenuate extremely high 
expected mobility premiums. Ultimately, not only intra-European and intra-national labour mobility 
could be fostered, but matching efficiency on regional labour markets as well. 
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1 Miscellaneous
1.1 Gender
male female
1.2 Age (in years)
years
1.3 Number of siblings
0 1 2 3 > 3
If you have one or more siblings: Are you the …
oldest one youngest one neither nor
1.4 Place of birth
if in Germany: please state PLZ (alternatively city and state)
if abroad please state the country
1.5 Highest educational attainment
A levels (Abitur) university degree
vocational baccalaureate other:
1.6 Where did you obtain your university entrance certificate (e.g. Abitur)?
if in Germany: please state PLZ (alternatively city and state)
if abroad please state the country
1.7 In which year did you obtain your university entrance certificate?
1.8 Which average grade did you attain in your university entrance certificate (e.g. Abitur)?
1.9 Mother's highest educational attainment
lower secondary education (Hauptschule)  secondary education (Realschulabschluss )
A levels (auch Fachabitur) university degree (inc. Univers i ty of appl ied sciences)
none other:
1.10 Father's highest educational attainment
lower secondary education (Hauptschule)  secondary education (Realschulabschluss )
A levels (auch Fachabitur) university degree (inc. Univers i ty of appl ied sciences)
none other:
1.11 Are you currently in a relationship?
no yes
If yes, for how long have you been in this relationship?
< 6 months 6-12 months 1-2 years 2-3 years > 3 years
1.12 Did you complete any vocational training?
no yes, the following:
1.13 Did you work in one (or several) of the following employment relationships before your current study programme?
(multiple responses allowed)
full-time part-time Minijob, temporary help no
(100%) (< 100%, mehr a ls  Mini job) (e.g. on 450 Euro-bas is )
Figure A2.1: MESARAS-survey questionnaire (translated version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobility and preferences of students 
Survey, winter term 2013/201 
4 
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2 Mobility
2.1 Did you still live at the place of birth when you enrolled in elementary school?
yes no
if other location in Germany: please state PLZ (alternatively city and state)
if other location abroad: please state the country
2.2 How often did you change your place of residence during school years?
not once once twice three times more than three times
If you changed your place of residence at least once during school years,
please state the new location of your last residence change.
if in Germany: PLZ or city and state
if abroad: country
If you changed your  place of residence at least twice during school years,
please state the new location of your penultimate residence change.
if in Germany: PLZ or city and state
if abroad: country
If you changed your  place of residence at least three times during school years,
please state the new location of your antepenultimate residence change.
if in Germany: PLZ or city and state
if abroad: country
2.3 How often did you change your palce of residence after completion of your school years?
not once once twice three times more than three times
If you changed your place of residence at least once after completion of your school years,
please state the new location of your last residence change.
if in Germany: PLZ or city and state
if abroad: country
If you changed your place of residence at least twice after completion of your school years,
please state the new location of your penultimate residence change.
if in Germany: PLZ or city and state
if abroad: country
If you changed your place of residence at least three times after completion of your school years,
please state the new location of your antepenultimate residence change.
if in Germany: PLZ or city and state
if abroad: country
2.4 Did you participate in a school exchange programme during your school years?
(usually a one or two week mutual exchange)
no yes, in the following country
2.5 Did you spent in the past a considerable time (more than one month) without your family abroad?
(multiple responses allowed)
yes, as part of a semester abroad during school or studies Country:
yes, within an internship abroad or as "Au-Pair" Country:
yes, work-related  (i f you have been previous ly employed) Country:
yes, within "Work and Travel" Country:
yes, for another reason: Country:
no
C
A
B
C
A
B
(only A) (only A and B) (A, B and C) (A, B and C)
(only A) (only A and B) (A, B and C) (A, B and C)
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3 Studies
3.1 Please state your current study programme.
3.2 Which type of study programme is it? 
Bachelor Master other:
3.3 In which semester are you currently?
study semester (semesters enroled in your current programme)
university semester (total number of semesters enroled at higher education institutions)
3.4 Do you intend to enrol in a consecutive study programme after completion of your current study programme?
no yes perhaps
3.5 Are you planning on studying one semester abroad during studies?
no yes perhaps
If yes or perhaps, what would be your preferred destination country?
3.6 Did you apply for an economics programme at other higher education institutions in the winter term 2013/2014?
no yes
If yes, please state these higher education institutions in your preferred order.
Institution 1:
Institution 2:
Institution 3:
In the winter term 2013/2014, did you obtain at other higher education institutions
admission to an economics programme?
no yes
If yes, please state these higher education institutions in your preferred order.
Institution 1:
Institution 2:
Institution 3:
3.7 Did you apply for any other programme at other higher education institutions in the winter term 2013/2014?
no yes
If yes, please state these higher education institutions in your preferred order.
Institution 1:
Institution 2:
Institution 3:
In the winter term 2013/2014, did you obtain at other higher education institutions
admission to any other programme?
no yes
If yes, please state these higher education institutions in your preferred order.
Institution 1:
Institution 2:
Institution 3:
 
2.6 In your opinion, which would be the most severe obstacle to a move to another country?
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3.8 Is your current study programme the preferred one?
no yes
3.9 Is your current university the preferred one?
no yes
3.10 Is the current university the closest university (higher education institution) in relation to your place of residence
immediately before enrolment?
no yes don't know
3.11 How important were the following aspects concerning your decision for studying at your current university?
reputation of university / department very unimportant very important
curriculum (programme features) very unimportant very important
ressources of university / department very unimportant very important
proximity to previous palce of residence very unimportant very important
friends study / live here as well very unimportant very important
living costs very unimportant very important
interest in city very unimportant very important
admission criteria very unimportant very important
availability of accomodation very unimportant very important
3.12 Did you already find an accommodation, you would like to stay in for some semesters?
no yes
3.13 Please state the postal code of your current place of residence.
PLZ: (if PLZ unknown, please state city and state)
3.14 In which housing situation are you currently living?
parental home private flat share
student dorm own (rented) flat other:
(a lone or with partner)
3.15 How long does it take you to reach your university (your campus) from your current residence?
< 10 minutes 10 - 20 minutes 20 - 30 minutes
30 - 45 minutes 45 - 60 minutes 60 - 90 minutes
90 - 120 minutes > 120 minutes
3.16 What are your monthly accommodation costs (inlcuding all known service charges)?
Euro
3.17 Which sum do you have at your disposal  - after deduction of your accommodation costs - for your livelihood per month?
Euro
3.18 How do you intend to finance the current semester?
(Please state the approximate share. The sum has to add up to 100%.)
parents
working
own saving
BAFöG
student loan
scholarship
other:
row sum
100%
4 !
10% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%40%30%20%
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4 Preferences and valuations
4.1 To what extent do the following statements apply?
Moving to another town (in the same state)
is a risky endeavour.
Moving to another state
is a risky endeavour.
Moving to another country within Europe
is a risky endeavour.
Moving to another country outside Europe
is a risky endeavour.
Below, you will have the choice between two alternative payoffs.
Please state for each row, whether you chose option A or option B.
4.2 Option A: You have a 50:50 CHANCE either to receive Option B: You receive ANYWAY
0 € or 10 € 0 €
0 € or 10 € 1 €
0 € or 10 € 2 €
0 € or 10 € 3 €
0 € or 10 € 4 €
0 € or 10 € 5 €
0 € or 10 € 6 €
0 € or 10 € 7 €
0 € or 10 € 8 €
0 € or 10 € 9 €
0 € or 10 € 10 €
4.3 Option A: You have a 50:50 CHANCE either Option B: You receive ANYWAY
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 0 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 1 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 2 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 3 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 4 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 5 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 6 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 7 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 8 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 9 €
to pay 4 € or to receive 10 € 10 €
4.4 Option A: You receive the following amount TODAY Option B: You receive the following amount IN ONE MONTH
10 € 10 €
10 € 11 €
10 € 12 €
10 € 13 €
10 € 14 €
10 € 15 €
10 € 16 €
10 € 17 €
10 € 18 €
10 € 19 €
10 € 20 €
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
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5 Expectations
5.1 What would be the minimum monthly net income* you expect to receive after you eventually will have graduated from university?
(*corresponds to the income after taxes and social insurance contributions have been deducted)
Euro
5.2 How would you rate your income after you finally graduated from university in relation to the income of your …
… mother? don't know
… father? don't know
5.3 Imagine, that after graduation, you will receive an interesting job offer in the vicinity of your current residence, 
realising the monthly net income you expect (see Question 5.1).
What would be the minimum monthly net income for an otherwise comparable job offer,
which made you willing to move for this alternative job to an unfamilar environment:
to another state Euro per month (net)
to another country Euro per month (net)
distinctly higherdis tinctly lower
dis tinctly higherdis tinctly lower
4.5 Option A: You receive the following amount IN ONE MONTH Option B: You receive the following amount IN TWO MONTHS
10 € 10 €
10 € 11 €
10 € 12 €
10 € 13 €
10 € 14 €
10 € 15 €
10 € 16 €
10 € 17 €
10 € 18 €
10 € 19 €
10 € 20 €
4.6 How certain do you feel that you would behave in a real situation accordingly to your statements in the last four questions?
4.7 Which amount would you request as a payoff in one month so you would be willing to forego today
a payoff of 1000 Euro?
Euro
4.8 How would you see yourself: Are you in general willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid risks?
4.9 How would you assess your willingness to take risks in the following domains?
driving
financial matters
leisure and sports
career aspects (your studies)
health aspects
trusting other persons
new experiences
4.10 Imagine you won a prize of 1000 Euro from a local bank. You have now the choice between either to take the money with you right away
or to invest it for one year at the bank. Which interest rate would you request, so you would be willing to leave the money at the bank?
per cent
highly willing 
to take risks
not at a ll willing to 
take ri sks
very certa invery uncertain
highly willing 
to take risks
not at a ll willing to 
take ri sks
highly willing 
to take ri sks
not at a ll willing to 
take risks
highly willing 
to take ri sks
not at a ll willing to 
take risks
highly willing 
to take ri sks
not at a ll willing to 
take risks
highly willing 
to take ri sks
not at a ll willing to 
take ri sks
highly willing 
to take ri sks
not at a ll willing to 
take ri sks
highly willing 
to take ri sks
not at a ll willing to 
take ri sks
Appendix, Chapter 2 152 
 
   
 
5.4 In your opinion, how likely is it that you will move within five years after you graduated from university?
within town
to another town in the same state
to another state
to another country in Europe
to another country outside Europe
5.5 Please state, how far you would be willing to move for the following aspects.
(within the state <  to another state <  to another European country <  to a country outside Europe)
not wi l l ing to 
move at a l l
within the 
s tate
to another 
s tate
to another 
European 
country
to a  country 
outs ide 
Europe
larger proximity to family or friends
better income opportunities (higher income)
better housing conditions
new living environment
better infrastructure
better employment chances when unemployed
climatic preferences
5.6 Imagine, that despite intensive job search after graduation, you will NOT receive an interesting job offer in the vicinity of your current 
residence, realising the monthly net income you expect (see Question 5.1).
What would be the minimum monthly net income for a job offer you were interested in,
which made you willing to move for this alternative job to an unfamilar environment:
to another state Euro per month (net)
to another country Euro per month (net)
highly likelyhighly unlikely
highly likelyhighly unlikely
highly likelyhighly unlikely
highly likelyhighly unlikely
highly likelyhighly unlikely
6 Self-assessment
6.1 Please think of your university entrance certificate. How would you rate your average grade in relation to your …
… school cohort?
… fellow students in your programme?
6.2 In relation to your fellow students, how do you expect to graduate from university?
6.3 To what extent do the following statements apply? I see myself as someone who …
… is reserved
… is generally trusting
… tends to be lazy
… is relaxed, handles stress well
… has few artictic interests
… is outgoing, sociable
… tends to find fault with outhers
… does a thorough job
… gets nervous easily
… has an active imgaination
6.4 Imagine you had the choice between either going to the cinema or meeting with fellow students in the university library 
to learn together. Please mark for consistency reasons, independently from the initial situation, both the outmost
left and the outmonst right check box.
I can easily chose between these alternatives.
strongly above 
average
strongly below 
average
strongly above 
average
strongly below 
average
strongly above 
average
strongly below 
average
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
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6.5 How often do you go out with your friends per week?
less than once once twice
three times more than three times
6.6 How often are you active on Facebook or other social networks?
several times a day once a day several times a week
once a week less frequent never
6.7 How do you see yourself regarding the following aspects?
I have a hard time adjusting to new circumstances.
I am willing to bear costs in the present, so I can
benefit from related benefits in the future.
I would like to live or work abroad later in my life. 
Spatial proximity to my family plays an
important role for me.
Spatial proximity to my friends plays an
important role for me.
I am a patient person.
6.8 How would you rate your language proficiencies?
business fluent : You are able to to discuss and understand complex topics and details in the respective language.
fluent in daily routine : You are able to get along and communicate without problems in daily life with your vocabulary.
basic : You have a basic language proficiency, however, speaking fluently or understanding details
remains a substantial challenge.
mother tongue business fluent fluent in daily routine basic
German
English
other language:
other language:
other language:
6.9 How do you assess yourself / the following statements?
If someone treats you unfarily, it is legit 
to reciprocate this unfairness.
Since you cannot expect fairness from a stranger,
I sometimes treat an unknown person in an 
unfair manner.
6.10 There are different demographic groups, some closer to the top and others closer to the bottom of our society.
Thinking of yourself, where would you locate yourself on such a scale …
… in comparison to the top … in comparison to your top
overall society? immediate social environment?
bottom bottom
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
applies completelyapplies not at a ll
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Please wait until the persons sitting beside you have finished as well. You then may pass through all questionnaires. 
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Figure A2.2: Catchment area of participating universities (primary target group) 
Bielefeld Dortmund Hannover 
   
Magdeburg Halle / Saale Muenster 
   
 Clausthal-Zellerfeld  
 
 
 
Note: The graphs illustrate the frequency a postal code area has been identified as a respondent’s origin. 
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Table A3.1: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
section variable label short description scale N min max mean std.dev. 
choice set’s 
scope 
𝑏𝑖,𝐶0  1 if several applications, 0 
otherwise 
binary 1717 0 1 0.78 - 
𝑛𝑖,𝐶0  number of applications, 
censored at 4  
ordinal 1717 1 4 - - 
𝑏𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿     1 if several applications at 
distinct locations, 0 otherwise 
binary 1717 0 1 0.78 - 
𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿   number of applications at 
distinct locations, censored at 
4 
ordinal 1717 0 4 - - 
choice set’s 
components 
𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑚𝑖𝑛  excess distance of closest 
application 
km, 
cardinal 
1714 0 439.1 42.76 70.92 
𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑣𝑔
  average excess distance of all 
applications 
km, 
cardinal 
1714 0 482.8 100.42 94.58 
𝑟𝑑,𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑣𝑔
  excess distance of remotest 
application 
km, 
cardinal 
1714 0 680.0 169.05 150.73 
observed 
mobility 
𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2  1 if chosen university is not 
closest compared to the most 
preferred alternative with 
admission, 0 else 
binary 1053 0 1 0.34 - 
𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
𝐿∗ = 2  1 if chosen university is not 
closest compared to the most 
preferred geographically 
distinct alternative with 
admission, 0 else 
binary 1053 0 1 0.37 - 
𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]  1 if chosen university is not 
closest compared to three 
most preferred alternatives 
with admission, 0 else 
binary 1053 0 1 0.53 - 
𝑟𝑢|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]  1 if chosen university was the 
closest alternative with 
admission, 2 if it was neither 
the closest nor the remotest 
alternative, 3 if it was the 
remotest alternative 
ordinal 1053 1 3 - - 
robustness 
checks: 
alternative 
distance 
concepts 
𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2 (road) 1 if chosen university is not 
closest (based on road 
distance) compared to the 
most preferred alternative 
with admission, 0 else 
binary 1053 0 1 0.34 - 
𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2 (travel time) 1 if chosen university is not 
closest (based on travel time in 
minutes) compared to the 
most preferred alternative 
with admission, 0 else 
binary 1053 0 1 0.35 - 
Note: Observed mobility measures are based on a simple distance measure, representing geographic distance between origin (place where 
the university entrance certificate was obtained) and a location of interest. The concept of ‘excess distance’ refers always to the difference 
between simple distance and the distance from origin to the closest potential alternative. Means are only depicted for non-ordinal 
variables; standard deviations only for cardinal variables. 
  
Appendix, Chapter 3 156 
 
 
 
Table A3.2: Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
category variable label short description original 
scale 
N min max mean 
std. 
dev. 
modified 
scale 
socio-
demographic 
gender 1: female, 0: male binary 1717 0 1 0.56 -  
age age in years cardinal 1717 17 45 19.71 1.80  
academic household 1: at least one parent is 
academic, 0: no parent is 
academic 
binary 1717 0 1 0.43 -  
uec grade average grade of uec 
entrance certificate (best 
grade: 1.0, worst grade: 4.0) 
cardinal 1717 1 3.8 2.31 0.58  
vocational training 1: vocational training 
completed, 0: otherwise 
binary 1717 0 1 0.15 -  
partnership 0: no relationship, 1: < 6 
months, 2: 6-12 months, 3: 
1-2 years, 4: 2-3 years, 5: > 3 
years 
ordinal 1717 0 5 - -  
previous 
mobility 
experiences 
residential move during 
school 
1: at least one residential 
move during school, 0: none 
binary 1717 0 1 0.22 -  
exchange participation 1 : exchange participation 
during school, 0 : otherwise 
binary 1717 0 1 0.34 -  
individual traits 
/ personality 
 
Big-Five: extraversion 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1717 1 5 3.42 0.97  
Big-Five: neuroticism 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1717 1 5 2.83 0.91  
Big-Five: openness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1717 1 5 3.20 1.03  
Big-Five: conscientiousness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1717 1 5 3.42 0.89  
Big-Five: agreeableness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1717 1 5 2.96 0.80  
risk attitude (career 
domain) 
willingness to take risks in 
the career domain, 11-point 
scale (1: low, 11: high) 
ordinal 1717 1 11 5.39 2.42  
patience willingness to bear costs in 
the present for future 
benefits, 7-point scale (1: 
low, 7: high) 
ordinal 1717 1 7 5.44 1.17  
importance of proximity 
(family) 
7-point scale (1: low, 7: high) ordinal 1717 1 7 4.81 1.63  
adaptability ability to adapt to new 
circumstances, 7-point scale 
(1: low, 7: high) 
ordinal 1717 1 7 4.93 1.53  
distance 
deterrence 
distance to closest 
alternative (2) 
distance to the closer 
alternative, either chosen 
university or most preferred 
(but not chosen) alternative 
km, 
cardinal 
1717 0 484.8 80.50 89.92  
 distance to closest 
alternative (4) 
distance to the closest 
alternative, among the 
chosen university or the 
three most preferred (but 
not chosen) alternatives 
km, 
cardinal 
1717 0 481.5 68.84 82.13  
local conditions 
at origin 
GDP growth INKAR 2012 data, reference 
year 2007 
% 1717 -14 31.4 10.23 6.10  
unemployment growth  INKAR 2012 data, reference 
year: 2007 
 
% 1717 -7.4 -0.10 -2.01 1.15  
population density (log) INKAR 2012 data log 1717 3.61 8.40 6.07 1.05  
recreational area (per 
capita, log) 
INKAR 2012 data log 1717 2.83 5.94 3.85 0.55  
Note: Reported descriptive statistics refer to the largest analytical sample, taken from the scope approach. ‘Original scale’ refers to the 
scale the information has been elicited from survey participants. Modified variables have been standardised and categorised into three 
distinct groups: those scoring low (score below the mean minus one standard deviation), the reference group of medium-type individuals 
(score within the range of one standard deviation around the mean) and those scoring high (score more than one standard deviation above 
the mean). INKAR data originates from the INKAR online database (http://www.inkar.de/), provided by the Federal Institute for Research 
on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR, 2014). 
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Table A3.3: Choice set’s scope – binary approach, applications to geographically distinct locations 
dependent variable 𝑏𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿   𝑏𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿   𝑏𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿  
estimation method logit  LPM  IV (2
nd stage)  LPM  IV (2nd stage) 
 
OR  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female) 1.2485  (0.1713)  0.0322  (0.0212)  0.0006 (0.0354)  0.0165  (0.0217)  -0.0334 (0.0417) 
age 0.8312 *** (0.0401)  -0.0319 *** (0.0088)  -0.0362 *** (0.0093)  -0.0264 *** (0.0086)  -0.0318 *** (0.0095) 
academic household 1.1833  (0.1527)  0.0267  (0.0201)  0.0303 (0.0291)  0.0226  (0.0204)  0.0248 (0.0326) 
uec grade 0.7795 ** (0.0955)  -0.0374 * (0.0199)  -0.0522 * (0.0301)  -0.0641 *** (0.0198)  -0.0971 *** (0.0360) 
vocational training 1.4682  (0.3553)  0.0669  (0.0414)  0.0672 (0.0476)  0.0666  (0.0409)  0.0675 (0.0520) 
partnership                     
< 6 months 1.3220  (0.3539)  0.0365  (0.0349)  -0.0010 (0.0478)  0.0343  (0.0358)  -0.0239 (0.0558) 
6-12 months 0.8259  (0.1833)  -0.0296  (0.0382)  -0.0762 (0.0555)  -0.0470  (0.0391)  -0.1193 * (0.0650) 
1-2 years 0.7252  (0.1520)  -0.0555  (0.0374)  -0.0630 (0.0535)  -0.0636 * (0.0382)  -0.0722 (0.0588) 
2-3 years 1.0698  (0.2389)  0.0093  (0.0341)  0.0108 (0.0430)  0.0076  (0.0357)  0.0111 (0.0497) 
> 3 years 1.1664  (0.2936)  0.0199  (0.0382)  0.0029 (0.0483)  0.0194  (0.0395)  -0.0064 (0.0553) 
risk attitude (career domain)                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0489  (0.2012)  0.0089  (0.0289)  0.0097 (0.0359)  0.0164  (0.0302)  0.0215 (0.0420) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.7631 * (0.1166)  -0.0443 * (0.0252)  -0.0353 (0.0372)  -0.0398  (0.0253)  -0.0275 (0.0421) 
patience                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.5664 *** (0.0873)  -0.0997 *** (0.0287)  -0.1026 *** (0.0314)  -0.0981 *** (0.0295)  -0.1003 *** (0.0350) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.3145  (0.2460)  0.0409  (0.0261)  0.0144 (0.0482)  0.0366  (0.0261)  -0.0098 (0.0552) 
extraversion                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8361  (0.1542)  -0.0325  (0.0325)  0.0410 (0.0879)  -0.0457  (0.0334)  0.0737 (0.1005) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9481  (0.1505)  -0.0080  (0.0250)  -0.0597 (0.0529)  -0.0101  (0.0255)  -0.0955 (0.0634) 
neuroticism                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8169  (0.1625)  -0.0339  (0.0324)  -0.1058 (0.0679)  -0.0298  (0.0325)  -0.1416 * (0.0781) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8804  (0.1562)  -0.0192  (0.0281)  0.0207 (0.0488)  -0.0110  (0.0285)  0.0560 (0.0573) 
openness                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9284  (0.1460)  -0.0131  (0.0253)  -0.0120 (0.0332)  -0.0066  (0.0260)  -0.0015 (0.0372) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9533  (0.1612)  -0.0077  (0.0269)  -0.0162 (0.0331)  -0.0333  (0.0272)  -0.0531 (0.0388) 
conscientiousness                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9492  (0.1483)  -0.0107  (0.0262)  0.0075 (0.0315)  -0.0093  (0.0269)  0.0182 (0.0358) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8927  (0.1537)  -0.0184  (0.0259)  -0.0454 (0.0356)  -0.0219  (0.0265)  -0.0658 (0.0412) 
agreeableness                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0113  (0.1580)  -0.0005  (0.0252)  0.0286 (0.0353)  -0.0111  (0.0261)  0.0296 (0.0405) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0701  (0.1840)  0.0091  (0.0263)  -0.0190 (0.0350)  0.0088  (0.0271)  -0.0354 (0.0410) 
𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: imp. of prox. (family) 1.0321  (0.0418)  0.0049  (0.0063)  0.0848 (0.0725)  0.0028  (0.0063)  0.1188 (0.0844) 
𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: adaptability 1.1642 *** (0.0524)  0.0242 *** (0.0074)  0.1360 (0.0960)  0.0213 *** (0.0076)  0.1998 * (0.1138) 
origin controls                    
constant                    
observations 1717  1717  1717  1717  1717 
log likelihood -834.45         
df 30  30  30  26  26 
LR 𝜒2(df)  / F(df) 124.95  4.78  118.97  3.07  54.76 
prob > 𝜒2/ prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0008 
pseudo 𝑅2  / adjusted 𝑅2 0.0793  0.0689    0.0304   
exogeneity test          
Wooldridge (1995) score test     2.18 (p=0.3383)    4.30 (p=0.1166) 
regression based test     1.06 (p=0.3453)    2.12 (p=0.1203) 
1st stage: 𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
          
F(model)     6.51 (p=0.0000)    7.14 (p=0.0000) 
𝑧1: res. move during school     -0.3671 *** (0.0976)    -0.3568 *** (0.0972) 
𝑧2: exchange participation     -0.1225  (0.0820)    -0.1278  (0.0814) 
F(instruments)     8.38 (p=0.0002)    8.18 (p=0.0004) 
1st stage: 𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
          
F(model)     13.54 (p=0.0000)    15.08 (p=0.0000) 
𝑧1: res. move during school     0.0068  (0.0857)    0.0143  (0.0857) 
𝑧2: exchange participation     0.2505 *** (0.0744)    0.2421 *** (0.0742) 
F(instruments)     5.71 (p=0.0034)    5.36 (p=0.0048) 
weak instrument test          
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  (𝛼 = 0.10)      7.03    7.03 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  (𝛼 = 0.15)     4.58    4.58 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  (𝛼 = 0.20)     3.95    3.95 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The two potentially endogenous variables (importance of proximity to family and adaptability to new circumstance) enter 
the specifications as quasi continuous variables (on a scale from 1 to 7). This modification is implemented with regard to the first 
stage estimations. 𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡report the critical values of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak instrument test, assuming i.i.d. error structure.
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Table A3.4: Choice set’s scope – ordinal approach, applications to geographically distinct locations 
dependent variable 𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿   𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿   𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿𝑃   𝑛𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿𝑃  
estimation method ologit 
 
ologit 
 
cpoisson 
 
cpoisson 
 
OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  IRR  s.e.  IRR  s.e. 
gender (female) 1.1586  (0.1182)   1.0686  (0.1078)  1.0694   (0.0496)   1.0360   (0.0480) 
age 0.8740 *** (0.0325)   0.9034 *** (0.0318)  0.9389 *** (0.0168)   0.9530 *** (0.0163) 
academic household 1.1614  (0.1118)   1.1277  (0.1064)  1.0630   (0.0459)   1.0588   (0.0458) 
uec grade 0.9847  (0.0918)   0.8560 * (0.0774)  0.9915   (0.0417)   0.9261 * (0.0377) 
vocational training 1.2579  (0.2292)   1.2483  (0.2189)  1.1080   (0.0948)   1.1058   (0.0934) 
partnership                            
< 6 months 0.8762  (0.1395)   0.8645  (0.1367)  0.9531   (0.0715)   0.9392   (0.0714) 
6-12 months 0.8065  (0.1416)   0.7228 * (0.1273)  0.8990   (0.0748)   0.8525 * (0.0715) 
1-2 years 0.8008  (0.1374)   0.7502 * (0.1290)  0.8893   (0.0720)   0.8670 * (0.0704) 
2-3 years 0.8543  (0.1336)   0.8695  (0.1363)  0.9448   (0.0693)   0.9402   (0.0708) 
> 3 years 0.7562 * (0.1267)   0.7613 * (0.1245)  0.8779   (0.0720)   0.8779   (0.0725) 
risk attitude (career domain)                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9875  (0.1376)   1.0464  (0.1455)  1.0007   (0.0635)   1.0241   (0.0657) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8560  (0.1020)   0.8836  (0.1025)  0.9265   (0.0506)   0.9425   (0.0511) 
patience                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.6328 *** (0.0799)   0.6474 *** (0.0817)  0.8030 *** (0.0495)   0.8118 *** (0.0506) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.1525  (0.1447)   1.1319  (0.1396)  1.0733   (0.0603)   1.0648   (0.0596) 
extraversion                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.6156 *** (0.0871)   0.6147 *** (0.0856)  0.7989 *** (0.0558)   0.7880 *** (0.0554) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0527  (0.1243)   1.0311  (0.1207)  1.0265   (0.0552)   1.0147   (0.0547) 
neuroticism                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9269  (0.1393)   0.9470  (0.1395)  0.9569   (0.0670)   0.9707   (0.0678) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0834  (0.1483)   1.1113  (0.1502)  1.0413   (0.0631)   1.0560   (0.0637) 
openness                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9104  (0.1082)   0.9444  (0.1115)  0.9597   (0.0527)   0.9719   (0.0538) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0334  (0.1324)   0.8965  (0.1126)  1.0114   (0.0587)   0.9511   (0.0550) 
conscientiousness                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9549  (0.1157)   0.9582  (0.1159)  0.9721   (0.0537)   0.9740   (0.0544) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8978  (0.1107)   0.8818  (0.1075)  0.9437   (0.0539)   0.9376   (0.0536) 
agreeableness                            
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9721  (0.1162)   0.9283  (0.1100)  0.9870   (0.0545)   0.9651   (0.0535) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9321  (0.1180)   0.9414  (0.1194)  0.9727   (0.0563)   0.9706   (0.0566) 
local conditions at origin (district)                              
GDP growth 1.0132 * (0.0080)         1.0066 * (0.0037)         
unemployment growth  1.2131 *** (0.0600)         1.0977 *** (0.0267)         
population density (log) 0.8314 *** (0.0427)         0.9207 *** (0.0227)         
recreational area (per capita, log) 0.6009 *** (0.0738)         0.7897 *** (0.0458)         
constant                
cut points (𝜅1, 𝜅2, 𝜅3)                
observations 1717  1717  1717  1717 
log likelihood -2085.34  -2124.15  -2242.81  -2293.17 
df 28  24  28  24 
LR 𝜒2 (df) 133.20  61.83  125.36  60.34 
prob > 𝜒2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 
pseudo R-squared 0.0320  0.0139     
Brant test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2) 66.64 / 56 / 0.156  58.00 / 48 / 0.153     
Wolfe-Gould test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2) 73.27 / 56 / 0.061  55.09 / 48 / 0.224     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
    
 
 
Table A3.5: Model comparison – binary scope approach 
dependent variable 𝑏𝑖,𝐶0   𝑏𝑖,𝐶0
𝐿  
estimation method logit  logit 
 
OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
gender (female) 1.2546  (0.1744)  1.2638 * (0.1742)  1.1234  (0.1518)  1.1032  (0.1364)  1.0969  (0.1348)  1.2537 (0.1732)  1.2619 * (0.1728)  1.1086  (0.1364) 
age 0.8309 *** (0.0412)  0.8363 *** (0.0415)  0.8673 *** (0.0405)  0.8697 *** (0.0402)  0.8793 *** (0.0407)  0.8326 *** (0.0410)  0.8383 *** (0.0413)  0.8714 *** (0.0401) 
academic household 1.2383  (0.1614)  1.2504 * (0.1633)  1.2180  (0.1538)  1.2082  (0.1511)  1.2233  (0.1513)  1.1904 (0.1540)  1.2039  (0.1560)  1.1670  (0.1450) 
uec grade 0.7850 ** (0.0967)  0.8107 * (0.0996)  0.6982 *** (0.0837)  0.7091 *** (0.0822)  0.6868 *** (0.0784)  0.7802 ** (0.0956)  0.8068 * (0.0987)  0.7047 *** (0.0813) 
vocational training 1.4483  (0.3559)  1.4215  (0.3456)  1.4218  (0.3276)  1.4016  (0.3168)  1.3656  (0.3077)  1.4599 (0.3573)  1.4287  (0.3458)  1.4123  (0.3185) 
partnership                                             
< 6 months 1.3020  (0.3523)  1.3168  (0.3528)  1.2757  (0.3390)  1.3049  (0.3427)  1.3738  (0.3613)  1.3329 (0.3593)  1.3461  (0.3592)  1.3299  (0.3487) 
6-12 months 0.8147  (0.1805)  0.8389  (0.1849)  0.7600  (0.1644)  0.7574  (0.1648)  0.7688  (0.1633)  0.8279 (0.1829)  0.8525  (0.1876)  0.7714  (0.1674) 
1-2 years 0.7231  (0.1534)  0.7189  (0.1519)  0.6868 * (0.1405)  0.6972 * (0.1416)  0.7045 * (0.1409)  0.7123 (0.1505)  0.7063 * (0.1485)  0.6862 * (0.1385) 
2-3 years 1.0540  (0.2370)  1.0297  (0.2305)  1.0246  (0.2277)  1.0187  (0.2247)  0.9911  (0.2176)  1.0667 (0.2390)  1.0423  (0.2325)  1.0326  (0.2274) 
> 3 years 1.1600  (0.2926)  1.1522  (0.2830)  1.1051  (0.2644)  1.1218  (0.2672)  1.1384  (0.2711)  1.1694 (0.2937)  1.1609  (0.2841)  1.1321  (0.2695) 
risk attitude (career domain)                                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0470  (0.2023)  1.0243  (0.1958)  1.0851  (0.2110)  1.0403  (0.1984)        1.0534 (0.2033)  1.0316  (0.1970)  1.0484  (0.1998) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.7992  (0.1234)  0.7919  (0.1205)  0.8238  (0.1198)  0.8400  (0.1209)        0.7799 (0.1198)  0.7753 * (0.1173)  0.8235  (0.1179) 
patience                                             
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.5446 *** (0.0840)  0.5518 *** (0.0843)  0.5734 *** (0.0856)  0.5760 *** (0.0853)        0.5607 *** (0.0862)  0.5680 *** (0.0866)  0.5887 *** (0.0870) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.3354  (0.2545)  1.3669 * (0.2553)  1.3375  (0.2430)  1.2831  (0.2250)        1.3541 (0.2567)  1.3911 * (0.2586)  1.3149  (0.2302) 
extraversion                                       
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8090  (0.1495)  0.7227 * (0.1290)  0.6874 ** (0.1209)        0.8227 (0.1515)  0.7342 * (0.1307)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9754  (0.1555)  1.0154  (0.1599)  1.0006  (0.1552)        0.9718 (0.1539)  1.0135  (0.1586)    
neuroticism                                    
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8207  (0.1632)  0.8722  (0.1710)  0.8820  (0.1664)        0.8418 (0.1668)  0.8964  (0.1751)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8479  (0.1504)  0.8234  (0.1457)  0.8746  (0.1501)        0.8590 (0.1519)  0.8348  (0.1472)    
openness                                    
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9319  (0.1479)  0.9167  (0.1446)  0.9455  (0.1478)        0.9259 (0.1463)  0.9108  (0.1430)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9775  (0.1669)  0.9942  (0.1688)  0.8498  (0.1372)        0.9609 (0.1630)  0.9801  (0.1654)    
conscientiousness                                    
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0069  (0.1588)  0.9812  (0.1543)  0.9827  (0.1523)        0.9628 (0.1504)  0.9396  (0.1463)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9119  (0.1589)  0.9238  (0.1592)  0.8945  (0.1504)        0.9114 (0.1584)  0.9254  (0.1591)    
agreeableness                                    
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0108  (0.1584)  0.9835  (0.1543)  0.9151  (0.1406)        1.0251 (0.1601)  0.9990  (0.1562)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0808  (0.1866)  1.1040  (0.1900)  1.0903  (0.1858)        1.0738 (0.1843)  1.0969  (0.1876)    
importance of proximity (family)                                    
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8692  (0.1356)                    0.8969 (0.1395)          
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0320  (0.1874)                    1.0480 (0.1894)          
adaptability                                 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.6333 *** (0.0958)                    0.6337 *** (0.0955)          
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.1099  (0.2207)                    1.1196 (0.2217)          
local conditions at origin (district)                                      
GDP growth 1.0183 * (0.0102)  1.0192 * (0.0102)              1.0180 * (0.0101)  1.0189 * (0.0101)    
unemployment growth  1.1445 ** (0.0766)  1.1366 * (0.0755)              1.1356 * (0.0755)  1.1274 * (0.0745)    
population density (log) 0.7883 *** (0.0527)  0.7887 *** (0.0526)              0.7862 *** (0.0524)  0.7866 *** (0.0522)    
recreational area (per capita, log) 0.4605 *** (0.0778)  0.4685 *** (0.0788)              0.4607 *** (0.0777)  0.4680 *** (0.0785)    
constant                                
observations 1717  1717  1717  1717  1717  1717  1717  1717 
log likelihood -828.90  -833.96  -866.50  -870.83  -880.77  -835.30  -840.34  -876.22 
df 32  28  24  14  10  32  28  14 
LR 𝜒2 (df) 127.39  117.21  69.68  59.85  38.47  126.20  116.03  59.44 
prob > 𝜒2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.0802  0.0746  0.0385  0.0337  0.0227  0.0783  0.0728  0.0332 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors have been implemented.   
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Table A3.6: Model comparison – influential factors for the initial choice set’s components (various models) 
dependent variable 𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑣𝑔
  𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑚𝑖𝑛  𝑑𝑖,𝐶0
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑟𝑑,𝑖,𝐶0
𝑎𝑐𝑔
 
estimation method Γ, log-link  Γ, log-link  Γ, log-link  Γ, log-link 
 
coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female) 0.0188 (0.0489)  0.0090 (0.0491)  -0.0172  (0.0486)  0.0019  (0.0468)  -0.0044  (0.0470)  0.0201  (0.0844)  -0.0264  (0.0475)  -0.0520  (0.0565) 
age 0.0301 * (0.0177)  0.0366 ** (0.0178)  0.0416 ** (0.0179)  0.0427 ** (0.0181)  0.0508 *** (0.0180)  0.0956 *** (0.0303)  0.0173  (0.0173)  0.0380 * (0.0208) 
academic household 0.1832 *** (0.0458)  0.2080 *** (0.0465)  0.2023 *** (0.0462)  0.1961 *** (0.0459)  0.2036 *** (0.0459)  0.1617 ** (0.0819)  0.2170 *** (0.0440)  0.2154 *** (0.0530) 
uec grade -0.0637 (0.0419)  -0.0428 (0.0427)  -0.0516  (0.0421)  -0.0464  (0.0401)  -0.0617  (0.0399)  0.0334  (0.0751)  -0.0865 ** (0.0398)  -0.1047 ** (0.0488) 
vocational training -0.0770 (0.0878)  -0.1312 (0.0873)  -0.1398  (0.0869)  -0.1499 * (0.0878)  -0.1600 * (0.0870)  -0.3038 ** (0.1465)  -0.0494  (0.0848)  -0.2001 ** (0.1008) 
partnership < 6 months 0.0099 (0.0867)  -0.0067 (0.0872)  -0.0095  (0.0852)  -0.0100  (0.0845)  0.0031  (0.0828)  0.0885  (0.1364)  -0.0092  (0.0810)  -0.0279  (0.0962) 
6-12 months -0.1505 * (0.0889)  -0.1788 ** (0.0907)  -0.1925 ** (0.0915)  -0.2105 ** (0.0914)  -0.2216 ** (0.0899)  -0.2674 * (0.1559)  -0.1653 * (0.0906)  -0.1831 * (0.1092) 
1-2 years -0.1440 * (0.0822)  -0.2233 *** (0.0818)  -0.2207 *** (0.0808)  -0.2194 *** (0.0809)  -0.2148 *** (0.0820)  -0.0439  (0.1350)  -0.2391 *** (0.0774)  -0.2496 *** (0.0942) 
2-3 years -0.1520 * (0.0822)  -0.2029 ** (0.0833)  -0.1806 ** (0.0866)  -0.1647 * (0.0889)  -0.1900 ** (0.0865)  -0.1808  (0.1521)  -0.1717 ** (0.0799)  -0.2631 *** (0.0977) 
> 3 years -0.3600 *** (0.0962)  -0.3940 *** (0.0996)  -0.3649 *** (0.1000)  -0.3633 *** (0.1010)  -0.3512 *** (0.1030)  -0.3488 ** (0.1643)  -0.3478 *** (0.0994)  -0.3829 *** (0.1172) 
 
                             
risk attitude  
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1433 * (0.0738)  -0.1581 ** (0.0756)  -0.1471 * (0.0751)  -0.1769 ** (0.0745)      -0.2810 ** (0.1294)  -0.0833  (0.0709)  -0.1318  (0.0876) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0095 (0.0543)  0.0408 (0.0539)  0.0465  (0.0540)  0.0554  (0.0542)      0.1099  (0.0971)  0.0586  (0.0510)  0.0494  (0.0627) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1913 *** (0.0643)  -0.1861 *** (0.0664)  -0.1774 *** (0.0666)  -0.1700 ** (0.0674)      0.0303  (0.1093)  -0.2394 *** (0.0632)  -0.1812 ** (0.0773) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.1177 * (0.0624)  0.1711 *** (0.0630)  0.1451 ** (0.0621)  0.1414 ** (0.0612)      0.1485  (0.1069)  0.1384 ** (0.0582)  0.1784 ** (0.0696) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1543 ** (0.0777)  -0.2344 *** (0.0761)  -0.2455 *** (0.0764)          -0.2658 ** (0.1319)  -0.2355 *** (0.0734)  -0.2470 *** (0.0901) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.0437 (0.0578)  0.0232 (0.0595)  0.0130  (0.0593)          0.0624  (0.1006)  0.0006  (0.0550)  0.0040  (0.0672) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0136 (0.0714)  0.0253 (0.0725)  0.0208  (0.0726)          0.0494  (0.1264)  -0.0020  (0.0674)  0.0039  (0.0833) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0757 (0.0637)  0.0573 (0.0656)  0.0665  (0.0664)          0.1111  (0.1126)  0.0464  (0.0634)  0.0826  (0.0773) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0910 (0.0573)  -0.1251 ** (0.0567)  -0.1129 ** (0.0564)          -0.2042 ** (0.0964)  -0.0979 * (0.0570)  -0.1490 ** (0.0654) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0894 (0.0600)  0.1164 * (0.0617)  0.0893  (0.0619)          0.0720  (0.1036)  0.0986 * (0.0590)  0.0692  (0.0722) 
conscientiousness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.0003 (0.0564)  0.0077 (0.0578)  0.0092  (0.0580)          -0.0471  (0.0997)  0.0225  (0.0565)  -0.0027  (0.0674) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.0892 (0.0630)  -0.0987 (0.0625)  -0.1005  (0.0621)          -0.2240 ** (0.1088)  -0.0831  (0.0593)  -0.1249 * (0.0709) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0617 (0.0588)  -0.0558 (0.0595)  -0.0663  (0.0592)          -0.1201  (0.1026)  -0.0454  (0.0572)  -0.0409  (0.0696) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.0523 (0.0603)  -0.0708 (0.0611)  -0.0595  (0.0619)          -0.1884 * (0.1065)  -0.0112  (0.0596)  -0.0824  (0.0705) 
importance of 
proximity (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.2080 *** (0.0545)                            
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.1839 *** (0.0656)                            
adaptability  score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1162 * (0.0614)                            
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.2500 *** (0.0660)                            
local conditions at origin (district)                                
GDP growth 0.0081 ** (0.0032)  0.0079 ** (0.0032)                         
unemployment growth  0.0287 (0.0230)  0.0227 (0.0233)                         
population density (log) -0.0730 *** (0.0253)  -0.0754 *** (0.0255)                         
recreational area (per capita, log) -0.2327 *** (0.0658)  -0.2477 *** (0.0663)                         
constant                                
observations 1714  1714  1714  1714  1714  1714  1714  1714 
log likelihood -9530.70  -9554.65  -9568.16  -9578.51  -9589.02  -8078.01  -10459.99  -7233.39 
deviance 1208.03  1242.92  1240.93  1253.61  1268.05  1549.73  1236.63  2283.23 
rank (k) 33  29  25  15  11  25  25  25 
AIC 11.1595  11.1828  11.1939  11.1943  11.2019  9.4551  12. 2345  8.4695 
BIC -11309.68  -11304.58  -11336.36  -11398.13  -11413.48  -11027.55  -11340.65  -10294.05 
link test: 𝑃 > |𝑧|  (𝐻0: coeff.?̂?
2 = 0 ) 0.013  0.000  0.318  0.918  0.603  0.550  0.279  0.203 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Table contains raw coefficients from GLM estimation (Gamma with log-link), applying robust standard errors. The dependent variable in the first five specifications is the ‘average excess distance’ measure in the 
application set. Columns 6 and 7 contain results for the dependent variables ‘minimum excess distance’ and ‘maximum excess distance’ measure. This measure for potential excess mobility is derived as difference between 
the geographic distance from previous location to a stated study place and the distance to the closest hypothetical alternative, given by the nearest university (of applied sciences) offering an economics programme. The 
dependent variable in column 8 is the average distance rank of the universities in the application set amongst all hypothetical alternatives, based on the full set of university (of applied sciences) offering an economics 
programme. Link test (Pregibon, 1979) is based on a second order approximation of the outcome variable, based on a model refit with the regressors ?̂? and ?̂?2. Under the Null (appropriate link-function), the coefficient 
estimate for  ?̂?2 should be insignificant. 
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Table A3.7: Observed mobility – accounting for most preferred alternatives (OLS and IV) 
dependent variable 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2  𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2  𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4] 
estimation method OLS  OLS  IV (2
nd stage)  OLS  IV (2nd stage) 
 
coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female) -0.0006  (0.0325)  -0.0033  (0.0328)  -0.0115 (0.0597)  0.0743 ** (0.0345)  0.0480 (0.0731) 
age -0.0130  (0.0116)  -0.0145  (0.0118)  -0.0316 (0.0205)  -0.0039  (0.0130)  -0.0318 (0.0261) 
academic household -0.0088  (0.0300)  -0.0092  (0.0301)  -0.0236 (0.0417)  0.0480  (0.0321)  0.0296 (0.0535) 
uec grade 0.1269 *** (0.0294)  0.1239 *** (0.0293)  0.0808 (0.0509)  0.0477  (0.0317)  -0.0110 (0.0584) 
vocational training -0.0764  (0.0542)  -0.0720  (0.0546)  -0.0000 (0.0940)  -0.0798  (0.0610)  0.0226 (0.1152) 
partnership                     
< 6 months -0.0140  (0.0558)  -0.0196  (0.0558)  -0.0632 (0.0862)  -0.0830  (0.0591)  -0.1628 (0.1056) 
6-12 months -0.0233  (0.0529)  -0.0276  (0.0533)  -0.0606 (0.0792)  -0.0936  (0.0582)  -0.1535 (0.1026) 
1-2 years -0.0733  (0.0508)  -0.0737  (0.0506)  -0.0467 (0.0893)  -0.0608  (0.0560)  -0.0334 (0.1093) 
2-3 years -0.0668  (0.0523)  -0.0654  (0.0525)  -0.0280 (0.0815)  -0.0807  (0.0585)  -0.0330 (0.1008) 
> 3 years 0.0710  (0.0614)  0.0706  (0.0614)  0.0750 (0.0716)  0.0745  (0.0606)  0.0762 (0.0843) 
risk attitude (career domain)                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0631  (0.0458)  -0.0605  (0.0458)  -0.0282 (0.0622)  -0.0778  (0.0498)  -0.0266 (0.0807) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0309  (0.0359)  0.0295  (0.0362)  -0.0102 (0.0685)  0.0445  (0.0381)  -0.0067 (0.0847) 
patience                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.0233  (0.0439)  0.0244  (0.0438)  0.0461 (0.0542)  -0.0601  (0.0456)  -0.0272 (0.0674) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0191  (0.0390)  0.0157  (0.0389)  -0.0360 (0.0650)  0.0402  (0.0430)  -0.0335 (0.0754) 
extraversion                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.1006 ** (0.0431)  -0.0892 ** (0.0435)  0.0719 (0.1466)  -0.0643  (0.0509)  0.1772 (0.1800) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0036  (0.0383)  -0.0069  (0.0390)  -0.1321 (0.1165)  0.0266  (0.0406)  -0.1759 (0.1420) 
neuroticism                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0306  (0.0468)  -0.0423  (0.0468)  -0.1660 (0.1215)  -0.0052  (0.0495)  -0.2114 (0.1487) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.0003  (0.0417)  0.0073  (0.0418)  0.1055 (0.0928)  -0.0372  (0.0449)  0.1181 (0.1188) 
openness                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0307  (0.0372)  -0.0318  (0.0372)  -0.0306 (0.0499)  0.0458  (0.0400)  0.0394 (0.0634) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0282  (0.0404)  0.0258  (0.0403)  -0.0098 (0.0561)  0.0434  (0.0422)  -0.0105 (0.0685) 
conscientiousness                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.0153  (0.0401)  0.0178  (0.0401)  0.0494 (0.0538)  0.0056  (0.0413)  0.0530 (0.0636) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0102  (0.0393)  0.0056  (0.0393)  -0.0447 (0.0618)  0.0073  (0.0427)  -0.0779 (0.0802) 
agreeableness                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0841 ** (0.0358)  -0.0805 ** (0.0359)  -0.0495 (0.0579)  -0.0056  (0.0407)  0.0484 (0.0742) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.0859 ** (0.0430)  0.0816 * (0.0426)  0.0340 (0.0606)  0.0789 * (0.0429)  0.0013 (0.0702) 
𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: imp. of prox. (family)    0.0096  (0.0098)  0.0556 (0.1400)  0.0028  (0.0102)  0.1121 (0.1732) 
𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
: adaptability    0.0179 * (0.0109)  0.2350 (0.1810)  0.0060  (0.0119)  0.3508 (0.2179) 
distance to closest alternative                   
constant                    
observations 1053  1053  1053  1053  1053 
df 25  27  27  27  27 
F / Wald 𝜒2 2.31  2.25  45.00  1.39  22.36 
prob > 𝜒2/ prob > F 0.0003  0.0003  0.0162  0.0907  0.7187 
adjusted R-squared 0.0262  0.0273    0.0088   
exogeneity test          
Wooldridge (1995) score test     2.00 (p=0.3673)    4.67 (p=0.0967) 
Regression based test     0.98 (p=0.3774)    2.29 (p=0.1017) 
1st stage: 𝑥1
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
          
F(model)     4.94 (p=0.0000)    4.64 (p=0.0240) 
𝑧1: res. move during school     -0.3283 ** (0.1293)    -0.3342 ** (0.1293) 
𝑧2: exchange participation     -0.0491  (0.1007)    -0.0788  (0.1011) 
F(instruments)     3.41 (p=0.0333)    3.74 (p=0.0240) 
1st stage: 𝑥2
𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔
          
F(model)     9.91 (p=0.0000)    9.92 (p=0.0000) 
𝑧1: res. move during school     0.0370  (0.1125)    0.0362  (0.1124) 
𝑧2: exchange participation     0.2089 ** (0.0893)    0.2195 ** (0.0886) 
F(instruments)     2.81 (p=0.0607)    3.14 (p=0.0434) 
weak instrument test          
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  (𝛼 = 0.10)      7.03    7.03 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  (𝛼 = 0.15)     4.58    4.58 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  (𝛼 = 0.20)     3.95    3.95 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2 is coded as one when the eventually selected location is not the closer alternative in 
comparison to the most preferred alternative. 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4] is coded as one when the finally chosen location is not the closest 
alternative compared to all stated available alternatives. The two potentially endogenous variables (importance of proximity to 
family and adaptability to new circumstance) enter the specifications as quasi continuous variables (on a scale from 1 to 7). This 
modification is implemented with regard to the first stage estimations. 𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡report the critical values of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) 
weak instrument test, assuming i.i.d. error structure. 
  
   
 
 
 
 
Table A3.8: Model comparison – observed mobility (logit and ordered logit) 
dependent variable 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2  𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
𝐿∗ = 2  𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4]  𝑟𝑢|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4] 
estimation method logit  logit  logit  ologit 
 
OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
gender (female) 0.9144  (0.1410)  1.1203  (0.1547)  0.8985   (0.1368)  1.0599   (0.1440)  1.2708 * (0.1840)  1.3782 ** (0.1804)  1.2445   (0.1687)  1.3087 ** (0.1610) 
age 0.9173  (0.0556)  0.9451  (0.0550)  0.9135   (0.0533)  0.9409   (0.0528)  0.9784   (0.0541)  0.9926   (0.0525)  0.9650   (0.0502)  0.9886   (0.0494) 
academic household 0.9099  (0.1278)  0.9338  (0.1271)  0.9307   (0.1286)  0.9514   (0.1273)  1.1900   (0.1588)  1.2071   (0.1555)  1.0382   (0.1308)  1.0730   (0.1289) 
uec grade 1.8684 *** (0.2774)  1.8190 *** (0.2385)  1.7210 *** (0.2488)  1.6822 *** (0.2157)  1.1942   (0.1619)  1.2248 * (0.1505)  1.3721 ** (0.1748)  1.4016 *** (0.1651) 
vocational training 0.7881  (0.2163)  0.6681  (0.1767)  0.8259   (0.2204)  0.7041   (0.1820)  0.7664   (0.1947)  0.6987   (0.1739)  0.6809 * (0.1557)  0.6049 ** (0.1362) 
partnership < 6 months 0.8988  (0.2337)  0.9719  (0.2460)  0.8589   (0.2211)  0.9245   (0.2313)  0.6984   (0.1756)  0.7493   (0.1759)  0.7626   (0.1864)  0.7868   (0.1796) 
6-12 months 0.8153  (0.2122)  0.8531  (0.2166)  0.7711   (0.1973)  0.8179   (0.2051)  0.6307 * (0.1527)  0.6876   (0.1629)  0.6263 ** (0.1420)  0.6895 * (0.1530) 
1-2 years 0.6801  (0.1740)  0.7081  (0.1752)  0.8567   (0.2093)  0.8817   (0.2082)  0.7450   (0.1688)  0.7940   (0.1778)  0.8516   (0.1923)  0.8904   (0.2018) 
2-3 years 0.7361  (0.1953)  0.7306  (0.1869)  0.6684   (0.1755)  0.6714   (0.1703)  0.7124   (0.1727)  0.7267   (0.1702)  0.7069   (0.1593)  0.7137   (0.1553) 
> 3 years 1.3892  (0.3904)  1.3462  (0.3571)  1.4958   (0.4056)  1.4458   (0.3771)  1.3726   (0.3504)  1.3396   (0.3444)  1.3960   (0.3239)  1.3364   (0.3047) 
                              
risk attitude  
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.7371  (0.1719)  0.7123  (0.1615)  0.6840 * (0.1557)  0.6653 * (0.1475)  0.7020 * (0.1449)  0.7232   (0.1464)  0.6957 * (0.1330)  0.6881 * (0.1315) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.1391  (0.1859)  1.1614  (0.1855)  1.1060   (0.1779)  1.1457   (0.1801)  1.1792   (0.1876)  1.2275   (0.1895)  1.0647   (0.1507)  1.1379   (0.1558) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0818  (0.2169)  1.0963  (0.2092)  0.9856   (0.1940)  1.0071   (0.1901)  0.7622   (0.1448)  0.7858   (0.1429)  0.7849   (0.1479)  0.8174   (0.1487) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9517  (0.1778)  1.0613  (0.1911)  0.9982   (0.1835)  1.0973   (0.1932)  1.1130   (0.2024)  1.2071   (0.2083)  1.0603   (0.1711)  1.1448   (0.1742) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.6140 ** (0.1439)     0.5890 ** (0.1367)      0.7424   (0.1559)      0.7463   (0.1458)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9006  (0.1593)     0.9561   (0.1656)      1.0682   (0.1787)      1.0777   (0.1671)     
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.7969  (0.1780)     0.8600   (0.1854)      0.9591   (0.1965)      0.9523   (0.1912)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0524  (0.2071)     0.9671   (0.1882)      0.8589   (0.1593)      0.7586 * (0.1197)     
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8410  (0.1573)     0.8803   (0.1583)      1.1779   (0.1979)      1.1085   (0.1722)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0568  (0.1933)     1.0485   (0.1909)      1.1020   (0.1928)      1.0336   (0.1663)     
conscientiousness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0811  (0.2004)     1.0336   (0.1871)      1.0335   (0.1779)      0.9989   (0.1654)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0546  (0.1990)     0.9973   (0.1840)      1.0251   (0.1806)      0.8886   (0.1355)     
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.6450 ** (0.1204)     0.6560 ** (0.1190)      0.9610   (0.1596)      0.9658   (0.1495)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4637 ** (0.2665)     1.4282 ** (0.2568)      1.4111 * (0.2528)      1.4061 ** (0.2322)     
importance of 
proximity (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8744  (0.1532)     0.9235   (0.1587)      0.9700   (0.1571)      0.9838   (0.1505)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4003 * (0.2809)     1.4540 * (0.2893)      1.4444 * (0.2837)      1.4124 ** (0.2399)     
adaptability  score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9073  (0.1723)     0.8962   (0.1663)      1.0052   (0.1724)      0.9315   (0.1456)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.7249 *** (0.3499)     1.6290 ** (0.3244)      1.3779   (0.2808)      1.4545 ** (0.2754)     
local conditions at origin (district)                                            
GDP growth 0.9753 ** (0.0117)     0.9745 ** (0.0116)      0.9796 * (0.0104)      0.9746 ** (0.0100)     
unemployment growth  0.8318 ** (0.0673)     0.8393 ** (0.0672)      0.8171 *** (0.0637)      0.8209 *** (0.0585)     
population density (log) 1.1328  (0.0934)     1.1019   (0.0890)      1.0103   (0.0773)      1.0136   (0.0730)     
recreational area (per capita, log) 0.8364  (0.1636)     0.8054   (0.1558)      0.8496   (0.1635)      0.7791   (0.1439)     
distance to closest alternative                                
constant                                
cut points (𝜅1, 𝜅2)                                
observations 1053  1053  1053  1053  1053  1053  1053  1053 
log likelihood -636.06  -659.04  -653.58  -675.86  -701.83  -715.45  -1066.19  -1084.59 
df 33  15  33  15  33  15  33  15 
LR 𝜒2 (df) 72.84  30.41  69.18  26.93  49.15  24.48  66.07  28.21 
prob > 𝜒2 0.0001  0.0105  0.0002  0.0294  0.0349  0.0573  0.0005  0.0203 
pseudo R-squared 0.0586  0.0246  0.0539  0.0217  0.0365  0.0178  0.0306  0.0138 
Brant test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2)             50.96 / 33 / 0.024  32.72 / 15 / 0.005 
Wolfe-Gould test (𝜒2 / df / P>𝜒2)             45.66 / 33 / 0.070  28.23 / 15 / 0.020 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors implemented. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 𝑅2 = 1 −
𝐿(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑓)
𝐿(𝑑𝑓=1)
. 
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Table A3.9: Partial proportional odds model – ranked observed mobility 
dependent variable 𝑟𝑢|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ ∈ [2,4] 
estimation method partial proportional odds model (generalised ordered logit model) 
 
intermediate and 
maximum vs minimum 
distance 
 maximum  vs. minimum 
and intermediate  
distance 
 intermediate and 
maximum vs minimum 
distance 
 maximum  vs. minimum 
and intermediate 
distance 
 intermediate and 
maximum vs minimum 
distance 
 maximum  vs. minimum 
and intermediate 
distance 
 
OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
gender (female) 1.2408 (0.1676)  1.2408 (0.1676)  1.3424 ** (0.1759)  1.3424 ** (0.1759)  1.3148 ** (0.1622)  1.3148 ** (0.1622) 
age 0.9647 (0.0501)  0.9647 (0.0501)  0.9795  (0.0485)  0.9795  (0.0485)  0.9902  (0.0490)  0.9902  (0.0490) 
academic household 1.1709 (0.1573)  0.7641 (0.1264)  1.1994  (0.1574)  0.8099  (0.1310)  1.1995  (0.1544)  0.8310  (0.1329) 
uec grade 1.2124 (0.1635)  1.8100 *** (0.2831)  1.2394 * (0.1607)  1.8155 *** (0.2796)  1.2287 * (0.1508)  1.9076 *** (0.2855) 
vocational training 0.7984 (0.1937)  0.4608 ** (0.1390)  0.7285  (0.1734)  0.4041 *** (0.1197)  0.7077  (0.1678)  0.3782 *** (0.1126) 
partnership < 6 months 0.7627 (0.1873)  0.7627 (0.1873)  0.7742  (0.1817)  0.7742  (0.1817)  0.7887  (0.1805)  0.7887  (0.1805) 
6-12 months 0.6354 ** (0.1431)  0.6354 ** (0.1431)  0.6843 * (0.1533)  0.6843 * (0.1533)  0.6882 * (0.1535)  0.6882 * (0.1535) 
1-2 years 0.8718 (0.2017)  0.8718 (0.2017)  0.8897  (0.2088)  0.8897  (0.2088)  0.8940  (0.2035)  0.8940  (0.2035) 
2-3 years 0.7152 (0.1613)  0.7152 (0.1613)  0.7055  (0.1565)  0.7055  (0.1565)  0.7169  (0.1546)  0.7169  (0.1546) 
> 3 years 1.4208 (0.3422)  1.4208 (0.3422)  1.3960  (0.3275)  1.3960  (0.3275)  1.3526  (0.3169)  1.3526  (0.3169) 
                      
risk attitude  
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.7076 * (0.1376)  0.7076 * (0.1376)  0.7127 * (0.1382)  0.7127 * (0.1382)  0.6998 * (0.1328)  0.6998 * (0.1328) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0656 (0.1508)  1.0656 (0.1508)  1.0976  (0.1533)  1.0976  (0.1533)  1.1300  (0.1548)  1.1300  (0.1548) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.7934 (0.1452)  0.7934 (0.1452)  0.8170  (0.1487)  0.8170  (0.1487)  0.8233  (0.1482)  0.8233  (0.1482) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0698 (0.1760)  1.0698 (0.1760)  1.1515  (0.1845)  1.1515  (0.1845)  1.1333  (0.1733)  1.1333  (0.1733) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.7543 (0.1507)  0.7543 (0.1507)  0.7569  (0.1471)  0.7569  (0.1471)         
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0814 (0.1676)  1.0814 (0.1676)  1.1640  (0.1789)  1.1640  (0.1789)         
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9548 (0.1879)  0.9548 (0.1879)  1.0160  (0.1940)  1.0160  (0.1940)         
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8797 (0.1596)  0.4962 *** (0.1213)  0.8579  (0.1545)  0.4785 *** (0.1174)         
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.1225 (0.1748)  1.1225 (0.1748)  1.1338  (0.1726)  1.1338  (0.1726)         
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0358 (0.1701)  1.0358 (0.1701)  1.1466  (0.1840)  1.1466  (0.1840)         
conscientiousness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9911 (0.1575)  0.9911 (0.1575)  0.9701  (0.1526)  0.9701  (0.1526)         
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0052 (0.1736)  0.6547 * (0.1486)  1.0145  (0.1746)  0.6688 * (0.1507)         
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9591 (0.1481)  0.9591 (0.1481)  0.9790  (0.1494)  0.9790  (0.1494)         
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4413 ** (0.2416)  1.4413 ** (0.2416)  1.4366 ** (0.2424)  1.4366 ** (0.2424)         
importance of 
proximity (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9943 (0.1522)  0.9943 (0.1522)                 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4038 * (0.2445)  1.4038 * (0.2445)                 
adaptability  score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.9357 (0.1477)  0.9357 (0.1477)                 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4401 * (0.2724)  1.4401 * (0.2724)                 
local conditions at origin (district)                        
GDP growth 0.9739 ** (0.0103)  0.9739 ** (0.0103)                 
unemployment growth  0.8103 *** (0.0586)  0.8103 *** (0.0586)                 
population density (log) 1.0132 (0.0726)  1.0132 (0.0726)                 
recreational area (per capita, log) 0.8672 (0.1666)  0.6200 ** (0.1356)                 
distance to closest alternative      
constant      
observations 1053  1053  -1073.30 
log likelihood -1046.76  -1059.93  18 
df 39  30  49.50 
LR 𝜒2 (df) 101.03  72.97  0.0001 
prob > 𝜒2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0241 
pseudo R-squared 0.0482  0.0362  -1099.79 
proportional odds test (final model)      
(𝜒2 / df / prob >𝜒2) 11.97 / 27 / 0.9944  8.21 / 20 / 0.9904  6.78 / 12 / 0.8717 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors implemented. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 𝑅2 = 1 − 𝐿(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑓) 𝐿(𝑑𝑓 = 1)⁄ . Estimation based on gologit2 (Williams, 2006), with partial 
proportional odds introduced for variables not violating the proportional odds assumption at a significance level of 5 %. Reported odds ratios in bold differ across the outcome levels; 
these are the cases where the proportional odds assumption has initially been violated. The proportional odds test for the final model refers to a test of parallel lines of those variables 
(𝐻0: partial proportional odds assumption holds), which have not been identified as causing the assumption’s violation in the first place.  
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Table A3.10: Observed mobility – alternative distance concepts 
dependent variable 𝑢𝑖|𝑛𝑖,𝐶1
∗ = 2 
estimation method logit 
 road distance 
 travel time 
 
OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
gender (female) 0.9193 (0.1418)  1.0044 (0.1508)  1.1330  (0.1561)  0.9704  (0.1499)  1.0362  (0.1564)  1.1571  (0.1605) 
age 0.9144 (0.0550)  0.9283 (0.0553)  0.9416  (0.0547)  0.9227  (0.0550)  0.9368  (0.0551)  0.9460  (0.0540) 
academic household 0.9511 (0.1331)  0.9925 (0.1378)  0.9632  (0.1307)  0.9377  (0.1305)  0.9561  (0.1324)  0.9404  (0.1280) 
uec grade 1.9287 *** (0.2852)  1.8946 *** (0.2703)  1.8614 *** (0.2434)  1.9604 *** (0.2900)  1.9421 *** (0.2785)  1.9397 *** (0.2564) 
vocational training 0.7945 (0.2165)  0.7167 (0.1906)  0.6832  (0.1800)  0.9216  (0.2449)  0.8363  (0.2186)  0.7938  (0.2051) 
partnership < 6 months 0.8550 (0.2225)  0.8877 (0.2252)  0.9297  (0.2355)  0.8540  (0.2193)  0.8699  (0.2202)  0.9121  (0.2319) 
6-12 months 0.8145 (0.2088)  0.8812 (0.2222)  0.8574  (0.2155)  0.7656  (0.1968)  0.8000  (0.2021)  0.7671  (0.1929) 
1-2 years 0.6068 * (0.1561)  0.6286 * (0.1618)  0.6458 * (0.1614)  0.4844 *** (0.1270)  0.4986 *** (0.1316)  0.5138 ** (0.1336) 
2-3 years 0.7368 (0.1923)  0.7355 (0.1863)  0.7486  (0.1885)  0.6072 * (0.1614)  0.6178 * (0.1605)  0.6269 * (0.1617) 
> 3 years 1.1687 (0.3283)  1.1723 (0.3191)  1.1499  (0.3074)  0.9675  (0.2715)  0.9685  (0.2643)  0.9402  (0.2527) 
                       
risk attitude  
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8514 (0.1940)  0.8506 (0.1906)  0.8238  (0.1816)  0.7985  (0.1822)  0.8239  (0.1854)  0.7997  (0.1765) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.1137 (0.1822)  1.1262 (0.1812)  1.1372  (0.1817)  1.1547  (0.1892)  1.1776  (0.1899)  1.1786  (0.1889) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0091 (0.2056)  1.0450 (0.2099)  1.0211  (0.1970)  0.8823  (0.1811)  0.9221  (0.1880)  0.9137  (0.1791) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0714 (0.1985)  1.2119 (0.2203)  1.1761  (0.2098)  1.1010  (0.2041)  1.2168  (0.2217)  1.1920  (0.2128) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.5632 ** (0.1347)  0.5575 ** (0.1305)      0.5761 ** (0.1372)  0.5822 ** (0.1358)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9702 (0.1705)  1.0779 (0.1851)      0.8845  (0.1562)  0.9466  (0.1633)     
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.7353 (0.1656)  0.7906 (0.1760)      0.7807  (0.1749)  0.8373  (0.1852)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0387 (0.2047)  0.9921 (0.1928)      1.0257  (0.2024)  1.0057  (0.1949)     
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8437 (0.1567)  0.8684 (0.1552)      0.8976  (0.1639)  0.9313  (0.1655)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.1368 (0.2077)  1.2204 (0.2215)      1.1467  (0.2105)  1.2151  (0.2212)     
conscientiousness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.0487 (0.1940)  1.0336 (0.1864)      1.0717  (0.1998)  1.0546  (0.1925)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.0244 (0.1920)  1.0285 (0.1914)      0.9778  (0.1831)  1.0008  (0.1859)     
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.6931 ** (0.1281)  0.6994 * (0.1284)      0.8133  (0.1484)  0.8125  (0.1476)     
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4190 * (0.2585)  1.4184 * (0.2585)      1.5940 ** (0.2927)  1.5919 ** (0.2908)     
importance of 
proximity (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8977 (0.1554)         0.9404  (0.1627)         
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4775 * (0.2969)         1.5567 ** (0.3127)         
adaptability  score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8844 (0.1675)         0.9785  (0.1843)         
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.5501 ** (0.3153)         1.4476 * (0.2944)         
local conditions at origin (district)                        
GDP growth 0.9762 ** (0.0116)         0.9764 ** (0.0115)         
unemployment growth  0.8489 ** (0.0681)         0.9183  (0.0751)         
population density (log) 1.1167 (0.0915)         1.0176  (0.0838)         
recreational area (per capita, log) 0.8579 (0.1679)         0.8565  (0.1685)         
distance to closest alternative      
constant      
observations 1053  1053  1053  1053  1053  1053 
log likelihood -639.58  -650.42  -661.32  -641.73  -648.94  -658.35 
df 33  25  15  33  25  15 
LR 𝜒2(df) 69.07  47.79  30.57  65.48  51.90  37.51 
prob > 𝜒2 0.0002  0.0039  0.0100  0.0006  0.0012  0.0011 
pseudo R2 0.0561  0.0401  0.0240  0.0547  0.0441  0.0303 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors implemented. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 𝑅2 = 1 −
𝐿(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑓)
𝐿(𝑑𝑓=1)
. 
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Table A4.1: Construction and distributional properties of simulated explanatory variables and error 
components 
simulated variable underlying 
distribution 
Stata syntax properties 
gender (1=female) Uniform 𝑈(0,1)  gen g_base=runiform(0,1) 
gen g=1 if g_base>=0.5 
replace g=0 if g_base<0.5 
𝐸[𝑔𝑖] = 0.5  
 
age Gamma Γ(2,1.5) gen a=round(17+rgamma(2,1.5)) 𝐸[𝑎𝑖] = 20, 
min [𝑎𝑖] = 17  
university entrance 
certificate grade 
Normal 𝑁(2.4,0.6) gen c_base=round(rnormal(2.4,0.6),0.1) 
gen c=c_base 
replace c=1.0 if c<1.0 
replace c=4.0 if c>4.0 
𝐸[𝑐𝑖] ≈ 2.4 , 
min[𝑐𝑖] = 1.0, 
max[𝑐𝑖] = 4.0  
risk Normal 𝑁(0,1) gen r_base=rnormal(0,1) 
gen r=r_base+g_base/2 if g==0 
replace r=r_base-g_base/2 if g==1 
𝐸[𝑟𝑖] ≈ −0.125 , 
𝜌[𝑟𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖] < 0  
number of alternative 
applications 
Neg. binomial 
𝑁𝐵(3,0.5) 
gen n_base=rnbinomial(3,0.5) 
gen n=round(n_base-r,1) 
replace n=1 if n<1 
𝐸[𝑛𝑖] ≈ 3  
𝜌[𝑛𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖] < 0  
clustered error 
component 
𝑣𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑈(−0.5,0.5)  gen e_cc=runiform(-0.5,0.5) 𝐸[𝑣𝑖] = 0  
type 1 extreme value 
error 
𝑢𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  
𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1)  
 
gen e_t1=-ln(-ln(runiform(0,1)) 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑙] = 𝛾
𝐸𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑟 =
0.5772  
normally distributed 
error  
𝑢𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  𝑁(0,1) gen e_n=rnormal(0,1) 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑙] = 0  
clustered error 𝑒𝑖𝑙 = 𝑢𝑖𝑙(1 + 𝑣𝑖)  gen e_t1cc=e_t1*(1+e_cc) 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑙] = 𝛾
𝐸𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑟, 
𝜌[𝑒𝑖𝑙 , 𝑣𝑖] > 0  
admission likelihood 
(implicit) 
Uniform 𝑈(0,1) gen adm_base=runiform(0,1) 
gen adm=adm_base+(4-c)/3 
replace adm=1 if adm>1 
𝐸[𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑙|𝑐 = 1] = 1, 
𝐸[𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑙|𝑐 = 4] = 0.5, 
𝜌[𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑙 , 𝑐𝑖] < 0  
Note: The algorithm has been implemented with Stata 14.1 and seed set to 1218193708. 
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Table A4.2: Overall descriptive statistics for model variables in the empirical analyses 
category variable label short description original 
scale 
N min max mean std.dev. 
modified 
scale 
𝑥𝑖𝑙  distance average distance from all postal code 
areas in an origin district to a 
potential destination 
km (𝐷 ×
𝑛) 
0 859.07 288.94 141.73  
𝑥𝑙  total population INKAR 2012 data cardinal, 
in 1000 
164 34.06 3375.22 276.36 332.19  
population density INKAR 2012 data cardinal 164 48.1 4468.3 831.27 833.01  
GDP (per capita) INKAR 2012 data cardinal, 
1000 € 
164 17.4 106.2 37.72 16.03  
price level / building 
prices 
proxied by local building plot prices cardinal, 
€ per m2 
164 9.6 1292.6 179.63 187.36  
share of recreational 
area 
INKAR 2012 data % 164 0.2 14.5 3.22 3.06  
reg. centre reachability travel time to next regional centre 
(based on the BBSR’s reachability 
model),  INKAR 2012 data 
cardinal, 
min 
164 0 76 18.37 19.12  
unemployment rate INKAR 2012 data % 164 2.3 14.9 7.20 3.14  
youth unemployment 
rate (<25 yrs.) 
INKAR 2012 data % 164 1.6 14.5 6.16 3.05  
high-skilled 
employment rate 
INKAR 2012 data % 164 5.6 28.9 12.28 5.00  
high-skilled 
employment rate  
(30-34 yrs.) 
in relation to all employed, INKAR 
2012 data 
‰  164 6.1 78.2 23.39 14.98  
𝑣𝑖            
socio-
demographic 
gender 1: female, 0: male binary 1712 0 1 0.44 /  
age age in years cardinal 1712 17 32 19.71 1.80  
uecgrade average grade (university entrance 
certificate; 1: best, 4: worst) 
cardinal 1712 1.0 3.8 2.31 0.58  
academic household 1 : at least one parent holds university 
degree, 0 : no parents with university 
degree 
binary 1712 0 1 0.43 /  
partnership 1: currently in a relationship, 0: no 
relationship 
binary 1712 0 1 0.40 /  
vocational training 1: vocational training completed, 0: 
otherwise 
binary 1712 0 1 0.15 /  
previous 
mobility 
experiences 
residential move during 
school 
1: at least one residential move 
during school, 0: none 
binary 1712 0 1 0.22 /  
exchange participation 1 : exchange participation during 
school, 0 : otherwise 
binary 1712 0 1 0.34 /  
stay abroad 1 : at least one month spent abroad 
without family, 0: otherwise 
binary 1712 0 1 0.21 /  
personality 
 
risk attitude (career 
domain) 
willingness to take risk in the career 
domain, 11-point scale (1: low, 11: 
high) 
ordinal 1712 1 11 5.39 2.42  
 patience willingness to bear costs in the 
present for future benefits, 7-point 
scale (1: low, 7: high) 
ordinal 1712 1 7 5.44 1.17  
 Big-Five: extraversion 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1712 1 5 3.42 0.97  
 Big-Five: openness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1712 1 5 3.20 1.03  
 Big-Five: neuroticism 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1712 1 5 2.83 0.91  
 Big-Five: 
conscientiousness 
5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1712 1 5 3.41 0.89  
 Big-Five: agreeableness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1712 1 5 2.96 0.80  
adaptability to new 
circumstance 
ability to adapt to new circumstances, 
7-point scale (1: low, 7: high) 
ordinal 1712 1 7 3.94 1.53  
social 
preference 
importance of proximity 
(family) 
7-point scale (1: low, 7: high) ordinal 1712 1 7 4.81 1.63  
importance of proximity 
(friends) 
7-point scale (1: low, 7: high) ordinal 1712 1 7 5.05 1.41  
Note: Overall descriptive statistics are conditional on being in the estimation sample for the full model M4 discussed in Chapter 4.5. Destination-
specific variables refer to the 𝐷 = 164 potential destinations; individual-specific variables refer to the 𝑛 = 1712 included subjects. Modified 
variables have been standardised and categorised into three distinct groups: those scoring low (score below the mean minus one standard 
deviation), the reference group of medium-type individuals (score within the range of one standard deviation around the mean) and those scoring 
high (score more than one standard deviation above the mean). INKAR data originates from the INKAR online database (http://www.inkar.de/), 
provided by the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR, 2014). 
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Figure A4.1: Kernel densities for simulated coefficients in the fully interacted specification (with type 1 extreme 
value specification) 
𝑢𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.   
𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1) 
 𝑥𝑖𝑙  
𝑣𝑖    average distance population density recreational area unemployment rate 
 
 
 
gender 
 
 
 
 
 
age 
 
 
 
 
 
uecgrade 
 
 
 
risk-averse 
 
 
 
risk-loving 
 
Note: Densities based on Epanechnikov kernels with optimal bandwidth. Coefficients 𝛽 and 𝛾 indicate the true parameters in the main 
DGP. Illustrations in the first row refer to simulated coefficients for non-interacted location-specific variables 𝑥𝑖𝑙, panels in rows two to six 
show densities for the respective interactions of individual-specific variable 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖𝑙. 
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Table A4.3: Simulation results for varying information sets with error misspecification 
𝑒𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.𝑁(0,1) 
  information set 
(estimated specification) 
   preferences in 𝐷 (I)  choice in 𝐷 (II)  choice in 𝐴 (III) 
observed location choices  𝑆 = 4  𝑆 = 1  𝑆 = 1 
destination space  𝐷 = 164  𝐷 = 164  𝐴 ∈ [2,4] 
model DGP  none partial full  none partial full  none partial full 
𝒙𝒊𝒍: average 
distance 
-0.0080  -0.02428 
(500) 
-0.01796 
(497) 
-0.01784 
(497) 
 
-0.02365 
(500) 
-0.02162 
(475) 
-0.02169 
(471) 
 
-0.00785 
(500) 
-0.00473 
(38) 
-0.00467 
(38) 
gender # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0   
-0.00051 
(44) 
-0.00003 
(27) 
  
-0.0003 
(18) 
0.00003 
(16) 
  
-0.00038 
(20) 
-0.0001 
(21) 
age # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.0002   
-0.00031 
(166) 
-0.00031 
(166) 
  
-0.00027 
(50) 
-0.00027 
(52) 
  
-0.00016 
(37) 
-0.00016 
(37) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0   
-0.00002 
(8) 
-0.00001 
(7) 
  
0.00139 
(122) 
0.00139 
(114) 
  
-0.00001 
(30) 
0.00000 
(29) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.0015    
-0.00234 
(318) 
   
-0.00164 
(63) 
   
-0.00165 
(41) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0.0010    
0.00132 
(93) 
   
0.00083 
(29) 
   
-0.00019 
(18) 
𝒙𝒍: population 
density 
0.0015  -0.00095 
(500) 
0.0029 
(500) 
0.0029 
(500) 
 
-0.00095 
(500) 
0.00266 
(432) 
0.00266 
(429) 
 
-0.00029 
(264) 
0.00108 
(53) 
0.00108 
(57) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0   
0.00000 
(22) 
-0.00001 
(18) 
  
0.00001 
(22) 
-0.00001 
(20) 
  
-0.00003 
(21) 
-0.0003 
(23) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 -0.0001   
-0.0002 
(500) 
-0.0002 
(500) 
  
-0.00019 
(498) 
-0.00019 
(498) 
  
-0.00007 
(74) 
-0.00007 
(72) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0   
0.00000 
(21) 
0.00000 
(22) 
  
0.00006 
(37) 
0.00006 
(37) 
  
0.00001 
(18) 
0.00002 
(20) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0    
0.00003 
(37) 
   
0.00005 
(31) 
   
-0.00001 
(25) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0    
-0.0004 
(26) 
   
-0.00006 
(27) 
   
-0.00006 
(24) 
𝒙𝒍: recreational 
area (p.c.) 
0.0150  0.00933 
(500) 
0.02872 
(500) 
0.02869 
(500) 
 
0.00841 
(500) 
0.02868 
(497) 
0.02869 
(496) 
 
0.00351 
(429) 
0.01134 
(76) 
0.01133 
(81) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0   
-0.0007 
(31) 
-0.00004 
(24) 
  
-0.00016 
(27) 
-0.00005 
(28) 
  
0.00018 
(21) 
0.00012 
(26) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 -0.0005   
-0.00097 
(495) 
-0.00097 
(496) 
  
-0.00093 
(443) 
-0.00093 
(446) 
  
-0.0004 
(60) 
-0.00041 
(57) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0   
-0.00002 
(29) 
-0.00002 
(28) 
  
-0.00072 
(41) 
-0.00072 
(42) 
  
0.0001 
(27) 
0.00013 
(22) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0    
-0.00009 
(28) 
   
-0.00061 
(28) 
   
0.00029 
(33) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0    
0.0001 
(30) 
   
0.00036 
(37) 
   
0.00034 
(23) 
𝒙𝒍: unemploy-
ment rate 
-0.3000  0.08311 
(500) 
-0.55595 
(498) 
-0.57188 
(499) 
 
0.08885 
(498) 
-0.51534 
(395) 
-0.53560 
(404) 
 
0.02247 
(47) 
-0.22672 
(56) 
-0.23355 
(55) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0   
-0.00826 
(30) 
0.00144 
(24) 
  
-0.00977 
(31) 
0.0023 
(23) 
  
0.00413 
(19) 
0.00718 
(25) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 0.0150   
0.02886 
(500) 
0.02883 
(499) 
  
0.02778 
(447) 
0.02776 
(445) 
  
0.01138 
(53) 
0.01156 
(54) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0.0150   
0.02888 
(146) 
0.02893 
(147) 
  
0.02313 
(55) 
0.02301 
(54) 
  
0.01009 
(20) 
0.01029 
(21) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0    
-0.00096 
(26) 
   
-0.00259 
(16) 
   
-0.00144 
(27) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0.0500    
0.10337 
(388) 
   
0.10301 
(262) 
   
0.02995 
(24) 
Note: The DGP-column presents the true parameters used in the data generating process (DGP). All results originate from a simulation, 
based on 500 replications and a simulated sample size of 1000 where the error has been deliberately mis-specified (normally distributed 
instead of type 1 extreme value). The first value in each cell is the average estimated coefficient, the second number stands for the number 
of estimated coefficients, which are significant at the 5 % level. Specifications ‘none’ are based solely on the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑙 of location specific 
variables. Specifications labelled ‘partial’ draw on an interacted model (𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑙) without the two risk indicators. Specifications ‘full’ includes 
all (interacted) variables involved in the DGP. In case of the most restricted choice set, with 𝐴 ∈ [2,4], all simulated individuals with only 
one alternative have been dropped (no variation on the individual level). This reduced the sample by approximately one half.  
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Figure A4.2: Kernel densities for simulated coefficients in the fully interacted specification (with error 
misspecification) 
𝑢𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.   
𝑁(0,1)  
 𝑥𝑖𝑙  
𝑣𝑖    average distance population density recreational area unemployment rate 
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risk-loving 
 
Note: Densities based on Epanechnikov kernels with optimal bandwidth. Coefficients 𝛽 and 𝛾 indicate the true parameters in the main 
DGP. Illustrations in the first row refer to simulated coefficients for non-interacted location-specific variables 𝑥𝑖𝑙, panels in row two to six 
show densities for the respective interactions of individual-specific variable 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖𝑙. 
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Table A4.4: Simulated average coefficients for varying information sets with clustered errors 
𝑒𝑖𝑙 = 𝑢𝑖𝑙(1 + 𝑣𝑖)  
𝑢𝑖𝑙~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.  𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(0,1)  
𝑣𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑈(−0.5,0.5)  
 
information set 
(estimated specification) 
   preferences in 𝐷 (I)  choice in 𝐷 (II)  choice in 𝐴 (III) 
observed location choices  𝑆 = 4  𝑆 = 1  𝑆 = 1 
destination space  𝐷 = 164  𝐷 = 164  𝐴 ∈ [2,4] 
model DGP  full 
𝑢𝑖𝑙  
full 
𝑒𝑖𝑙  
full 
𝑒𝑖𝑙  (c) 
 
full 
𝑢𝑖𝑙  
full 
𝑒𝑖𝑙  
full 
𝑒𝑖𝑙  (c) 
 
full 
𝑢𝑖𝑙  
full 
𝑒𝑖𝑙  
full 
𝑒𝑖𝑙  (c) 
𝒙𝒊𝒍: average 
distance 
-0.0080  -0.00791 
(457) 
-0.00824 
(442) 
-0.00824 
(420) 
 -0.00817 
(307) 
-0.00688 
(313) 
-0.00688 
(293) 
 
0.00023 
(24) 
0.00014 
(25) 
0.00014 
(21) 
gender # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0  0.00000 
(25) 
-0.00002 
(50) 
-0.00002 
(28) 
 0.00000 
(19) 
-0.00002 
(34) 
-0.00002 
(32) 
 
0.00006 
(25) 
0.00006 
(32) 
0.00006 
(30) 
age # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.0002  -0.00022 
(245) 
-0.0022 
(242) 
-0.0022 
(190) 
 -0.0002 
(103) 
-0.0002 
(100) 
-0.0002 
(92) 
 
-0.00004 
(22) 
-0.00004 
(21) 
-0.00004 
(22) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0  0.00001 
(24) 
0.00003 
(48) 
0.00003 
(26) 
 0.00013 
(25) 
0.00017 
(32) 
0.00017 
(28) 
 
-0.00003 
(27) 
-0.00006 
(28) 
-0.00006 
(28) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 -0.0015  -0.0016 
(391) 
-0.00157 
(372) 
-0.00157 
(310) 
 -0.00143 
(149) 
-0.00139 
(145) 
-0.00139 
(128) 
 
-0.00026 
(26) 
-0.0002 
(21) 
-0.0002 
(22) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑖𝑙 0.0010  0.00102 
(141) 
0.00098 
(153) 
0.00098 
(116) 
 0.00087 
(74) 
0.00083 
(72) 
0.00083 
(66) 
 
-0.00002 
(25) 
-0.0001 
(33) 
-0.0001 
(41) 
𝒙𝒍: population 
density 
0.0015  0.00157 
(491) 
0.00161 
(484) 
0.00161 
(483) 
 0.00149 
(312) 
0.00152 
(323) 
0.00152 
(325) 
 
0.00019 
(26) 
0.00018 
(31) 
0.00018 
(30) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0  0.00000 
(22) 
0.00000 
(32) 
0.00000 
(31) 
 0.00000 
(20) 
0.0000 
(33) 
0.0000 
(27) 
 
-0.00002 
(24) 
-0.00001 
(24) 
-0.00001 
(28) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 -0.0001  -0.0001 
(500) 
-0.00011 
(500) 
-0.00011 
(500) 
 -0.0001 
(454) 
-0.0001 
(454) 
-0.0001 
(454) 
 
-0.00001 
(24) 
-0.00001 
(20) 
-0.00001 
(23) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0  0.00000 
(23) 
0.00000 
(32) 
0.00000 
(30) 
 0.00000 
(20) 
0.00000 
(24) 
0.00000 
(27) 
 
-0.00001 
(24) 
-0.00001 
(28) 
-0.00001 
(29) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0  0.00000 
(27) 
0.00000 
(23) 
0.00000 
(25) 
 0.00000 
(27) 
0.00000 
(28) 
0.00000 
(32) 
 
0.00000 
(26) 
0.00000 
(30) 
0.00000 
(32) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0  -0.00001 
(29) 
-0.00001 
(31) 
-0.00001 
(31) 
 -0.00001 
(25) 
-0.00001 
(27) 
-0.00001 
(27) 
 
0.00002 
(16) 
0.00002 
(18) 
0.00002 
(25) 
𝒙𝒍: recreational 
area (p.c.) 
0.0150  0.01585 
(481) 
0.01683 
(490) 
0.01683 
(492) 
 0.01517 
(309) 
0.01638 
(358) 
0.01638 
(359) 
 
0.00117 
(31) 
0.00234 
(38) 
0.00234 
(40) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0  0.00001 
(33) 
0.00004 
(30) 
0.00004 
(30) 
 0.00001 
(24) 
0.00007 
(26) 
0.00007 
(28) 
 
-0.00003 
(30) 
0.00005 
(25) 
0.00005 
(26) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 -0.0005  -0.00053 
(392) 
-0.00056 
(419) 
-0.00056 
(420) 
 -0.00051 
(196) 
-0.00054 
(236) 
-0.00054 
(237) 
 
-0.00005 
(21) 
-0.00009 
(29) 
-0.00009 
(35) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0  0.00001 
(27) 
-0.00003 
(21) 
-0.00003 
(23) 
 -0.0001 
(21) 
-0.00019 
(32) 
-0.00019 
(34) 
 
0.00011 
(34) 
0.00014 
(22) 
0.00014 
(21) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0  -0.00001 
(25) 
-0.0001 
(29) 
-0.0001 
(28) 
 -0.00014 
(21) 
-0.00025 
(30) 
-0.00025 
(25) 
 
0.00032 
(27) 
0.0019 
(23) 
0.0019 
(29) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0  -0.00017 
(27) 
-0.00012 
(30) 
-0.00012 
(32) 
 -0.00012 
(24) 
-0.00009 
(26) 
-0.00009 
(31) 
 
-0.0005 
(20) 
-0.0005 
(20) 
-0.0005 
(32) 
𝒙𝒍: unemploy-
ment rate 
-0.3000  -0.31507 
(433) 
-0.32967 
(450) 
-0.32967 
(447) 
 -0.29240 
(224) 
-0.30883 
(237) 
-0.30883 
(238) 
 
-0.02989 
(25) 
-0.03788 
(32) 
-0.03788 
(33) 
gender # 𝑥𝑙 0  0.00124 
(25) 
0.00121 
(30) 
0.00121 
(27) 
 0.00037 
(27) 
0.00117 
(32) 
0.00117 
(31) 
 
0.00142 
(29) 
0.00217 
(26) 
0.00217 
(25) 
age # 𝑥𝑙 0.0150  0.01576 
(465) 
0.01626 
(471) 
0.01626 
(467) 
 0.1477 
(265) 
0.01527 
(272) 
0.01527 
(264) 
 
0.0012 
(27) 
0.00168 
(27) 
0.00168 
(30) 
uecgrade # 𝑥𝑙 0.0150  0.01475 
(80) 
0.01563 
(77) 
0.01563 
(74) 
 0.01375 
(33) 
0.01491 
(44) 
0.01491 
(45) 
 
0.00329 
(30) 
0.00102 
(31) 
0.00102 
(34) 
risk-averse # 𝑥𝑙 0  -0.00089 
(23) 
0.00088 
(21) 
0.00088 
(22) 
 -0.00073 
(24) 
-0.00058 
(19) 
-0.00058 
(22) 
 
-0.00237 
(36) 
-0.00374 
(29) 
-0.00374 
(31) 
risk-loving # 𝑥𝑙 0.0500  0.05338 
(193) 
0.05688 
(209) 
0.05688 
(199) 
 0.05215 
(114) 
0.05604 
(118) 
0.05604 
(118) 
 
0.00386 
(21) 
0.01079 
(27) 
0.01079 
(33) 
Note: The DGP-column presents the true parameters used in the data generating process (DGP). All results originate from a simulation, 
based on 500 replications and a simulated sample size of 1000. Each presented specification ‘full’ includes all (interacted) variables 
involved in the DGP. Columns 𝑢𝑖𝑙  depict results identical to Table 4.2 where errors in the DGP are not clustered on the individual level. 
Columns  𝑒𝑖𝑙  show outcomes based on uncorrected standard errors for the same DGP, but with error correlation on the individual level. 
Columns 𝑒𝑖𝑙  (𝑐) are based on cluster robust variance-covariance estimators to account for intra-individual error correlation in the DGP. The 
first value in each cell is the average estimated coefficient, the second number stands for the number of estimated coefficients, which are 
significant at the 5 % level. In case of the most restricted choice set, with 𝐴 ∈ [2,4], all simulated individuals with only one alternative have 
been dropped (no variation on the individual level). This reduced the sample by approximately one half. 
    
 
 
 
 
Table A4.5: Sequential model derivation for ‘preferences in 𝐷’ 
dependent variable preferences in 𝐷 
observed location choices 𝑆 ≤ 4 
destination space 𝐷 = 164 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙                          
distance 0.9885 *** (0.0003)  0.9869 *** (0.0004)  0.9755 *** (0.0045)  0.9787 *** (0.0048)  0.9802 *** (0.0046)  0.9808 *** (0.0045)  0.9831 *** (0.0044)  0.9853 *** (0.0039) 
𝑥𝑙                                               
population    1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)       
population density    0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9986 *** (0.0001)       
GDP (per capita)    0.9948 *** (0.0018)  0.9944 *** (0.0018)  0.9942 *** (0.0018)  0.9942 *** (0.0018)  0.9941 *** (0.0018)  0.9940 *** (0.0018)       
price level (€/sq.)    1.0011 *** (0.0002)  1.0012 *** (0.0002)  1.0013 *** (0.0002)  1.0013 *** (0.0002)  1.0013 *** (0.0002)  1.0013 *** (0.0002)       
share of recreational area    1.1707 *** (0.0113)  1.1696 *** (0.0114)  1.1729 *** (0.0114)  1.1741 *** (0.0114)  1.1752 *** (0.0114)  1.1767 *** (0.0115)       
reg. centre reachability    0.9515 *** (0.0020)  0.9514 *** (0.0020)  0.9507 *** (0.0020)  0.9507 *** (0.0020)  0.9506 *** (0.0020)  0.9506 *** (0.0020)       
unemployment rate    1.1619 *** (0.0204)  1.1610 *** (0.0205)  1.1602 *** (0.0206)  1.1605 *** (0.0206)  1.1613 *** (0.0206)  1.1601 *** (0.0206)       
youth unemp. rate    0.9878  (0.0172)  0.9886  (0.0172)  0.9894  (0.0173)  0.9898  (0.0174)  0.9894  (0.0174)  0.9901  (0.0174)       
high-skilled emp. rate    0.9300 *** (0.0070)  0.9313 *** (0.0070)  0.9318 *** (0.0071)  0.9322 *** (0.0071)  0.9329 *** (0.0070)  0.9336 *** (0.0070)       
high-skilled emp. rate (<34)    1.0771 *** (0.0030)  1.0767 *** (0.0030)  1.0771 *** (0.0030)  1.0772 *** (0.0030)  1.0772 *** (0.0030)  1.0773 *** (0.0030)       
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                                           
female       1.0003  (0.0007)  0.9992  (0.0007)  0.9995  (0.0007)  0.9988 * (0.0007)  0.9988 * (0.0007)  0.9990 * (0.0006) 
age       1.0007 *** (0.0002)  1.0003  (0.0002)  1.0002  (0.0002)  1.0002  (0.0002)  1.0002  (0.0002)  1.0002  (0.0002) 
uecgrade       0.9989 * (0.0006)  0.9996  (0.0006)  0.9997  (0.0006)  0.9998  (0.0006)  0.9995  (0.0006)  0.9991 * (0.0005) 
academic household       1.0032 *** (0.0007)  1.0025 *** (0.0007)  1.0025 *** (0.0007)  1.0026 *** (0.0006)  1.0025 *** (0.0006)  1.0017 *** (0.0006) 
in partnership       0.9974 *** (0.0007)  0.9977 *** (0.0007)  0.9976 *** (0.0007)  0.9977 *** (0.0007)  0.9978 *** (0.0007)  0.9984 *** (0.0006) 
vocational education       0.9972 ** (0.0013)  0.9984  (0.0012)  0.9983  (0.0012)  0.9983  (0.0012)  0.9987  (0.0012)  0.9993  (0.0010) 
moved during school          1.0021 *** (0.0008)  1.0019 ** (0.0007)  1.0019 ** (0.0007)  1.0019 *** (0.0007)  1.0010  (0.0007) 
exchange participation          1.0027 *** (0.0007)  1.0027 *** (0.0007)  1.0028 *** (0.0007)  1.0027 *** (0.0007)  1.0023 *** (0.0006) 
stay abroad          1.0056 *** (0.0007)  1.0052 *** (0.0007)  1.0052 *** (0.0007)  1.0047 *** (0.0007)  1.0038 *** (0.0006) 
risk attitude low             0.9977 *** (0.0007)  0.9980 *** (0.0007)  0.9981 *** (0.0007)  0.9986 ** (0.0006) 
high             1.0001  (0.0010)  1.0003  (0.0010)  1.0001  (0.0010)  0.9998  (0.0009) 
patience low             0.9980 ** (0.0010)  0.9982 * (0.0010)  0.9982 * (0.0010)  0.9982 ** (0.0009) 
high             1.0021 ** (0.0008)  1.0022 ** (0.0009)  1.0016 * (0.0008)  1.0014 * (0.0007) 
extraversion low                0.9981 * (0.0011)  0.9987  (0.0011)  0.9985  (0.0010) 
high                0.9994  (0.0008)  0.9988  (0.0008)  0.9990  (0.0007) 
openness low                0.9986  (0.0008)  0.9987  (0.0009)  0.9989  (0.0008) 
high                1.0020 ** (0.0008)  1.0018 ** (0.0008)  1.0010  (0.0007) 
neuroticism low                0.9994  (0.0010)  0.9986  (0.0011)  0.9992  (0.0009) 
high                1.0010  (0.0009)  1.0014  (0.0009)  1.0014 * (0.0008) 
conscientiousness low                0.9995  (0.0008)  0.9997  (0.0008)  0.9998  (0.0007) 
high                0.9990  (0.0008)  0.9988  (0.0008)  0.9992  (0.0008) 
agreeableness low                0.9990  (0.0009)  0.9990  (0.0009)  0.9988  (0.0008) 
high                0.9998  (0.0008)  0.9999  (0.0008)  0.9998  (0.0007) 
adaptability low                      0.9978 ** (0.0009)  0.9987 * (0.0008) 
high                      1.0032 *** (0.0009)  1.0020 ** (0.0008) 
importance of 
proximity to family 
low                            1.0018 ** (0.0007) 
high                            0.9986  (0.0010) 
importance of 
proximity to friends 
low                            1.0018 ** (0.0008) 
high                            0.9981 * (0.0010) 
observations 1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷 
LL(0) -21393.29  -21393.29  -21393.29  -21393.29  -21393.29  -21393.29  -21393.29  -21393.29 
LL -17528.88  -13842.76  -13753.18  -13579.44  -13540.89  -13506.59  -13469.84  -17176.32 
df 1  11  17  20  24  34  36  30 
Wald 𝜒2 1553.63  5923.00  5977.80  6292.23  6450.21  6596.70  6622.09  1843.39 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.1806  0.3529  0.3571  0.3652  0.3670  0.3687  0.3704  0.1971 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific characteristics. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0). 
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Table A4.6: Sequential model derivation for ‘choice in 𝐷’ 
dependent variable choice in 𝐷 
observed location choices 𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷 = 164 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙                          
distance 0.9842 *** (0.0005)  0.9801 *** (0.0005)  0.9622 *** (0.0062)  0.9648 *** (0.0064)  0.9668 *** (0.0062)  0.9685 *** (0.0061)  0.9705 *** (0.0062)  0.9702 *** (0.0062) 
𝑥𝑙                                               
population    1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)       
population density    0.9962 *** (0.0001)  0.9962 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)       
GDP (per capita)    1.0128 *** (0.0019)  1.0134 *** (0.0019)  1.0135 *** (0.0019)  1.0134 *** (0.0019)  1.0134 *** (0.0019)  1.0137 *** (0.0019)       
price level (€/sq.)    0.9969 *** (0.0003)  0.9969 *** (0.0003)  0.9971 *** (0.0003)  0.9971 *** (0.0003)  0.9971 *** (0.0003)  0.9971 *** (0.0003)       
share of recreational area    1.2942 *** (0.0176)  1.3009 *** (0.0181)  1.3031 *** (0.0181)  1.3044 *** (0.0181)  1.3054 *** (0.0182)  1.3072 *** (0.0183)       
reg. centre reachability    0.9157 *** (0.0046)  0.9174 *** (0.0045)  0.9178 *** (0.0044)  0.9181 *** (0.0044)  0.9183 *** (0.0044)  0.9187 *** (0.0044)       
unemployment rate    1.0265  (0.0298)  1.0419  (0.0305)  1.0509 * (0.0304)  1.0518 * (0.0303)  1.0538 * (0.0303)  1.0556 * (0.0304)       
youth unemp. rate    1.7830 *** (0.0621)  1.7607 *** (0.0611)  1.7487 *** (0.0598)  1.7482 *** (0.0595)  1.7453 *** (0.0593)  1.7433 *** (0.0591)       
high-skilled emp. rate    0.8548 *** (0.0144)  0.8511 *** (0.0144)  0.8483 *** (0.0146)  0.8477 *** (0.0146)  0.8476 *** (0.0147)  0.8465 *** (0.0147)       
high-skilled emp. rate (<34)    1.1752 *** (0.0068)  1.1767 *** (0.0069)  1.1776 *** (0.0070)  1.1778 *** (0.0070)  1.1779 *** (0.0070)  1.1786 *** (0.0070)       
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                                           
female       1.0004  (0.0009)  0.9994  (0.0009)  0.9996  (0.0009)  0.9992  (0.0010)  0.9989  (0.0010)  0.9993  (0.0010) 
age       1.0003  (0.0003)  1.0000  (0.0003)  0.9999  (0.0003)  0.9998  (0.0003)  0.9998  (0.0003)  1.0002  (0.0003) 
uecgrade       1.0053 *** (0.0008)  1.0060 *** (0.0008)  1.0060 *** (0.0008)  1.0059 *** (0.0009)  1.0055 *** (0.0009)  1.0038 *** (0.0009) 
academic household       1.0022 *** (0.0009)  1.0015 * (0.0009)  1.0014  (0.0009)  1.0014 * (0.0009)  1.0014  (0.0009)  1.0012  (0.0009) 
in partnership       0.9974 *** (0.0009)  0.9976 *** (0.0009)  0.9976 *** (0.0009)  0.9976 *** (0.0009)  0.9976 ** (0.0009)  0.9974 *** (0.0010) 
vocational education       0.9943 *** (0.0017)  0.9955 *** (0.0017)  0.9956 *** (0.0017)  0.9960 ** (0.0017)  0.9963 ** (0.0017)  0.9961 ** (0.0017) 
moved during school          1.0023 ** (0.0010)  1.0022 ** (0.0010)  1.0022 ** (0.0010)  1.0022 ** (0.0010)  1.0012  (0.0010) 
exchange participation          1.0028 *** (0.0009)  1.0029 *** (0.0009)  1.0030 *** (0.0009)  1.0030 *** (0.0009)  1.0031 *** (0.0009) 
stay abroad          1.0060 *** (0.0009)  1.0055 *** (0.0009)  1.0055 *** (0.0010)  1.0049 *** (0.0009)  1.0048 *** (0.0010) 
risk attitude low             0.9976 ** (0.0011)  0.9980 * (0.0011)  0.9981 * (0.0011)  0.9986  (0.0012) 
high             1.0013  (0.0012)  1.0015  (0.0013)  1.0013  (0.0013)  1.0011  (0.0013) 
patience low             0.9989  (0.0012)  0.9990  (0.0012)  0.9989  (0.0012)  0.9988  (0.0013) 
high             1.0030 *** (0.0011)  1.0032 *** (0.0011)  1.0022 ** (0.0011)  1.0025 ** (0.0011) 
extraversion low                0.9985  (0.0015)  0.9993  (0.0015)  0.9981  (0.0017) 
high                0.9997  (0.0011)  0.9989  (0.0011)  0.9986  (0.0011) 
openness low                0.9979 * (0.0011)  0.9980 * (0.0011)  0.9985  (0.0012) 
high                1.0018  (0.0011)  1.0016  (0.0011)  1.0004  (0.0011) 
neuroticism low                0.9988  (0.0014)  0.9978  (0.0014)  0.9982  (0.0014) 
high                0.9996  (0.0013)  1.0001  (0.0013)  1.0002  (0.0013) 
conscientiousness low                1.0000  (0.0010)  1.0002  (0.0010)  1.0008  (0.0011) 
high                0.9985  (0.0013)  0.9982  (0.0013)  0.9973 * (0.0014) 
agreeableness low                0.9987  (0.0011)  0.9986  (0.0011)  0.9978 * (0.0012) 
high                1.0016  (0.0011)  1.0015  (0.0011)  1.0020 * (0.0011) 
adaptability low                   0.9974 ** (0.0012)  0.9981  (0.0014) 
high                   1.0044 *** (0.0011)  1.0033 *** (0.0011) 
importance of 
proximity to family 
low                      1.0030 ** (0.0012) 
high                      0.9989  (0.0016) 
importance of 
proximity to friends 
low                      1.0021  (0.0013) 
high                      0.9993  (0.0017) 
observations 1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷 
LL(0) -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97  -8730.97 
LL -6683.60  -4283.12  -4226.96  -4177.00  -4162.81  -4150.29  -4133.03  -6519.19 
df 1  11  17  20  24  34  36  30 
Wald 𝜒2 1126.99  5936.95  6374.05  6694.17  6741.43  6812.39  6785.50  1270.69 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.2345  0.5094  0.5159  0.5216  0.5232  0.5246  0.5266  0.2533 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific characteristics. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0).
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Table A4.7: Robustness check – minimum sample analysis for varying information sets 
dependent variable preferences in 𝐷  choice in 𝐷  choice in 𝐴 
observed location choices 𝑆 ≤ 4  𝑆 = 1  𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷 = 164  𝐷 = 164  𝐴 ∈ [2,4] 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙           
distance 0.9845 *** (0.0051)  0.9755 *** (0.0075)  1.0014 (0.0154) 
𝑥𝑙           
population 1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0028 *** (0.0001)  1.0012 *** (0.0003) 
population density 0.9989 *** (0.0001)  0.9957 *** (0.0001)  0.9949 *** (0.0004) 
GDP (per capita) 0.9938 *** (0.0020)  1.0269 *** (0.0027)  1.0053 (0.0151) 
price level (€/sq.) 1.0010 *** (0.0002)  0.9969 *** (0.0003)  1.0000 (0.0014) 
share of recreational area 1.1251 *** (0.0129)  1.2494 *** (0.0239)  1.3344 *** (0.0523) 
reg. centre reachability 0.9449 *** (0.0025)  0.8861 *** (0.0060)  0.9173 *** (0.0193) 
unemployment rate 1.1474 *** (0.0235)  0.8418 *** (0.0324)  1.3762 *** (0.1618) 
youth unemp. rate 0.9542 ** (0.0192)  2.4461 *** (0.1183)  2.3758 *** (0.2840) 
high-skilled emp. rate 0.9240 *** (0.0075)  0.7288 *** (0.0134)  0.5291 *** (0.0459) 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 1.0757 *** (0.0032)  1.2492 *** (0.0088)  1.3912 *** (0.0430) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙          
female 0.9991 (0.0007)  0.9999 (0.0010)  0.9950 *** (0.0019) 
age 1.0001 (0.0003)  0.9996 (0.0004)  0.9993 (0.0008) 
uecgrade 0.9994 (0.0006)  1.0053 *** (0.0010)  1.0001 (0.0017) 
academic household 1.0024 *** (0.0007)  1.0013 (0.0010)  1.0012 (0.0016) 
in partnership 0.9980 *** (0.0007)  0.9977 ** (0.0010)  1.0001 (0.0018) 
vocational education 0.9994 (0.0013)  0.9982 (0.0018)  1.0017 (0.0041) 
moved during school 1.0019 ** (0.0008)  1.0014 (0.0012)  0.9989 (0.0018) 
exchange participation 1.0021 *** (0.0007)  1.0030 *** (0.0010)  1.0017 (0.0017) 
stay abroad 1.0039 *** (0.0008)  1.0041 *** (0.0010)  1.0006 (0.0019) 
risk attitude low 0.9980 *** (0.0008)  0.9970 ** (0.0012)  0.9978 (0.0021) 
high 0.9993 (0.0011)  1.0001 (0.0015)  1.0022 (0.0025) 
patience low 0.9985 (0.0010)  0.9988 (0.0015)  0.9922 ** (0.0031) 
high 1.0014 (0.0009)  1.0014 (0.0012)  0.9979 (0.0023) 
extraversion low 0.9997 (0.0012)  1.0011 (0.0016)  0.9966 (0.0030) 
high 0.9994 (0.0008)  0.9999 (0.0012)  0.9998 (0.0021) 
openness low 0.9986 (0.0009)  0.9977 * (0.0013)  0.9943 ** (0.0022) 
high 1.0022 *** (0.0008)  1.0021 * (0.0012)  1.0043 ** (0.0019) 
neuroticism low 0.9989 (0.0011)  0.9974 * (0.0014)  0.9962 (0.0031) 
high 1.0012 (0.0009)  1.0005 (0.0013)  0.9975 (0.0022) 
conscientiousness low 0.9993 (0.0009)  0.9984 (0.0013)  1.0000 (0.0022) 
high 0.9987 (0.0009)  0.9979 (0.0013)  1.0061 *** (0.0022) 
agreeableness low 0.9986 (0.0009)  0.9978 * (0.0012)  1.0024 (0.0025) 
high 0.9994 (0.0009)  1.0010 (0.0012)  1.0050 *** (0.0019) 
adaptability low 0.9981 ** (0.0010)  0.9976 * (0.0014)  1.0045 ** (0.0021) 
high 1.0026 *** (0.0009)  1.0049 *** (0.0012)  1.0058 *** (0.0022) 
importance of proximity 
to family 
low 1.0018 ** (0.0009)  1.0029 ** (0.0013)  1.0035 * (0.0021) 
high 0.9990 (0.0012)  1.0008 (0.0016)  1.0026 (0.0034) 
importance of proximity 
to friends 
low 1.0027 *** (0.0009)  1.0032 ** (0.0015)  1.0006 (0.0023) 
high 0.9982 (0.0013)  0.9997 (0.0017)  0.9989 (0.0031) 
observations 1139 × 𝐷  1139 × 𝐷  1139 × ?̅? 
LL(0) -16933.39  -5808.75  -1259.80 
LL -10802.15  -2603.18  -478.13 
df 40  40  40 
Wald 𝜒2 5115.83  3949.27  576.39 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.3621  0.5519  0.6205 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance 
and individual-specific characteristics. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0). 
  
   
 
 
 
Table A4.8: Robustness check – preferences and choices for alternative definitions of the destination space 
dependent variable preferences in 𝐷  choice in 𝐷 
observed location choices 𝑆 ≤ 4  𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷𝑈 = 71  𝐷𝑆=101  𝐷𝑈 = 71  𝐷𝑆=101 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙                          
distance 0.9876 *** (0.0003)  0.9841 *** (0.0042)  0.9874 *** (0.0003)  0.9835 *** (0.0042)  0.9809 *** (0.0005)  0.9726 *** (0.0061)  0.9804 *** (0.0005)  0.9720 *** (0.0058) 
𝑥𝑙                                                  
population 1.0013 *** (0.0000)  1.0014 *** (0.0000)  1.0014 *** (0.0000)  1.0014 *** (0.0000)  1.0020 *** (0.0001)  1.0020 *** (0.0001)  1.0021 *** (0.0001)  1.0021 *** (0.0001) 
population density 0.9987 *** (0.0001)  0.9987 *** (0.0001)  0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9985 *** (0.0001)  0.9963 *** (0.0001)  0.9962 *** (0.0001)  0.9962 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001) 
GDP (per capita) 0.9954 * (0.0026)  0.9950 ** (0.0026)  0.9861 *** (0.0025)  0.9854 *** (0.0025)  1.0341 *** (0.0032)  1.0340 *** (0.0028)  1.0223 *** (0.0025)  1.0225 *** (0.0024) 
price level (€/sq.) 1.0018 *** (0.0002)  1.0019 *** (0.0002)  1.0020 *** (0.0002)  1.0021 *** (0.0002)  0.9974 *** (0.0003)  0.9975 *** (0.0003)  0.9979 *** (0.0003)  0.9980 *** (0.0003) 
share of recreational area 1.1724 *** (0.0108)  1.1778 *** (0.0110)  1.1656 *** (0.0111)  1.1718 *** (0.0113)  1.2462 *** (0.0147)  1.2655 *** (0.0158)  1.2701 *** (0.0166)  1.2854 *** (0.0175) 
reg. centre reachability 0.9666 *** (0.0030)  0.9662 *** (0.0031)  0.9627 *** (0.0021)  0.9617 *** (0.0021)  0.9321 *** (0.0069)  0.9365 *** (0.0065)  0.9426 *** (0.0049)  0.9432 *** (0.0047) 
unemployment rate 1.1801 *** (0.0271)  1.1790 *** (0.0270)  1.1576 *** (0.0205)  1.1517 *** (0.0206)  1.2326 *** (0.0369)  1.2443 *** (0.0353)  1.2233 *** (0.0319)  1.2266 *** (0.0320) 
youth unemp. rate 0.9237 *** (0.0207)  0.9207 *** (0.0210)  1.0011  (0.0167)  1.0034  (0.0171)  1.6714 *** (0.0633)  1.6536 *** (0.0612)  1.7625 *** (0.0592)  1.7397 *** (0.0592) 
high-skilled emp. rate 0.9504 *** (0.0096)  0.9576 *** (0.0097)  0.8877 *** (0.0085)  0.8926 *** (0.0085)  0.7747 *** (0.0185)  0.7622 *** (0.0188)  0.7659 *** (0.0170)  0.7645 *** (0.0173) 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 1.0395 *** (0.0036)  1.0390 *** (0.0036)  1.0909 *** (0.0040)  1.0905 *** (0.0039)  1.1825 *** (0.0100)  1.1890 *** (0.0103)  1.2222 *** (0.0107)  1.2211 *** (0.0108) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                                     
female    0.9990  (0.0006)     0.9990  (0.0006)     0.9993  (0.0009)     0.9993  (0.0009) 
age    1.0001  (0.0002)     1.0002  (0.0002)     0.9997  (0.0003)     0.9997  (0.0003) 
uecgrade    0.9995  (0.0006)     0.9994  (0.0006)     1.0052 *** (0.0008)     1.0051 *** (0.0008) 
academic household    1.0021 *** (0.0006)     1.0022 *** (0.0006)     1.0010  (0.0008)     1.0011  (0.0008) 
in partnership    0.9982 *** (0.0007)     0.9982 *** (0.0007)     0.9982 ** (0.0009)     0.9981 ** (0.0009) 
vocational education    0.9991  (0.0011)     0.9992  (0.0012)     0.9964 ** (0.0016)     0.9967 ** (0.0016) 
moved during school    1.0014 * (0.0007)     1.0015 ** (0.0007)     1.0017 * (0.0010)     1.0016 * (0.0010) 
exchange participation    1.0024 *** (0.0006)     1.0025 *** (0.0006)     1.0026 *** (0.0009)     1.0026 *** (0.0009) 
stay abroad    1.0044 *** (0.0007)     1.0044 *** (0.0007)     1.0047 *** (0.0009)     1.0045 *** (0.0009) 
risk attitude low    0.9984 ** (0.0007)     0.9982 ** (0.0007)     0.9983  (0.0011)     0.9983  (0.0011) 
high    0.9999  (0.0010)     0.9998  (0.0010)     1.0009  (0.0012)     1.0009  (0.0012) 
patience low    0.9981 ** (0.0010)     0.9981 ** (0.0009)     0.9987  (0.0012)     0.9990  (0.0012) 
high    1.0016 ** (0.0008)     1.0018 ** (0.0008)     1.0024 ** (0.0011)     1.0025 ** (0.0011) 
extraversion low    0.9988  (0.0011)     0.9990  (0.0011)     0.9998  (0.0015)     0.9997  (0.0014) 
high    0.9990  (0.0007)     0.9990  (0.0007)     0.9989  (0.0010)     0.9990  (0.0010) 
openness low    0.9986 * (0.0008)     0.9986 * (0.0008)     0.9980 * (0.0011)     0.9980 * (0.0011) 
high    1.0016 ** (0.0008)     1.0016 ** (0.0008)     1.0013  (0.0011)     1.0013  (0.0011) 
neuroticism low    0.9987  (0.0010)     0.9988  (0.0010)     0.9976 * (0.0013)     0.9978  (0.0013) 
high    1.0010  (0.0008)     1.0012  (0.0008)     0.9997  (0.0012)     0.9997  (0.0012) 
conscientiousness low    0.9998  (0.0008)     0.9997  (0.0008)     1.0003  (0.0010)     1.0002  (0.0010) 
high    0.9988  (0.0008)     0.9989  (0.0008)     0.9977 * (0.0013)     0.9980  (0.0013) 
agreeableness low    0.9989  (0.0008)     0.9988  (0.0008)     0.9979 * (0.0011)     0.9982 * (0.0011) 
high    1.0000  (0.0008)     0.9998  (0.0008)     1.0014  (0.0011)     1.0015  (0.0011) 
adaptability low    0.9983 * (0.0009)     0.9984 * (0.0009)     0.9978 * (0.0012)     0.9979 * (0.0012) 
high    1.0023 *** (0.0009)     1.0024 *** (0.0009)     1.0038 *** (0.0011)     1.0036 *** (0.0011) 
importance of 
proximity to family 
low    1.0019 ** (0.0008)     1.0020 ** (0.0008)     1.0031 *** (0.0012)     1.0030 *** (0.0011) 
high    0.9987  (0.0011)     0.9984  (0.0011)     0.9989  (0.0015)     0.9991  (0.0015) 
importance of 
proximity to friends 
low    1.0018 ** (0.0009)     1.0019 ** (0.0009)     1.0020  (0.0013)     1.0019  (0.0012) 
high    0.9981  (0.0012)     0.9982  (0.0012)     0.9999  (0.0016)     0.9999  (0.0016) 
observations 1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑆  1712 × 𝐷𝑆  1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑆  1712 × 𝐷𝑆 
LL(0) -17040.49  -17040.49  -19045.63  -19045.63  -7297.71  -7297.71  -7901.09  -7901.09 
LL -12295.32  -11914.47  -13201.70  -12790.82  -3943.64  -3785.93  -4098.40  -3943.70 
df 11  40  11  40  11  40  11  40 
Wald 𝜒2 3467.40  3727.70  4622.33  5090.36  4440.57  4119.59  5434.11  5749.37 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.2785  0.3008  0.3068  0.3284  0.4596  0.4812  0.4813  0.5009 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific characteristics. The first restricted potential destination space 𝐷𝑈 composes only of locations with a 
university on site (excluding those with exclusively universities of applied sciences). The second modification 𝐷𝑆 includes only those potential destinations that have either been finally chosen or were selected into the three 
most preferred alternatives at the application or the final selection stage by at least on subject in the sample. The corresponding results for the baseline destination space 𝐷 = 164 can be found in Table A4.5 and Table A4.6, 
respectively. 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix, C
h
ap
te
r 4
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
     1
74
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
Table A4.9: Robustness check – programme selectivity 
dependent variable preferences in 𝐷  choice in 𝐷 
observed location choices 𝑆 ≤ 4  𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷 = 164  𝐷 = 164 
sample (study programmes) full   restricted (only Business Studies and Economics and Business)  full  restricted (only Business Studies and Economics and Business) 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙                           
distance 0.9830 *** (0.0043)  0.9859 *** (0.0004)  0.9860 *** (0.0048)  0.9892 ** (0.0045)  0.9695 *** (0.0060)  0.9788 *** (0.0006)  0.9735 *** (0.0076)  0.9761 *** (0.0073) 
𝑥𝑙                                                  
population 1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0024 *** (0.0001)  1.0024 *** (0.0001)  1.0024 *** (0.0001) 
population density 0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9987 *** (0.0001)  0.9987 *** (0.0001)  0.9987 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)  0.9966 *** (0.0001)  0.9965 *** (0.0001)  0.9965 *** (0.0001) 
GDP (per capita) 0.9939 *** (0.0018)  0.9920 *** (0.0022)  0.9914 *** (0.0022)  0.9912 *** (0.0022)  1.0138 *** (0.0019)  1.0103 *** (0.0021)  1.0111 *** (0.0021)  1.0112 *** (0.0021) 
price level (€/sq.) 1.0013 *** (0.0002)  1.0013 *** (0.0002)  1.0014 *** (0.0002)  1.0014 *** (0.0002)  0.9971 *** (0.0003)  0.9961 *** (0.0004)  0.9962 *** (0.0004)  0.9963 *** (0.0004) 
share of recreational area 1.1764 *** (0.0115)  1.1376 *** (0.0124)  1.1383 *** (0.0125)  1.1423 *** (0.0126)  1.3074 *** (0.0183)  1.2195 *** (0.0177)  1.2274 *** (0.0183)  1.2327 *** (0.0185) 
reg. centre reachability 0.9505 *** (0.0021)  0.9514 *** (0.0022)  0.9508 *** (0.0022)  0.9507 *** (0.0022)  0.9187 *** (0.0044)  0.9221 *** (0.0046)  0.9236 *** (0.0045)  0.9244 *** (0.0044) 
unemployment rate 1.1563 *** (0.0205)  1.1672 *** (0.0226)  1.1670 *** (0.0228)  1.1660 *** (0.0230)  1.0542 * (0.0304)  1.0538  (0.0336)  1.0761 ** (0.0342)  1.0806 ** (0.0341) 
youth unemp. rate 0.9919  (0.0175)  0.9936  (0.0196)  0.9952  (0.0196)  0.9969  (0.0198)  1.7445 *** (0.0590)  1.7554 *** (0.0665)  1.7232 *** (0.0645)  1.7178 *** (0.0636) 
high-skilled emp. rate 0.9340 *** (0.0070)  0.9327 *** (0.0082)  0.9339 *** (0.0083)  0.9363 *** (0.0082)  0.8468 *** (0.0147)  0.9048 *** (0.0190)  0.8993 *** (0.0191)  0.8978 *** (0.0192) 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 1.0773 *** (0.0030)  1.0756 *** (0.0035)  1.0756 *** (0.0035)  1.0757 *** (0.0035)  1.1785 *** (0.0070)  1.1538 *** (0.0081)  1.1558 *** (0.0082)  1.1568 *** (0.0083) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                                     
female 0.9990  (0.0007)     0.9991  (0.0008)  0.9992  (0.0008)  0.9992  (0.0009)     0.9993  (0.0011)  0.9992  (0.0011) 
age 1.0002  (0.0002)     1.0000  (0.0002)  0.9999  (0.0002)  0.9998  (0.0003)     0.9996  (0.0004)  0.9995  (0.0004) 
uecgrade 0.9994  (0.0006)     0.9987 * (0.0007)  0.9988 * (0.0007)  1.0054 *** (0.0009)     1.0053 *** (0.0010)  1.0048 *** (0.0011) 
academic household 1.0023 *** (0.0006)     1.0025 *** (0.0007)  1.0025 *** (0.0007)  1.0011  (0.0009)     1.0009  (0.0010)  1.0009  (0.0010) 
in partnership 0.9981 *** (0.0007)     0.9968 *** (0.0008)  0.9972 *** (0.0008)  0.9979 ** (0.0009)     0.9973 ** (0.0011)  0.9978 ** (0.0011) 
vocational education 0.9991  (0.0012)     1.0004  (0.0013)  1.0010  (0.0012)  0.9966 ** (0.0016)     0.9974  (0.0018)  0.9985  (0.0018) 
moved during school 1.0015 ** (0.0007)     1.0015 * (0.0009)  1.0009  (0.0009)  1.0018 * (0.0010)     1.0024 ** (0.0012)  1.0021 * (0.0012) 
exchange participation 1.0026 *** (0.0007)     1.0024 *** (0.0008)  1.0026 *** (0.0008)  1.0028 *** (0.0009)     1.0024 ** (0.0010)  1.0027 ** (0.0010) 
stay abroad 1.0045 *** (0.0007)     1.0059 *** (0.0008)  1.0046 *** (0.0008)  1.0049 *** (0.0009)     1.0063 *** (0.0011)  1.0049 *** (0.0011) 
risk attitude low 0.9982 ** (0.0007)        0.9982 ** (0.0008)  0.9982 * (0.0011)        0.9976 * (0.0013) 
high 0.9999  (0.0010)        0.9999  (0.0013)  1.0011  (0.0013)        0.9999  (0.0017) 
patience low 0.9982 * (0.0010)        0.9984  (0.0011)  0.9989  (0.0012)        0.9999  (0.0014) 
high 1.0018 ** (0.0008)        1.0023 ** (0.0009)  1.0023 ** (0.0011)        1.0028 ** (0.0013) 
extraversion low 0.9989  (0.0011)        0.9970 ** (0.0014)  0.9995  (0.0015)        0.9985  (0.0020) 
high 0.9990  (0.0008)        1.0000  (0.0009)  0.9990  (0.0010)        0.9997  (0.0012) 
openness low 0.9986  (0.0009)        0.9994  (0.0010)  0.9981 * (0.0011)        0.9983  (0.0013) 
high 1.0017 ** (0.0008)        1.0019 ** (0.0009)  1.0014  (0.0011)        1.0018  (0.0013) 
neuroticism low 0.9988  (0.0010)        0.9986  (0.0012)  0.9978  (0.0014)        0.9987  (0.0017) 
high 1.0012  (0.0009)        1.0005  (0.0011)  0.9998  (0.0013)        0.9993  (0.0015) 
conscientiousness low 0.9997  (0.0008)        0.9999  (0.0010)  1.0002  (0.0010)        1.0007  (0.0013) 
high 0.9989  (0.0008)        0.9995  (0.0009)  0.9981  (0.0013)        0.9984  (0.0015) 
agreeableness low 0.9988  (0.0009)        0.9998  (0.0010)  0.9981 * (0.0011)        0.9987  (0.0013) 
high 0.9999  (0.0008)        1.0000  (0.0009)  1.0016  (0.0011)        1.0020  (0.0013) 
adaptability low 0.9984 * (0.0009)        0.9978 ** (0.0010)  0.9979 * (0.0012)        0.9976 * (0.0014) 
high 1.0025 *** (0.0009)        1.0017  (0.0011)  1.0036 *** (0.0011)        1.0037 *** (0.0014) 
importance of 
proximity to family 
low 1.0020 ** (0.0008)        1.0012  (0.0010)  1.0031 *** (0.0012)        1.0023  (0.0015) 
high 0.9985  (0.0011)        0.9983  (0.0012)  0.9993  (0.0015)        1.0001  (0.0017) 
importance of 
proximity to friends 
low 1.0020 ** (0.0009)        1.0019 * (0.0011)  1.0020  (0.0013)        1.0017  (0.0017) 
high 0.9981  (0.0012)        0.9974 * (0.0013)  0.9998  (0.0016)        0.9993  (0.0019) 
observations 1712 × 𝐷  1391 × 𝐷  1391 × 𝐷  1391 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1391 × 𝐷  1391 × 𝐷  1391 × 𝐷 
LL(0) -21393.29  -17311.63  -17311.63  -17311.63  -8730.97  -7093.91  -7093.91  -7093.91 
LL -13411.59  -10998.41  -10778.32  -10657.72  -4116.20  -3526.19  -3457.01  -3413.90 
df 40  11  20  40  40  11  20  40 
Wald 𝜒2 6624.60  4606.04  4847.57  5072.73  6793.91  3860.25  4426.86  4582.03 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.3731  0.3647  0.3774  0.3844  0.5286  0.5029  0.5127  0.5188 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific characteristics. This table reports results for the full and a restricted sample consisting only of the two 
most similar and widely available programmes (Business Studies, Economics and Business). 
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Table A4.10: Destination preferences and choices in a model of maximum individual-level conditioning (including 
labour market sorting patterns) 
dependent variable preferences in 𝐷  choice in 𝐷  choice in 𝐴 
observed location choices 𝑆 ≤ 4  𝑆 = 1  𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷 = 164  𝐷 = 164  𝐷𝑈 = 71  𝐷𝑆=101  𝐴 ∈ [2,4] 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙                 
distance 0.9829 *** (0.0043)  0.9689 *** (0.0061)  0.9720 *** (0.0061)  0.9714 *** (0.0059)  0.9989 (0.0159) 
𝑥𝑙                       
population 1.0015 *** (0.0001)  1.0025 *** (0.0001)  1.0021 *** (0.0001)  1.0022 *** (0.0001)  1.0013 *** (0.0003) 
population density 0.9986 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)  0.9962 *** (0.0001)  0.9961 *** (0.0001)  0.9948 *** (0.0004) 
GDP (per capita) 0.9946 ** (0.0024)  1.0133 *** (0.0028)  1.0345 *** (0.0043)  1.0218 *** (0.0032)  0.9989 (0.0203) 
price level (€/sq.) 1.0015 *** (0.0002)  0.9978 *** (0.0004)  0.9982 *** (0.0004)  0.9988 *** (0.0004)  1.0026 * (0.0016) 
share of recreational area 1.1781 *** (0.0115)  1.3131 *** (0.0186)  1.2698 *** (0.0161)  1.2906 *** (0.0177)  1.3430 *** (0.0519) 
reg. centre reachability 0.9506 *** (0.0021)  0.9185 *** (0.0044)  0.9360 *** (0.0065)  0.9433 *** (0.0047)  0.9171 *** (0.0189) 
unemployment rate 1.1846 *** (0.0287)  1.0637 (0.0443)  1.2767 *** (0.0572)  1.2404 *** (0.0493)  1.4213 ** (0.2181) 
youth unemp. rate 0.9612 (0.0236)  1.7095 *** (0.0821)  1.5994 *** (0.0870)  1.7090 *** (0.0833)  2.1829 *** (0.3316) 
high-skilled emp. rate 0.9330 *** (0.0101)  0.8587 *** (0.0217)  0.7765 *** (0.0261)  0.7743 *** (0.0234)  0.5897 *** (0.0609) 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 1.0772 *** (0.0039)  1.1721 *** (0.0096)  1.1812 *** (0.0128)  1.2155 *** (0.0133)  1.3399 *** (0.0474) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                   
female 0.9990 (0.0007)  0.9992 (0.0010)  0.9992  (0.0009)  0.9993  (0.0009)  0.9951 ** (0.0019) 
age 1.0002 (0.0002)  0.9998 (0.0003)  0.9998  (0.0003)  0.9998  (0.0003)  0.9995  (0.0008) 
uecgrade 0.9994 (0.0006)  1.0054 *** (0.0009)  1.0052 *** (0.0008)  1.0051 *** (0.0008)  0.9998  (0.0017) 
academic household 1.0023 *** (0.0006)  1.0012 (0.0009)  1.0010  (0.0008)  1.0012  (0.0008)  1.0015  (0.0017) 
in partnership 0.9981 *** (0.0007)  0.9980 ** (0.0009)  0.9982 ** (0.0009)  0.9981 ** (0.0009)  0.9996  (0.0018) 
vocational education 0.9991 (0.0012)  0.9965 ** (0.0016)  0.9963 ** (0.0016)  0.9966 ** (0.0016)  1.0025  (0.0043) 
moved during school 1.0015 ** (0.0007)  1.0018 * (0.0010)  1.0017 * (0.0010)  1.0016 * (0.0010)  0.9990  (0.0019) 
exchange participation 1.0026 *** (0.0007)  1.0029 *** (0.0009)  1.0026 *** (0.0009)  1.0027 *** (0.0009)  1.0021  (0.0017) 
stay abroad 1.0045 *** (0.0007)  1.0048 *** (0.0009)  1.0046 *** (0.0009)  1.0045 *** (0.0009)  1.0004  (0.0019) 
risk attitude low 0.9980 *** (0.0008)  0.9976 * (0.0014)  0.9979  (0.0013)  0.9977 * (0.0013)  0.9982 (0.0022) 
high 1.0000 (0.0011)  1.0014 (0.0017)  1.0010  (0.0016)  1.0012  (0.0017)  1.0011 (0.0028) 
patience low 0.9979 ** (0.0010)  0.9968 ** (0.0016)  0.9967 ** (0.0015)  0.9968 ** (0.0015)  0.9871 *** (0.0043) 
high 1.0020 ** (0.0009)  1.0034 ** (0.0014)  1.0033 ** (0.0013)  1.0036 *** (0.0014)  0.9985 (0.0023) 
extraversion low 0.9989 (0.0011)  0.9996 (0.0015)  0.9998  (0.0015)  0.9997  (0.0014)  0.9967 (0.0030) 
high 0.9990 (0.0008)  0.9990 (0.0010)  0.9988  (0.0010)  0.9990  (0.0010)  1.0007 (0.0021) 
openness low 0.9986 (0.0009)  0.9981 (0.0011)  0.9980 * (0.0011)  0.9981 * (0.0011)  0.9941 *** (0.0022) 
high 1.0017 ** (0.0008)  1.0015 (0.0011)  1.0014  (0.0011)  1.0014  (0.0011)  1.0033 * (0.0019) 
neuroticism low 0.9988 (0.0010)  0.9977 (0.0014)  0.9976 * (0.0013)  0.9978  (0.0013)  0.9960 (0.0031) 
high 1.0012 (0.0009)  0.9997 (0.0012)  0.9997  (0.0012)  0.9996  (0.0012)  0.9979 (0.0023) 
conscientiousness low 0.9997 (0.0008)  1.0002 (0.0011)  1.0004  (0.0010)  1.0003  (0.0010)  1.0004 (0.0022) 
high 0.9989 (0.0008)  0.9981 (0.0013)  0.9978 * (0.0013)  0.9981  (0.0013)  1.0052 ** (0.0021) 
agreeableness low 0.9988 (0.0009)  0.9982 (0.0011)  0.9980 * (0.0011)  0.9982  (0.0011)  1.0025 (0.0024) 
high 1.0000 (0.0008)  1.0016 (0.0011)  1.0014  (0.0011)  1.0016  (0.0011)  1.0051 ** (0.0020) 
adaptability low 0.9983 * (0.0009)  0.9979 * (0.0012)  0.9979 * (0.0012)  0.9979 * (0.0012)  1.0033 (0.0021) 
high 1.0024 *** (0.0009)  1.0037 *** (0.0012)  1.0039 *** (0.0011)  1.0037 *** (0.0011)  1.0068 *** (0.0022) 
importance of proximity 
to family 
low 1.0020 ** (0.0008)  1.0030 ** (0.0012)  1.0030 ** (0.0012)  1.0029 *** (0.0011)  1.0027 (0.0020) 
high 0.9985 (0.0011)  0.9991 (0.0015)  0.9987  (0.0015)  0.9989  (0.0015)  1.0022 (0.0035) 
importance of proximity 
to friends 
low 1.0020 ** (0.0009)  1.0020 (0.0013)  1.0020  (0.0013)  1.0020  (0.0013)  1.0011 (0.0021) 
high 0.9981 (0.0012)  1.0000 (0.0016)  1.0000  (0.0016)  1.0000  (0.0015)  0.9991 (0.0032) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙                  
GDP (pc) # risk attitude low 0.9998 (0.0035)  1.0016 (0.0043)  1.0002  (0.0063)  1.0025  (0.0041)  1.0289 (0.0279) 
 high 1.0010 (0.0040)  0.9971 (0.0070)  0.9972  (0.0086)  0.9982  (0.0065)  1.0355 (0.0260) 
patience low 0.9943 (0.0038)  0.9928 (0.0056)  0.9952  (0.0074)  0.9972  (0.0050)  0.9844 (0.0490) 
 high 0.9992 (0.0035)  1.0071 (0.0047)  1.0032  (0.0070)  1.0032  (0.0046)  0.9817 (0.0348) 
price level # risk attitude low 0.9996 (0.0004)  0.9992 (0.0006)  0.9991  (0.0006)  0.9988 * (0.0006)  0.9973 (0.0021) 
 high 0.9995 (0.0005)  1.0003 (0.0007)  1.0000  (0.0008)  1.0005  (0.0008)  0.9945 (0.0036) 
patience low 0.9993 (0.0004)  0.9977 *** (0.0008)  0.9972 *** (0.0010)  0.9972 *** (0.0009)  0.9901 ** (0.0046) 
 high 1.0002 (0.0004)  0.9987 ** (0.0006)  0.9990  (0.0007)  0.9993  (0.0007)  0.9949 (0.0037) 
unemp. rate # risk attitude low 0.9244 ** (0.0342)  0.9094 (0.0674)  0.8674  (0.0789)  0.9092  (0.0710)  0.8080 (0.2148) 
 high 0.9950 (0.0574)  1.0405 (0.0996)  1.0639  (0.1152)  1.0254  (0.1009)  1.0162 (0.3720) 
patience low 0.9436 (0.0436)  1.0477 (0.0853)  1.0677  (0.1060)  1.0703  (0.0895)  0.9575 (0.3312) 
 high 1.0361 (0.0433)  1.0120 (0.0747)  0.9463  (0.0866)  0.9839  (0.0773)  1.2090 (0.3487) 
youth unemp. 
Rate # 
risk attitude low 1.0704 * (0.0420)  1.1633 * (0.0923)  1.1985 * (0.1179)  1.1586 * (0.0980)  1.3567 (0.3599) 
 high 1.0038 (0.0613)  0.9555 (0.0957)  0.9688  (0.1177)  0.9954  (0.1064)  1.1943 (0.4558) 
patience low 1.1234 ** (0.0541)  1.0071 (0.0865)  0.9739  (0.1046)  0.9756  (0.0878)  1.2813 (0.4394) 
 high 0.9772 (0.0441)  0.9331 (0.0765)  0.9894  (0.1022)  0.9382  (0.0816)  0.9853 (0.3015) 
high-skilled 
emp. rate # 
risk attitude low 1.0375 ** (0.0182)  0.9826 (0.0398)  0.9865  (0.0517)  0.9722  (0.0457)  0.8295 (0.1394) 
 high 1.0161 (0.0259)  0.9801 (0.0534)  0.9465  (0.0693)  0.9603  (0.0569)  0.9362 (0.1955) 
patience low 0.9895 (0.0245)  1.0977 * (0.0564)  1.0828  (0.0721)  1.1111 * (0.0625)  0.9408 (0.2297) 
 high 0.9602 ** (0.0182)  0.8987 *** (0.0359)  0.9039 * (0.0485)  0.9157 ** (0.0411)  0.4758 *** (0.1181) 
high-skilled 
emp rate 
 (<34 yrs) # 
risk attitude low 0.9939 (0.0056)  1.0175 (0.0134)  1.0168  (0.0164)  1.0199  (0.0160)  1.0570 (0.0533) 
 high 0.9926 (0.0078)  1.0001 (0.0165)  1.0118  (0.0206)  1.0094  (0.0191)  1.0798 (0.0834) 
patience low 1.0096 (0.0078)  0.9793 (0.0155)  0.9800  (0.0189)  0.9734  (0.0173)  1.0823 (0.0841) 
 high 1.0066 (0.0061)  1.0264 ** (0.0131)  1.0248  (0.0162)  1.0207  (0.0154)  1.2209 *** (0.0866) 
observations 1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷  1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑆  1139 × ?̅? 
LL(0) -21393.29  -8730.97  -7297.71  -7901.09  -1259.80 
LL -13388.34  -4092.43  -3764.37  -3920.43  -462.00 
df 64  64  64  64  64 
Wald 𝜒2 7104.18  6817.76  4195.65  5806.43  585.44 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.3742  0.5313  0.4842  0.5038  0.6333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific characteristics. 
?̅? ≈ 3.1370 is the average number of observed alternatives in the admission set of those 1139 individuals whose admission set included more than 
one alternative. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0). 
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Table A4.11: Distribution of coefficient estimates for the Hausman-McFadden test 
dependent variable choice in 𝐷 
observed location choices 𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷 = 164 
 full destination space  restricted destination space (𝐷𝑅 = 163) 
 
coeff.  s.e. 
 
𝛽𝑅   
 no. of 
significant  𝛽𝑅  
(𝛼 = 0.1) 
 
 mean 
(coeff.) 
standard 
deviation 
min max 𝑞 = 0.05 𝑞 = 0.95  
𝑥𝑖𝑙           
distance -0.0309 *** (0.0062)  -0.0310 0.0021 -0.0569 -0.0274 -0.0311 -0.0303 164 
𝑥𝑙             
population 0.0025 *** (0.0001)  0.0025 0.0002 0.0017 0.0035 0.0024 0.0025 164 
population density -0.0039 *** (0.0001)  -0.0039 0.0002 -0.0052 -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0038 164 
GDP (per capita) 0.0137 *** (0.0019)  0.0135 0.0039 -0.0227 0.0323 0.0118 0.0149 163 
price level (€/sq.) -0.0029 *** (0.0003)  -0.0030 0.0015 -0.0211 -0.0015 -0.0033 -0.0025 164 
share of recreational area 0.2680 *** (0.0140)  0.2683 0.0262 0.1423 0.5615 0.2627 0.2695 164 
reg. centre reachability -0.0848 *** (0.0048)  -0.0851 0.0053 -0.1241 -0.0653 -0.0886 -0.0828 164 
unemployment rate 0.0527 * (0.0288)  0.0513 0.0434 -0.2915 0.2563 0.0259 0.0766 142 
youth unemp. rate 0.5565 *** (0.0338)  0.5572 0.0564 0.3028 1.1568 0.5233 0.5952 164 
high-skilled emp. rate -0.1663 *** (0.0174)  -0.1656 0.0396 -0.4356 0.2338 -0.1826 -0.1554 164 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 0.1642 *** (0.0060)  0.1641 0.0135 0.0378 0.2723 0.1604 0.1701 164 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙            
female -0.0008 (0.0009)  -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0007 0 
age -0.0002 (0.0003)  -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 0 
uecgrade 0.0054 *** (0.0008)  0.0054 0.0005 0.0026 0.0108 0.0053 0.0054 164 
academic household 0.0011 (0.0009)  0.0011 0.0001 0.0003 0.0017 0.0011 0.0012 1 
in partnership -0.0021 ** (0.0009)  -0.0021 0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0020 163 
vocational education -0.0034 ** (0.0016)  -0.0034 0.0006 -0.0097 -0.0012 -0.0035 -0.0033 162 
moved during school 0.0018 * (0.0010)  0.0018 0.0001 0.0006 0.0022 0.0018 0.0018 162 
exchange participation 0.0028 *** (0.0009)  0.0028 0.0002 0.0009 0.0034 0.0028 0.0028 163 
stay abroad 0.0049 *** (0.0009)  0.0049 0.0002 0.0024 0.0057 0.0048 0.0049 163 
risk attitude low -0.0018 * (0.0011)  -0.0018 0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0018 139 
high 0.0011 (0.0013)  0.0011 0.0002 0.0000 0.0026 0.0010 0.0011 1 
patience low -0.0011 (0.0012)  -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0010 0 
high 0.0023 ** (0.0011)  0.0023 0.0001 0.0011 0.0029 0.0023 0.0024 162 
extraversion low -0.0005 (0.0015)  -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 0 
high -0.0010 (0.0010)  -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0010 0 
openness low -0.0019 * (0.0011)  -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0019 159 
high 0.0014 (0.0011)  0.0014 0.0001 0.0002 0.0018 0.0014 0.0014 0 
neuroticism low -0.0023 (0.0014)  -0.0022 0.0002 -0.0037 -0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0022 11 
high -0.0002 (0.0013)  -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0012 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0002 0 
conscientiousness low 0.0002 (0.0010)  0.0002 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0014 0.0001 0.0002 0 
high -0.0019 (0.0013)  -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0030 -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0019 2 
agreeableness low -0.0019 * (0.0011)  -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0018 150 
high 0.0016 (0.0011)  0.0016 0.0001 0.0008 0.0031 0.0015 0.0016 2 
adaptability low -0.0021 * (0.0012)  -0.0021 0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0021 160 
high 0.0036 *** (0.0011)  0.0036 0.0002 0.0023 0.0049 0.0036 0.0036 164 
importance of proximity 
to family 
low 0.0031 *** (0.0012)  0.0031 0.0001 0.0019 0.0036 0.0031 0.0031 163 
high -0.0007 (0.0015)  -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0023 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0007 0 
importance of proximity 
to friends 
low 0.0020 (0.0013)  0.0020 0.0002 0.0012 0.0034 0.0019 0.0020 1 
high -0.0002 (0.0016)  -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0001 0 
observations 1712 × 𝐷  𝐼𝑅 × 𝐷𝑅 
LL(0) -8730.97  -8667.33 294.85 -8720.50 -5857.81 -8720.50 -8720.50  
LL -4116.20  -4074.49 190.79 -4116.20 -2297.90 -4116.18 -4029.24  
df 40  40 
Wald 𝜒2 6793.91  6800.06 736.12 2365.19 13684.55 6257.24 7063.87  
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
pseudo R-squared 0.5286  0.5302 0.0091 0.5261 0.6077 0.5280 0.5353  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The restricted destination space is always of size 𝐷𝑅 = 𝐷 − 1 = 163, since in each of the 164 restricted samples one 
alternative is excluded. The relevant restricted sample size varies, such that 𝐼𝑅 ∈ [1150,1712]. Reported values for estimated 
coefficients in the restricted destination space are always aggregates for the 164 restricted samples. The same holds for the 
estimation diagnostics aside from the number of observations and the model degrees of freedom. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual-specific characteristics. The pseudo 
R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0). 
  
   
 
 
Table A4.12: Competing destinations framework – choices for alternative definitions of the destination space 
dependent variable choice in 𝐷  choice in 𝐷 
observed location choices 𝑆 = 1  𝑆 = 1 
destination space 𝐷𝑈 = 71  𝐷𝑆=101 
 OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙                          
distance 0.9825 *** (0.0006)  0.9727 *** (0.0067)  0.9705 *** (0.0059)  0.9778 *** (0.0063)  0.9822 *** (0.0006)  0.9728 *** (0.0061)  0.9706 *** (0.0060)  0.9776 *** (0.0059) 
𝑥𝑙                                                  
population 1.0033 *** (0.0003)  1.0033 *** (0.0003)        1.0032 *** (0.0002)  1.0037 *** (0.0002)  1.0037 *** (0.0002)        1.0037 *** (0.0002) 
population density 0.9947 *** (0.0001)  0.9947 *** (0.0001)        0.9947 *** (0.0001)  0.9941 *** (0.0001)  0.9941 *** (0.0001)        0.9941 *** (0.0001) 
GDP (per capita) 1.0841 *** (0.0067)  1.0833 *** (0.0065)        1.0863 *** (0.0061)  1.0452 *** (0.0039)  1.0444 *** (0.0037)        1.0449 *** (0.0038) 
price level (€/sq.) 0.9912 *** (0.0004)  0.9914 *** (0.0004)        0.9913 *** (0.0004)  0.9955 *** (0.0004)  0.9956 *** (0.0004)        0.9957 *** (0.0004) 
share of recreational area 1.2886 *** (0.0136)  1.2984 *** (0.0139)        1.3022 *** (0.0141)  1.3259 *** (0.0149)  1.3309 *** (0.0151)        1.3331 *** (0.0152) 
reg. centre reachability 0.9065 *** (0.0147)  0.9116 *** (0.0138)        0.9148 *** (0.0134)  0.8990 *** (0.0101)  0.8998 *** (0.0098)        0.9012 *** (0.0097) 
unemployment rate 2.0712 *** (0.1416)  2.0897 *** (0.1347)        2.1152 *** (0.1330)  1.7350 *** (0.0934)  1.7623 *** (0.0924)        1.7768 *** (0.0917) 
youth unemp. rate 1.2814 *** (0.0630)  1.2782 *** (0.0614)        1.2826 *** (0.0613)  1.6498 *** (0.0791)  1.6193 *** (0.0755)        1.6195 *** (0.0746) 
high-skilled emp. rate 0.7019 *** (0.0224)  0.6946 *** (0.0220)        0.6912 *** (0.0218)  0.6632 *** (0.0212)  0.6650 *** (0.0209)        0.6641 *** (0.0208) 
high-skilled emp. rate (<34) 1.2650 *** (0.0162)  1.2703 *** (0.0161)        1.2743 *** (0.0162)  1.3239 *** (0.0170)  1.3218 *** (0.0168)        1.3234 *** (0.0168) 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑖𝑙                                           
female    0.9991  (0.0009)  0.9993  (0.0010)  0.9991  (0.0010)     0.9994  (0.0009)  0.9993  (0.0010)  0.9992  (0.0009) 
age    0.9997  (0.0004)  1.0001  (0.0003)  0.9995  (0.0003)     0.9997  (0.0003)  1.0001  (0.0003)  0.9995  (0.0003) 
uecgrade    1.0062 *** (0.0009)  1.0040 *** (0.0009)  1.0055 *** (0.0009)     1.0063 *** (0.0009)  1.0041 *** (0.0009)  1.0057 *** (0.0009) 
academic household    1.0013  (0.0009)  1.0012  (0.0009)  1.0010  (0.0009)     1.0013  (0.0008)  1.0012  (0.0009)  1.0010  (0.0009) 
in partnership    0.9979 ** (0.0009)  0.9975 *** (0.0009)  0.9983 * (0.0009)     0.9978 ** (0.0009)  0.9975 *** (0.0010)  0.9982 ** (0.0009) 
vocational education    0.9944 *** (0.0019)  0.9965 ** (0.0016)  0.9955 ** (0.0018)     0.9947 *** (0.0018)  0.9961 ** (0.0017)  0.9958 ** (0.0017) 
moved during school    1.0026 ** (0.0010)  1.0013  (0.0010)  1.0018 * (0.0010)     1.0022 ** (0.0010)  1.0012  (0.0010)  1.0015  (0.0010) 
exchange participation    1.0027 *** (0.0009)  1.0030 *** (0.0009)  1.0027 *** (0.0009)     1.0026 *** (0.0009)  1.0030 *** (0.0009)  1.0027 *** (0.0009) 
stay abroad    1.0053 *** (0.0010)  1.0049 *** (0.0009)  1.0041 *** (0.0010)     1.0051 *** (0.0009)  1.0048 *** (0.0009)  1.0039 *** (0.0010) 
risk attitude low        0.9987  (0.0011)  0.9980 * (0.0012)         0.9988  (0.0011)  0.9981 * (0.0011) 
high        1.0011  (0.0013)  1.0002  (0.0012)         1.0011  (0.0012)  0.9999  (0.0012) 
patience low        0.9989  (0.0013)  0.9988  (0.0014)         0.9990  (0.0013)  0.9993  (0.0013) 
high        1.0025 ** (0.0011)  1.0031 *** (0.0011)         1.0026 ** (0.0011)  1.0030 *** (0.0011) 
extraversion low        0.9985  (0.0016)  1.0004  (0.0015)         0.9982  (0.0016)  1.0003  (0.0014) 
high        0.9986  (0.0010)  0.9991  (0.0011)         0.9986  (0.0011)  0.9994  (0.0011) 
openness low        0.9986  (0.0012)  0.9975 ** (0.0012)         0.9984  (0.0012)  0.9974 ** (0.0011) 
high        1.0005  (0.0011)  1.0009  (0.0011)         1.0005  (0.0011)  1.0010  (0.0011) 
neuroticism low        0.9981  (0.0014)  0.9974 * (0.0014)         0.9981  (0.0014)  0.9978  (0.0014) 
high        1.0000  (0.0013)  0.9997  (0.0013)         1.0001  (0.0013)  0.9995  (0.0012) 
conscientiousness low        1.0006  (0.0011)  1.0004  (0.0010)         1.0007  (0.0011)  1.0001  (0.0010) 
high        0.9973 ** (0.0014)  0.9975 * (0.0014)         0.9974 * (0.0014)  0.9979  (0.0013) 
agreeableness low        0.9979 * (0.0011)  0.9979 * (0.0011)         0.9979 * (0.0011)  0.9983  (0.0011) 
high        1.0018  (0.0011)  1.0018 * (0.0011)         1.0018  (0.0011)  1.0018 * (0.0011) 
adaptability low        0.9981  (0.0013)  0.9978 * (0.0013)         0.9980  (0.0014)  0.9976 ** (0.0012) 
high        1.0031 *** (0.0011)  1.0042 *** (0.0011)         1.0033 *** (0.0011)  1.0040 *** (0.0011) 
importance of 
proximity to family 
low        1.0031 *** (0.0012)  1.0028 ** (0.0012)         1.0030 *** (0.0012)  1.0027 ** (0.0011) 
high        0.9989  (0.0015)  0.9984  (0.0017)         0.9990  (0.0015)  0.9988  (0.0016) 
importance of 
proximity to friends 
low        1.0021  (0.0013)  1.0020  (0.0013)         1.0020  (0.0013)  1.0018  (0.0012) 
high        0.9995  (0.0016)  0.9998  (0.0018)         0.9994  (0.0016)  0.9998  (0.0017) 
ln 𝐴𝑙: accessibility of 𝑙                 
observations 1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑈  1712 × 𝐷𝑆  1712 × 𝐷𝑆  1712 × 𝐷𝑆  1712 × 𝐷𝑆 
LL(0) -7297.71  -7297.71  -7297.71  -7297.71  -7901.09  -7901.09  -7901.09  -7901.09 
LL -3641.39  -3554.23  -5223.35  -3495.64  -3681.41  -3600.46  -5912.73  -3548.52 
df 12  21  31  41  12  21  31  41 
Wald 𝜒2 4029.08  3940.33  1484.96  3983.95  11619.98  8715.11  1516.65  9779.34 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.5010  0.5130  0.2842  0.5210  0.5341  0.5443  0.2517  0.5509 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ‘#’ indicates interactions between distance and individual specific characteristics. The first restricted potential destination space 𝐷𝑈 composes only of locations with a 
university on site (excluding those with exclusively universities of applied sciences). The second modification 𝐷𝑆 includes only those potential destinations that have either been finally chosen or were selected into the three 
most preferred alternatives at the application or the final selection stage by at least on subject in the sample. The corresponding results for the baseline destination space 𝐷 = 164 can be found in Table 4.3. 
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Table A5.1: Descriptive statistics for model variables 
category variable label short description scale N min max mean std.dev. 
modified 
scale 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1  residential move occurrence of a residential 
move from 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1 (SOEP-
Geocode) 
binary 10793 0 1 0.084 /  
distance distance between old and new 
address (SOEP-Geocode) 
km 10793 0 761.758 3.915 34.324  
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡  distance conditional logit approach: 
distance between RPU 
centroids 
km 75936 0 785.454 315.356 155.387  
𝑥𝑙𝑡  total population Gemeindeverzeichnis- 
Informationssystem 
cardinal, 
in 1000 
576 201.783 3501.872 848.4222 626.809  
population density INKAR cardinal 576 1.023 865 210.884 173.334  
GDP (per capita) INKAR cardinal, 
1000 € 
576 17 57.2 29.965 7.364  
share of recreational 
area 
INKAR % 576 0.3 12.0 1.452 1.680  
unemployment rate INKAR % 576 2.2 16.1 7.316 3.238  
high-skilled 
employment rate 
INKAR % 576 4.7 23.7 9.859 3.217  
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑜𝑐   gender 1: female, 0: male binary 10793 0 1 0.602 /  
age age in years cardinal 10793 18 64 44.725 11.837  
partnership 1: currently in a relationship, 0: 
no relationship 
binary 10793 0 1 0.301 /  
educational 
attainment 
0: middle vocational or below; 
1: secondary (vocational, Abitur 
or higher vocational); 2: tertiary  
(based on pgisced97) 
ordinal 10793 0 2 / /  
kids number of children living in HH cardinal 10793 0 6 0.305 0.688  
HH income household income cardinal 10793 0 40000 1712.614 1288.591  
own dwelling ownership of dwelling (based 
on hgowner) 
binary 10793 0 1 0.238 /  
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑎𝑏  labour market 
participation 
1: full-time; 2: part-time; 3: not 
working 
ordinal 10793 1 3 / /  
 unemployment 
experience 
cumulative months of previous 
unemployment spells 
cardinal 10793 0 37 1.974 3.635  
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑡   satisfaction with 
overall life 
11-point scale (0: completely 
dissatisfied; 10: completely 
satisfied) 
ordinal 10793 0 10 6.535 1.869  
satisfaction with HH 
income 
11-point scale (0: completely 
dissatisfied; 10: completely 
satisfied) 
ordinal 10793 0 10 5.571 2.531  
satisfaction with 
dwelling 
11-point scale (0: completely 
dissatisfied; 10: completely 
satisfied) 
ordinal 10793 0 10 7.295 1.993  
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑏  previous moves total number of recorded 
residential moves (since 2001) 
binary 10793 0 10 0.964 1.215  
covered distance sum of recorded covered 
distance (since 2001) 
binary 10793 0 1467.635 39.931 126.241  
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
  
 
extraversion Big-Five trait; 7-point scale (1: 
low; 7: high); 2009 and 2013 
ordinal 3560 1 7 4.852 1.146  
 neuroticism Big- Five trait; 7-point scale (1: 
low; 7: high); 2009 and 2013 
ordinal 3567 1 7 4.614 1.233  
 openness Big- Five trait; 7-point scale (1: 
low; 7: high); 2009 and 2013 
ordinal 3569 1 7 3.792 1.238  
 conscientiousness Big- Five trait; 7-point scale (1: 
low; 7: high); 2009 and 2013 
ordinal 3563 1 7 5.800 0.913  
 agreeableness Big- Five trait; 7-point scale (1: 
low; 7: high); 2009 and 2013 
ordinal 3561 1 7 5.392 0.930  
patience 11-point scale (0: very 
impatient; 10: very patient); 
2008 and 2013 
ordinal 3710 0 10 5.165 2.169  
risk attitude willingness to take risks, 11-
point scale (0: low; 10: high) 
ordinal 10793 0 10 4.562 2.246  
Note: Reported figures are pooled descriptive statistics from the sample time horizon 2008-2014. More specifically, variables indexed 𝑡 
refer to 2008-2013, outcome variables indexed 𝑡 + 1 to 2009-2014. Outcome variables 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 are reported for the full sample of 10793 
person-year observations, as are individual level variables 𝑣𝑖𝑡. Reported statistics for the destination specific variables 𝑥𝑙𝑡 refer to the 96 
unique regional planning units (RPU) over the time horizon 2008-2012, yielding 576 destination-year observations. Distances to potential 
destinations (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡) are recorded for 75936 person-destination-year combinations. If a summary statistic for a specific variable does not 
have any meaningful interpretation, ‘/’ is displayed. Modified variables have been standardised and categorised into three distinct 
groups: those scoring low (score below the mean minus one standard deviation), the reference group of medium-type individuals (score 
within the range of one standard deviation around the mean) and those scoring high (score more than one standard deviation above the 
mean). 
   
   
 
 
 
Table A5.2: Moving likelihood in the binary destination space – sequential model derivation 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 
model pooled logit 
time horizon 6 years  2 years  1 year 
  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑐  gender (female=1) 1.3487 *** (0.1120)  1.3617 *** (0.1159)  1.3460 *** (0.1115)  1.3731 ** (0.2008)  1.2941 * (0.1966)  1.4309  (0.3171)  1.3971  (0.3215)  1.3725  (0.3149) 
 age (years) 0.9569 *** (0.0032)  0.9547 *** (0.0034)  0.9624 *** (0.0035)  0.9621 *** (0.0061)  0.9618 *** (0.0062)  0.9526 *** (0.0089)  0.9530 *** (0.0091)  0.9521 *** (0.0090) 
 
educational attainment                        
 secondary 0.9458  (0.1090)  0.9711  (0.1140)  0.9746  (0.1124)  1.0237  (0.2126)  0.9689  (0.2058)  0.9282  (0.2888)  0.9062  (0.2920)  0.9433  (0.3044) 
 tertiary 0.8844  (0.0836)  0.9248  (0.0887)  0.8882  (0.0846)  0.9754  (0.1581)  0.9384  (0.1546)  1.2076  (0.2781)  1.1964  (0.2843)  1.2613  (0.3040) 
 number of kids in HH 0.9227  (0.0482)  0.8725 ** (0.0471)  0.8811 ** (0.0461)  0.7138 *** (0.0907)  0.7092 *** (0.0915)  0.7832  (0.1373)  0.7908  (0.1424)  0.7942  (0.1436) 
 HH income 1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0001)  1.0000  (0.0001)  1.0000  (0.0001)  1.0000  (0.0001)  1.0001  (0.0001) 
 partnership 1.0582  (0.0798)  1.0250  (0.0785)  1.0223  (0.0785)  0.9569  (0.1333)  0.9467  (0.1339)  0.8295  (0.1681)  0.8420  (0.1719)  0.8329  (0.1720) 
 dwelling ownership 0.3463 *** (0.0475)  0.3918 *** (0.0541)  0.4304 *** (0.0596)  0.4292 *** (0.1077)  0.4301 *** (0.1084)  0.4920 * (0.1894)  0.4837 * (0.1889)  0.4820 * (0.1883) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏  labour market participation                        
 full-time 0.6700 *** (0.0705)  0.6812 *** (0.0730)  0.6556 *** (0.0683)  0.7006 * (0.1299)  0.6950 * (0.1313)  0.4897 *** (0.1332)  0.4929 ** (0.1374)  0.4948 ** (0.1383) 
 part-time 0.9120  (0.0908)  0.9151  (0.0928)  0.8957  (0.0901)  1.0138  (0.1891)  1.0002  (0.1894)  0.8251  (0.2222)  0.8374  (0.2254)  0.8553  (0.2328) 
 unempl. exp. (months) 0.9644 ** (0.0137)  0.9570 *** (0.0141)  0.9461 *** (0.0141)  0.9275 *** (0.0247)  0.9289 *** (0.0248)  0.9132 ** (0.0387)  0.9150 ** (0.0378)  0.9136 ** (0.0374) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡  
satisfaction with                        
 life (low)    1.0541  (0.1198)  1.0640  (0.1215)  0.8367  (0.1780)  0.8446  (0.1841)  0.6765  (0.2247)  0.6600  (0.2261)  0.6635  (0.2252) 
 life (high)    1.4061 *** (0.1625)  1.3972 *** (0.1625)  1.3791  (0.2785)  1.3854  (0.2888)  1.1389  (0.3488)  1.1731  (0.3725)  1.1609  (0.3778) 
 hh income (low)    0.8101 * (0.0933)  0.8047 * (0.0923)  1.0854  (0.2265)  1.0796  (0.2266)  1.0032  (0.3223)  1.0309  (0.3332)  1.0785  (0.3440) 
 hh income (high)    0.7479 * (0.1135)  0.7547 * (0.1139)  0.7504  (0.1952)  0.7498  (0.1953)  1.0260  (0.3651)  1.0151  (0.3596)  0.9976  (0.3586) 
 dwelling (low)    2.7050 *** (0.2318)  2.7685 *** (0.2383)  2.7643 *** (0.4285)  2.7578 *** (0.4292)  3.6037 *** (0.8186)  3.4321 *** (0.7819)  3.4645 *** (0.7944) 
 dwelling (high)    0.7972  (0.1168)  0.8063  (0.1193)  1.0488  (0.2586)  1.0324  (0.2590)  0.8700  (0.3304)  0.9383  (0.3622)  0.9721  (0.3817) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏  previous moves       1.2180 *** (0.0372)  1.2591 *** (0.0631)  1.2543 *** (0.0634)  1.2050 ** (0.0880)  1.2035 ** (0.0910)  1.2131 ** (0.0919) 
 covered distance       1.0003  (0.0002)  1.0007 ** (0.0004)  1.0007 * (0.0004)  1.0000  (0.0006)  0.9998  (0.0007)  0.9998  (0.0006) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
  risk attitude (low)       0.9721  (0.0939)  0.7902  (0.1366)  0.8339  (0.1473)  0.3720 *** (0.1213)  0.3594 *** (0.1175)  0.3810 *** (0.1257) 
 risk attitude (high)       1.1570  (0.1314)  1.0085  (0.2172)  0.9885  (0.2195)  1.0060  (0.2625)  1.0667  (0.2945)  1.0828  (0.2985) 
 openness (low)             0.7968  (0.1581)     0.6343  (0.1997)  0.6442  (0.2032) 
 openness (high)             1.1648  (0.1946)     0.8198  (0.2092)  0.8187  (0.2113) 
 extraversion (low)             0.9338  (0.1814)     1.1023  (0.3084)  1.0713  (0.2988) 
 extraversion (high)               1.0205  (0.1951)     0.9501  (0.2764)  0.9816  (0.2890) 
 neuroticism (low)             0.8405  (0.1720)     1.0636  (0.3126)  1.0863  (0.3223) 
 neuroticism (high)             1.1810  (0.2238)     1.6378 * (0.4479)  1.8482 ** (0.5181) 
 conscientiousness (low)             0.8352  (0.1570)     0.7604  (0.2161)  0.7690  (0.2201) 
 conscientiousness (high)             1.0188  (0.2222)     0.8043  (0.2939)  0.8132  (0.3031) 
 agreeableness (low)             0.8269  (0.1524)     0.9679  (0.2564)  1.0885  (0.2948) 
 agreeableness (high)             0.8142  (0.1804)     0.7300  (0.2525)  0.7289  (0.2618) 
 patience (low)                      0.4963 ** (0.1574) 
 patience (high)                      0.9018  (0.2798) 
reference years 2008 - 2013  2008 - 2013  2008 - 2013  2009,2013  2009,2013  2013  2013  2013 
individuals 4044  4044  4044  2686  2686  1791  1791  1791 
individual-year observations 10793  10793  10793  3505  3505  1791  1791  1791 
LL(0) -3111.58  -3111.58  -3111.58  -990.70  -990.70  -468.70  -468.70  -468.70 
LL -2875.42  -2794.35  -2761.29  -863.84  -859.91  -396.56  -392.48  -389.75 
df 11  17  21  21  31  21  31  33 
Wald 𝜒2 400.50  531.66  623.05  226.12  238.89  129.93  137.88  148.69 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared 0.0759  0.1020  0.1126  0.1281  0.1320  0.1539  0.1626  0.1684 
test 𝐻0: coefficients in 𝑣𝑖  are jointly 
zero 
𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏 
 
 𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏 
  
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏  
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
, 𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏  
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
, 𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏  
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
, 𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏  
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
, 𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏  
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
, 𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏 
df (𝐻0) 3  9  2 13  2 13  12 23  2 13  12 23  14 25 
Wald 𝜒2 20.46  179.22  1.88 245.83  1.94 99.05  9.50 107.14  9.43 61.68  15.93 67.67  24.39 76.40 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0001  0.0000  0.3905 0.0000  0.3797 0.0000  0.6598 0.0000  0.0090 0.0000  0.1943 0.000  0.0411 0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as 1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0). 
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Table A5.3: Residential moving likelihood – comparison of pooled and panel specifications 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 (residential move) 
sample full sample  FE sample 
model pooled OLS RE 
 
pooled OLS FE RE Hausman test  
test on  
coefficient equality 
 
 
coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 𝛽𝐹𝐸   s.e. 𝛽𝑅𝐸    s.e. 𝛽𝐹𝐸 − 𝛽𝑅𝐸   s.e. 𝜒
2(1) p-value 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑐  gender (female=1) 0.2971 *** (0.0829) 0.2997 *** (0.0837)               
 age (years) -0.0383 *** (0.0037) -0.0388 *** (0.0037)  -0.0199 *** (0.0036) 1.4346 *** (0.0872) -0.0199 *** (0.0044) 1.4545 (0.0871) 278.79 0.0000 
 educational attainment                   
 secondary -0.0257  (0.1154) -0.0269  (0.1122)               
 tertiary -0.1185  (0.0952) -0.1213  (0.0983)               
 number of kids in HH -0.1266 ** (0.0523) -0.1287 ** (0.0557)  -0.1524 *** (0.0443) -0.8014 ** (0.4048) -0.1524 ** (0.0637) -0.6491 (0.3998) 2.64 0.1045 
 HH income 0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000  (0.0000)  0.0001  (0.0001) 0.0003 ** (0.0001) 0.0001  (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 3.62 0.0572 
 partnership 0.0220  (0.0768) 0.0222  (0.0792)  -0.0611  (0.0880) -0.4346 ** (0.1984) -0.0611  (0.0986) -0.3735 (0.1722) 4.71 0.0300 
 dwelling ownership -0.8430 *** (0.1384) -0.8481 *** (0.1388)  -0.0991  (0.1540) -0.6913  (0.4464) -0.0991  (0.1763) -0.5922 (0.4101) 2.09 0.1487 
𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏 labour market participation               
 full-time -0.4222 *** (0.1042) -0.4266 *** (0.1074)  -0.1373  (0.1130) 0.3860  (0.3156) -0.1373  (0.1359) 0.5233 (0.2848) 3.38 0.0662 
 part-time -0.1101  (0.1006) -0.1124  (0.1017)  0.0116  (0.1103) 0.3662  (0.2641) 0.0116  (0.1276) 0.3546 (0.2312) 2.35 0.1251 
 unempl. exp. (months) -0.0555 *** (0.0149) -0.0557 *** (0.0143)  0.0099  (0.0140) 0.2145  (0.1525) 0.0099  (0.0174) 0.2046 (0.1515) 1.82 0.1770 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 satisfaction with                   
 life low 0.0620  (0.1142) 0.0610  (0.1146)  0.0645  (0.1314) 0.2414  (0.2613) 0.0645  (0.1397) 0.1769 (0.2208) 0.64 0.4231 
 life high 0.3345 *** (0.1163) 0.3346 *** (0.1188)  0.2190  (0.1471) -0.0580  (0.2843) 0.2190  (0.1531) -0.2770 (0.2395) 1.34 0.2475 
 hh income low -0.2173 * (0.1147) -0.2202 * (0.1174)  -0.2326 * (0.1296) 0.2392  (0.2721) -0.2326  (0.1464) 0.4718 (0.2293) 4.23 0.0396 
 hh income high -0.2814 * (0.1509) -0.2874 ** (0.1441)  -0.2676  (0.1783) -0.6673 ** (0.3183) -0.2676  (0.1746) -0.3998 (0.2662) 2.26 0.1331 
 dwelling low 1.0183 *** (0.0861) 1.0329 *** (0.0881)  0.8399 *** (0.1040) 1.0505 *** (0.2021) 0.8398 *** (0.1082) 0.2106 (0.1707) 1.52 0.2172 
 dwelling high -0.2153  (0.1480) -0.2154  (0.1449)  -0.1118  (0.1719) -0.2450  (0.3248) -0.1118  (0.1753) -0.1332 (0.2734) 0.24 0.6262 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏 previous moves 0.1972 *** (0.0306) 0.1946 *** (0.0294)  -0.1580 *** (0.0391) -6.1773 *** (0.3264) -0.1580 *** (0.0360) -6.0193 (0.3244) 344.34 0.0000 
 covered distance 0.0003  (0.0002) 0.0003  (0.0002)  0.0001  (0.0002) 0.0048 *** (0.0010) 0.0001  (0.0002) 0.0046 (0.0010) 22.92 0.0000 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 risk attitude  low -0.0283  (0.0966) -0.0287  (0.0996)  -0.0457  (0.1071) -0.1424  (0.2433) -0.0457  (0.1224) -0.0967 (0.2102) 0.21 0.6455 
 risk attitude high 0.1458  (0.1136) 0.1454  (0.1148)  0.1099  (0.1308) 0.1367  (0.2687) 0.1099  (0.1483) 0.0267 (0.2241) 0.01 0.9050 
reference years 2008 – 2013 2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013 2008 – 2013 2008 – 2013   
individuals 4044 4044  601 601 601   
individual-year observations 10793 10793  2526 2526 2526   
log likelihood -2761.29 -2761.09  -1458.82 -387.58 -1458.82   
df 21 21  18 18 18 18  
𝜒2  623.05 559.96  124.69 994.40 112.59 364.55  
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The 𝜒2-statistic is a LR statistic in case of the fixed effects model (FE) and a Wald statistic in case of the random effects model (RE). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level in the pooled 
specifications, but not in the panel models to allow an application of the Hausman test. The Hausman test is based on a specification without those variables displaying insufficient variation over time to be 
used in a FE specification. In addition, the FE sample includes only those individuals for whom the dependent variable displays any variation over time. The resulting Hausman test statistic 𝜒2 = 364.55 leads 
to a rejection of the Null of joint coefficient equality, thus the FE model is to be preferred. Tests on specific coefficient equality (last column) provide information on the factors likely to drive this outcome. 
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Table A5.4: Heterogeneous decisions in the distance space, conditional on moving 
dependent variable log(moving distance) |𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1 
model pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e. 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑐  gender (female=1) 0.2367  (0.1789) 0.2354  (0.1790) 0.1826  (0.1768) 0.1668  (0.1768) 
 age (years) -0.0286 *** (0.0071) -0.0311 *** (0.0071) -0.0248 *** (0.0070) -0.0251 *** (0.0071) 
 
educational attainment         
 (higher) vocational -0.0536  (0.2485) -0.0846  (0.2483) -0.1227  (0.2464) -0.1050  (0.2483) 
 higher education 0.5671 ** (0.2243) 0.5633 ** (0.2227) 0.3316  (0.2241) 0.3281  (0.2280) 
 number of kids in HH -0.6139 *** (0.1293) -0.6258 *** (0.1254) -0.5592 *** (0.1236) -0.5559 *** (0.1224) 
 HH income -0.0000  (0.0001) 0.0000  (0.0001) 0.0000  (0.0001) 0.0000  (0.0001) 
 partnership -0.1276  (0.1644) -0.1075  (0.1669) -0.0631  (0.1653) -0.0611  (0.1650) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏  
labour market participation         
 full-time -0.3215  (0.2334) -0.2810  (0.2353) -0.2222  (0.2347) -0.2199  (0.2360) 
 part-time -0.0333  (0.2130) 0.0150  (0.2139) 0.0319  (0.2095) 0.0453  (0.2099) 
 unempl. exp. (months) -0.0565 * (0.0303) -0.0760 ** (0.0303) -0.0755 ** (0.0302) -0.0795 *** (0.0297) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡  
satisfaction with         
 life (low)   0.3884 * (0.2297) 0.4472 * (0.2283) 0.4413 * (0.2263) 
 life (high)   0.0148  (0.2366) -0.0501  (0.2358) -0.1171  (0.2394) 
 hh income (low)   0.4994 * (0.2725) 0.4787 * (0.2723) 0.4539 * (0.2714) 
 hh income (high)   -0.0256  (0.2851) -0.0859  (0.2805) -0.0905  (0.2803) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏  previous moves     -0.0312  (0.0553) -0.0282  (0.0551) 
 covered distance     0.0024 *** (0.0005) 0.0024 *** (0.0005) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
  risk attitude (low)       0.3735 * (0.2046) 
 risk attitude (high)       0.4158  (0.2568) 
reference years 2008 – 2013 2008 – 2013 2008 – 2013 2008 – 2013 
individuals 776 776 776 776 
individual-year observations 907 907 907 907 
df 10 14 16 18 
𝐹  6.30 5.63 6.50 6.10 
prob > 𝐹  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0812 0.0911 0.1179 0.1234 
test 𝐻0: coefficients in 𝑣𝑖  are jointly zero 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏 𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏 𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏 𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑏, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏, 𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
 
df (𝐻0) 3 4 7 2 9 2 11 
𝐹   1.68 2.48 2.31 11.23 4.18 2.64 3.92 
prob > 𝐹  0.1692 0.0426 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0719 0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
  
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
Table A5.5: Conditional logit results for heterogeneous selection probabilities in a high-dimensional destination space 
dependent variable 𝐼(𝑙𝑡+1|𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 1, 𝑧𝑖𝑙𝑡) 
 (1)  (1’)  (2)  (2’)  (3)  (3’)  (4)  (4’) 
 
 
OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e.  OR  s.e. 
𝑥𝑖𝑙   distance 0.9723 *** (0.0017)  0.9724 *** (0.0017)  0.9900 * (0.0054)  0.9901 * (0.0054)  0.9898 * (0.0052)  0.9900 * (0.0052)  0.9898 ** (0.0052)  0.9899 * (0.0052) 
𝑥𝑙   population (in 1000) 1.0005 *** (0.0001)  1.0005 *** (0.0001)        1.0006 *** (0.0001)  1.0005 *** (0.0001)  1.0006 *** (0.0001)  1.0005 *** (0.0001) 
 population density 1.0002  (0.0002)  1.0003  (0.0002)        1.0002  (0.0002)  1.0003  (0.0003)  1.0002  (0.0002)  1.0004  (0.0003) 
 GDP per capita (1000 €) 0.9820 * (0.0106)  0.9837  (0.0106)        0.9732 ** (0.0105)  0.9756 ** (0.0105)  0.9735 ** (0.0105)  0.9759 ** (0.0105) 
 share of recr. area 0.9692  (0.0279)  0.9770  (0.0285)        0.9807  (0.0303)  0.9892  (0.0306)  0.9827  (0.0305)  0.9912  (0.0307) 
𝑥𝑙
𝑈  unemployment rate  1.0148  (0.0276)  1.0070  (0.0283)        1.0005  (0.0286)  0.9911  (0.0291)  1.0199  (0.0306)  1.0094  (0.0307) 
𝑥𝑙
𝐻𝑆 high-skilled emp. rate 1.0392 * (0.0223)  1.0403 * (0.0222)        1.0621 *** (0.0239)  1.0606 *** (0.0234)  1.0503 ** (0.0247)  1.0492 ** (0.0243) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑐#𝑥𝑖𝑙    gender (female=1)        1.0082 ** (0.0035)  1.0080 ** (0.0035)  1.0077 ** (0.0034)  1.0077 ** (0.0034)  1.0077 ** (0.0034)  1.0077 ** (0.0034) 
 age (years)        0.9995 *** (0.0001)  0.9995 *** (0.0001)  0.9995 *** (0.0001)  0.9995 *** (0.0001)  0.9995 *** (0.0001)  0.9995 *** (0.0001) 
 educational attainment                      
 secondary        0.9934  (0.0052)  0.9935  (0.0051)  0.9931  (0.0051)  0.9933  (0.0051)  0.9932  (0.0051)  0.9933  (0.0051) 
 tertiary        1.0115 *** (0.0036)  1.0113 *** (0.0036)  1.0115 *** (0.0035)  1.0114 *** (0.0035)  1.0114 *** (0.0035)  1.0113 *** (0.0035) 
 number of kids in HH        0.9909 * (0.0051)  0.9909 * (0.0051)  0.9901 * (0.0053)  0.9901 * (0.0053)  0.9902 * (0.0053)  0.9902 * (0.0053) 
 HH income        1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0000)  1.0000  (0.0000) 
 partnership        0.9957 * (0.0025)  0.9958 * (0.0024)  0.9963  (0.0024)  0.9962  (0.0024)  0.9963  (0.0024)  0.9962  (0.0023) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑐#𝑥𝑖𝑙    LM participation                      
 full-time        0.9977  (0.0038)  0.9976  (0.0038)  0.9976  (0.0036)  0.9976  (0.0036)  0.9976  (0.0036)  0.9976  (0.0036) 
 part-time        0.9982  (0.0033)  0.9985  (0.0033)  0.9984  (0.0032)  0.9986  (0.0032)  0.9984  (0.0032)  0.9986  (0.0032) 
 unemp. experience        0.9988  (0.0007)  0.9988  (0.0007)  0.9988  (0.0008)  0.9987  (0.0008)  0.9988  (0.0008)  0.9987 * (0.0008) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑡#𝑥𝑖𝑙  satisfaction with                      
 life (low)        1.0066 * (0.0040)  1.0065  (0.0040)  1.0064 * (0.0038)  1.0063  (0.0038)  1.0063  (0.0039)  1.0062  (0.0039) 
 life (high)        0.9951  (0.0032)  0.9951  (0.0032)  0.9954  (0.0031)  0.9954  (0.0031)  0.9953  (0.0031)  0.9953  (0.0031) 
 HH income (low)        1.0039  (0.0040)  1.0039  (0.0040)  1.0044  (0.0038)  1.0045  (0.0038)  1.0045  (0.0038)  1.0046  (0.0038) 
 HH income (high)        0.9951  (0.0050)  0.9952  (0.0052)  0.9956  (0.0049)  0.9956  (0.0051)  0.9954  (0.0048)  0.9955  (0.0049) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑚𝑜𝑏#𝑥𝑖𝑙   sum of res. moves         0.9958 *** (0.0013)  0.9958 *** (0.0013)  0.9960 *** (0.0013)  0.9960 *** (0.0013)  0.9960 *** (0.0013)  0.9960 *** (0.0013) 
 sum of covered distance        1.0000 *** (0.0000)  1.0000 *** (0.0000)  1.0000 *** (0.0000)  1.0000 *** (0.0000)  1.0000 *** (0.0000)  1.0000 *** (0.0000) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
#𝑥𝑖𝑙  risk attitude (low)        1.0019  (0.0036)  1.0021  (0.0036)  1.0019  (0.0035)  1.0021  (0.0035)  1.0020  (0.0036)  1.0022  (0.0036) 
 risk attitude (high)        1.0056 * (0.0031)  1.0055 * (0.0031)  1.0057 * (0.0029)  1.0057 * (0.0029)  1.0057 * (0.0030)  1.0056 * (0.0030) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
#𝑥𝑙
𝑈  risk attitude (low)                      0.8947 ** (0.0480)  0.8957 ** (0.0479) 
 risk attitude (high)                      0.9903  (0.0545)  0.9956  (0.0548) 
𝑣𝑖
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠
#𝑥𝑙
𝐻𝑆  risk attitude (low)                      1.0468  (0.0344)  1.0459  (0.0338) 
 risk attitude (high)                      1.0143  (0.0339)  1.0137  (0.0334) 
information-processing control                
reference years 2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013  2008 – 2013 
individuals 679  679  679  679  679  679  679  679 
individual-year observations × 𝐷 75936  75936  75936  75936  75936  75936  75936  75936 
𝐿𝐿(0)  -3689.58  -3689.58  -3689.58  -3689.58  -3689.58  -3689.58  -3689.58  -3689.58 
log pseudolikelihood (𝐿𝐿) -1685.75  -1681.81  -1525.20  -1515.26  -1468.30  -1463.53  -1465.98  -1461.24 
df 7  8  19  20  25  26  29  30 
Wald 𝜒2 514.84  529.27  391.23  405.84  563.11  578.63  586.52  606.97 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
pseudo R-squared (1 − 𝐿𝐿/𝐿𝐿(0)) 0.5431  0.5442  0.5866  0.5893  0.6020  0.6033  0.6027  0.6040 
test 𝐻0: coefficients in 𝑧𝑖𝑘 are jointly 
zero 
𝑥𝑖𝑙  𝑥𝑙   𝑥𝑖𝑙  𝑥𝑙   𝑥𝑖𝑙  𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙𝑖  𝑥𝑖𝑙  𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙𝑖   𝑥𝑙  𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙𝑖  𝑥𝑙  𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙𝑖   𝑥𝑙  𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙𝑖, 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙  
 𝑥𝑙  𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙𝑖, 
𝑣𝑖#𝑥𝑙  
df (𝐻0) 1 6  1 6  1 18  1 18  6 18  6 18  6 22  6 22 
Wald 𝜒2 271.38 128.18  267.32 116.81  3.44 130.14  3.34 131.30  132.61 131.62  122.09 133.45  113.96 137.63  99.29 140.05 
prob > 𝜒2  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0636 0.0000  0.0675 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Distance refers to the distance between the centroid of the current residence’s RPU and the centroid of a potential destination RPU. All individual level variables, constant across potential destinations, are 
interacted with the respective distance 𝑥𝑖𝑙 or a destination-specific variable 𝑥𝑙. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The information processing control corresponds to the accessibility measure, 
addressing varying degrees of substitutability of alternatives which may lead to a violation of the ‘independence from irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA) assumption in the random utility framework. 
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Figure A6.1: Items for expected income levels under various scenarios 
 
Note: Depicted items are translated versions from the German original. Their visual presentation corresponds exactly to the layout the 
original items had in the MESARS-survey. Item 5.1 gives the reference income, labelled 𝑤𝑂. In the scenarios with existing job alternative the 
first answer of question 5.3 corresponds to 𝑤𝐴1, the second one to 𝑤𝐴2. Similarly, the first answer to question 5.6 yields 𝑤𝑈1, the second 
𝑤𝑈2 in the unemployment scenarios. 
 
 
Figure A6.2: Mobility premiums for cross-border migration scenarios, conditional on personality groupings (in 
%) 
 
Note: * The solid line represents risk-loving individuals; the line with dashes and dots stands for risk-neutral and the dashed-line 
for risk-averse individuals. In all other cases, the three depicted groups refer to a classification based on standardised scores, 
such that ‘medium’ refers to those scoring within one standard deviation around the mean and ‘high’ (‘low’) comprises those 
more than one standard deviation above (below) the mean. The sample size varies across dimensions between 2096 and 2172. 
5.1 What would be the minimum monthly net income* you expect to receive after you eventually will have graduated from university?
(*corresponds to the income after taxes and social insurance contributions have been deducted)
Euro
5.3 Imagine, that after graduation, you will receive an interesting job offer in the vicinity of your current residence, 
realising the monthly net income you expect (see Question 5.1).
What would be the minimum monthly net income for an otherwise comparable job offer,
which made you willing to move for this alternative job to an unfamilar environment:
to another state Euro per month (net)
to another country Euro per month (net)
5.6 Imagine, that despite intensive job search after graduation, you will NOT receive an interesting job offer in the vicinity of your current 
residence, realising the monthly net income you expect (see Question 5.1).
What would be the minimum monthly net income for a job offer you were interested in,
which made you willing to move for this alternative job to an unfamilar environment:
to another state Euro per month (net)
to another country Euro per month (net)
Big5: Openness
Big5: Concientiousness
Big5: Extraversion
Big5: Agreeableness
Big5: Neuroticism
Importance of proximity to family
Importance of proximity to friends
Adaptability to new circumstances
Willingness to bear present costs to reap future benefits
Willingness to take risk in general
Willingness to take risk (career)
Risk attitude: gain domain*
Risk attitude: loss domain*
Riskiness of interstate moves
Riskiness of intra-EU moves
Riskiness of worldwide moves
41
61
82
102
123
Δ (employed), high Δ (unemployed), high
Δ (employed), medium Δ (unemployed), medium
Δ (employed), low Δ (unemployed), low
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Table A6.1: Assumed interrelationships between the mobility premium, basic model components and 
personality parameters 
model parameter 𝑚 description 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝑚
  
personality / 
preference 
parameter 𝑏 
description 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑏
  
𝑝𝐷  price level at destination 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝑝𝐷
> 0     
𝑝𝑂  price level at origin 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝑝𝑂
< 0     
𝑎𝐷  amenity level at 
destination 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝑎𝐷
< 0     
𝑎𝑂  amenity level at origin 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝑎𝑂
> 0     
𝜂𝐷  unemployment 
insurance replacement 
rate at destination 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝜂𝐷
< 0     
𝜂𝑂  unemployment 
insurance replacement 
rate at origin 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝜂𝑂
> 0     
Γ𝐷  fixed costs of moving 
𝜕Δ
𝜕Γ𝐷
> 0     
𝑤𝑂  accustomed wage 
income at origin 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝑤𝑂
< 0     
𝛾𝑖(𝜙𝐴, 𝜓𝑂, 𝑑, 𝜒, Λ𝐿)  individual adjustment 
capability 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝛾𝑖
< 0  𝜙𝐴 adaptability to new 
circumstances 
𝜕𝛾𝑖(𝜙𝐴,𝜓𝑂,𝑑,𝜒,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝜙𝐴
> 0  
 𝜒 previous mobility 
experiences (internal or 
abroad) 
𝜕𝛾𝑖(𝜙𝐴,𝜓𝑂,𝑑,𝜒,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝜓𝑂
> 0  
 Λ𝐿 local language 
proficiency 
𝜕𝛾𝑖(𝜙𝐴,𝜓𝑂,𝑑,𝜒,Λ𝐿)
𝜕Λ𝐿
> 0  
 𝜓𝑂 Big-Five: openness to 
new experiences 
𝜕𝛾𝑖(𝜙𝐴,𝜓𝑂,𝑑,𝜒,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝜓𝑂
> 0  
 𝑑 moving distance / 
cross-border versus 
internal move 
𝜕𝛾𝑖(𝜙𝐴,𝜓𝑂,𝑑,𝜒,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝑑
< 0  
𝜏𝑖(𝜓𝐸, 𝜙𝑆)  psychic cost parameter 𝜕Δ
𝜕𝜏𝑖
> 0 
𝜓𝐸  Big-Five: extraversion 
𝜕𝜏𝑖(𝜓𝐸,𝜙𝑆)
𝜕𝜓𝐸
< 0  
  𝜙𝑆 social preferences: 
proximity to reference 
persons 
𝜕𝜏𝑖(𝜓𝐸,𝜙𝑆)
𝜕𝜙𝑆
> 0  
𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖(𝜋𝑈𝑂, 𝜓𝑁)  perceived probability of 
job loss at origin, also 
depending on objective 
local unemployment risk 
𝜋𝑈𝑂 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖
< 0 
𝜓𝑁 Big-Five: neuroticism 
𝜕𝜋𝑈𝑂,𝑖(𝜓𝑁)
𝜕𝜓𝑁
> 0  
𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖(𝜓𝐶 , 𝜓𝐴, 𝜙𝑅, 𝜙𝑃 , Λ𝐿)  job finding probability at 
location 𝐿 (depends also 
on objective local 
conditions 𝜋𝐸𝐷 and 𝜋𝐸𝑂) 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝑂,𝑖
> 0 
𝜕Δ
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐷,𝑖
⋚ 0 
𝜓𝐶 Big-Five: 
conscientiousness 
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖(𝜓𝐶,𝜓𝐴,𝜙𝑅,𝜙𝑃,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝜓𝐶
> 0  
 𝜓𝐴 Big-Five: agreeableness 
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖(𝜓𝐶,𝜓𝐴,𝜙𝑅,𝜙𝑃,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝜓𝐴
> 0  
 𝜙𝑅 risk attitude 
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖(𝜓𝐶,𝜓𝐴,𝜙𝑅,𝜙𝑃,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝜙𝑅
> 0  
 𝜙𝑃 patience parameter 
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖(𝜓𝐶,𝜓𝐴,𝜙𝑅,𝜙𝑃,Λ𝐿)
𝜕𝜙𝑃
> 0  
   Λ𝐿 local language skill 
𝜕𝜋𝐸𝐿,𝑖(𝜓𝐶,𝜓𝐴,𝜙𝑅,𝜙𝑃,Λ𝐿)
𝜕Λ𝐿
> 0  
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Table A6.2: Overall descriptive statistics for model variables included in the empirical analyses 
category  variable label short description original 
scale 
N min max mean std.dev. 
modified 
scale 
mobility 
premiums 
Δ𝐴1 internal, given job 
alternative 
dependent variable cardinal 1851 -71.43 185.71 27.016 25.80  
 Δ𝑈1 internal, given 
unemployment 
dependent variable cardinal 1851 -71.43 150 6.65 28.04  
 Δ𝐴2 cross-border, given job 
alternative 
dependent variable cardinal 1851 -42.86 900 82.60 75.62  
 Δ𝑈2 cross-border, given 
unemployment 
dependent variable cardinal 1851 -66.67 525 52.64 66.68  
socio-
demographic 
X gender 1: female, 0: male binary 1851 0 1 0.42 /  
 age age in years cardinal 1851 17 49 20.28 2.35  
 partnership 1: currently in a relationship, 0: no 
relationship 
binary 1851 0 1 0.44 /  
Λ English language 
proficiency 
(1: mother tongue or business fluent, 2: 
fluent in daily routine, 3: basic 
ordinal 1851 1 3 / /  
Big-Five / 
personality 
 
𝜙𝑅 risk attitude (career 
domain) 
willingness to take risk, 11-point scale 
(1: low, 11: high) 
ordinal 1851 1 11 5.54 2.49  
𝜙𝑃 patience willingness to bear costs in the present 
for future benefits, 7-point scale (1: low, 
7: high) 
ordinal 1851 1 7 5.46 1.16  
𝜓𝐸  extraversion 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1851 1 5 3.42 0.96  
𝜓𝑁 neuroticism 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1851 1 5 2.82 0.92  
𝜓𝑂 openness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1851 1 5 3.24 1.03  
𝜓𝐶  conscientiousness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1851 1 5 3.37 0.90  
𝜓𝐴 agreeableness 5-point scale (1: low, 5: high) ordinal 1851 1 5 2.95 0.81  
𝜙𝐴 adaptability ability to adapt to new circumstances, 7-
point scale (1: low, 7: high) 
ordinal 1851 1 7 3.97 1.52  
social 
preference 
𝜙𝑆 importance of proximity 
(family) 
7-point scale (1: low, 7: high) ordinal 1851 1 7 4.75 1.64  
𝜙𝑆 importance of proximity 
(friends) 
7-point scale (1: low, 7: high) ordinal 1851 1 7 5.00 1.44  
perceived 
behavioural 
control 
𝜃𝑅1 riskiness of moving to 
another state 
7-point scale (1: not at all risky, 7: risky) ordinal 1851 1 7 2.83 1.62  
𝜃𝑅2 riskiness of moving to 
another Europ. country 
7-point scale (1: not at all risky, 7: risky) ordinal 1850 1 7 4.41 1.66  
migration 
intentions 
𝜃𝑀1 moving to another state 7-point scale (1: highly unlikely, 7: highly 
likely) 
ordinal 1848 1 7 4.96 1.69  
𝜃𝑀2 moving to another 
European country 
7-point scale (1: highly unlikely, 7: highly 
likely) 
ordinal 1850 1 7 3.16 1.65  
labour 
market 
readiness 
 work experience 2: fulltime, 1: part-time or mini-job, 0: 
none 
ordinal 1850 0 2 / /  
 vocational training 1: vocational training completed, 0: 
otherwise 
binary 1848 0 1 0.17 /  
 master student 1:  master student, 0 : bachelor student binary 1850 0 1 0.02 /  
previous 
mobility 
experiences 
𝜒 residential move during 
school 
1: at least one residential move during 
school, 0: none 
binary 1851 0 1 0.23 /  
𝜒 exchange participation 1 : exchange participation during school, 
0 : otherwise 
binary 1851 0 1 0.33 /  
𝜒 stay abroad 1 : at least one month abroad without 
family, 0: otherwise 
binary 1851 0 1 0.23 /  
𝜒 educational mobility excess distance of chosen university km, 
cardinal 
1851 0 531.2 89.36 107.79  
local 
conditions at 
origin 
𝑎𝑂 GDP (per capita) INKAR 2012 data cardinal, 
1000 € 
1851 16.5 106.2 33.38 10.71  
𝑝𝑂/𝑎𝑂 price level / building 
prices 
proxied by local building plot prices cardinal, 
€ per m
2
 
1851 16 368.4 130.77 80.80  
𝑎𝑂 accessibility of 3 closest 
agglomeration centres by 
train 
aggregated travel time to the three 
nearest agglomeration centres; INKAR 
2012 data 
minutes, 
cardinal 
1851 36 181 83.39 25.44  
𝑎𝑂 accessibility of 3 closest 
agglomeration centres by 
car 
aggregated travel time to the three 
nearest agglomeration centres; INKAR 
2012 data 
minutes, 
cardinal 
1851 44 151 90.57 14.20  
𝑎𝑂 population density INKAR 2012 data cardinal 1851 58.6 3005.9 970.32 669.32  
𝑎𝑂 recreational area (per 
capita) 
INKAR 2012 data cardinal, 
m2  
1851 17 333.8 75.09 62.07  
𝑎𝑂 public service provision public employees (full time equivalents) 
per 10000 inhabitants; INKAR 2012 data 
cardinal 1851 56.3 269.1 168.11 40.38  
𝜋𝑈𝑂 unemployment rate INKAR 2012 data % 1851 3.1 14.3 9.37 2.91  
other 𝑤𝑂 expected monthly net 
income 
expected post-graduation income net 
income tax and social insurance 
contributions 
log 1851 5.86 10.71 7.92 0.44  
Note: Overall descriptive statistics (for other variables than the mobility premiums) are conditional on the existence of all four scenario 
specific mobility premiums and refer to the preferred specification. ‘Original scale’ refers to the scale the information has been elicited 
from survey participants. Modified variables have been standardised and categorised into three distinct groups: those scoring low (score 
below the mean minus one standard deviation), the reference group of medium-type individuals (score within the range of one standard 
deviation around the mean) and those scoring high (score more than one standard deviation above the mean). Standard deviations are 
only reported for cardinal variables. INKAR data originates from the INKAR online database (BBSR, 2014). 
    
 
 
 
Table A6.3: OLS model comparison for pooled mobility premiums 
dependent variable Δ (pooled) 
estimation method OLS 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -0.4960 (1.2364)   -0.5368 (1.2238)  -1.1617 (1.3610)   -1.3941 (1.3556)  -2.9363 ** (1.3719)  0.3680 (1.3587)  -1.4270 (1.3706)  -0.4406 (1.3801) 
age -0.1228 (0.3267)   -0.2396 (0.3204)  -0.1124 (0.3224)   -0.0609 (0.3186)  -0.1742 (0.3170)  0.0993 (0.3163)  0.0132 (0.3135)  0.1976 (0.3096) 
partnership (yes=1) 5.9548 *** (1.2439)   5.7206 *** (1.2401)  5.9233 *** (1.2503)   5.7708 *** (1.2458)  4.9327 *** (1.2267)  5.3391 *** (1.2391)  4.5258 *** (1.2187)  4.5730 *** (1.2259) 
language skills (English)                          
high -11.9575 *** (2.1235)   -12.0859 *** (2.1325)  -11.2107 *** (2.1557)   -10.3761 *** (2.1524)  -9.5596 *** (2.1582)  -6.4409 *** (2.1708)  -5.4846 ** (2.1700)  -5.8999 *** (2.1750) 
medium -5.2754 ** (2.0899)   -5.5349 *** (2.0775)  -5.4370 *** (2.0925)   -5.6901 *** (2.0885)  -5.6032 *** (2.0878)  -3.5606 * (2.0624)  -3.8161 * (2.0635)  -3.6926 * (2.0665) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎             6.3095 *** (1.5167)   6.1467 *** (1.5109)  4.2975 *** (1.4937)  4.9601 *** (1.4991)  3.2169 ** (1.4854)  2.8567 * (1.4944) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎              0.6999 (2.0845)   0.9463 (2.0673)  1.3860 (2.0384)  1.6560 (2.0718)  1.9471 (2.0277)  1.5061 (2.0309) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎              5.1266 *** (1.8634)   5.5062 *** (1.8727)  5.6494 *** (1.8591)  5.2702 *** (1.8458)  5.5332 *** (1.8439)  5.6116 *** (1.8501) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎              -4.1372 ** (1.6282)   -2.9646 * (1.6958)  -3.0686 * (1.6793)  -3.2979 ** (1.6100)  -2.9838 * (1.6646)  -3.3502 ** (1.6726) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎              3.4437 (2.1725)   0.7065 (2.1494)  0.0803 (2.1414)  2.2634 (2.1757)  -0.5623 (2.1348)  -0.0218 (2.1419) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎              0.8463 (1.6163)   2.4783 (1.6145)  1.5619 (1.6024)  1.6280 (1.5962)  1.7294 (1.5828)  1.5527 (1.5872) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎              -1.3459 (2.1409)   0.6673 (2.1160)  0.0441 (2.1265)  -1.1377 (2.1380)  -0.2922 (2.1250)  -1.4790 (2.1270) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎              -0.2557 (1.6629)   -1.5522 (1.6657)  -1.1106 (1.6463)  0.1586 (1.6462)  -0.5316 (1.6377)  -0.6733 (1.6478) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎              -0.7483 (1.6507)   -1.1746 (1.6354)  -2.1639 (1.6208)  -1.0395 (1.6464)  -2.2346 (1.6215)  -1.8984 (1.6304) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎              -0.4221 (1.6728)   0.0689 (1.6740)  -0.2008 (1.6443)  -0.5494 (1.6553)  -0.4738 (1.6307)  -0.0339 (1.6550) 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎              0.0971 (2.1183)   -0.2934 (2.0958)  -0.7387 (2.0753)  0.7664 (2.0995)  -0.1602 (2.0614)  -0.1909 (2.0655) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎              -1.0358 (1.6083)   -0.7741 (1.6056)  -1.1560 (1.5884)  -1.9005 (1.6048)  -2.0733 (1.5892)  -2.6220 (1.6000) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎              0.0052 (1.6310)   -0.3282 (1.6276)  1.2779 (1.6118)  -0.8038 (1.6166)  0.4499 (1.6026)  0.1470 (1.6072) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎              1.0281 (1.6464)   1.3174 (1.6457)  1.0775 (1.6143)  1.7835 (1.6132)  1.6450 (1.5898)  2.5584 (1.5997) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎                     9.7682 *** (1.7109)  7.3282 *** (1.6799)     6.4159 *** (1.6698)  6.1156 *** (1.6800) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎                     -7.0430 *** (1.8236)  -4.0675 ** (1.8317)     -0.8650 (1.8667)  -0.8567 (1.8749) 
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎                        -3.5237 ** (1.6194)     -2.9647 * (1.6278)  -2.5849 (1.6315) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎                        9.5592 *** (2.1529)     9.6209 *** (2.1239)  9.3428 *** (2.1294) 
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎                        -7.2379 *** (1.7131)     -6.7878 *** (1.6812)  -7.2649 *** (1.6843) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎                        11.5480 *** (2.3336)     10.4159 *** (2.3144)  11.4089 *** (2.3165) 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                                   
residential move (yes=1)                           -0.4114 (1.4416)  0.7753 (1.4290)  1.1933 (1.4429) 
exchange participation (yes=1)                           -4.5267 *** (1.2957)  -3.8862 *** (1.2788)  -3.9259 *** (1.2874) 
stay abroad (yes=1)                           -11.6974 *** (1.3962)  -10.7625 *** (1.3930)  -10.5340 *** (1.3988) 
educational mobility (km)                           -0.0455 *** (0.0058)  -0.0370 *** (0.0060)  -0.0398 *** (0.0060) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                                   
GDP (per capita)        -1.0309 *** (0.2120)  -0.9937 *** (0.2145)   -1.0053 *** (0.2146)  -0.9617 *** (0.2120)  -0.9161 *** (0.2085)  -0.8941 *** (0.2075)  -0.8472 *** (0.2085) 
building land prices        0.1140 *** (0.0316)  0.1164 *** (0.0318)   0.1190 *** (0.0318)  0.1049 *** (0.0316)  0.0988 *** (0.0311)  0.0915 *** (0.0311)  0.0867 *** (0.0312) 
accessibility (train)         -0.1961 *** (0.0531)  -0.1976 *** (0.0536)   -0.2192 *** (0.0538)  -0.1940 *** (0.0533)  -0.2037 *** (0.0526)  -0.1950 *** (0.0525)  -0.2000 *** (0.0525) 
accessibility (car)         0.0469 (0.1039)  0.0581 (0.1047)   0.0845 (0.1046)  0.0225 (0.1040)  0.1007 (0.1030)  0.0547 (0.1028)  0.0656 (0.1028) 
pop. density        -0.0022 (0.0023)  -0.0024 (0.0023)   -0.0020 (0.0023)  -0.0028 (0.0023)  -0.0012 (0.0023)  -0.0018 (0.0023)  -0.0017 (0.0023) 
recreational area (per capita)        0.0412 (0.0277)  0.0463 * (0.0277)   0.0571 ** (0.0276)  0.0464 * (0.0276)  0.0638 ** (0.0274)  0.0600 ** (0.0274)  0.0616 ** (0.0275) 
public services         -0.0352 (0.0475)  -0.0379 (0.0475)   -0.0414 (0.0473)  -0.0179 (0.0469)  0.0079 (0.0471)  0.0184 (0.0467)  0.0152 (0.0471) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂)        -1.8517 *** (0.6726)  -1.7632 *** (0.6719)   -1.7740 *** (0.6712)  -1.6242 ** (0.6654)  -1.8515 *** (0.6637)  -1.7269 *** (0.6611)  -1.6374 ** (0.6616) 
premium type controls                                
relative income control (𝑤0)                                
constant                                
observations 7404  7404  7404  7404  7404  7404  7404  7404 
df (model) 9  17  31  33  37  35  41  40 
F-statistic 253.61  139.83  79.05  74.28  67.44  70.21  61.11  62.45 
prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.2347  0.2425  0.2469  0.2527  0.2686  0.2628  0.2800  0.2728 
adjusted R-squared 0.2337  0.2408  0.2437  0.2494  0.2649  0.2593  0.2760  0.2689 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are implemented. 
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Table A6.4: Quantile regression model comparison for pooled mobility premiums 
dependent variable Δ (pooled) 
estimation method QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.50)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75) 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -0.9815  (0.9771)   -0.5515  (0.9557)   -0.5584  (1.4618)  -1.6330 * (0.9168)  -1.4717 (0.9788)  -3.6496 ** (1.4396)  0.2119 (0.8382)  0.1200 (0.8979)  1.0220 (1.4263) 
age 0.1619  (0.1827)   0.1604  (0.2008)   -0.0249  (0.2822)  0.1301 (0.2001)  0.0226 (0.1874)  -0.3171 (0.2928)  0.4797 *** (0.1635)  0.4421 ** (0.2006)  -0.2120 (0.2816) 
partnership (yes=1) 4.2207 *** (0.8875)   4.2973 *** (0.8329)   4.5766 *** (1.3621)  3.4344 *** (0.8093)  3.6120 *** (0.8014)  3.2657 *** (1.2554)  3.0872 *** (0.8064)  4.8000 *** (0.8508)  4.1488 *** (1.2356) 
language skills (English)                                      
high -4.4753 *** (1.3406)   -5.1173 *** (1.3596)   -6.1428 *** (2.1124)  -3.2286 ** (1.5868)  -3.7065 ** (1.4481)  -5.0891 *** (1.8623)  -2.3958 * (1.2295)  -2.7605 * (1.4997)  -2.6939 (2.2020) 
medium -1.8285  (1.2421)   -2.4628 * (1.3027)   -3.4723 * (1.9506)  -1.1414 (1.3782)  -1.8686 (1.3235)  -3.9835 ** (1.7222)  -1.5094 (1.1670)  -1.7701 (1.3391)  -2.1005 (2.0478) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.4131  (1.0265)   3.6614 *** (1.0757)   5.6479 *** (1.5629)  1.2226 (0.9989)  1.5667 (1.0172)  3.5229 ** (1.4403)  0.8019 (0.8456)  2.5431 ** (0.9963)  4.8466 *** (1.6817) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.9253 ** (1.4434)   -0.1773  (1.1798)   2.3527  (1.9012)  -1.8408 (1.4022)  0.3949 (1.3589)  1.9355 (1.9097)  -1.7216 (1.2915)  -1.0547 (1.4504)  2.7690 (1.9012) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.5523  (1.1805)   1.1561  (1.2269)   4.7769 ** (1.9924)  0.6833 (1.2456)  1.0713 (1.3171)  5.7046 *** (1.6846)  0.7323 (1.1038)  1.4290 (1.2930)  4.9105 ** (1.9403) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -3.4023 *** (1.1619)   -1.6621  (1.1287)   -2.9984 * (1.5378)  -2.3278 * (1.3841)  -0.4001 (1.1832)  -1.3698 (1.5567)  -2.3001 * (1.3149)  -1.8285 (1.2086)  -0.8056 (1.5482) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.0172  (1.4492)   -0.0005  (1.4675)   2.0223  (2.1141)  -1.3230 (1.3362)  -0.8845 (1.4336)  -2.2313 (2.0428)  -0.7703 (1.2221)  -1.0268 (1.3905)  1.1062 (2.2971) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.3363 ** (1.1484)   -0.7389  (1.0232)   2.7709  (1.7101)  -1.9360 * (1.1523)  0.1298 (1.2110)  3.5349 ** (1.5853)  -0.9742 (0.9605)  0.3884 (1.1199)  2.0028 (1.6168) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.9921  (1.3797)   -2.2281 * (1.2159)   -5.1931 *** (1.6705)  -1.4619 (1.2716)  -1.8797 (1.3561)  -4.1045 ** (1.9808)  -2.6529 ** (1.2780)  -2.5320 ** (1.2252)  -5.1563 *** (1.7704) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.3589  (1.1840)   0.0213  (1.2488)   -0.7306  (1.6240)  0.9705 (1.1966)  -0.0389 (1.2871)  -0.5725 (1.8551)  1.3777 (1.0751)  -0.2035 (1.1837)  -0.6050 (1.9721) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.2555  (1.0095)   -2.1946 ** (1.0670)   -2.2678  (1.5418)  -1.9740 * (1.1036)  -2.0150 * (1.0990)  -2.0538 (1.4835)  -1.4191 (0.9185)  -3.3357 *** (1.1314)  -1.6028 (1.6727) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.6994  (1.1858)   -1.8453 * (0.9648)   -0.1531  (1.6757)  -1.9409 (1.1899)  -1.7363 (1.1619)  -0.4171 (1.7221)  -1.5517 (0.9996)  -3.1581 *** (1.0902)  0.1645 (1.5933) 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.8636 *** (1.4069)   -0.4130  (1.3873)   1.8132  (2.0778)  -2.4465 (1.7758)  -0.5535 (1.3957)  -0.0630 (1.9972)  -2.4180 * (1.4496)  0.0894 (1.4315)  0.4814 (1.9925) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.9059  (1.1886)   0.6509  (1.0975)   0.7807  (1.7047)  -0.5195 (1.2424)  0.3631 (1.1053)  2.6568 (1.7966)  -0.8479 (1.2404)  0.1856 (1.2837)  0.8715 (1.6471) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.5309  (0.9624)   -0.8934  (1.0266)   -1.1436  (1.5791)  -0.0821 (1.0633)  -0.6131 (1.0949)  0.9131 (1.6684)  -1.5566 * (0.9362)  -1.3372 (1.1700)  -1.6902 (1.6645) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 2.3140 * (1.3540)   1.7968 * (1.0852)   3.8698 ** (1.7631)  1.7608 (1.2572)  2.4010 ** (1.1926)  3.0186 * (1.7583)  2.5169 ** (1.0660)  2.2914 ** (1.1528)  3.2181 * (1.6946) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎             2.5495 ** (1.1861)  3.6185 *** (1.1195)  7.3649 *** (1.9653)          
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎             -2.4117 * (1.2819)  -2.4326 * (1.3955)  -3.8554 ** (1.7560)          
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎             -4.7393 *** (1.2359)  -4.4559 *** (1.0385)  -4.2882 ** (1.7074)          
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎             2.3129 (1.7638)  7.6354 *** (1.6934)  10.7516 *** (3.1493)          
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎             -2.1422 (1.3355)  -2.6721 ** (1.2062)  -4.4311 ** (1.7772)          
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎             5.9095 *** (1.5368)  8.3919 *** (1.6984)  13.5883 *** (3.2296)          
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                                 
residential move (yes=1)                         -1.3372 (0.9365)  -0.0380 (1.0049)  1.5196 (1.4732) 
exchange participation (yes=1)                      -1.4010 (0.8968)  -1.7218 * (0.9371)  -4.0944 *** (1.3814) 
stay abroad (yes=1)                         -7.1600 *** (1.0396)  -6.7161 *** (0.9863)  -7.5422 *** (1.5591) 
educational mobility (km)                         -0.0272 *** (0.0033)  -0.0325 *** (0.0042)  -0.0445 *** (0.0055) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                                 
GDP (per capita) -0.5814 *** (0.1391)   -0.5919 *** (0.1454)   -0.7449 *** (0.2213)  -0.6236 *** (0.1453)  -0.4419 *** (0.1480)  -0.4836 ** (0.2011)  -0.3695 *** (0.1225)  -0.3755 *** (0.1361)  -0.6700 *** (0.2049) 
building land prices 0.0642 *** (0.0241)   0.0732 *** (0.0227)   0.0861 *** (0.0318)  0.0799 *** (0.0254)  0.0518 ** (0.0230)  0.0509 * (0.0280)  0.0346 (0.0237)  0.0410 ** (0.0207)  0.0729 ** (0.0304) 
accessibility (train)  -0.0413  (0.0390)   -0.1156 *** (0.0404)   -0.1491 *** (0.0573)  -0.0475 (0.0372)  -0.0771 * (0.0409)  -0.0863 (0.0537)  -0.0333 (0.0351)  -0.0891 ** (0.0377)  -0.1723 *** (0.0527) 
accessibility (car)  0.0118  (0.0685)   0.0318  (0.0749)   0.0281  (0.1031)  0.0219 (0.0768)  -0.0148 (0.0769)  -0.0334 (0.0962)  0.0138 (0.0677)  0.0195 (0.0707)  0.1364 (0.1019) 
pop. density -0.0012  (0.0014)   -0.0024  (0.0015)   -0.0029  (0.0020)  -0.0009 (0.0015)  -0.0003 (0.0014)  -0.0017 (0.0021)  0.0008 (0.0013)  -0.0007 (0.0014)  -0.0009 (0.0021) 
recreational area (per capita) -0.0081  (0.0200)   0.0023  (0.0187)   -0.0053  (0.0232)  0.0089 (0.0207)  0.0123 (0.0162)  -0.0070 (0.0227)  0.0115 (0.0182)  0.0129 (0.0175)  0.0156 (0.0247) 
public services  -0.0127  (0.0303)   -0.0200  (0.0331)   -0.0061  (0.0474)  -0.0164 (0.0327)  -0.0266 (0.0298)  -0.0087 (0.0428)  0.0047 (0.0286)  0.0051 (0.0312)  0.0170 (0.0465) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -0.6918 * (0.4071)   -0.7303 * (0.4400)   -0.9802  (0.5993)  -0.7467 * (0.4373)  -0.8447 ** (0.4303)  -0.7334 (0.5674)  -0.8544 ** (0.3647)  -0.8286 ** (0.3926)  -1.0462 * (0.5957) 
premium type controls                                    
relative income control (𝑤0)                                    
constant                                    
observations 7404  7404  7404  7404  7404  7404  7404  7404  7404 
df (model) 31  31  31  37  37  37  35  35  35 
raw sum of deviation (rsd) 95347.54  141949.34  142658.09  95347.54  141949.34  142658.09  95347.54  141949.34  142658.09 
min. sum of deviations (msd) 82394.36  118970.42  114353.01  81544.18  117062.78  111921.97  81338.14  117707.56  113010.95 
pseudo R-squared (1-msd/rsd) 0.1359  0.1619  0.1984  0.1448  0.1753  0.2155  0.1469  0.1708  0.2078 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications) in Stata 14.2. The seed was each time set to 27644873, to ensure that across specifications the same ‘random-sample’ was drawn. 
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Table A6.5: OLS model comparison for internal mobility premiums 
dependent variable Δ𝐴1 (internal, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈1 (internal, given unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  OLS 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -0.2754 (1.3607)  -0.3371 (1.3480)  -1.4960 (1.3556)  0.4297 (1.3473)  2.6216 * (1.4682)  2.8011 * (1.4666)  2.3257 (1.4843)  3.3477 ** (1.4602) 
age 0.0180 (0.3101)  -0.0639 (0.3084)  -0.1137 (0.2996)  0.0180 (0.2999)  0.7400 ** (0.3462)  0.7142 ** (0.3526)  0.7237 ** (0.3521)  0.8008 ** (0.3476) 
partnership (yes=1) 2.6884 ** (1.2194)  2.6450 ** (1.1963)  2.0262 * (1.1740)  2.3188 * (1.1877)  2.1686 * (1.3051)  2.2879 * (1.3092)  2.0672 (1.3077)  1.9241 (1.3077) 
language skills (English)                        
high -1.8443 (1.9460)  -2.7612 (1.9491)  -1.8399 (1.9471)  -0.3757 (1.9498)  -1.1450 (2.2021)  -1.6557 (2.2455)  -1.2022 (2.2488)  0.2224 (2.2741) 
medium -1.2629 (1.8354)  -1.7633 (1.8224)  -1.8264 (1.8135)  -0.8404 (1.7851)  -1.1890 (2.0863)  -1.5575 (2.0908)  -1.7100 (2.0845)  -0.8528 (2.0663) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.1846 ** (1.5077)  2.9233 * (1.4966)  1.6322 (1.4718)  2.2153 (1.4697)  0.5549 (1.6063)  0.3686 (1.6067)  -0.2839 (1.6008)  -0.2770 (1.5939) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.5477 (1.8963)  0.8904 (1.8624)  1.2376 (1.8070)  1.4214 (1.8463)  -0.8674 (2.1095)  -0.8040 (2.1031)  -0.6316 (2.0846)  -0.3135 (2.0801) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.3475 * (1.7617)  3.4679 ** (1.7304)  3.6662 ** (1.6992)  3.5408 ** (1.7002)  2.6977 (1.9002)  2.7310 (1.8939)  2.9472 (1.8943)  2.8121 (1.8764) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.7687 (1.6247)  -1.1718 (1.6201)  -0.8614 (1.6146)  -0.7574 (1.6061)  -3.6211 ** (1.8031)  -3.2577 * (1.8271)  -2.8791 (1.8276)  -2.8303 (1.8292) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 5.1720 *** (1.9347)  4.6889 ** (1.9094)  2.8566 (1.8643)  4.1527 ** (1.9249)  -0.8196 (2.2150)  -1.0448 (2.2027)  -2.4119 (2.2280)  -1.5828 (2.1927) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.4281 (1.5228)  -0.3319 (1.5174)  -0.2251 (1.5162)  0.0353 (1.4880)  0.8809 (1.7512)  1.0055 (1.7624)  1.1301 (1.7965)  1.3005 (1.7550) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.7319 (1.8658)  -1.6723 (1.8652)  -1.1900 (1.8439)  -1.6520 (1.8429)  -1.5270 (1.9299)  -1.2849 (1.9480)  -0.6843 (2.0022)  -1.3034 (1.9478) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9757 (1.7301)  1.0067 (1.7238)  0.6262 (1.6956)  1.1728 (1.7160)  1.7053 (1.8513)  1.5464 (1.8839)  1.1666 (1.8819)  1.7221 (1.8638) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.9855 (1.5385)  -2.4274 (1.5033)  -3.2999 ** (1.4750)  -2.6447 * (1.5000)  -0.4961 (1.7226)  -0.7922 (1.7057)  -1.2310 (1.7174)  -0.9933 (1.7137) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -3.0311 * (1.5762)  -2.4079 (1.5556)  -2.3652 (1.5261)  -2.5160 * (1.5282)  0.2133 (1.7293)  0.3043 (1.7293)  0.5349 (1.7184)  0.2689 (1.7120) 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.7820 (1.9077)  -0.1525 (1.8819)  -0.5956 (1.8328)  0.2161 (1.8488)  0.1943 (2.2764)  0.5812 (2.2605)  0.1756 (2.2332)  1.0219 (2.2566) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9818 (1.6742)  0.3506 (1.6577)  0.2078 (1.6080)  -0.1122 (1.6473)  -0.7409 (1.8008)  -1.0914 (1.8200)  -1.1224 (1.8036)  -1.4904 (1.8198) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.4718 (1.5941)  -0.4783 (1.5660)  0.3669 (1.5429)  -0.9523 (1.5422)  0.5338 (1.7981)  0.4990 (1.8033)  0.8901 (1.7813)  0.1246 (1.7920) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 2.9372 * (1.7180)  2.8646 * (1.7177)  2.8436 * (1.6753)  3.3087 ** (1.6865)  2.6349 (1.7038)  2.5556 (1.7000)  2.6231 (1.6955)  2.9973 * (1.6809) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎       3.7570 ** (1.6135)           3.6044 ** (1.8360)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎       -0.5820 (1.7576)           -0.8172 (1.8323)    
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎       -2.4222 (1.5239)           -1.0978 (1.7477)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎       6.8367 *** (2.1549)           -0.0820 (2.4020)    
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎       -4.4339 *** (1.6334)           -2.9610 (1.8392)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎       6.6269 *** (2.1258)           6.6505 *** (2.5070)    
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                        
residential move (yes=1)          -0.0519 (1.3430)           -0.3737 (1.5510) 
exchange participation (yes=1)          -2.9656 ** (1.2888)           -1.6391 (1.4162) 
stay abroad (yes=1)          -5.1171 *** (1.5280)           -4.4696 *** (1.5933) 
educational mobility (km)          -0.0286 *** (0.0058)           -0.0280 *** (0.0059) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                        
GDP (per capita)    -0.5040 ** (0.2032)  -0.4801 ** (0.1962)  -0.4591 ** (0.1968)     -0.4645 ** (0.2101)  -0.4492 ** (0.2093)  -0.4210 ** (0.2022) 
building land prices    0.1024 *** (0.0293)  0.0945 *** (0.0285)  0.0923 *** (0.0283)     0.0360 (0.0322)  0.0336 (0.0323)  0.0249 (0.0312) 
accessibility (train)     -0.0940 * (0.0532)  -0.0879 * (0.0517)  -0.0968 * (0.0520)     -0.0825 (0.0570)  -0.0828 (0.0580)  -0.0845 (0.0560) 
accessibility (car)     -0.0406 (0.0944)  -0.0680 (0.0920)  -0.0113 (0.0922)     0.0394 (0.1073)  0.0315 (0.1079)  0.0642 (0.1046) 
pop. density    -0.0035 * (0.0019)  -0.0038 ** (0.0018)  -0.0028 (0.0019)     -0.0025 (0.0021)  -0.0028 (0.0021)  -0.0018 (0.0021) 
recreational area (per capita)    0.0148 (0.0237)  0.0137 (0.0224)  0.0248 (0.0230)     -0.0241 (0.0270)  -0.0254 (0.0276)  -0.0151 (0.0269) 
public services     -0.0536 (0.0426)  -0.0406 (0.0414)  -0.0277 (0.0419)     0.0359 (0.0478)  0.0410 (0.0477)  0.0611 (0.0473) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂)    -0.5356 (0.5585)  -0.4490 (0.5367)  -0.5613 (0.5466)     -0.5058 (0.6422)  -0.4025 (0.6359)  -0.5209 (0.6352) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                                
constant                                
observations 1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851 
df (model) 20  28  34  32  20  28  34  32 
F-statistic 3.74  4.90  7.06  6.46  3.58  2.91  3.40  3.49 
prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.0340  0.0643  0.1084  0.0913  0.0473  0.0552  0.0691  0.0733 
adjusted R-squared 0.0234  0.0499  0.0917  0.0753  0.0369  0.0407  0.0517  0.0570 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors implemented. 
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Table A6.6: OLS model comparison for cross-border mobility premiums 
dependent variable Δ𝐴2 (cross-border, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈2 (cross-border, given unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  OLS 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -6.0137 (3.7504)  -6.1503 * (3.7349)  -9.2686 ** (3.7252)  -3.5276 (3.7149)  -0.8478 (3.4449)  -0.9605 (3.3959)  -3.3063 (3.4290)  1.2224 (3.3833) 
age -0.8544 (0.8866)  -1.0549 (0.8528)  -1.1934 (0.8353)  -0.7391 (0.8230)  0.1484 (0.8586)  -0.0450 (0.8231)  -0.1133 (0.8072)  0.3177 (0.8027) 
partnership (yes=1) 9.3967 *** (3.4846)  8.8990 ** (3.4689)  7.0816 ** (3.3604)  8.1222 ** (3.4298)  10.4596 *** (3.0985)  9.8614 *** (3.1135)  8.5555 *** (3.0609)  8.9913 *** (3.0766) 
language skills (English)                        
high -23.6879 *** (6.0125)  -23.9855 *** (6.0491)  -21.0169 *** (6.0630)  -16.1405 *** (6.0409)  -17.1100 *** (5.3224)  -16.4404 *** (5.3669)  -14.1794 *** (5.3794)  -9.4697 * (5.4445) 
medium -10.2719 * (5.9435)  -10.6444 * (5.9288)  -10.7991 * (5.9179)  -7.5529 (5.8053)  -7.9837 (5.2263)  -7.7829 (5.1926)  -8.0775 (5.1861)  -4.9963 (5.1336) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 13.2469 *** (4.2107)  13.1224 *** (4.1659)  9.7278 ** (4.0739)  10.9922 *** (4.0828)  8.5952 ** (3.8063)  8.8238 ** (3.7748)  6.1141 * (3.6904)  6.9100 * (3.7431) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 3.6678 (6.2959)  4.2463 (6.1936)  5.5719 (6.0119)  5.7538 (6.1869)  -1.7722 (4.8820)  -1.5332 (4.8207)  -0.6342 (4.7400)  -0.2379 (4.7356) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 7.5505 (5.0853)  7.4406 (5.0886)  8.3598 (5.0845)  7.6499 (5.0259)  7.2865 (4.8264)  6.8670 (4.7984)  7.6242 (4.7760)  7.0780 (4.7546) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -6.8922 (4.4869)  -5.4298 (4.4844)  -3.4816 (4.6783)  -4.1676 (4.3823)  -7.7745 * (3.9794)  -6.6895 * (3.9946)  -5.0524 (4.0449)  -5.4361 (3.9453) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 12.1283 * (6.2902)  10.7611 * (6.2793)  5.4891 (6.1426)  9.0318 (6.3078)  0.6293 (5.2387)  -0.6305 (5.2056)  -5.6125 (5.1363)  -2.5483 (5.2071) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.2911 (4.6062)  0.0617 (4.5765)  1.4610 (4.4801)  1.3488 (4.5047)  2.9835 (3.9327)  2.6501 (3.9034)  3.8816 (3.8931)  3.8275 (3.8340) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.8428 (6.4434)  0.7872 (6.5199)  3.0667 (6.3956)  1.1426 (6.4745)  -3.5265 (4.7860)  -3.2135 (4.8331)  -1.0162 (4.8609)  -2.7380 (4.8427) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -4.1235 (4.4400)  -3.8519 (4.4106)  -5.0932 (4.3041)  -3.2470 (4.3748)  -0.2463 (4.2487)  0.2761 (4.2595)  -1.1421 (4.1924)  0.9865 (4.1851) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.8502 (4.5841)  -2.0937 (4.4778)  -4.5068 (4.3346)  -2.5682 (4.4565)  2.1728 (4.3009)  2.3202 (4.2285)  0.3821 (4.1415)  2.0481 (4.2091) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.2311 (4.6136)  -0.4385 (4.6578)  -0.2233 (4.5450)  -0.7081 (4.6013)  0.6780 (4.1971)  0.8536 (4.1840)  1.2504 (4.0754)  0.7576 (4.1274) 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -2.3040 (5.8102)  -1.7193 (5.8420)  -2.9595 (5.6966)  -0.7835 (5.7597)  1.6912 (5.3993)  1.6789 (5.3961)  0.4247 (5.2267)  2.6113 (5.3658) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.6871 (4.4168)  -1.4370 (4.4034)  -1.5782 (4.3199)  -2.7937 (4.3688)  -2.0627 (3.9494)  -1.9653 (3.9242)  -2.1311 (3.8764)  -3.2059 (3.9287) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.5264 (4.4674)  -0.8929 (4.4424)  1.3764 (4.3966)  -2.2011 (4.4062)  1.4352 (4.0697)  0.8931 (4.0754)  2.4783 (4.0184)  -0.1865 (4.0249) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8986 (4.5888)  0.6592 (4.6368)  0.6889 (4.4942)  1.7845 (4.5093)  -1.6250 (4.0266)  -1.9670 (4.0488)  -1.8457 (3.9522)  -0.9563 (3.9567) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎       10.3582 ** (4.5175)           11.5933 *** (4.2287)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎       -8.0209 (5.4676)           -6.8498 * (4.0174)    
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎       -6.3241 (4.6587)           -4.2507 (3.8046)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎       19.4954 *** (5.6287)           11.9865 ** (5.4871)    
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎       -12.3053 ** (4.9182)           -9.2513 ** (4.0285)    
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎       16.4754 *** (6.1202)           16.4393 *** (5.9998)    
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                        
residential move (yes=1)          -1.0536 (4.0234)           -0.1666 (3.5511) 
exchange participation (yes=1)          -8.8576 ** (3.5232)           -4.6446 (3.2129) 
stay abroad (yes=1)          -18.5417 *** (3.8474)           -18.6614 *** (3.3043) 
educational mobility (km)          -0.0682 *** (0.0164)           -0.0571 *** (0.0140) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                        
GDP (per capita)    -1.5941 *** (0.5946)  -1.5469 *** (0.5845)  -1.4747 ** (0.5766)     -1.4120 *** (0.5365)  -1.3704 *** (0.5314)  -1.3098 ** (0.5166) 
building land prices    0.2146 ** (0.0858)  0.1938 ** (0.0844)  0.1893 ** (0.0837)     0.1125 (0.0813)  0.0975 (0.0804)  0.0887 (0.0785) 
accessibility (train)     -0.2887 ** (0.1444)  -0.2809 ** (0.1426)  -0.2994 ** (0.1418)     -0.3253 ** (0.1350)  -0.3244 ** (0.1341)  -0.3339 ** (0.1315) 
accessibility (car)     0.1309 (0.2845)  0.0663 (0.2818)  0.2000 (0.2798)     0.1028 (0.2656)  0.0600 (0.2635)  0.1498 (0.2602) 
pop. density    -0.0029 (0.0064)  -0.0033 (0.0063)  -0.0011 (0.0063)     -0.0006 (0.0059)  -0.0011 (0.0059)  0.0009 (0.0058) 
recreational area (per capita)    0.1038 (0.0728)  0.1057 (0.0717)  0.1306 * (0.0716)     0.0907 (0.0726)  0.0917 (0.0722)  0.1149 (0.0715) 
public services     -0.1222 (0.1319)  -0.0868 (0.1284)  -0.0523 (0.1313)     -0.0116 (0.1163)  0.0147 (0.1151)  0.0506 (0.1148) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂)    -2.9696 (1.8238)  -2.8003 (1.7997)  -3.1068 * (1.7974)     -3.0419 * (1.7414)  -2.8448 * (1.7278)  -3.2171 * (1.7162) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                                
constant                                
observations 1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851 
df (model) 20  28  34  32  20  28  34  32 
F-statistic 4.48  3.83  5.67  6.14  4.61  3.79  5.06  5.62 
prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.0372  0.0505  0.0906  0.0770  0.0442  0.0551  0.0895  0.0808 
adjusted R-squared 0.0267  0.0359  0.0736  0.0607  0.0338  0.0405  0.0724  0.0646 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors implemented. 
  
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix, C
h
ap
te
r 6
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
     1
90
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
Table A6.7: Scenario-specific outcomes for the lower and upper quartile 
dependent variable Δ𝐴1 (internal, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈1 (internal, given unemployment)  Δ𝐴2 (cross-border, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈2 (cross-border, given unemployment) 
estimation method QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.25)  QREG (𝑞 = 0.75) 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -0.5514 (1.3049)  -1.1452 (1.9107)  -0.1485 (1.8212)  2.3268 (2.0003)  -6.0010 ** (2.4162)  -10.2627 * (5.5936)  0.2561 (2.8390)  -4.5290 (4.5012) 
age 0.0510 (0.2291)  -0.1172 (0.4587)  0.5872 (0.3822)  0.5156 (0.4770)  0.4742 (0.5368)  -1.3325 (0.9990)  0.7312 (0.5801)  -0.4730 (0.8551) 
partnership (yes=1) 2.6877 ** (1.0866)  -0.1705 (1.7388)  1.4531 (1.5714)  0.6411 (1.8855)  5.0617 ** (2.1013)  7.0716 (4.9984)  4.7411 ** (2.3712)  11.1132 ** (4.3624) 
language skills (English)                        
high -0.4046 (1.8103)  0.1947 (2.8222)  4.6485 (3.0917)  3.1436 (3.0299)  -9.4784 ** (4.1531)  -22.4253 ** (9.3049)  -7.8203 * (4.0401)  -4.9535 (7.3526) 
medium -0.8469 (1.6510)  -0.7880 (2.7043)  3.6963 (2.8210)  -0.5641 (2.7155)  -3.9708 (3.3971)  -17.0999 * (9.0547)  -4.2663 (3.8003)  -1.8373 (7.2207) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.1372 (1.1975)  1.7404 (2.1718)  -1.2295 (1.8068)  -0.6930 (2.2159)  1.5936 (2.7369)  12.0002 ** (5.8736)  1.4971 (2.8312)  6.4503 (4.9617) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.2148 (1.6475)  3.2953 (2.4320)  1.0199 (2.4597)  0.1987 (2.7438)  -3.0593 (3.8952)  2.4121 (9.0048)  -1.2711 (3.3699)  4.4859 (6.7649) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.7383 (1.3673)  3.8367 (2.4133)  1.9709 (2.2896)  3.4410 (2.7562)  -0.6687 (3.4630)  15.5012 ** (7.1867)  2.3893 (3.4850)  6.7044 (6.5318) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.0716 (1.4483)  -0.3768 (2.3061)  -4.0820 (2.7113)  -1.3159 (2.2433)  -0.4686 (3.5461)  1.4412 (6.2554)  -4.2295 (3.6775)  -3.7317 (5.6925) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.6350 (1.4770)  1.7856 (2.8444)  -5.8248 ** (2.7895)  -2.2271 (3.7770)  2.7268 (3.4029)  -6.2711 (7.6233)  -6.4132 * (3.6111)  -4.3021 (6.2815) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.3637 (1.2582)  1.3161 (2.3149)  -3.7943 * (2.0512)  2.7059 (2.3936)  -1.4353 (3.0414)  7.4033 (6.9343)  -1.4136 (3.0732)  6.8599 (5.4733) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.6990 (1.4657)  -4.1182 (2.6621)  0.1042 (2.4876)  -3.6994 (3.0000)  -6.8427 ** (3.3577)  0.7498 (8.6338)  -2.6948 (3.9822)  -5.9342 (5.7734) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.6556 (1.5068)  1.9467 (2.4581)  1.9399 (2.0029)  2.3323 (2.9636)  -0.1499 (3.6263)  -4.0800 (6.2132)  -0.2514 (3.1628)  -0.6008 (5.4244) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -2.2380 * (1.2998)  -1.2694 (2.1939)  -1.4467 (2.1192)  0.2640 (2.5832)  -2.0061 (2.7203)  -5.3696 (5.7361)  -4.0573 (2.7816)  -0.7699 (5.0711) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.9856 (1.4127)  -2.0203 (2.4474)  1.2967 (1.9464)  -0.7064 (2.3018)  -4.8425 (2.9945)  3.0424 (6.3547)  -0.2313 (3.0014)  -0.7605 (5.3054) 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.0550 (1.8419)  -1.1820 (3.0571)  -1.4907 (2.9591)  1.3682 (3.0957)  -3.2999 (3.9937)  -1.5050 (8.3182)  -4.2795 (4.2253)  0.3729 (6.8597) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.0309 (1.3256)  3.5574 (2.4526)  -2.4780 (2.5394)  -1.3515 (2.8616)  -0.2562 (3.1207)  5.7850 (6.5407)  -3.8531 (3.7405)  0.0590 (5.6927) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.5571 (1.3136)  -0.8357 (2.1862)  -2.1626 (1.9960)  1.6875 (2.3232)  -1.5081 (2.7384)  0.9321 (6.2484)  0.5443 (3.1105)  1.6277 (5.5255) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 2.2609 (1.3961)  4.4815 * (2.3390)  2.3730 (1.8355)  2.6927 (2.4149)  3.8596 (2.9918)  3.6458 (6.6325)  3.1260 (3.2690)  -0.5152 (4.5466) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.0761 (1.4951)  7.0026 *** (2.5681)  3.7466 * (1.9775)  2.8919 (2.9225)  1.6706 (3.3802)  10.1880 (8.1504)  5.7540 * (3.1808)  9.4159 (6.1988) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.3694 (1.4106)  0.0536 (2.5262)  4.0195 * (2.3843)  -1.2342 (2.4685)  -5.3278 (4.0082)  -12.4717 * (7.2963)  3.5153 (3.6323)  -3.1857 (5.3266) 
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.5212 ** (1.4530)  -1.6608 (2.1478)  -0.7178 (2.1008)  -3.4211 (2.8664)  -6.6036 ** (2.8546)  -10.0707 * (6.0260)  -2.8205 (3.0965)  -5.7766 (4.8657) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 3.0480 (2.0804)  5.4371 * (3.1250)  -0.9602 (2.7848)  0.8737 (3.9460)  16.8306 *** (4.9553)  24.7437 *** (8.7659)  7.8599 * (4.6302)  18.3010 ** (7.3340) 
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -2.3042 * (1.3912)  -5.7381 *** (2.2166)  2.5288 (2.5960)  -1.9884 (2.9209)  -0.9695 (3.4277)  -15.8228 ** (6.5589)  -2.9635 (3.2838)  -8.2848 * (4.7987) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 5.2347 *** (1.8305)  9.6560 *** (3.5938)  3.4466 (2.8381)  6.3881 (4.2648)  7.6810 (4.7712)  22.6245 ** (9.3671)  5.8574 (4.9448)  18.1490 * (9.7014) 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                        
residential move (yes=1) -0.5517 (1.2240)  0.0872 (2.0215)  -0.6412 (1.8479)  0.9444 (2.5590)  -1.2577 (3.0659)  -1.1266 (5.6291)  -1.0730 (2.6432)  4.5686 (4.7829) 
exchange participation (yes=1) -0.9756 (1.1243)  -2.5767 (1.8652)  -1.2589 (1.7190)  -0.0064 (2.0584)  -1.6242 (2.6908)  -12.2384 ** (4.7533)  0.3702 (2.3408)  -5.5607 (4.5232) 
stay abroad (yes=1) -3.9569 *** (1.3121)  -3.8678 * (2.1062)  -2.0172 (1.9079)  -5.8404 ** (2.2720)  -11.9094 *** (3.1619)  -14.2863 *** (4.9921)  -9.4402 *** (2.9679)  -11.8485 *** (4.5905) 
educational mobility (km) -0.0239 *** (0.0052)  -0.0228 *** (0.0073)  -0.0183 ** (0.0071)  -0.0364 *** (0.0087)  -0.0271 ** (0.0112)  -0.0590 *** (0.0199)  -0.0265 *** (0.0097)  -0.0595 *** (0.0166) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                        
GDP (per capita) -0.2136 (0.1726)  -0.4625 * (0.2386)  -0.4851 * (0.2538)  -0.0335 (0.2775)  -0.6129 * (0.3673)  -1.2720 (0.9193)  -0.9090 ** (0.3983)  -1.1753 (0.7319) 
building land prices 0.0359 (0.0276)  0.0813 ** (0.0349)  0.0455 (0.0439)  -0.0168 (0.0436)  0.0979 (0.0630)  0.1788 (0.1297)  0.0640 (0.0716)  0.0022 (0.0984) 
accessibility (train)  0.0356 (0.0441)  -0.1249 ** (0.0634)  -0.0455 (0.0605)  -0.0327 (0.0782)  -0.0194 (0.1040)  -0.3364 (0.2340)  -0.0997 (0.1211)  -0.2720 (0.2016) 
accessibility (car)  -0.1322 (0.0820)  -0.0446 (0.1255)  0.0479 (0.1302)  0.0218 (0.1523)  0.0648 (0.1802)  0.3948 (0.4271)  0.0186 (0.2284)  0.0397 (0.3361) 
pop. density -0.0010 (0.0017)  -0.0028 (0.0027)  -0.0028 (0.0030)  0.0004 (0.0031)  0.0009 (0.0036)  0.0037 (0.0082)  -0.0002 (0.0038)  -0.0001 (0.0067) 
recreational area (per capita) -0.0079 (0.0243)  0.0162 (0.0298)  -0.0051 (0.0345)  -0.0249 (0.0356)  0.0099 (0.0502)  0.1203 (0.1006)  0.0275 (0.0559)  0.0279 (0.0908) 
public services  -0.0160 (0.0356)  -0.0027 (0.0554)  0.0385 (0.0592)  0.0296 (0.0645)  -0.0339 (0.0813)  -0.0984 (0.1930)  0.0573 (0.0909)  0.1808 (0.1478) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -0.4563 (0.4722)  -0.4633 (0.7900)  -0.4669 (0.8630)  -0.2442 (0.8077)  -0.7892 (1.1922)  -3.0587 (2.2182)  -1.1794 (1.1669)  -2.5244 (2.0071) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                                
constant                                
observations 1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851  1851 
df (model) 38  38  38  38  38  38  38  38 
raw sum of deviation (rsd) 11914.14  15786.85  15076.40  16611.08  29869.33  44162.07  27946.30  39771.67 
minimum sum of deviations (msd) 10734.52  14312.74  14136.39  15825.43  27678.50  41191.68  26396.51  36634.92 
pseudo R-squared (1-msd/rsd) 0.0990  0.0934  0.0623  0.0473  0.0733  0.0673  0.0555  0.0789 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The corresponding results for the median (𝑞 = 0.50) are reported in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Standard errors in the simultaneous quantile regressions are bootstrapped (500 replications). The standard errors are also used 
in the test for coefficient equality across the three quantiles. Depicted coefficients in bold indicate significant differences of quantile coefficients at the conventional significance levels. 
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Table A6.8: Model comparison for sensitivity check (A) – the theory of planned behaviour 
dependent variable Δ𝐴1 (internal, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈1 (internal, given unemployment)  Δ𝐴2 (Europe, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈2 (Europe, given unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) 0.7977 (1.2948)  -0.1912 (1.3138)  3.7324 ** (1.4573)  3.3255 ** (1.4795)  -2.5250 (3.5927)  -5.0556 (3.6396)  2.0589 (3.3072)  0.2012 (3.3869) 
age -0.0714 (0.2992)  -0.1286 (0.2931)  0.6905 ** (0.3520)  0.6922 * (0.3533)  -1.5002 * (0.8196)  -1.5782 * (0.8129)  -0.4201 (0.8013)  -0.4358 (0.7960) 
partnership (yes=1) 1.6361 (1.1538)  1.2952 (1.1431)  1.7543 (1.2965)  1.6894 (1.2984)  5.1065 (3.3393)  4.3552 (3.2792)  6.9534 ** (3.0418)  6.4961 ** (3.0180) 
language skills (English)                        
high -1.5686 (1.9113)  -1.1848 (1.9209)  -0.8625 (2.2149)  -0.6768 (2.2227)  -14.1605 ** (6.0578)  -13.7595 ** (6.0549)  -8.4952 (5.3752)  -8.2329 (5.3823) 
medium -1.0327 (1.7848)  -1.2692 (1.7893)  -0.9927 (2.0585)  -1.2558 (2.0564)  -6.0516 (5.8990)  -7.0968 (5.9142)  -3.7444 (5.1725)  -4.7714 (5.1871) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.5074 (1.4348)  0.5892 (1.4264)  -0.6088 (1.5824)  -1.0295 (1.5833)  8.3697 ** (4.0413)  6.4495 (4.0078)  4.8268 (3.7045)  3.3835 (3.6707) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.3181 (1.7885)  1.4147 (1.7494)  -0.6817 (2.0593)  -0.6549 (2.0423)  7.2555 (6.0639)  7.4599 (5.9260)  0.5421 (4.5855)  0.6083 (4.5532) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.0081 * (1.6829)  3.0541 * (1.6597)  2.3332 (1.8827)  2.4719 (1.8805)  5.6998 (4.8433)  6.2877 (4.8498)  5.3701 (4.6350)  5.9402 (4.6162) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.6364 (1.5641)  0.4910 (1.5625)  -2.1012 (1.8361)  -1.9865 (1.8308)  -1.4724 (4.1297)  -1.0170 (4.3673)  -4.1255 (3.8093)  -3.5169 (3.8946) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 2.5964 (1.8818)  1.5724 (1.8297)  -2.1144 (2.1710)  -3.0999 (2.1924)  7.6966 (6.1991)  4.6011 (6.0566)  -2.9310 (5.2019)  -6.2129 (5.1018) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.2868 (1.4772)  0.0075 (1.4818)  1.3289 (1.7524)  1.2632 (1.7831)  3.8087 (4.4443)  4.0346 (4.3395)  5.5840 (3.7745)  6.0611 (3.7790) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.3399 (1.7580)  -1.3318 (1.7509)  -1.0297 (1.9324)  -0.6240 (1.9876)  1.8678 (6.1749)  2.8656 (6.0762)  -2.3387 (4.6000)  -0.9582 (4.6641) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.8825 (1.6796)  0.7407 (1.6649)  1.4425 (1.8639)  1.1729 (1.8644)  -6.9089 * (4.1918)  -7.1904 * (4.1595)  -2.5181 (4.0743)  -3.1742 (4.0506) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.0217 ** (1.4772)  -3.6122 ** (1.4602)  -1.5336 (1.6882)  -1.8348 (1.6990)  -5.0900 (4.4034)  -6.3811 (4.3176)  -0.4402 (4.1438)  -1.4709 (4.1035) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.8216 (1.4940)  -1.8613 (1.4752)  0.6321 (1.7074)  0.8344 (1.6985)  1.4252 (4.4580)  1.2149 (4.4040)  2.0563 (4.0628)  2.1691 (3.9957) 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0877 (1.7909)  -0.2720 (1.7682)  0.9448 (2.2372)  0.7148 (2.2167)  -2.4433 (5.5610)  -3.1328 (5.4743)  0.7274 (5.2727)  -0.0621 (5.1350) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.1825 (1.5742)  -0.2434 (1.5524)  -1.5098 (1.8029)  -1.4588 (1.7957)  -2.4506 (4.1616)  -2.5994 (4.1672)  -3.7114 (3.6985)  -3.8092 (3.7165) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.2853 (1.5069)  0.8626 (1.4977)  1.0726 (1.7685)  1.3004 (1.7492)  -0.2443 (4.2788)  1.2146 (4.2714)  1.4049 (3.9240)  2.3317 (3.8957) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 2.1324 (1.6771)  2.1624 (1.6475)  2.0683 (1.6847)  2.1711 (1.6849)  1.6373 (4.4132)  1.5706 (4.3524)  -1.4907 (3.9157)  -1.4366 (3.8729) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎    2.7233 * (1.5967)     3.4222 * (1.8253)     7.9118 * (4.4388)     9.8387 ** (4.1688) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎    1.0557 (1.7687)     -0.1262 (1.8686)     -3.6422 (5.5611)     -4.4254 (4.0326) 
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎    -1.0756 (1.4995)     -0.6763 (1.7275)     -2.1610 (4.6599)     -1.3607 (3.7842) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎    6.0207 *** (2.0897)     -0.6248 (2.3746)     14.9902 *** (5.4109)     7.6889 (5.3338) 
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎    -4.1379 *** (1.5807)     -2.7325 (1.8322)     -9.3149 ** (4.7199)     -7.0559 * (3.9848) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎    4.7171 ** (2.0737)     5.3770 ** (2.4356)     10.5211 * (5.9034)     11.3254 * (5.8121) 
riskiness of move (𝜃𝑅)                                
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -4.8123 *** (1.3533)  -4.2221 *** (1.3978)  -2.2633 (1.4790)  -1.6787 (1.5190)  -18.8435 *** (4.0904)  -15.9753 *** (4.3975)  -11.7192 *** (3.8324)  -8.9871 ** (3.9842) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 3.3500 ** (1.6644)  1.4589 (1.7231)  -0.0223 (1.8963)  -1.2653 (1.9136)  10.9684 * (6.1078)  6.4857 (6.1614)  13.2192 ** (6.0942)  9.6221 (6.3282) 
likelihood of move (𝜃𝑀)                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 15.7505 *** (1.7856)  14.2120 *** (1.7744)  11.1021 *** (1.9752)  10.2431 *** (1.9640)  36.8221 *** (5.8463)  33.5317 *** (5.7405)  31.1888 *** (5.4040)  28.6905 *** (5.3329) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -3.1543 ** (1.3694)  -3.4140 ** (1.3614)  -2.5391 (1.5772)  -2.5474 (1.5779)  -24.6188 *** (3.3263)  -21.7863 *** (3.4413)  -17.3248 *** (2.9345)  -14.8970 *** (2.9964) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                        
GDP (per capita) -0.3527 * (0.1851)  -0.3518 * (0.1833)  -0.3746 * (0.1978)  -0.3754 * (0.1985)  -1.4211 *** (0.5484)  -1.4166 ** (0.5503)  -1.2605 *** (0.4875)  -1.2579 ** (0.4924) 
building land prices 0.0589 ** (0.0269)  0.0557 ** (0.0267)  0.0039 (0.0314)  0.0049 (0.0316)  0.1895 ** (0.0801)  0.1770 ** (0.0807)  0.0900 (0.0750)  0.0829 (0.0757) 
accessibility (train)  -0.0712 (0.0499)  -0.0687 (0.0498)  -0.0643 (0.0574)  -0.0679 (0.0584)  -0.2658 * (0.1390)  -0.2628 * (0.1390)  -0.2881 ** (0.1299)  -0.2930 ** (0.1305) 
accessibility (car)  -0.0518 (0.0906)  -0.0721 (0.0904)  0.0309 (0.1074)  0.0281 (0.1082)  0.0634 (0.2717)  0.0254 (0.2735)  0.0321 (0.2531)  0.0149 (0.2546) 
pop. density -0.0015 (0.0019)  -0.0019 (0.0018)  -0.0011 (0.0021)  -0.0014 (0.0021)  -0.0012 (0.0061)  -0.0018 (0.0061)  0.0005 (0.0057)  -0.0000 (0.0057) 
recreational area (per capita) 0.0262 (0.0225)  0.0231 (0.0219)  -0.0193 (0.0273)  -0.0211 (0.0279)  0.1315 * (0.0686)  0.1277 * (0.0691)  0.1059 (0.0687)  0.1038 (0.0696) 
public services  -0.0116 (0.0401)  -0.0052 (0.0397)  0.0713 (0.0471)  0.0721 (0.0472)  -0.0727 (0.1243)  -0.0538 (0.1238)  0.0389 (0.1092)  0.0509 (0.1102) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -0.6631 (0.5257)  -0.6107 (0.5154)  -0.6077 (0.6350)  -0.5251 (0.6332)  -3.1408 * (1.7336)  -3.0347 * (1.7339)  -3.0619 * (1.6713)  -2.9194 * (1.6776) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                                
constant                                
observations 1842  1842  1842  1842  1842  1842  1842  1842 
df (model) 32  38  32  38  32  38  32  38 
F-statistic 8.41  8.91  3.79  3.69  8.84  8.71  6.85  6.83 
prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.1403  0.1647  0.0834  0.0920  0.1289  0.1462  0.1185  0.1340 
adjusted R-squared 0.1250  0.1471  0.0672  0.0729  0.1134  0.1282  0.1029  0.1158 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Statistical inference relies on robust standard errors. Measures of behavioural control (𝜃𝑅) and migration intention (𝜃𝑀) are accordingly conditioned, either with reference to an interstate or a cross-border move to 
another country in Europe. 
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Table A6.9: Model comparison for sensitivity check (B) – labour market readiness in internal migration scenarios 
dependent variable Δ𝐴1 (internal, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈1 (internal, given unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  OLS 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) 0.5474  (1.3245)   -0.4297  (1.3637)   3.6097 ** (1.4897)   3.0167 ** (1.4920) 
age 0.3266  (0.3718)   0.2404  (0.3812)   0.9063 ** (0.4616)   0.8971 ** (0.4571) 
partnership (yes=1) 1.1457  (1.1469)   1.7962  (1.1754)   1.5990  (1.3068)   2.0202  (1.3147) 
language skills (English)                           
high 0.7215  (1.9335)   0.4861  (1.9627)   0.9571  (2.2832)   0.8357  (2.2883) 
medium -0.5871  (1.7689)   -0.9334  (1.7933)   -0.6518  (2.0515)   -0.7649  (2.0532) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.1105  (1.4216)   0.8499  (1.4655)   -1.5581  (1.5808)   -1.0037  (1.5989) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.4816  (1.7543)   1.4945  (1.7997)   -0.4883  (2.0312)   -0.3017  (2.0630) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 3.0844 * (1.6493)   3.7162 ** (1.6807)   2.3871  (1.8648)   2.8702  (1.8753) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.3163  (1.5603)   -0.7918  (1.6049)   -2.1492  (1.8342)   -2.7335  (1.8291) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 1.4367  (1.8556)   2.6822  (1.8986)   -3.3099  (2.1876)   -2.5683  (2.2220) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.0474  (1.4768)   -0.1303  (1.5039)   1.3598  (1.7808)   1.4782  (1.7900) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.4447  (1.7533)   -1.4221  (1.8383)   -0.8634  (1.9905)   -0.7481  (2.0017) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.1927  (1.6699)   0.9277  (1.7068)   1.6829  (1.8544)   1.4493  (1.8688) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.3422 ** (1.4602)   -3.3125 ** (1.4838)   -1.7396  (1.7024)   -1.6912  (1.7123) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.1592  (1.4617)   -2.5747 * (1.5064)   0.5987  (1.6889)   0.2961  (1.7079) 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.2034  (1.7632)   -0.2921  (1.8105)   0.9653  (2.2109)   0.7021  (2.2267) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.4301  (1.5484)   -0.3386  (1.6135)   -1.7675  (1.8037)   -1.7980  (1.8156) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 0.4278  (1.4857)   -0.1545  (1.5287)   0.8378  (1.7451)   0.5385  (1.7733) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 2.2762  (1.6339)   3.1485 * (1.6560)   2.3538  (1.6717)   2.9578 * (1.6805) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 2.4963  (1.5943)   3.2797 ** (1.6072)   3.1817 * (1.8331)   3.2712 * (1.8435) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.9230  (1.8137)   0.9775  (1.8049)   0.9509  (1.9039)   0.7123  (1.8783) 
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.8441  (1.5043)   -1.8472  (1.5298)   -0.1501  (1.7356)   -0.6119  (1.7346) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 5.8309 *** (2.0777)   6.6505 *** (2.1268)   -0.6580  (2.3695)   -0.2661  (2.3892) 
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -4.3905 *** (1.5807)   -4.4783 *** (1.6252)   -3.0694 * (1.8555)   -3.0718 * (1.8580) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 4.5366 ** (2.0748)   5.9935 *** (2.1080)   5.0301 ** (2.4355)   5.8205 ** (2.4901) 
riskiness of move (𝜃𝑅)                
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.7522 *** (1.3847)          -1.1092  (1.5158)        
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.9590  (1.7481)          -1.7538  (1.9347)        
likelihood of move (𝜃𝑀)                           
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 13.7071 *** (1.7604)          9.4763 *** (1.9426)        
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -2.3489 * (1.3893)          -1.1585  (1.5719)        
work experience                           
part-time (or mini-job) 1.5840  (1.4169)   1.5188  (1.4554)   -0.0237  (1.6414)   -0.0706  (1.6576) 
full-time -0.4023  (1.7919)   -0.5004  (1.8484)   -3.6981  (2.2784)   -3.6555  (2.3074) 
vocational training (yes=1) -1.7094  (1.9620)   -0.3838  (2.0513)   2.8745  (2.4055)   3.6946  (2.4573) 
master student (yes=1) -9.4267 *** (2.7827)   -10.0417 *** (2.8221)   -8.4636 ** (3.5092)   -8.9157 ** (3.5211) 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                
residential move (yes=1) 0.7426  (1.3165)   0.5787  (1.3316)   -0.0344  (1.5500)   -0.2618  (1.5588) 
exchange participation (yes=1) -1.8492  (1.2524)   -2.6960 ** (1.2743)   -0.8470  (1.4152)   -1.3566  (1.4250) 
stay abroad (yes=1) -3.8809 *** (1.4740)   -4.3580 *** (1.5255)   -3.5719 ** (1.6369)   -3.6639 ** (1.6307) 
educational mobility (km) -0.0128 ** (0.0058)   -0.0227 *** (0.0059)   -0.0179 *** (0.0060)   -0.0234 *** (0.0060) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                           
GDP (per capita) -0.3539 * (0.1829)   -0.4501 ** (0.1916)   -0.3670 * (0.1956)   -0.4164 ** (0.2013) 
building land prices 0.0575 ** (0.0265)   0.0861 *** (0.0277)   0.0030  (0.0309)   0.0207  (0.0311) 
accessibility (train)  -0.0721  (0.0491)   -0.0841 * (0.0505)   -0.0728  (0.0580)   -0.0757  (0.0571) 
accessibility (car)  -0.0598  (0.0889)   -0.0534  (0.0903)   0.0431  (0.1060)   0.0438  (0.1049) 
pop. density -0.0019  (0.0018)   -0.0033 * (0.0018)   -0.0011  (0.0021)   -0.0020  (0.0021) 
recreational area (per capita) 0.0267  (0.0212)   0.0192  (0.0217)   -0.0157  (0.0274)   -0.0207  (0.0271) 
public services  0.0095  (0.0396)   -0.0117  (0.0413)   0.0878 * (0.0465)   0.0741  (0.0467) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -0.7235  (0.5140)   -0.5439  (0.5328)   -0.6280  (0.6328)   -0.4840  (0.6320) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                
constant                
observations 1842  1842  1842  1842 
df (model) 46  42  46  42 
F-statistic 8.67  7.61  3.50  3.46 
prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.1778  0.1307  0.1048  0.0878 
adjusted R-squared 0.1567  0.1104  0.0819  0.0665 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Statistical inference relies on robust standard errors. For each scenario, the first results also include sensitivity check (A). 
Measures of behavioural control (𝜃𝑅) and migration intention (𝜃𝑀) refer to an interstate move. 
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Table A6.10: Model comparison for sensitivity check (B) – labour market readiness in cross-border migration scenarios 
dependent variable Δ𝐴2 (cross-border, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈2 (cross-border, given unemployment) 
estimation method OLS  OLS 
 coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
gender (female=1) -3.4902  (3.6870)   -6.2143 * (3.7529)   1.3174  (3.4340)   -0.8155  (3.4557) 
age -0.5850  (1.0043)   -0.4676 (1.0710)   -0.1009  (1.0519)   0.0448  (1.0938) 
partnership (yes=1) 3.8026  (3.2903)   6.4245 * (3.3635)   6.0763 ** (3.0298)   8.1716 *** (3.0505) 
language skills (English)                        
high -9.6019  (6.0418)   -14.4559 ** (6.0786)   -4.1462  (5.4643)   -7.8540  (5.4850) 
medium -5.6319  (5.8209)   -8.4778 (5.8381)   -3.1228  (5.1508)   -5.5875  (5.1463) 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 5.4363  (3.9837)   7.6190 * (4.0502)   2.3553  (3.6717)   4.1920  (3.7041) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 8.1725  (5.9830)   6.7934 (6.0731)   1.0579  (4.5199)   0.2183  (4.6857) 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 6.4925  (4.8257)   8.6734 * (5.0551)   5.9101  (4.5710)   7.7557  (4.7281) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -1.0204  (4.3429)   -2.8971 (4.5968)   -3.5710  (3.8991)   -4.5107  (4.0067) 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 4.3457  (6.1023)   5.2899 (6.2068)   -6.9805  (5.1088)   -6.3116  (5.1435) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 3.6434  (4.3038)   1.7437 (4.4425)   6.1615  (3.7518)   4.7124  (3.8558) 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 2.4484  (6.0783)   2.7479 (6.3760)   -1.2381  (4.7235)   -0.8940  (4.9103) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -6.2936  (4.1521)   -5.1462 (4.2626)   -2.0645  (4.0214)   -1.0120  (4.0789) 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -5.4874  (4.3645)   -4.4288 (4.3895)   -1.0962  (4.1372)   -0.3231  (4.1669) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 0.5690  (4.3831)   -0.6919 (4.5153)   1.7852  (3.9771)   0.8498  (4.0519) 
conscientious-ness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -3.2504  (5.4554)   -2.5874 (5.6300)   0.5172  (5.1396)   1.3782  (5.2081) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -3.6841  (4.2024)   -3.7332 (4.3125)   -4.8903  (3.7622)   -4.3953  (3.8518) 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -0.0822  (4.2569)   -0.0323 (4.3821)   1.3940  (3.8710)   1.5270  (3.9873) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 1.8612  (4.2906)   1.5964 (4.4058)   -1.0429  (3.8207)   -0.8971  (3.8844) 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 7.4595 * (4.4453)   9.3735 ** (4.5220)   9.2487 ** (4.1713)   10.8263 ** (4.2131) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -0.4943  (5.7680)   -2.9513 (5.6835)   -1.5754  (4.0882)   -2.4940  (4.0468) 
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -1.5890  (4.7466)   -5.0344 (4.7526)   -0.9137  (3.8640)   -3.4724  (3.8729) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 14.6378 *** (5.3718)   18.5556 *** (5.5190)   8.0691  (5.2867)   11.6196 ** (5.3860) 
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -9.6529 ** (4.6209)   -12.0531 ** (4.7829)   -7.4114 * (4.0018)   -9.0191 ** (4.0359) 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 9.7200 * (5.8713)   14.3599 ** (6.0302)   10.3407 * (5.7908)   14.1385 ** (5.9189) 
riskiness of move (𝜃𝑅)               
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 -14.4254 *** (4.3129)       -7.2598 * (3.9699)        
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 5.0434  (6.1948)       8.4333  (6.3899)        
likelihood of move (𝜃𝑀)                        
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎 32.5247 *** (5.7197)       27.4024 *** (5.2767)        
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎 -19.4019 *** (3.3769)       -12.5646 *** (3.0153)        
work experience                        
part-time (or mini-job) 6.9247 * (4.1476)   7.1514 * (4.2909)   1.3333  (3.8251)   1.2150  (3.9245) 
full-time -2.2931  (5.7241)   -1.9378 (5.8799)   -2.2182  (5.6495)   -2.2784  (5.7465) 
vocational training (yes=1) -2.0441  (6.0556)   1.4323 (6.4292)   2.8146  (6.0892)   5.2612  (6.3306) 
master student (yes=1) -8.1120  (7.5751)   -10.8781 (8.4404)   -7.9741  (6.8655)   -10.3000  (7.2061) 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)               
residential move (yes=1) 2.3415  (3.8985)   1.1510 (3.9582)   2.0574  (3.5237)   1.5347  (3.5452) 
exchange participation (yes=1) -6.3147 * (3.4325)   -8.0249 ** (3.4848)   -2.1373  (3.1621)   -3.5053  (3.2020) 
stay abroad (yes=1) -10.6642 *** (3.7432)   -16.4121 *** (3.9011)   -12.4858 *** (3.2037)   -16.6608 *** (3.3010) 
educational mobility (km) -0.0410 ** (0.0165)   -0.0528 *** (0.0169)   -0.0357 *** (0.0138)   -0.0443 *** (0.0141) 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                        
GDP (per capita) -1.4338 *** (0.5510)   -1.4769 *** (0.5690)   -1.2177 ** (0.4903)   -1.2571 ** (0.5119) 
building land prices 0.1732 ** (0.0807)   0.1671 ** (0.0821)   0.0711  (0.0753)   0.0636  (0.0769) 
accessibility (train)  -0.2824 ** (0.1373)   -0.2774 ** (0.1385)   -0.2973 ** (0.1296)   -0.3007 ** (0.1294) 
accessibility (car)  0.0715  (0.2715)   0.0646 (0.2754)   0.0419  (0.2536)   0.0364  (0.2550) 
pop. density -0.0015  (0.0061)   -0.0031 (0.0062)   0.0010  (0.0057)   -0.0002  (0.0058) 
recreational area (per capita) 0.1402 ** (0.0676)   0.1128 (0.0694)   0.1180 * (0.0689)   0.0972  (0.0704) 
public services  -0.0063  (0.1243)   0.0013 (0.1273)   0.0904  (0.1093)   0.0975  (0.1108) 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂) -3.2907 * (1.7198)   -2.9295 * (1.7770)   -3.1447 * (1.6705)   -2.9265 * (1.7055) 
relative income control (𝑤0)                
constant                
observations 1842  1842  1842  1842 
df (model) 46  42  46  42 
F-statistic 8.34  6.66  6.67  5.96 
prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.1586  0.1105  0.1451  0.1076 
adjusted R-squared 0.1370  0.0898  0.1232  0.0868 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Statistical inference relies on robust standard errors. For each scenario, the first results also include sensitivity check (A). 
Measures of behavioural control (𝜃𝑅) and migration intention (𝜃𝑀) refer to a cross-border move. 
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Table A6.11: Sensitivity check (C) – gender-specific internal mobility premiums 
dependent variable  Δ𝐴1 (internal, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈1 (internal, given unemployment) 
estimation method  OLS    OLS   
  female  male  𝛽𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚  female  male  𝛽𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚 
  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  P>𝜒2  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  P>𝜒2 
age  0.0913 (0.4770)  0.2950 (0.4881)  0.7598  0.8565 (0.5916)  0.9931 * (0.5697)  0.8647 
partnership (yes=1)  3.5993 * (1.8667)  0.3097 (1.5398)  0.1635  3.4444 (2.1017)  1.1681 (1.6885)  0.3868 
language skills (English)                 
high  -0.9259 (3.4229)  1.8875 (2.3372)  0.4863  1.2531 (3.6961)  1.0432 (2.8668)  0.9633 
medium  -2.2848 (3.1243)  0.2062 (2.0894)  0.4967  -2.3470 (3.4846)  0.5643 (2.4784)  0.4851 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  1.2159 (2.1167)  0.3296 (2.0512)  0.7581  -1.9985 (2.3273)  -0.1464 (2.2001)  0.5536 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.2983 (2.8251)  1.5594 (2.3598)  0.9421  -2.8839 (3.5683)  1.1451 (2.5707)  0.3475 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  4.5218 * (2.6099)  3.3283 (2.2075)  0.7205  6.1572 ** (3.1099)  0.3495 (2.3345)  0.1257 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -0.7772 (2.9824)  -0.6331 (1.8569)  0.9664  -2.6610 (3.0105)  -2.3160 (2.2809)  0.9254 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  1.7577 (3.4660)  3.6845 (2.2727)  0.6335  -3.7468 (3.8057)  -1.4096 (2.7883)  0.6115 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  1.0637 (2.5240)  -0.6828 (1.8701)  0.5687  3.2895 (2.9104)  0.3727 (2.2827)  0.4189 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -2.1022 (4.0218)  -0.9455 (2.1007)  0.7936  -0.3922 (4.6852)  -0.4795 (2.3042)  0.9863 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -0.1824 (2.1353)  4.2341 (2.9835)  0.2183  1.6790 (2.4592)  1.8294 (3.0525)  0.9687 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -2.4113 (2.5916)  -3.4539 * (1.7853)  0.7340  0.1586 (3.1457)  -2.6665 (2.0488)  0.4402 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -1.7053 (2.2904)  -4.7221 ** (2.0092)  0.3103  3.3074 (2.6023)  -3.6747 (2.2915)  0.0391 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  5.9828 (4.3581)  -2.1883 (1.9123)  0.0779  8.2491 (5.4745)  -1.6344 (2.3337)  0.0881 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -2.5667 (2.0580)  2.8553 (2.7548)  0.1068  -2.0255 (2.2753)  -1.5712 (3.0529)  0.9028 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -0.5827 (2.4129)  0.5953 (1.9726)  0.6985  3.2320 (2.9341)  -0.7395 (2.2040)  0.2672 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  3.1164 (2.3309)  2.4393 (2.3548)  0.8342  3.0138 (2.5971)  2.1989 (2.3203)  0.8105 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  6.3171 ** (2.5808)  0.2480 (2.1076)  0.0619  4.1469 (2.8045)  2.7535 (2.4691)  0.7024 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  0.2440 (2.8349)  2.0602 (2.3552)  0.6135  3.3290 (3.1251)  -0.8338 (2.3568)  0.2756 
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  3.8032 (2.7288)  -4.4367 ** (1.8291)  0.0101  1.7016 (3.4446)  -1.4157 (1.9687)  0.4201 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  9.1731 *** (3.0177)  4.2465 (2.9383)  0.2309  2.5875 (3.3010)  -3.0457 (3.3699)  0.2214 
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -4.2766 (2.8834)  -6.1097 *** (2.0491)  0.5951  -3.0088 (3.3719)  -3.1250 (2.2345)  0.9765 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  4.4140 (3.1487)  7.6516 *** (2.8363)  0.4338  4.6680 (3.6737)  7.1812 ** (3.2864)  0.6014 
work experience                 
part-time (or mini-job)  -0.9550 (2.3681)  3.2963 * (1.8203)  0.1445  -1.3855 (2.5171)  1.0500 (2.1885)  0.4544 
full-time  -1.3793 (3.2130)  0.3296 (2.2946)  0.6572  -1.7739 (3.9340)  -4.5735 (2.9519)  0.5595 
vocational training (yes=1)  -4.2653 (3.2696)  1.7668 (2.5857)  0.1380  -2.3946 (4.1304)  6.9235 ** (3.0284)  0.0621 
master student (yes=1)  -10.6519 *** (3.6148)  -10.8998 ** (4.2983)  0.9640  -11.3440 ** (4.5023)  -9.1346 (5.7875)  0.7579 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                 
residential move (yes=1)  2.9194 (2.3653)  -1.4666 (1.5523)  0.1118  -0.8413 (2.5342)  -0.9163 (1.9847)  0.9809 
exchange participation (yes=1)  -2.9861 (1.9277)  -2.4073 (1.7649)  0.8205  -2.2940 (2.2806)  -0.8385 (1.8467)  0.6112 
stay abroad (yes=1)  -2.4712 (2.1910)  -6.0446 *** (2.1837)  0.2368  -3.2144 (2.4553)  -4.1802 * (2.1985)  0.7640 
educational mobility (km)  -0.0395 *** (0.0097)  -0.0129 * (0.0074)  0.0251  -0.0373 *** (0.0108)  -0.0168 ** (0.0074)  0.1096 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                 
GDP (per capita)  -0.0149 (0.2903)  -0.6912 *** (0.2567)  0.0737  0.0608 (0.3637)  -0.6243 ** (0.2737)  0.1228 
building land prices  0.0734 * (0.0416)  0.0937 ** (0.0380)  0.7123  -0.0262 (0.0534)  0.0511 (0.0397)  0.2336 
accessibility (train)   0.0344 (0.0661)  -0.1705 ** (0.0735)  0.0340  0.0315 (0.0898)  -0.1510 ** (0.0726)  0.1054 
accessibility (car)   -0.0992 (0.1241)  -0.0293 (0.1306)  0.6913  -0.1910 (0.1596)  0.2175 (0.1329)  0.0439 
pop. density  -0.0052 * (0.0027)  -0.0021 (0.0025)  0.3964  -0.0061 * (0.0034)  0.0003 (0.0027)  0.1335 
recreational area (per capita)  -0.0142 (0.0298)  0.0452 (0.0308)  0.1558  -0.0592 (0.0414)  0.0014 (0.0332)  0.2414 
public services   -0.0025 (0.0617)  -0.0235 (0.0572)  0.7981  0.1102 (0.0719)  0.0413 (0.0628)  0.4593 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂)  1.2086 (0.8075)  -1.7867 *** (0.6824)  0.0037  0.3500 (0.9566)  -0.8518 (0.8529)  0.3367 
relative income control (𝑤0)                     
constant                     
observations  767  1075    767  1075   
df (model)  41  41    41  41   
F-statistic  4.40  5.09    2.76  2.18   
prob > F  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000   
R-squared  0.1703  0.1485    0.1271  0.0854   
adjusted R-squared  0.1234  0.1147    0.0777  0.0491   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors implemented. The column labelled 𝛽𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚 reports p-values from a Wald test (unadjusted) of 
equality of coefficients between the groups of male and female respondents. This test was implemented using the suest-command in Stata 
14.2. 
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Table A6.12: Sensitivity check (C) – gender-specific cross-border mobility premiums 
dependent variable  Δ𝐴2 (cross-border, given alternative job)  Δ𝑈2 (cross-border, given unemployment) 
estimation method  OLS    OLS   
  female  male  𝛽𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚  female  male  𝛽𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚 
  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  P>𝜒2  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  P>𝜒2 
age  0.7754 (1.5313)  -0.8212 (1.4453)  0.4373  1.3404 (1.3506)  -0.3009 (1.4776)  0.4013 
partnership (yes=1)  14.7602 *** (5.0081)  0.7965 (4.6253)  0.0359  14.7615 *** (4.5929)  4.4477 (4.0270)  0.0836 
language skills (English)                 
high  -18.3529 * (9.6847)  -11.5501 (7.9025)  0.5770  -5.2503 (8.3719)  -11.0164 (7.3809)  0.5966 
medium  -13.5591 (9.2560)  -4.7200 (7.5466)  0.4481  -5.2779 (7.9089)  -6.2560 (6.8223)  0.9236 
risk attitude 
(career domain) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  1.5223 (5.4440)  12.8202 ** (5.8598)  0.1482  -3.6638 (4.8573)  11.1651 ** (5.4248)  0.0371 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -8.6406 (6.6723)  14.3817 * (8.5104)  0.0294  -8.6650 (6.6698)  4.4928 (6.2241)  0.1396 
patience score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  12.0098 * (6.8866)  7.2494 (7.1059)  0.6223  8.0927 (6.4449)  7.6661 (6.6206)  0.9623 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  5.5605 (7.4683)  -7.8426 (5.9783)  0.1510  4.3846 (7.0028)  -10.3619 ** (4.7976)  0.0748 
extraversion score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -0.7523 (9.4279)  9.5193 (8.1907)  0.3994  -17.3264 ** (8.2332)  -0.3823 (6.4147)  0.0961 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  12.5634 * (6.5351)  -4.1233 (6.1329)  0.0565  12.8215 ** (5.7432)  -0.1289 (5.0096)  0.0817 
neuroticism score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -9.0318 (9.5209)  5.4118 (7.6901)  0.2264  -2.8313 (8.6624)  -0.6519 (5.9714)  0.8318 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -5.7465 (5.2416)  -0.2971 (7.1771)  0.5306  3.6059 (5.1946)  -4.5431 (6.7203)  0.3264 
openness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -0.6158 (7.2387)  -5.0324 (5.3558)  0.6150  4.2014 (7.1827)  -3.2592 (5.0298)  0.3829 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -3.7865 (5.8413)  -1.9528 (6.7934)  0.8341  2.5047 (5.0971)  -4.2963 (6.0612)  0.3795 
conscientious-
ness 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  21.7379 * (11.6933)  -10.3609 (6.5074)  0.0138  26.0752 ** (11.4639)  -6.5270 (5.6796)  0.0089 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -7.3443 (5.1541)  0.8823 (7.4516)  0.3532  -5.9896 (4.8016)  -3.4280 (6.5280)  0.7465 
agreeableness score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  2.7697 (6.9269)  -0.5193 (5.4937)  0.7030  5.6654 (6.2305)  0.2270 (5.1604)  0.4909 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -2.5071 (5.6842)  1.8753 (6.8398)  0.6141  -8.2180 * (4.7677)  4.0288 (6.1234)  0.1064 
adaptability score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  16.6477 ** (6.7073)  0.9420 (6.2849)  0.0801  14.4848 ** (6.0012)  6.3902 (5.8273)  0.3217 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  -11.2024 (6.9553)  4.0962 (8.4368)  0.1522  -7.1047 (6.0970)  2.7820 (5.5608)  0.2197 
importance of 
prox. (family) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  7.6376 (6.6676)  -10.8201 * (6.1842)  0.0376  5.8985 (7.0214)  -6.9936 (4.5781)  0.1146 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  23.8564 *** (7.5691)  16.4875 ** (7.9314)  0.4914  14.3435 ** (7.1560)  10.5493 (7.9890)  0.7173 
importance of 
prox. (friends) 
score < 𝜇 − 𝜎  -10.0261 (6.7155)  -14.9018 ** (7.0059)  0.6070  -8.6126 (6.6154)  -9.6679 * (5.4844)  0.8998 
score > 𝜇 + 𝜎  4.7737 (8.0912)  21.9748 *** (8.4552)  0.1324  10.5356 (7.8705)  17.3203 ** (8.1459)  0.5397 
work experience                 
part-time (or mini-job)  2.3134 (5.8245)  10.0872 (6.2467)  0.3514  -1.9504 (5.4258)  2.1673 (5.5869)  0.5883 
full-time  -0.7474 (9.4447)  -0.7943 (7.6031)  0.9968  -0.8081 (9.5771)  -2.8821 (7.1977)  0.8591 
vocational training (yes=1)  -16.0069 (10.0226)  8.1306 (8.5153)  0.0600  -13.9234 (10.0707)  13.9895 * (8.2709)  0.0282 
master student (yes=1)  -20.6427 * (10.7981)  -16.5313 (11.5492)  0.7901  -19.1872 ** (9.0208)  -16.1517 (10.1507)  0.8190 
previous mobility experiences (𝜒)                 
residential move (yes=1)  8.5249 (6.4026)  -5.7771 (5.1772)  0.0750  4.9967 (5.7511)  -3.0199 (4.5715)  0.2634 
exchange participation (yes=1)  -8.9818 * (4.9313)  -7.2882 (5.0101)  0.8052  -4.1327 (4.7123)  -3.9050 (4.4388)  0.9713 
stay abroad (yes=1)  -8.6674 (5.7574)  -23.4015 *** (5.3578)  0.0550  -14.0606 *** (4.6715)  -18.5111 *** (4.5949)  0.4867 
educational mobility (km)  -0.0890 *** (0.0249)  -0.0274 (0.0215)  0.0549  -0.0957 *** (0.0205)  -0.0193 (0.0183)  0.0044 
local conditions at origin (𝑎𝑂)                 
GDP (per capita)  -0.5796 (0.9360)  -1.9333 ** (0.7495)  0.2472  -0.9803 (0.9105)  -1.3387 ** (0.6510)  0.7426 
building land prices  0.2523 ** (0.1203)  0.1189 (0.1127)  0.4072  0.1444 (0.1168)  0.0242 (0.1020)  0.4270 
accessibility (train)   -0.0948 (0.1858)  -0.4010 * (0.2070)  0.2597  -0.1610 (0.1807)  -0.4150 ** (0.1850)  0.3143 
accessibility (car)   0.3308 (0.3371)  -0.1597 (0.4131)  0.3466  -0.2477 (0.3205)  0.2775 (0.3703)  0.2725 
pop. density  -0.0067 (0.0084)  -0.0021 (0.0088)  0.7032  -0.0121 (0.0083)  0.0063 (0.0078)  0.0999 
recreational area (per capita)  0.1060 (0.1019)  0.1220 (0.0936)  0.9056  0.1227 (0.1029)  0.0767 (0.0916)  0.7321 
public services   -0.1201 (0.1789)  0.0641 (0.1775)  0.4544  0.1427 (0.1571)  0.0518 (0.1546)  0.6731 
unemployment rate (𝜋𝑈𝑂)  0.3495 (2.3984)  -5.0875 ** (2.4896)  0.1073  -0.8469 (2.3685)  -4.1676 * (2.3947)  0.3127 
relative income control (𝑤0)                     
constant                     
observations  767  1075    767  1075   
df (model)  41  41    41  41   
F-statistic  3.98  4.46    3.89  4.08   
prob > F  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000   
R-squared  0.1786  0.1206    0.1941  0.1084   
adjusted R-squared  0.1322  0.0857    0.1485  0.0730   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors implemented. The column labelled 𝛽𝑓 = 𝛽𝑚 reports p-values from a Wald test (unadjusted) of 
equality of coefficients between the groups of male and female respondents. This test was implemented using the suest-command in Stata 
14.2. 
 
